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All the interviews were translated into English. However, regarding some keywords it 
seemed useful to use transliterated versions. For this purpose, the dissertation uses 
the IJMES transliteration table. 
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It is not good, as they say, to judge a book by its cover and presumably that includes its 
title as well. Therefore, this first chapter is intended to give the reader a better idea 
regarding what this dissertation is about and, maybe just as important, what it is not 
about. Let us start with the latter as it clarifies the matter considerably with only a few 
paragraphs. 
 
1.1 Wat it is not about  
The title “Is the voice of a woman shameful?” is an allusion to an Arabic saying which 
alleges that the voice of a woman is cawra. The word cawra has a whole array of 
meanings. It can mean “defectiveness, faultiness, deficiency, imperfection” and also 
“pudendum, genitals; weakness, weak spot” (Wehr, 1976, p. 656). While the prophet of 
Islam, Muhammad or his followers did not invent it, it is nowadays used predominantly 
within an Islamic context where it denotes the intimate body parts of men and women 
that are to be covered (Ahmed, 1992, p. 116). For example, to say that the upper thighs 
of a man are ᶜawra means that it is ḥarām, i.e., forbidden according to some 
interpretations of Islamic law, for a man to show them outside of a clearly defined circle 
of people. Hence, the saying suggests that it is ḥarām for a woman’s voice to be heard 
in the same way as it is forbidden to expose certain body parts, which are considered 
ᶜawra. 
The issue of ᶜawra is not debated merely on some academic level by Islamic scholars 
(e.g., Bashier, 1980) but is also of real-life concern for many Muslims in their everyday 
life. One quick way to support this statement is to type the phrase “voice of woman 
awra” into an Internet search bar. Such a search will yield a long list of online fatwa 
forums, where Muslims seek legal advice, and other Islamic websites, which offer their 
opinions on this question. Hence, looking only at the title of the dissertation, one could 
not be blamed to conclude that this research belongs either to the field of gender studies 
or to Islamic studies. However, neither category is appropriately fitting, although there 
is much talk about both subjects, viz. gender and religion, in this dissertation. 
There can be no doubt that Islam, in all its wide varieties and complexity, shaped this 
area, which many call the Islamic Middle East (e.g., Lindholm, 2002). Using the qualifier 
Islamic, though, bears the danger of totalizing the histories and cultures of this region 
as if they started and end with Islam. In this regard, the present dissertation endorses 
Zubaida’s position, who writes at the very outset of Beyond Islam: A New Understanding 
of the Middle East: 
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A common thread in the essays is to ‘de-sacralize’ the region, questioning the 
predominant role attributed to religion in so much of the writing on these histories 
and societies, where the adjective ‘Islamic’ is applied to every aspect of culture and 
society. We may question what can be ‘Islamic’ about art, science, music and politics, 
which are often so attributed. Religion is an important element in Middle Eastern 
societies, as indeed it is, or was, in Europe and elsewhere. But it is one among many 
factors, and one with varying inputs into social forms. (Zubaida, 2011, p. 1) 
It is perfectly justifiable to narrow down one’s research focus in order to understand the 
role and influence of Islam on the Jordanian society. However, one should always keep 
in mind that Islam is but one among other influences and that the socio-cultural and 
historical background of Jordan is broader and older than Islam. The social reality today 
includes pre-Islamic cultural features that have co-existed with Islamic ones, even if they 
may, at times, draw on Islamic vocabularies to be articulated. 
Considering the role of Islam in this research, there is another extremely crucial point 
to be made. It can hardly be stressed enough that the dissertation concerns itself 
primarily with a vernacular version of Islam as (re)presented by its informants and not 
with Islam as a religion. This remark is not just an incidental comment, but a critical 
disclaimer, which will be reiterated and explained in more detail in later chapters (see 
Section 3.3.4). 
Similarly, the gender issue is without a doubt of paramount importance in the 
Jordanian society. As of 2005, Jordan belonged to the group of countries which “still had 
not fully transitioned towards gender-equal family laws,” and it was singled out with 
seven other countries because they “had maintained highly discriminatory laws that, for 
example, endorse men’s authority over women in marriage, give men greater rights over 
property and limit women’s ability to file for divorce” (Unicef, 2011, p. 29). The Gender 
Gap Index of 2010 places Jordan on place 120 out of 134 countries (Unicef, 2011, p. 1). 
Thus, research from the perspective of gender studies appears to be not only justified 
but also downright indispensable, and the prospect that the insights rendered by the 
present research will prove helpful in tackling problems on this front only enhances its 
value. 
All these qualifications notwithstanding, the main point being put forward here is 
that this dissertation was not conceived as an exercise in gender studies or Islamic 
studies but sprang from the motivation to understand the Jordanian society from a 
broader anthropological perspective. The centrality of gender-related issues and its 
occupation with Islam is mainly due to the particular normative landscape of Jordan, as 
later chapters will show. 
 
1.2 What it is about 
There are three properties or characteristics, which are helpful to pigeonhole this 
dissertation. Firstly, it is ethnographic in nature and not just in methodology, which 
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means more than just using ethnographic interviews. This aspect shall be explained 
shortly within the bounds of this chapter. 
Secondly, it focuses on the relationship between language and society. It could, 
therefore, be called either sociolinguistic or linguistic anthropological. However, it does 
not limit its focus to language. Instead, it focuses on a kind of discourse for which the 
dissertation adopts Blommaert’s definition of discourse as referring to “all forms of 
meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural, and 
historical patterns and developments of use” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 3). Due to this 
cultural semiotic perspective, it seemed useful to simplify things and stick to the 
linguistic anthropological label instead of oscillating between this one and the 
sociolinguistic one. 
Thirdly, while it is not interested in analyzing merely language-centered discourse, it 
does share a central concern with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which Van Dijk 
describes as discourse analysis “with an attitude” because it 
focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production 
and reproduction of power abuse or domination. Wherever possible, it does so from 
a perspective that is consistent with the best interests of dominated groups. It takes 
the experiences and opinions of members of such groups seriously, and supports 
their struggle against inequality. That is, CDA research combines what perhaps 
somewhat pompously used to be called “solidarity with the oppressed” with an 
attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk in order to 
establish, confirm or legitimate their abuse of power. (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 96) 
Due to its cultural semiotic scope and its understanding of discourse, which entails non-
linguistic phenomena, the study does not really fit neatly into the research agenda of 
CDA. Instead, as Chapter 3 shows, it aligns itself more naturally with Mediated Discourse 
Analysis (MDA), which emerged out of the endeavor “to move discourse analysis beyond 
the analysis of texts to consider questions about the actions people take with them, as 
well as with other cultural tools, and the social consequences these actions have” (Norris 
& Jones, 2005, p. viii). Nevertheless, its interest in power abuse remains central, 
particularly in the ways how domination shapes culture as discourse. 
 
1.3 The ethnographic nature of the research 
Ethnography, according to Agar, is driven by something he calls “rich points” which “are 
those surprises, those departures from an outsider’s expectations that signal a 
difference between LC1 [languaculture of the ethnographer] and LC2 [languaculture of 
the studied group] and give direction to subsequent learning” (Agar, 2006a, 
Introduction). Such rich points are, in his view, connected to a central feature of what 
constitutes real ethnographies. He writes that 
more and more as time goes on, I think of ethnography as a kind of logic rather than 
any specific method or any particular unit of study. Ethnography names an 
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epistemology – a way of knowing and a kind of knowledge that results – rather than 
a recipe or a particular focus. (Agar, 2006b, sec. 4) 
Agar contends that proper ethnography employs something that Peirce termed 
abductive logic and which is different from the two other common forms of reasoning. 
Deductive reasoning refers to forming conclusions from old premises, and inductive 
reasoning consists of seeing how new material fits the available concepts. These two 
ways of reasoning are “closed with reference to the concepts in play” (Agar, 2006b, 
sec. 4). Abductive reasoning, however, is a creative and instinctively controlled process 
and constitutes a method of explaining data based on assumptions and hypotheses 
about probable, not yet certain laws (Nöth, 2000, pp. 68, 419). Agar argues, further, that 
rich points “are the raw material of ethnographic research” and suggests: 
As Peirce would have advocated, the purpose of ethnography is to go forth into the 
world, find and experience rich points, and then take them seriously as a signal of a 
difference between what you know and what you need to learn to understand and 
explain what just happened. People are said to be creatures of habit and seekers of 
certainty. Abduction turns them into the opposite. (Agar, 2006b, sec. 4) 
Looking back, it seems that this is, in a nutshell, what happened to me. After receiving a 
master’s degree in Intercultural Studies from Columbia International University (SC, 
USA) in 2001, my wife and I moved with (at that time) four daughters to Amman, the 
capital of Jordan, to work for a German non-government organization as a develop-
mental aid worker. It was important to us to immerse ourselves into the culture and 
language of our host country and to integrate into its society as much as we could 
because we did not want to live our lives in an isolated community of expatriates, which 
is often referred to as the “expat bubble”. 
The nature of my work also gave me much opportunity to become immersed in the 
reality of everyday life in Amman. In the year of 2005, I founded the Komensky Centre 
for Intercultural Development Ltd. as a social entrepreneurial project to provide lessons 
of spoken Arabic to foreigners and training on intercultural topics and Arabic society and 
culture. This project was not only meant to provide services to foreigners but also to 
create work opportunities for locals. Consequentially, most of the employees were 
Jordanians, and that also meant that during the majority of my working hours, local 
people surrounded me. 
It goes without saying that all of this together provided a never-ending stream of rich 
points. Since my task as a developmental aid worker was not just to somehow survive, 
but even to contribute to positive social change, trying to understand local social norms 
and customs became a constant pursuit long before I decided to take up doctoral 
studies. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that ethnography, at least the way this dissertation 
understands it, shares with CDA and MDA a counter-hegemonic concern as it “has the 
potential and capacity of challenging established views, not only of language but of 
symbolic capital in societies in general” (Blommaert & Dong, 2010, p. 11). 
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1.4 The rich points shaping the dissertation’s focus 
1.4.1 Type II incidents 
Rich points are surprises, as Agar suggested, from the perspective of an outsider. The 
outsider is not the only one experiencing violations of expectations, however. Storti 
speaks about Type I and Type II incidents in intercultural contexts (Storti, 2001, chap. 2). 
Type I incidents occur when visitors react to the behavior of local people, and Type II 
incidents refer to occasions when local people react to expatriates’ deviant conduct. 
Type I incidents are unmissable for the outsider because this is the time when somebody 
is treading on her foot. In contrast, Type II incidents comprise those moments when the 
outsider (often unknowingly) is treading on somebody else’s foot. For obvious reasons, 
these incidents are much more difficult to detect for the foreigner and consequentially 
much more difficult to avoid for somebody visiting or living in a foreign culture. 
It is probably safe to assume that I managed to violate norms from all the major 
normative systems which this study speaks about – mostly unintentionally, I hasten to 
add – and I suffered the consequences at least to a certain degree. Often, I was unaware 
of these Type II incidents, not unlike a child. Fortunately, humans possess language, and 
thus they have the ability to talk about transgressions in order to warn others and to 
discourage them from committing them. When they occur, they can also explain why 
certain behaviors are unacceptable. 
In Jordanian Arabic, there are ways to express in a general way that something 
cannot or should not be done like by saying mā biṣīr, lit. “it does/may not happen”. The 
reasons why it is impossible or unacceptable, though, can be very diverse. While trying 
to bargain down a price at the market, the seller might say mā biṣīr to express that the 
price is too low and will not work for him because of financial reasons. Another situation 
could be that a parent does not want the child to do something for some unnamed 
reason and simply says mā biṣīr. However, the research interest of this study lay more 
specifically with norms and not with things which are deemed, either unwise, 
unprofitable, or inconvenient. 
There are three words which one might call metapragmatic indicators of illicit 
behavior: ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ. They are widely and frequently used. Buckwalter 
and Parkinson’s A Frequency Dictionary of Arabic Core Vocabulary for Learners (2011) 
puts ḥarām on the 1261st place with the meaning “forbidden, out of bounds; sacred, 
holy” (p. 122), ᶜayb on the 1670th place with the meaning “fault, weakness; shame, 
disgrace, shameful behavior”, and mamnūᶜ on the 3072nd place with the meaning 
“forbidden, prohibited, banned” in its list of the 5000 most commonly used words in 
Arabic. 
I recall that I used these words somehow indiscriminately in the early stages of 
language learning as if they were synonyms, all conveying the idea that something 
should not be done. However, I soon realized that they belong to different domains and 
came to understand the puzzled look of my interlocutors when I had applied them 
randomly and interchangeably. One develops a feeling eventually for how to use them 
correctly (at least most of the time). However, understanding the precise rules which 
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define what is considered either ᶜayb, ḥarām, or mamnūᶜ – and when, where, for whom, 
and why – remained an abundant source of rich point experiences. 
 
1.4.2 Gender-specific restrictions 
When it comes to illicit behavior, my wife and I also realized that she is subject to very 
different rules as a woman compared to me as a man in the Jordanian society. Now, 
there are, of course, gender-related differences also in our home societies. However, in 
Jordan, she discovered that she must not talk with a loud voice or even laugh audibly in 
the street (according to some people) because it is considered ᶜayb. Further, she was 
not supposed to greet or smile at men when entering a servīs taxi, which is what 
Jordanians call a shared taxi running fixed routes. It was ᶜayb. It seemed also ᶜayb for a 
man to greet women but somehow to a much lesser degree than for a woman. Women 
explained to us that not wearing a head cover could be seen as ᶜayb and ḥarām. Others 
considered a woman wearing short sleeves as ḥarām but not ᶜayb. 
Moreover, some women cover their heads and their arms because it is ᶜayb or 
because their father said that it was mamnūᶜ to show them but not because it was 
ḥarām. For a woman to travel abroad without the permission of her husband, we heard, 
was considered by some as ḥarām and mamnūᶜ but not necessarily as ᶜayb. Then again, 
at times, my wife had more freedom and was allowed to enter the kitchen and other 
areas of the house when we visited friends, but for me, it was ᶜayb, although not ḥarām. 
We realized that people had rather clear conceptions about what men and women 
were allowed to do and used the three words in a non-arbitrary fashion that often 
seemed to signal not only that something was illicit but also why or on what basis. All 
this indicated that there was an intricately gendered web of normative codes mapping 
the distinct spaces and possible actions deemed (un)acceptable for both sexes. This web 
apparently constricted our abilities to move, act, and express ourselves, albeit to very 
different degrees. In the majority of cases, it empowered me as a man, while my wife 
felt often impeded and sometimes she had to ask me to speak on her behalf. All these 
examples are listed here to show how this talk about ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ 
constituted a vast field of rich point experiences over the years. 
 
1.4.3 Change of society in recent decades 
The whole issue of different norms for male and female behavior was further 
complicated by the fact that these norms and rules were not only dependent on 
different groups and segments of society or geographical location but also had been 
changing quite rapidly in the recent past. While there is also change in our home 
societies (in our cases Germany, Slovakia, and Serbia), the fashion how change has been 
happening in Jordan constituted another rich point for us. 
My grandmother, a Christian Slovak woman living north of Novi Sad (Serbia; the 
woman sitting in Picture 1.1), was never seen on the street or in the house during the 
day without a head cover. She only showed her hair at night when she took off both 
layers of her headgear to comb her hair and to braid it for the night. Most women from 
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following generations, though, stopped wearing the head cover altogether. Similarly, 
the grandmothers of my wife had worn a headscarf in Germany, but it would never occur 
to any of their daughters or granddaughters to do the same. In fact, it is not just the 
head covers, which disappeared, but the whole dress code changed considerably, 

















In Jordan, too, women of older generations – Muslim and Christian – had been wearing 
more traditional clothes, including a head cover. Later, particularly women in Amman 
dropped that dress code and exchanged it for something one could call a “modern” or 
“Western” style. Curiously enough, this change seemed to have taken place roughly 
during the same period as in Germany and Yugoslavia in the twentieth century. 
However, recently, many women have gone back to cover their hair in Jordan, but this 
time in a different fashion and only women from a Muslim background. Some embraced 
even an Islamic dress code for their whole wardrobe, not only adopting the Islamic head 
cover called ḥijāb. Then again, some women combine Islamic elements, such as the 
ḥijāb, with tight pullovers and jeans, effectively creating a hybrid dress style which does 
not appear to represent fully either modern Western or traditional Islamic notions of 
decorous attire. 
Also, in other areas, such as the mobility of women, there has been much change. In 
some regard, women gained more freedom. There is a higher acceptance of girls going 
to school or even to study at university. One can find groups of ḥijāb wearing young 
women enjoying a water pipe in one of the many cafés in Amman. So, on the one hand, 
at least some women seem to experience more freedom (in terms of mobility), while on 
the other hand, some seem to be more restricted (in terms of dress code) compared to 
half a century ago. 
No doubt, our list of rich points could be continued almost ad infinitum. However, 
the examples listed above broadly contour the areas, which contributed to the shaping 
Picture 1.1: Author with family and neighbor, 
including parents and grandparents in 1993. 
Bačsky Petrovec, Yugoslavia 
Picture 1.2: Depicting Sheikh Mohammaed 
Sayah al-Laboun (1901-1975) from Nothern 
Shouna area with his family in the year 1960 
(Appendix 1, Picture #4) 
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The structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 problematizes the notion that 
societies are homogenous and monolithic norm structures and argues that they instead 
consist of a plethora of different rules, customs, laws, conventions, and many other 
norms. The second half of the chapter then looks at literature in search of a workable 
notion of norms. Thus, it gives the main theoretical framework, which relies heavily on 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological approach and Blommaert’s concept of constructure. 
Chapter 3 is the methodological chapter and consists of two parts. In the first part, 
it picks up the thread where Chapter 2 left off and adds insights from Goffman’s 
sociology. The sociologies of Garfinkel and Goffman can be seen both as “sociologies of 
everyday life” (Berberoglu, 2017, p. 180). In order to counter some of their blind spots, 
the chapter enlarges the conceptual toolbox of the study by introducing Bakthin’s 
concept of chronotope, Blommaert’s notion of scale, Scollon’s language of mediated 
discourse analysis, and Silverstein’s concept of indexical orders. The second part of 
Chapter 3 then provides the research questions and reports in some detail how the 
research was designed, conducted, and what challenges were encountered. 
Due to the immense importance of the historical developments in recent history, 
Chapter 4 provides a brief historical overview of Jordan. As an organizing principle, it 
uses the concept of chronotope which supports the study’s quest to understand norms 
within their respective contexts. 
Chapters 5 and 6 attempt to provide a lucid presentation of all the relevant data, 
which were collected during two rounds of interviews. The goal is to provide the reader 
with the necessary familiarity with the data in order to understand and to appraise the 
following chapters. 
The research questions guided the data collection, but concerning the answers to 
these questions, Chapter 7 is the central part of the dissertation. It elucidates what the 
previous chapters through the mere data presentation have already tackled. It then goes 
on to offer detailed answers to the research questions, including abductive reasonings 
(cf. Agar, 2006a, 2006b). 









2.1 Dangerous rules and perilous habits 
 
It might be a naive notion that I acquired due to my upbringing in Germany, but I always 
assumed that rules would help me to stay out of trouble. I was under the impression 
that traffic rules, including traffic signs, are supposed to regulate traffic. As long as one 
follows the rules, everything should be fine. Ammanis certainly do not seem to agree, at 
least not when it comes to the official rules, and my own experience proves that it can 
be quite precarious to follow the official rules, especially on a crossroad where the side 
road has stop signs, and the drivers from all four directions behave diametrically 
opposite to the rules. The cars with the stop sign pace over the crossroad without 
slowing down, the cars on the main road stop dutifully and yield their right of way. What 
makes this even more impressive is the fact that Ammani drivers, in general, are usually 


















For several years I had to cross such a crossroad several times a day on my way to the 
office, and it never ceased to amaze me. Once I witnessed a young and seemingly 
inexperienced driver on the priority road adhering to the official traffic rule expecting 
the side road drivers would do the same and stop. She almost got herself killed that day 
Picture 2.1: Picture of one of the said crossroads in Amman showing how the cars with the stop 
sign keep driving while the car with priority is waiting 
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by a middle-aged man whose full speed SUV missed her by an inch. The man, feeling 
violated in his alleged rights, stopped his car and started yelling through the open 
window at the young driver if she had lost her mind completely. Coming to the defense 
of the pale young woman, I pointed to the stop sign which he had so blatantly ignored 
just a second ago. The sincere and confused look on his face convinced me that he 
apparently had never noticed the presence of that stop sign before – at least not 
consciously. 
On other occasions, when I felt I had to educate Ammani drivers about traffic signs, 
I would stop at the stop sign at that very crossroad, trying to yield my de facto right in 
order to enforce the “proper” and official rules. That project proved to be ill-conceived 
not only because it caused too much confusion but also because it even had entailed 
dangerous implications. Even if I had been able to convince some of the drivers to honor 
the signs, I might have ended up feeling responsible for possible accidents and deaths 
caused by two competing strategies that are so fatally opposed to each other. 
Nevertheless, official traffic rules, of course, do not only exist but are even reinforced 
by the traffic police. I can prove it – I had to pay my share of tickets in Jordan, including 
fines for ignored stop signs. Moreover, in order to acquire a driver’s license and to be 
allowed to participate in the traffic, one has to pass a driver’s test to prove sufficient 
knowledge of the official rules. That applies equally to Germany and Jordan. However, 
when it comes to the operational rules, the ones which influence the actual driving 
behavior, one discovers very soon that there is a whole set of norms in Jordanian traffic 
that has to be acquired on the street. 
This research project is not about traffic itself, but to view this traffic example as a 
mere metaphor would not be correct. It is more a pars pro toto mirroring societal 
patterns like a fractal which can be found on other levels as well. There are some more 
points, which can be drawn out of the traffic example, which will be of interest to this 
research. 
There are no books and manuals about the unofficial traffic “rules”. It is safe to 
assume that there is no clear and explicit body of rules, but what guides people through 
the traffic is instead something Bourdieu would call a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 128). This “feel for the game” makes you competent for playing the 
game, in this particular case participating in the traffic. That does not mean that it is just 
about pure feelings. Part of this competence would contain being acquainted with the 
official rules and knowing when to apply them and when not. Other skills need to be 
considered, like the ability to assess different parameters. There are some factual or 
more objective ones – let us take approaching crossroads in Jordan in general – like the 
comparison of the width and general appearance of both streets and the size and 
velocity of the oncoming cars. Also, the appraisal of subjective things like the other 
driver’s resolve, his “chutzpah”, and preparedness to risk a collision play a role. Last but 
not least, one’s attitude or preferred driving style is also part of the equation – more 
aggressive or more defensive, whichever one found to work best based on past 
experiences at similar crossroads. 
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Over time one develops a Bourdieuian “habitus”, which can be described as gradual 
incorporation of the social order, including the “feel for the game”. The habitus is shaped 
through experience, i.e., history, and seems to reside at times more in the entire human 
body than merely in the brain. Less figuratively speaking, it entails not just purely 
cognitive and conscious elements but things such as dispositions and tastes which are 
usually conceptualized as part of the body. Therefore, one can also call the habitus 
“historical body” (R. Scollon & Wong Scollon, 2004). This habitus or historical body, used 
interchangeably in this dissertation, operates according to Bourdieu (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992) on a less than fully conscious level and is attuned naturally to the 
environment in which it has been acquired. Due to its routinized nature and being so 
well attuned to the environment, the historical body can perform amazingly well and 
handle all kinds of situations on the fly. Problems arise when our habitus does not fit the 
environment anymore. Two reasons for this come to mind immediately. 
One rather obvious case is changing location, e.g., traveling or moving to a different 
country. Usually, when people travel, they are aware that going to other places might 
entail having to deal with different norms and habits. After all, the saying that when in 
Rome, do as the Romans do, is not a new insight. However, it is often easier said than 
done. A German friend, who had lived an extended time in Amman, was set back by a 
decent amount of money because she was driving a car in German traffic on the very 
first day after her return using her Ammani traffic habitus and consequently caused an 
accident. Realizing that one cannot rely on one’s habitus in another culture does not 
necessarily make things go smooth – after all, humans cannot just switch it off or upload 
an updated version – but the awareness certainly does help to adapt. 
The tricky thing with coming from Jordan to Germany is not only that the rules are 
different but also the fact that people seem to have a different concept of rules and 
norms. Driving in Germany has an entirely different feel to it than driving in Amman. A 
Jordanian friend visited Germany and when he came back to Jordan, he told his relatives 
about the German driving style. They all found it was hilarious that Germans would 
usually stop at stop signs – even in the middle of the night with no other cars around. In 
Germany, when taking a left turn at a T-section onto the main road, people usually wait 
patiently until all the cars on the main road have passed without pulling out after a 
handful of cars – as is the usual strategy in Amman – indicating that one has waited long 
enough, effectively blocking the traffic from the left and blackmailing the drivers from 
the right into yielding. 
In Germany, it sometimes feels like the cars are not steered by people at all but by 
automatons. Once I had the opportunity to drive a car which had a board computer and 
distance sensors. Being a boy-at-heart, I had a blast trying to make it through a city like 
Heidelberg without touching the brake or the accelerator pedal. There are algorithms 
that rely on rules that can do that, and they are getting better every day – even better 
than humans in some cases. In Amman, things are very different. If they ever introduce 
a Google car in Jordan, it would have to come with a face-recognition unit to discern, 
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e.g., if the other driver was in a hurry or relaxed. Moreover, it would need the ability to 
deal with more than one competing rule and decide which one to apply. 
However, staying “at home” where one has acquired a habitus, which was 
functioning well at some stage, is no guarantee to stay out of trouble and to lead a 
successful life either. That is not to say that the historical body is something static as if 
once shaped during socialization, it then remains fixed and immutable. It keeps learning 
and changing with our society. 
However, times and society are changing – sometimes at a frightening speed. The 
historian Bregman writes about the past: “There’s a growing gulf between us and that 
alien world – a world we can barely comprehend. ‘The past is a foreign country,’ a 
novelist once wrote. ‘They do things differently there’” (Bregman, 2016, chap. 6). One 
only has to power up a computer with an old operating system, e.g., Windows 3.1, to 
realize how foreign the past can become within a relatively short time. Thus, it can be 
quite worrying to realize that our habitus and our home environment are not in sync any 
longer than when we are traveling, and suddenly, it is not the past but the present that 
seems like a foreign country where things are done differently. In his article “Making the 
economic habitus: Algerian workers revisited,” Bourdieu (2000) describes how people 
from traditional backgrounds who are propelled into a new modern world suddenly lack 
specific competencies to earn a living in the new situation. He calls this phenomenon of 
the habitus getting out of sync with its environment “hysteresis” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 83), 
and it can spell financial and social disaster. 
 
2.2 Multinormativity 
2.2.1 A plethora of normative systems 
In light of the previous section, the notion that one would be on the safe side and keep 
out of harm’s way by merely adhering to rules – both, on the street and in other areas 
of societal life – looks indeed a bit naïve. Nevertheless, one does not have to look hard 
to find political opinions suggesting that one of the significant threats for “their” 
societies consists of foreigners (particularly refugees and guest workers of Muslim 
background) who fail or even refuse to integrate, some would say assimilate, fully into 
the host culture. So-called parallel societies are thought to have their own norms, laws, 
and even their own jurisdiction that override or suspend the normative and judiciary 
systems of the host society (e.g., Rohe & Jarabe, 2015; Wagner, 2011). In a speech at a 
security conference in Munich, the British prime minister David Cameron declared that 
the “doctrine of state multiculturalism” which “encouraged different cultures to live 
separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream” had failed and 
even suggested that it contributed to the problem of terrorism (Cameron, 2011, para. 8). 
When people are expected to integrate into some host culture and identify with the 
host society, it presupposes that there is a recognizable consensus of acceptable norms 
and values which are considered to belong clearly to that host culture. Such claims 
usually work as long as one is not asking questions, which are too detailed and concrete. 
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Just what exactly is the “way of life” which the terrorists allegedly try to disrupt and to 
end, according to George W. Bush (Busch, 2001), and which so many U.S. citizens feel is 
threatened by an invasion of immigrants (Monmouth University Polling Institute, 2016)? 
In the German context, one might wonder what exactly is the Leitkultur (lit. guiding 
culture) that non-Germans who want to live in Germany need to imbibe according to 
some politicians (Deutsche Welle, 2017). The metaphor of “clashing civilizations” is used 
by people as different as Huntington (1996) and Islamists (Ut Tahrir, 2002). This 
metaphor betrays a closed concept of culture in which cultures resemble containers, 
which are moving in opposite directions (Bolten, 2009). An open cultural concept is 
primarily concerned about relationships and not substance. It refers to network 
dynamics within a heterogeneous plurality of actors that can hardly be demarcated from 
other such networks (Bolten, 2009). Scott’s study of the ideological resistance of 
subordinate groups, such as their gossip, folktales, songs, jokes, and theatre, including 
their use of anonymity and ambiguity, showed how society is a layered, stratified 
phenomenon with multiple realities of life of different groups which at times are 
invisible to each other (Scott, 1990). 
So are societies indeed undivided entities and integral wholes, which work best 
within some imaginary self-contained borders, and are threatened to disintegrate if 
confronted with too much foreign influence? As people usually are not aware of all the 
various normative codes which they encounter and handle daily, Twinning’s opening 
statements to a lecture on “Normative and legal pluralism: A global perspective” might 
help to demonstrate how complex the world of norms is: 
Think of all the rules and norms you have encountered in the last few hours. Many 
of you, having followed various morning routines, such as brushing your teeth or 
swallowing pills, will have obeyed or flouted North Carolina traffic laws, observed 
local driving etiquette, grumbled about the university’s parking regulations, greeted 
colleagues and students, respected the law school’s ban on smoking, but brought 
coffee into the library despite the notices. You will have followed intricate sets of 
commands in checking your voice mail and starting your computer. You may have 
been worried by a circular from the central administration about plagiarism. In 
drafting a memo or e-mail message you will have accepted or surrendered to 
American usages of grammar and spelling, and you may even have consulted the 
Harvard Bluebook or a dictionary. 
You may have violated some norms of which you are unaware, and noticed but 
disregarded some that you do not feel apply to you, such as fashions in tattoos or 
new conventions of spelling of text messages. Glancing through the newspaper you 
may have encountered the U.S. Constitution, the WTO and IMF, North Carolina state 
law, European Union directives, Israeli law, Islamic banking practices, the rules of 
tennis, funerals in Baghdad, or Afghanistan, the Torture Convention and numerous 
examples of treaties, customs, conventions, folkways, mores, and “soft law”. And 
just now we have all witnessed the complex code of rituals that are conventional at 
a public lecture. 
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When I set my students to compile a list of all the rule systems they have 
encountered in a 48 hour period, only the lazy ones come up with less than a 
hundred items. (Twining, 2010, p. 457) 
It is hard to imagine that all these codes could overlap precisely with our national, state, 
ethnic, or whatever kind of border. Not even essential and central codes, like language, 
are congruent with such groups or entities. So how do then members of a particular 
group construct a discreet set of norms which is “theirs” and which others have to adopt 
if they want to belong to “them”, or at least be tolerated in their midst? 
For reasons of simplification, what Twinnings refers to as normative and legal 
pluralism will be referred to as multinormativity in this research. It seems safe to assume 
that multinormativity is a feature of virtually all human societies. Establishing the fact 
that societies are multinormative raises the question regarding the relationship 
between the different codes. In order to pursue this question further, it might be helpful 
to employ two concepts coined by Bakhtin (1895-1975): polyglossia and heteroglossia. 
 
2.2.2 Polyglossia 
Polyglossia, composed of the two Greek words for “many” and “language”, “refers to 
the mutual inter-animation of ‘national’ languages and insists that no language is or ever 
has been entirely self-sufficient, insulated from the influence of other languages” 
(Renfrew, 2015, chap. 7). It seems to be merely a question of how deep one wants to 
dig and how far back in history the search should go until it becomes evident that Rocker 
was right to contend that trying to clean a language from all foreign influence would 
“lead to a complete dissolution of the language” (Rocker, as in Barsky, 1998, p. 631). The 
concept of polyglossia can be usefully extended to refer not just to languages but also 
to the other sign systems of a society, i.e., to its whole culture and all the normative 
systems, which are somehow part of it or connected to it. If one takes a bit time to sit 
down and think of all the different areas of life that have been and are still being 
significantly shaped by artifacts and ideas from other cultures and societies, one might 
find that the poster, which was published in 1993 by the Deutsche Städte-Reklame as 
part of a broader billboard campaign against xenophobia, expresses it aptly. It reads: 
“Your Christ, a Jew; your car, Japanese; your pizza, Italian; your democracy, Greek; your 
coffee, Brazilian; your holiday, Turkish; your numerals, Arabic; your script, Latin. And 
your neighbor just a foreigner?” 
 
2.2.3 Heteroglossia 
The second Bakhtinian term is “heteroglossia” which refers to “the simultaneous use of 
different kinds of speech or other signs, the tensions between them, and their conflicting 
relationship within one text” which constitutes the presence of a multitude of social 
voices within the same utterance (Ivanov, 1999, p. 100). So while the term “polyglossia” 
deals more with the relationship between languages, heteroglossia focuses on the 
internal dimension of a language. It underscores the fact that there is not just one 
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version of a particular but rather that all the various forms spoken by different social 
and professional groups, classes, generations, and also the forms used at different 
occasions belong to this same language. Heteroglossia includes “large dialectal 
differences which can produce mutual unintelligibility and indeed are hard to distinguish 
from different languages as such” but also “at the other end of the scale it can allude to 
the distinguishing slang of one year to the next and even the slogan of the hour” 
(Dentith, 1995, p. 33). Bakhtin himself explains its significance with the following words: 
Thus at any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top 
to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions 
between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between 
different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, 
circles and so forth, all given a bodily form. These “languages” of heteroglossia 
intersect each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying “languages”. 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 291)  
As with the term polyglossia, the term heteroglossia can be extended to pertain to the 
entirety of a society’s culture and not merely to the verbal aspects of it. If one did an 
ethnographic study and described the lifestyle, worldview, norms, and values of three 
generations of the same family and presented the findings to an audience while with-
holding the information about the language of the studied groups and the relationship 
between them, it is quite imaginable that people might get the idea that three different 
societies or ethnic groups were the subjects of the study. Some might even wonder if 
such diverse groups could ever live peacefully together. 
In summary, every society is multinormative which means that in every society there 
is a variety of different normative codes operative. All societies are polyglossic to 
differing degrees: each culture is influenced and shaped by other cultures. Finally, 
languages and cultures are heteroglossic, which means that they exist in a great variety 
of forms, which might be unintelligible to each other and stand in contradiction to each 
other. 
 
2.2.4 Polynomic situations 
There is one more critical aspect of this matter of multinormativity worth mentioning. 
The different normative codes are not applied neatly, separately, and sequentially to 
different situations. However, the reality is rather messy, and several of the codes come 
to bear simultaneously on the same situation and even the same action. Thus, our 
societies are not just multinormative, but our real-life situations are also polynomic. 
Blommaert gives an example: 
A Facebook update, for instance, demands attendance to the (highly dynamic) norms 
of literacy and linguistic codes, the genre and register norms of an ‘update’ (not too 
long, preferably multimodal, etc.), the tacit norms of one’s community of ‘friends’ 
regarding certain topics and ways to discuss them (think of prevalent political 
orientations in one’s Facebook community), the Facebook rules of conduct 
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(proscribing certain forms of obscenity, for instance), and the rules of the algorithmic 
system behind Facebook that render certain updates more visible than others. 
(Blommaert, 2018a, sec. 4.2) 
In some cases, the different codes, which are operative in a given situation, might be 
compatible and merely narrow down the set of possible or acceptable options. In an 
ideal world, this would apply to all situations. However, in light of the heteroglossic 
nature of language and culture, humans find themselves in situations where they need 
to handle competing and contradictory norms and forces – which describe precisely the 
situations in which this research was conducted and also for which it had a particularly 
keen interest. So far, this dissertation discussed norms mostly on the level of codes and 
systems, and it is now time to get more concrete and outline what it considers to be 
norms. 
 
2.3 The nature of norms 
2.3.1 A precursory overview 
The term “norm” can be used widely and virtually in any area. In medicine, laboratory 
tests check if blood values are within a specific norm. There are DIN Standards where 
the DIN stands for Deutsche Industrie Norm, i.e., the German industry norm. In the field 
of artificial intelligence, norms are used to guide the common conduct of agents. This 
study is not talking about technical, biological, or other kinds of norms but cultural 
norms. While the concept of culture has been and arguably still is central in cultural 
anthropology, defining it was never a straightforward matter. Already around the 
middle of the twentieth century, Kluckhohn and his colleagues (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 
1952) were able to compile a list of some 164 definitions of the term “culture”. 
For a precursory overview of the different kinds of norms found in human cultures, 
Käser’s succinct definition of culture provides a practical point of departure. He 
characterizes cultures as “strategies for giving shape to human existence” and “for 
getting to grips with living” (Käser, 2014, p. 37). From this perspective, norms, just like 
artifacts, are shared and recognizable strategies that proved useful for meeting human 
needs and are therefore shared and handed down from one generation to another. 
Twinning’s list gave us a variety of terms, and the following overview introduces a 
manageable number of intuitive basic categories. According to the Oxford Dictionary of 
English, the word “norm” carries the meaning “something that is usual, typical, or 
standard” and can either refer to a “standard or pattern, especially of social behavior, 
that is typical or expected,” or it can denote “a required standard; a level to be complied 
with or reached” (“Norm”, 2010). According to this entry, norms can be both descriptive 
and prescriptive, and this dissertation will use the term in the same broad sense. Norms 
can be descriptive, i.e., they refer to recurring strategies, which are not perceived as 
reinforced intentionally by the community through rewards or threats and punishments. 
Prescriptive norms signify strategies, which are either expected or discouraged and 
rejected by the community. 
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While some of Twinning’s examples refer to norms of a rather private nature, like 
habits structuring our daily routine, most of his examples are collective norms, in other 
words, norms that are employed by groups to regulate or coordinate social interaction. 
The dissertation is interested in what will be called social norms. Social norms do include 
but are not limited to customs and traditions. When such social norms are based on a 
society’s customs, which means that they are usually not written down but circulate as 
common knowledge, they will be called customary norms in this research. 
Social norms, however, can also be decided upon and pronounced more formally 
and written down like in the case of legal norms, e.g., laws, which are authored by states. 
Similarly, religious communities developed social norms – even though they might insist 
that they are not of social origin but divine origin and authority. Be that as it may, from 
an anthropological point of view, they are the product of a particular society. Thus, this 
dissertation categorizes such religious norms as social norms, together with customary 
and legal norms. 
In search of a suitable definition and approach to norms, the following sections will 
look at different possible candidates, discussing their strengths and weakness, and show 
why a particular approach was chosen. 
 
2.3.2 Bicchieri’s approach to norms 
In Käser’s definition of culture from the previous section, the term “strategy” featured 
centrally, and it does so in another field of study, which deals with human interaction, 
namely game theory (GT). In her book The Grammar of Society: The Nature and 
Dynamics of Social Norms, Bicchieri attempts to apply game-theoretical principles to 
social norms. One of the central ideas from GT is the concept of equilibrium, particularly 
the Nash Equilibrium (NE). The NE can be defined as a set of strategies where “no player 
could improve her payoff, given the strategies of all other players in the game, by 
changing her strategy” (Ross, 2019, sec. 2.5). Conventions, according to this approach, 
are solutions to coordination games. These are games where the interests of the 
different players do not oppose each other fundamentally, like in the case of which hand 
will be used for greeting, and a NE can be found in the game matrix. However, in conflict 
games or mixed-motive games, which do not provide such a NE, the payoffs need to be 
changed in such a way that a NE is created. Social norms are a point in case. Because the 
collective puts out a punishment, e.g., on lying or stealing, these strategies lose their 
advantage, and dealing honestly with each other or respecting other people’s property 
becomes a NE (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 8ff). 
Bicchieri is not unaware of some of the pitfalls and shortcomings of classical GT, let 
alone Rational Choice Theory (RCT) which belongs to a broader group of models of 
purposive action and builds on the postulate of rational choice, i.e., that people 
generally act rationally (Abercrombie et al., 2006, p. 316). Bicchieri avoids the more 
extreme conclusions based on the postulate mentioned above by using empirical 
research from psychology. Therefore, on the face of it, an approach using game 
theoretical concepts appears to be useful for understanding society. In light of empirical 
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research presented by Bicchieri, some of the observations are not entirely implausible. 
In fact, Bourdieu also repeatedly used the framework of games and referred to some 
aspects of society, e.g., as the “economic game”, the “bureaucratic game”, the “political 
game”, and “social games” in general (Bourdieu, 2005; cf. also Grenfell, 2008). 
As mentioned already in the introduction, Bourdieu related the habitus (more than 
once) to the “feel for the game” which “is what enables an infinite number of ‘moves’ 
to be made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations which no rule, however 
complex, can foresee” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 9; emphasis added). Habitus, in Bourdieu’s 
own words, could be even characterized as “the social game embodied and turned into 
a second nature” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 63). He also recognized the usefulness of the 
concept of strategy but only “as a way of directing practice that is neither conscious nor 
calculated, nor mechanically determined [emphasis added]” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 22). A 
closer reading of the following quote shows that, while he was using the words “game” 
and “strategy”, he had something very different in mind than GT: 
You can use the analogy of the game in order to say that a set of people take part in 
a rule-bound activity, an activity which, without necessarily being the product of 
obedience to rules, obeys certain regularities... Should one talk of a rule? Yes and no. 
You can do so on condition that you distinguish clearly between rule and regularity. 
The social game is regulated, it is the locus of certain regularities. (Bourdieu, 1994, 
p. 64) 
Thus, Bourdieu was explicit that human agents are not to be viewed as devising actions 
in some rational way as RCT contends, and he rejected its anthropology as being based 
on a shallow, deterministic and calculable notion of human action. RCT, according to 
Bourdieu, is based on “the myth of homo oeconomicus” and he saw RCT as the 
“paradigmatic form of the scholastic illusion, which leads the scholar to project his 
thinking into the minds of the active agents” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 7). 
To be fair, Bicchieri’s approach is a far cry from RCT and leveling the same critique 
against her approach as against RCT would be unfair as she clearly rejects the validity of 
RCT’s assumptions: “Behavioral decision theorists have gathered compelling evidence 
that actors systematically violate the assumptions of rational choice theory” (Bicchieri, 
2006, p. 4). Within her game-theoretical paradigm, she suggests two different kinds of 
routes for decision making, and even the “rational” version, which she calls the 
deliberational route, does not fit the criteria of RCT. She also rejects the “simplistic, 
common view that we conform to norms either because of external sanctions or 
because they have been internalized” because it “flies in the face of much evidence that 
people sometimes obey norms even in the absence of any obvious incentive structure 
or personal commitment to what the norm stands for” (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 3). To solve 
the problem, Bicchieri devises a “rational reconstruction” of how social norms work in 
the form of a model, which she calls “heuristic route”. She describes it as follows: 
According to the heuristic route, norm compliance is an automatic response to 
situational cues that focus our attention on a particular norm, rather than a 
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conscious decision to give priority to normative considerations. On the heuristic 
view, norms are context-dependent, meaning that different social norms will be 
activated, or appear appropriate, depending on how a situation is understood. 
(Bicchieri, 2006, p. 5) 
Both the deliberational route and the heuristic route are used in everyday life situations 
and account for social life and order. All the empirical mitigations, which are intended 
to smoothen the sharp edges of RCT notwithstanding, Bicchieri’s approach was not 
deemed as useful for the present study mainly for two reasons. First, by constructing a 
rational reconstruction of social norms which uses game-theoretical assumptions based 
on quasi-mathematical logic, she does precisely what Bourdieu accused RTC of, namely, 
that scholars are projecting their thinking into the minds of the active agents (Bourdieu, 
2005, p. 7). Second, just as a stream cannot rise above its source, using GT as her primary 
model to interpret and understand human action keeps her understanding of norms 
confined to the epistemological limits of methodological individualism (MI) which 
Blommaert characterizes as:  
the theory complex in which every human activity is in fine reduced to individual 
interests, intentions, motives, concerns and decisions, because (it is argued) 
individual levels of subjectivity in action (even if eminently social) are the only ones 
available to the analyst (…). (Blommaert, 2018a, sec. 2.3) 
One might even suggest that Bicchieri’s approach is not only an instance of MI but that 
she is, in fact, bespeaking an atomistic view which is  
based upon the suggestion that it is possible to develop a complete characterization 
of individual psychology that is fully pre-social, then deduce what will happen when 
a group of individuals, so characterized, enter into interaction with one another. 
(Heath, 2015, sec. 1) 
The problem we are dealing with here has to do with the phenomenon of “emergence”. 
If “emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities 
and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them” (O’Connor & Wong, 2015), then 
the attempt to understand social norms and social order on the level of emergence on 
which MI operates leads to “the denial of Durkheim’s ‘social fact’” and ultimately “of 
the entire Durkheimian sociological imagination, for ‘there is no such thing as society’ 
(to quote Margret Thatcher’s slogan)” (Blommaert, 2018a, sec. 2.3). The following 
section interrogates an approach that goes in the opposite direction. 
 
2.3.3 Parsons’ approach to norms 
Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) was influenced by Durkheim and Weber (the last one being 
seen as introducing MI as an epistemological principle into sociology). He attempted to 
construct a theory of social life which would combine the different previous traditions 
by “reconciling positivist thinking that saw action determined by external structures 
with idealist thinking that emphasised individual and interpersonal constructions of 
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meaningful action” (Holton, 2006, p. 430). This quest eventually led him to co-edit 
Toward a General Theory of Action (1951) together with Edward Shils. However, shortly 
afterward, Parsons “abandoned his commitment to both methodological individualism 
and action theory, adopting a purely systems-theoretic view” (Heath, 2015, sec. 1). 
The result was a structural-functionalist perspective in which the Durkheimian 
influence was evidently visible. Parsons incorporated two central thoughts from 
Durkheim. First, “the idea that social integration is the product of collective subscription 
to commonly held norms and values” and, second, “the conception that such values 
could be 'internalized' and thus not merely limit egoistic tendencies but become 
constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire” (Heritage, 1984, p. 15). One can 
ask the question if people’s actions are motivated by “expedience”, i.e., if they are 
choosing conformity or non-conformity based on their instrumental interests, or if their 
motivation has to do with “introjection”, i.e., actions being motivated by a “need 
disposition in the actor’s own personality structure” which comes from internalizing 
societal standards. Parsons suggested that the “latter is to be regarded as the basic type 
of integration of motivation with a normative pattern-structure of values” (Parsons, 
1991, p. 23). 
The social actor’s “inner life”, so to speak, his reflexivity, and the possible insight into 
the normative background of his own actions pose a problem in Parsons’ paradigm. He 
seems to have been fully aware of it. However, his solutions were “strongly shaped by 
his desire to accommodate them to his pre-existing explanatory framework which 
stresses the internalization of norms as causal determinants of action” (Heritage, 1984, 
p. 23). The result was, according to Garfinkel, who had studied under him, that Parsons 
theory – just like most of the available theories of social action and social structure of 
his time – assigned rational actions only “residual status” (Heritage, 1984, p. 263). 
Thus, in Parsons’s view, the internalized values and norms are effectively creating 
social order by guiding and motivating the individual in actual situations to a specific 
behavior. Obviously, the individual would need to be able to recognize situations so that 
the proper scripts would be triggered. However, generally, he deprecated the ability of 
the agents for reflexive action so that research of the processes in the mind of agents 
within concrete situations fell mostly outside of Parsons’ research interest (Heritage, 
1984, chap. 2). The observations from this and the previous section lead us to a third 
approach. 
 
2.3.4 Garfinkel’s approach to norms 
Notwithstanding the fundamental difference of the two approaches sketched so far, 
namely Bicchieri’s and Parsons’, they are both subject to the same criticism: imposing 
abstract theoretical consideration onto the social reality. Avoiding exactly this pitfall was 
a central concern of Garfinkel. He was not only influenced by his teacher Parsons but 
also by Alfred Schütz, who applied Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology to social life. It 
was this phenomenological perspective which was brought to him and the writings of 
Husserl himself that helped him to conclude that “practical activities, practical 
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circumstances, and practical sociological reasoning” should be the subject of empirical 
study and that “by paying to the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention 
usually accorded extraordinary events” one should seek “to learn about them as 
phenomena in their own right” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 1). 
By this, he acknowledged that it was not just the professionals who were doing 
“practical sociological reasoning” (contra Parsons) but also the laymen, i.e., the actors 
themselves, were “doing sociology” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii). Their reasoning should not 
be discarded or ignored but studied because the social world is being “constantly 
produced and reproduced by sense-makers, who make decisions and act on the basis of 
the sense they make” (Heritage, 1988, p. 186). He was interested in “learning how 
members’ actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical actions, 
practical circumstances, common sense knowledge of social structures, and practical 
sociological reasoning analyzeable [sic]” and also in “discovering the formal properties 
of commonplace, practical common sense actions, ‘from within’ actual settings, as 
ongoing accomplishments of those settings” – in other words, studying social order and 
structure by investigating concrete, i.e., situated, interactions (Garfinkel, 1967, p. viii). 
The accounting practices, as he also refers to the social actors’ methods for making 
social activities “visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes, i.e., ‘ac-
countable’” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii), have to be viewed as social and shared. How else 
would actors be able “to reason towards the same conclusions, understand one another 
and act in a coordinated fashion” (Heritage, 1988, p. 178). Since members of specific 
cultures and subcultures shared these strategies of sense-making, Garfinkel called them 
ethnomethods. The research field and the approach he advocated for investigating 
social life came to be known as ethnomethodology (Heritage, 1988, p. 176). 
The notion of “accountability” is a critical idea in Garfinkel’s work, and he uses it in 
two ways. On the one hand, it refers to “an intelligible action and one which we can 
therefore name, or describe or, more generally, ‘give an account of’” (Heritage, 1988, 
p. 180). Accountability, in this sense, relates to the descriptive usage of the term norm, 
as described earlier. Because a particular pattern of social action was encountered 
before, humans recognize it and are able to use it for meaning construction later on. On 
the other hand, accountability in Garfinkel’s oeuvre also carries the more usual moral 
meaning “in which we speak of someone being ‘accountable for their actions’” (ibid.), 
relating to the prescriptive usage of the term norm. Heritage argues: 
These two senses link back to Garfinkel’s argument in the ticktacktoe experiment 
that rules are resources both to guide actions and to make sense of them. The notion 
of accountability helps to consolidate the idea that reasoning actors use rules to 
make sense of one another and hold one another to account. The question now 
becomes: what are these rules like, how do they work, what are their properties, 
how extensive are they? (Heritage, 1988, p. 180) 
In order to understand Heritage’s comment, it is helpful to look at the ticktacktoe 
experiment which he is referring to. This experiment was one in a series of so-called 
breaching experiments which were devised by Garfinkel. The goal of these experiments 
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was to confront people with unexpected behavior. The different types of social reactions 
engendered by the behavioral violations were then used to analyze the social structure, 
which made these social reactions possible (Rafalovich, 2006, p. 156). It was, so to speak, 
a way to disturb the flow of interaction in order to make apparent the structures, 
processes, and reasoning that were operative in the background and responsible for this 
very flow. 
For this particular experiment, Garfinkel asked his students to play the game 
ticktacktoe with people from their circle of family, friends, and acquaintances. They 
were instructed to let the unsuspecting opponent make his first mark, which then was 
erased by the experimenter, moved to another cell and followed by the experimenter 
making her own mark while pretending all along that her actions were nothing out of 
the ordinary. There are two main conclusions, which are drawn from the data gathered 
through this experiment. First, “behaviours, which were at variance with the basic rules 
of the game ‘immediately motivated attempts to normalize the discrepancy, i.e. to treat 
the observed behaviour as an instance of a legally possible event.’” Second, “senseless-
ness and disturbance was increased if the subject attempted to normalize the 
discrepancy while retaining an unaltered view of the ‘rules of the game’” (Heritage, 
1984, p. 79). 
Being aware that it was difficult to extrapolate from the game setting of this 
experiment to real-life situations, Garfinkel went on to develop and conduct other 
experiments. In one of these experiments, students were instructed to “engage an 
acquaintance or friend in an ordinary conversation and, without indicating that what the 
experimenter was saying was in any way out of the ordinary, to insist that the person 
clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks” (Garfinkel, as cited in Heritage, 1984, 
p. 80). By way of illustration, one of the cases is reproduced below in which the capital 
letter S stands for the subject and the letter E for experimenter: 
CASE 3 
“On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked 
that he was tired. I asked, ‘How are you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bored?’” 
S: I don’t know, I guess physically, mainly. 
E: You mean that your muscles ache or your bones? 
S: I guess so. Don’t be so technical. 
(After more watching) 
S: All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them. 
E: What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the 
ones you have seen? 
S: What’s the matter with you? You know what I mean. 
E: I wish you would be more specific. 
S: You know what I mean! Drop dead! (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 43)  
These experiments showed not only how much background knowledge is involved in 
any interaction but also how much it is expected tacitly from the other actor(s) to 
employ it. The breaching of this expectation often led within seconds to a deterioration 
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of the situation in which the subject felt, for example, strongly annoyed or stultified. 
Heritage summarizes some vital insights: 
With these experiments, the basic relationship between normative rules and socially 
organized events appears to be a strongly cognitive one in which ‘rules’ (concertedly 
applied) are constitutive of ‘what the events are’, or of ‘what is going on here’. By 
comparison, the more conventional regulative sense of rule in which rules are said 
to mark out ‘proper’ or ‘desirable’ conduct appears a more secondary matter. By the 
same token, the ‘force’ of the rules appears not to derive from a ‘moral consensus’ 
on the ‘sacredness’ of the rules, but rather from the fact that, if conduct cannot be 
interpreted in accordance with the rules, the social organization of a set of ‘real 
circumstances’ simply disintegrates. (Heritage, 1984, p. 83) 
The fact that Garfinkel recognized and emphasized the “reflexive” and “incarnate” 
nature of accounting practices, which according to his own words, made up the crux of 
his approach, does not imply that humans do not internalize norms and rules. After all, 
there is plenty of empirical evidence that the violation of such norms is often 
accompanied by negative self-conscious emotions like guilt, shame, and embarrassment 
in case of deviance, and the compliance with certain ideals does often evoke emotions 
such as pride (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). There is also no reason to argue against the 
notion that humans do indeed internalize structures, as Bourdieu explains: 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence 
produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. (Bourdieu, 
1990, p. 53)  
Nevertheless, such internalized norms and values have a distinctly different function in 
Garfinkel’s thinking as opposed to Parsons’ approach: 
In Garfinkel’s view, identities generate norms, not the reverse. And the motivational 
accounts that can be imputed to identities lay out the values of a social system. (…) 
In Garfinkel’s view, actors are not motivated by norms and values to pursue valued 
courses of action; rather, in trying to produce actions which accord with the 
motivational accounts that (in a particular configuration of social structures) go with 
their identities, actors can be seen in retrospect to have taken on the norms and 
values belonging to those identities and conferred on them the accent of reality. 
(Rawls, 2006, p. 70) 
The practical sociological reasoning which Garfinkel talks about is also very different 
from game-theoretical reasoning, let alone RTC, and it would be amiss to suggest that 
Garfinkel emphasized the micro perspective over the macro perspective. As Rawls 
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argues, the “micro/macro distinction has never had any relevance to Ethno-
methodology” and continues to detail his position as follows: 
Garfinkel works hard, in this early manuscript,1 to distinguish his position from what 
he sees as the individualism in these other developing forms of interactionism. If 
anything, he can be seen arguing against the early development of individualistic 
tendencies in interactionism. The actor, for Garfinkel, is not a concrete person, or a 
container for motivations, or roles. The actor is a series of propositions, or rules, for 
enacting identity and producing recognizable situated action. As such, an actor or 
identity belongs to a location or situation, not to a person. (Rawls, 2006, pp. 57-58) 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In light of the above considerations and based on Garfinkel’s approach, it makes sense 
to follow Blommaert in his suggestion to overcome the perceived juxtaposition of 
agency and structure by replacing the term structure and instead to speak of 
“constructure”:  
‘Constructure’ is not technically speaking a neologism – it is an archaic term that 
offers a felicitous collocation of ‘structure’ and ‘construction’. The latter term, as can 
be seen, can easily be changed into ‘agency’, and so we have a concept in which both 
dimensions, often seen as antagonistic, are heuristically and analytically joined, and 
in which the layered historicity of social processes can be captured. (Blommaert, 
2018a, sec. 4.7) 
This constructure is: 
–  “dynamic and unstable” as systems are perpetually unfolding and changing;  
–  “unfinished and stochastic” due to its evolving nature and because “today’s structure 
might be yesterday’s exception” which is usually not predictable from initial 
conditions;  
–  “non-unified” in the sense that it “consists of a mixture of different forces, 
developing at different speeds and with different scope and range” (Blommaert, 
2018a, sec. 4.7). 
In this paradigm, norms are considered essential tools for the continuous (re)con-
structing of social order and the expression, creation, and interpreting of meaning. 
However, they are neither some quasi determinative forces creating social order nor are 
they game-theoretical equilibria emanating from self-interested reasoning.  
Collective norms are, therefore, seen in this dissertation as “ordered sets of 
interactionally ratified behavioural details which we can call behavioural scripts” 
(Blommaert, 2018a, sec. 4.2) and because “[m]ost of the behavior we deploy socially is 
                                                 
1 Rawls is referring to Seeing Sociologically: The Routine Grounds of Social Action (Garfinkel, 2006) 
which had originated in 1948 as a proposal for a dissertation which was never written. 
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overwhelmingly iterative, but slightly inflected by unique, creative and situated 
performativity” (Blommaert, 2018a, sec. 4.7) they can also be described as “inter-
actionally co-constructed modes of turning situated behaviour into recognizable 











Building on the previous chapter, this chapter first provides a toolbox of concepts and 
approaches considered useful throughout the rest of the dissertation. Second, it 
presents the research questions and describes how the research was designed and 
conducted and what challenges had to be overcome. 
 
3.1 Conceptual toolbox 
3.1.1 Goffman’s dramatism and theory of stigma 
The previous chapter laid the groundwork regarding the question of how this disser-
tation defines norms. Continuing from that cornerstone, it is possible to integrate useful 
concepts and ideas from other sources which are congruent with Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology and Blommaert’s approach. Particularly Goffman’s work, which is 
another approach focusing on everyday life interaction like Garfinkel, provides a rich 
repertoire of compatible concepts. Berberoglu puts both, Garfinkel and Goffman, in the 
same category of “sociologies of everyday life” which “are, in a sense, social behaviorist 
approaches in that their prime concern is with detailing human behavior at the 
interpersonal level, as distinct from historical, comparative, or structural analyses of 
society and social relations” (Berberoglu, 2017, p. 180). 
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956), Goffman proposed to use the 
metaphor of theater and to look at social interactions through the lens of theatrical 
performance. Jacobsen and Kristiansen summarize Goffman’s approach succinctly: 
Introducing the dramaturgical framework, Goffman suggested that when an 
individual is in the immediate physical presence of other people, he or she will 
unavoidably seek to control the impression that others form of him or her in order 
to achieve individual or social goals. The actor will engage in impression 
management. On the other side, the other participants in the social encounter will 
attempt to form an impression of who and what this particular individual is. They will 
try to form a picture of his or her identity, and for that purpose they use a number 
of different types of sign vehicles, each saying something about the person in 
question. (Jacobsen & Kristiansen, 2015, p. 68) 
Social actors are not in complete control of the impression they make on others. There 
is information which the agent consciously and intentionally “gives” through verbal and 
nonverbal channels. There is also much information “given off”, consisting “of the signs 
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and expressions that actors unwittingly and unconsciously emit, signs the surroundings 
perceive as characteristic for that person” (Jacobsen & Kristiansen, 2015, p. 268f). 
Within the image of a theatre, there is the difference between a “front region” and 
a “back region”. Goffman applied this distinction to social situations where the front 
region or frontstage is where the performance is given and the back region or backstage 
where the performer can withdraw, relax, and recharge (Goffman, 1956, p. 66). In a 
restaurant, the dining hall with the guests amounts to the front stage where the 
employees of the restaurants “perform”, and the kitchen would be the backstage where 
the agents can prepare all the necessary things and get ready for the performance – out 
of sight of the audience. During her performance on the front stage, the agent is obliged 
to act according to specific standards: in her dealing with the audience, Goffman speaks 
of matters of politeness. The other standard “has to do with the way in which the 
performer comports himself while in visual or aural range of the audience but not 
necessarily engaged in talk with them” and is labeled decorum by Goffman (1956, p. 67). 
There is more to be said about the frontage-backstage dynamic, and the chapter will 
return to this particular aspect of Goffman’s approach in Section 3.4.4 on “Degree of 
privacy during interviews”. For now, another useful aspect of “impression management” 
for the present research, namely the problem of stigmatization, shall be presented. 
According to Goffman, society puts people into categories with specific attributes. 
He calls these categories social identities, and when a person encounters somebody 
from a particular social identity, she knows what to expect. Such expectations work 
because she has anticipations from past experiences, and these are transformed into 
normative expectations, “righteously presented demands” as Goffman calls them 
(Goffman, 1963a, p. 6). He labels what people expect or anticipate from others as 
“virtual social identity”. However, the reality, i.e., the “actual social identity”, does not 
always match the virtual social identity. When an individual fails to live up to what the 
others effectively demand of him, people tend to reject this person (Goffman, 1963b, 
p. 6). Therefore, the central issue of a stigmatized person is the question of acceptance: 
It is a question of what is often, if vaguely, called “acceptance.” Those who have 
dealings with him fail to accord him the respect and regard which the uncon-
taminated aspects of his social identity have led them to anticipate extending, and 
have led him to anticipate receiving; he echoes this denial by finding that some of 
his own attributes warrant it. (Goffman, 1963a, p. 8f) 
Stigma refers “to an attribute that is deeply discrediting” (Goffman, 1963a, p. 3). 
However, it is not necessarily the attribute itself, which is the problem but the fact that 
it does not fit with the social identity of the person and the attributes which are 
connected to that identity from the perspective of the society. For example, lacking a 
certain educational level could be embarrassing and something a person tries to conceal 
when doing a particular job because she feels that others might expect it from some-
body who holds this kind of job. However, a person who does hold such an academic 
degree might feel equally embarrassed when doing a job where her education could be 
seen as marking a failure, or she might be treated as an outsider (Goffman, 1963a, p. 3). 
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Goffman discerns three types of stigmas: 
First there are abominations of the body – the various physical deformities. Next 
there are blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will, domineering or 
unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, these being 
inferred from a known record of, for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, 
addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical 
political behavior. Finally there are the tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion, 
these being stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and equally 
contaminate all members of a family. (Goffman, 1963a, p. 4) 
The last category shows that a person can be stigmatized because of her group 
membership. Stigmatized people are sometimes seen somehow as “less than human, 
not quite human” and the society often imputes a whole variety of other attributes. 
Thus, people might be afraid to touch a blind person as if blindness was a communicable 
disease or will shout at her as if she was also deaf. 
Even if one carries an attribute for which people are stigmatized, one does not 
necessarily have to be stigmatized himself. First, there is a difference between a 
discredited attribute and a discreditable attribute. The former refers to something which 
is known by people, while the latter refers to an attribute which is not known but would 
be discredited if the others, i.e., the group or the society, learned about it. Such a 
discreditable but not (yet) discovered attribute could be a source of much anxiety and 
fear that somebody might find out. 
Second, there is a difference between supporting a standard, which defines some-
thing as a stigma and realizing that same standard. For example, a man can uphold a 
standard that topless bathing at a public beach is disgraceful for women but still goes 
bare-breasted himself, or a husband might expect submissiveness from his wife while 
behaving quite assertive himself. These examples illustrate what was said before, 
namely that an attribute as such is not necessarily a stigma but only if it does not match 
the social identity. 
Even if a woman is aware that there are undeniably unequal standards at play and 
that the standards, which apply to her social identity, impose more limitations on her 
than on her male counterpart, she might not only support the standard but also feel a 
strong urge to comply with it. The same holds for other social identities. A person from 
a lower social status might feel out of place and embarrassed in a gathering of upper-
class people because 
the standards he has incorporated from the wider society equip him to be intimately 
alive to what others see as his failing, inevitably causing him, if only for moments, to 
agree that he does indeed fall short of what he really ought to be. Shame becomes 
a central possibility, arising from the individual’s perception of one of his own 
attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one he can readily see himself as 
not possessing. (Goffman, 1963a, p. 7) 
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Goffman’s observations about stigma and the related phenomena of shame and honor, 
are supported by empirical studies in psychology (e.g., Tangney & Fischer, 1995) and 
also from insights yielded by psychological anthropology (Spiro, 1958). 
However, there are also limitations and blind spots existent in the approaches of 
Goffman and Garfinkel. A shared weakness of the “sociologies of everyday life” consists 
in the danger that “the microscopic, astructural aspects of both orientations not only 
result in an inadequate treatment of larger societal features, but put rather sharp limits 
on their historical and cross-cultural applicability” (Berberoglu, 2017, p. 187). Goffman’s 
sociology, in particular, was charged that it paints 
a picture of society in which there are scenes but no plot. And since there is no plot 
in this sociology, no history, there are no characters in it, as that term has any 
meaning in the theater, for their actions cause no change in the lives of his people; 
there are only endless adaptations. (Sennett, 1976, p. 36) 
In order to overcome these limitations and to counterbalance the mentioned 
weaknesses, the Bakhtinian concept of chronotopes proves to be very helpful and shall 
be explained shortly. However, before doing so, a closer look at the narrative nature of 
human thought is needed. 
 
3.1.2 The narrative nature of human thought 
Social norms are seen in this dissertation to originate as situated behavior, which turned 
into an interactionally ratified pattern of meaning “for another first time”. Emphasizing 
the importance of situatedness qua concrete (inter)actions does by no means imply that 
people’s personal or social lives merely consist of concatenations of more or less disjoint 
and maybe even random concrete events and encounters as the highest level of 
abstraction. 
The actions of bees in a beehive look random at first sight. The complexity of life 
within such a beehive is mind-bogglingly complex. Bees follow clear scripts and even 
cooperate and communicate according to inborn strategies called instincts. Humans are 
different from bees in this regard as human actions are based much less on instincts. As 
Garfinkel insisted, humans reason and this way make actions “accountable” – their own 
actions and those of others. The difference does not only consist of humans being less 
dependent on instincts and possessing a communication medium, viz. language, which 
can convey much more subtle information about reality. Humans operate on commonly 
shared narratives. 
Two observations by Harari, in particular, are relevant for the present argument. 
First, humans can talk about things that do not exist. They can invent these things and 
not just make themselves believe these things but do so together, i.e., collectively. 
Second, humans do that to their advantage: 
But fiction has enabled us not merely to imagine things, but to do so collectively. We 
can weave common myths such as the biblical creation story, the Dreamtime myths 
of Aboriginal Australians, and the nationalist myths of modern states. Such myths 
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give Sapiens the unprecedented ability to cooperate flexibly in large numbers. Ants 
and bees can also work together in huge numbers, but they do so in a very rigid 
manner and only with close relatives. Wolves and chimpanzees cooperate far more 
flexibly than ants, but they can do so only with small numbers of other individuals 
that they know intimately. Sapiens can cooperate in extremely flexible ways with 
countless numbers of strangers. (Harari, 2014, chap. 2) 
Harari confirms here a proposition from the previous chapter of this dissertation, 
namely that the human world, i.e., society and culture, is both a collective and a flexible 
product – just as the concept of constructure intends to express. He further points out 
the centrality of narratives in human reasoning and how it enables human groups to act 
collectively and in a flexible manner at the same time. Humans are usually not quite 
aware of how much they live in that virtual or semiotic world of stories: 
You might not realize it, but you are a creature of an imaginative realm called 
Neverland. Neverland is your home, and before you die, you will spend decades 
there. If you haven’t noticed this before, don’t despair: story is for a human as water 
is for a fish – all-encompassing and not quite palpable. (Gottschall, 2012, Preface) 
White agrees and suggests that “[t]o raise the question of the nature of narrative is to 
invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of 
humanity itself” (White, 1980, p. 1). It is, therefore, not surprising that “[n]arrative has 
received a great deal of attention in recent years, not simply in the corridors of literature 
departments but throughout the various disciplines of the human sciences, ranging from 
anthropology to linguistics and from jurisprudence to sociology” (Lucaites & Condit, 
1985, p. 90). Lucaites and Condit suggest that the “impetus for this surge of interest has 
been, in large measure, the growing belief that narrative represents a universal medium 
of human consciousness” (Lucaites & Condit, 1985, p. 90). The productivity of Bakhtin’s 
chronotope, which will be introduced shortly, is a point in case. 
Bruner supports the idea that narratives are central to humans and contends that 
“we organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form 
of narrative – stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on” 
(Bruner, 1991, p. 4). What is particularly intriguing considering his psychological back-
ground, though, is his emphasis that narrative structures are neither random nor 
somehow biologically hardwired but instead come to us in a “conventional form, 
transmitted culturally”, including their inherent logic: 
Narratives, then, are a version of reality whose acceptability is governed by 
convention and “narrative necessity” rather than by empirical verification and logical 
requiredness, although ironically we have no compunction about calling stories true 
or false. (Bruner, 1991, p. 4; emphasis added) 
In other words, narratives are not just a useful albeit ultimately dispensable tool but are 
rather central to the human experience. Narrativity is so universal and ubiquitous that 
it seems justified to speak of a “narrative urge” inherent to human reasoning, i.e., how 
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humans make sense of events and actions, how they construct meaning and make 
decisions (Beach et al., 2016, p. 35). Similar to the faculty of speech, which is a 
prerequisite to learn languages but also depends on being socialized into existing 
languages, the narrative urge makes individuals capable of partaking in a collective 
human world whose operating system, so to speak, consists of (pre-existing forms of) 
narratives. 
MacIntyre, promoting the view that man is “in his actions and practice, as well as in 
his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal,” describes the importance of the pool of 
pre-existing stories provided by our society: 
I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question 
‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, 
with one or more imputed characters – roles into which we have been drafted – and 
we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond 
to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed. It is through hearing 
stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided kings, wolves 
that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must make their 
own way in the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous living 
and go into exile to live with the swine, that children learn or mislearn both what a 
child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into 
which they have been born and what the ways of the world are. Deprive children of 
stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their 
words. (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 216) 
Research from social psychology confirms “the idea that narrative communication is an 
important part of cultural reproduction mechanism” (Imada & Yussen, 2012, p. 114). 
MacIntyre illustrates how humans learn to make actions “accountable” in Garfinkel’s 
two senses: through narratives, can they make sense of actions and assess the morality 
or appropriateness of behavior. It also explains where humans get their templates for 
the improvisational theatre – for that is how their everyday life actually works, according 
to Goffman and Burke. It is an improvisational theatre because humans are not merely 
watching and interpreting actions and events as stories. Instead, they are also involved 
actively in shaping them through their decisions and actions. Such kind of theatre, just 
like jazz music, needs some terms of reference or vital parameters. Otherwise, the 
participants would not be able to interact at all, and performances (musicians playing 
jazz together and encounters in the everyday world) would be utterly confusing, 
frustrating, and even frightening. People rely on some sort of templates, which gives 
them orientation – not only in concrete and relatively bounded situations but also to 
connect the dots, i.e., the millions of situations of their real lives, to create a bigger 
picture. The concept of chronotopes, which will be introduced in the next section, is very 
helpful in understanding such templates and how they work. 
Before proceeding to Bakhtin’s ideas, there is one more observation made by Beach 
and his colleagues from the perspective of narrative thinking, which is worth pointing 
out because it will be relevant in the subsequent section. Although action movies and 
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cooking shows both have a narrative structure, there is a difference, which deserves 
mentioning. Beach et al. (2016) suggest to group narratives into two broad categories. 
Chronicle narratives tell stories that are “organised around a time line, causality, and 
purpose,” while procedural narratives are about “how to perform specific tasks, like how 
to use a computer or a cell phone” (Beach et al., 2016, p. 62). A bookshelf of the first 
category would contain both, fiction like drama, action, romance and non-fiction like 
(auto)biographies and history books. Typical books of the procedural shelf would be 
manuals and cookbooks. 
 
3.1.3 Chronotopes 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) was a Russian literary theorist and philosopher of language. 
According to Renfrew, he was “without doubt the most astonishingly productive thinker 
in the Humanities to emerge from Soviet Russia and one of the twentieth century’s most 
significant theoreticians of literature” (Renfrew, 2015, chap. 1). He was intrigued by 
Einstein’s relativity theory, which was first published in 1916. The idea that time and 
space (including matter) are not independent phenomena but are instead connected in 
a time-space continuum bending and shaping each other inspired Baktin’s reasoning 
about literature. He realized that in literature, too, time and space are not independent 
parameters but exist in specific configurations. 
To convey this idea, he coined the word chronotope. It combines the Greek words 
for time, chronos, and place, topos, to express the intricate and indissoluble relationship 
between time and space. Certain kinds of stories are connected with particular 
chronotopes and can take place only in those chronotopes. With this idea, Bakhtin 
departs from the tradition of some of his formalist contemporaries and insists that 
genres can be distinguished based on their use of different chronotopes (Thomson, 
1984). Blommaert points out that it would be a grave mistake to see chronotopes just 
as a descriptive tool, used merely to represent time and space in discourse or as the 
cognitive theory behind Bakhtin’s work. Instead, it should be appreciated as something 
more productive that enables specific stories to take place and even shapes them: 
In Bakhtin’s analyses, chronotopes invoke and enable a plot structure, characters or 
identities, and social and political worlds in which actions become dialogically 
meaningful, evaluated and understandable in specific ways. Specific chronotopes 
produce specific kinds of person, actions, meaning and value. (Blommaert, 2015, 
p. 9). 
Bakhtin’s chronotope, which initially was referring to literary notions of time and space, 
evolved to become much more than just a device from literary criticism and came to be 
applied amply and productively in the social sciences and humanities in general. As a 
fitting illustration of what is meant by a chronotope one could take the description of 
“student life” by Bourdieu: 
The specific timespace of student life involves particular activities, discourses, and 
interaction patterns; role relationships and identity formation modes; particular 
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ways of conduct and consumption; of taste development and so forth, most of which 
are new, demand procedures of discovery and learning, and involve the mobilization 
of existing cultural and social capital in the (differential) process of acquiring new 
capital. References to similar timespace elements (a charismatic or dramatically 
incompetent lecturer, a particular café, or a then-popular movie or piece of music) 
create a shared sense of cohort belonging with others, which coexists with 
preexisting belongings to social groups and which enters into posterior forms of 
belonging. (Blommaert & De Fina, 2017, p. 2) 
The student life consists of particular places and specific times and rhythms and allows 
for certain events to happen. When somebody tells a story about his or her student life, 
his listeners know what to expect, viz. things like professors, lectures, pubs, parties, 
exams. The same applies to war stories or stories people tell about their time when they 
served in the army. When a friend says something like “when I was in the army”, we 
switch immediately into a specific symbolic world with rather particular situations, 
identities, practices, and rules. My father’s childhood stories from Yugoslavia early after 
World War II, require additional information about that chronotope because it is full of 
characters (roles and identities), practices, and artifacts that are entirely foreign to his 
children. His chronicle narratives are shot through with procedural narratives, e.g., how 
they used to make hay and what items they used. Often he would tell those stories to 
describe and explain that chronotope in order to compare it to the chronotope of my 
childhood. Whether it is situations which keep happening continuously, like student life 
and military service, or non-recurring phases, like post-war Yugoslavia, in both cases we 
are dealing with chronotopes which are “‘invokable histories’, elaborate frames in which 
time, space and patterns of agency coincide, create meaning and value, and can be set 
off against other chronotopes” (Blommaert, 2015, p. 9). Thus, chronotopes do not offer 
only orientation about what to expect and how to act, i.e., norms, but also identities, 
which can be adopted and inhabited. Even in a short and fleeting chronotope like the 
dinner at the restaurant, one becomes for a short while a guest and knows what is 
expected and how to behave. 
Some chronotopes are disadvantageous for particular identities. In such cases, 
agents might try to change and shape the chronotopic norms and structure. Alterna-
tively, they might try to replace the present unfavorable chronotope with another 
chronotope, for example, by proclaiming a country as a republic and abolishing the old 
chronotope, the kingdom, and its rules, which is what happened on September 21, 1792, 
in France. A more recent example would be the proclamation of the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant, where people suddenly find themselves in a completely new “story”, so 
to speak. 
Chronotopes vary significantly in size and duration. Having dinner at a restaurant, for 
example, is a much smaller and shorter chronotopic unit than the previously mentioned 
“student life”, not to mention chronotopes like the Ottoman Empire. A chronotope of 
having dinner at a restaurant or going to school is, on the one hand, detailed and 
concerned about procedural aspects and, on the other hand, abstracted. It is a pattern, 
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which is repeated and reused continuously. The Ottoman chronotope and the 
Yugoslavia chronotope of the childhood of my father are different. Such chronotopes 
refer to an “invokable history” that is, in principle, unrepeatable – unlike the visit at the 
restaurant. The narrative logic and the narrative necessities, as Bruner (1991) called 
them, are less focused on procedural patterns but more on historically based 
contingencies. When a novelist writes a fictitious story which takes place at an airport 
compared to a novel that unfolds in Victorian England, she is using different kinds of 
chronotopes. In order to account for this difference, one can employ the distinction 
between chronicle narratives and procedural narratives, which was introduced earlier 
and apply it to chronotopes. Studying at the university or eating out at a restaurant can 
be regarded as procedural chronotopes, and The Third Reich or the Industrial Revolution 
are examples of chronicle chronotopes. It is crucial to add that this distinction is merely 
one of degree. In other words, a chronotope has a more or less procedural or chronicle 
perspective or approach. 
Both kinds of chronotopes enable plots and provide identities. Although the identity 
as a guest at the restaurant is much more transient and fleeting than, say, a Janissary of 
the Ottoman Empire, it can still bleed into other parts and domains of the agent’s life. 
Even though a “regular customer” of Starbucks might not spend an extended amount of 
time there, her visible consumption of Starbucks’ products could still rub off on her 
overall identity, signaling to herself and others that she is the kind of person who visits 
this sort of café. 
 
3.1.4 Scales 
It has become apparent in the previous section that chronotopes come in different sizes. 
Quite naturally, at times, they overlay and superimpose each other. In order to grapple 
with this phenomenon, which Blommaert called “layered simultaneity” (Blommaert, 
2005, p. 126), and to be able to peel the different layers apart for closer investigation 
without being limited by a monochrome micro-macro distinction, Blommaert suggests 
the concept of scale. Scales, in his view, are not merely spatial phenomena but include 
the temporal dimension where social events develop “simultaneously in space and in 
time, often in multiply imagined spaces and timeframes” (Blommaert, 2010, sec. 2.2). 
Still, the spatial quality of the scale image refers to the “vertical dimension of 
hierarchical ordering and power differentiation” and indicates that sociolinguistic scales 
“need to be understood as ‘levels’ or ‘dimensions’ (…) at which particular forms of 
normativity, patterns of language use and expectations thereof are organized” 
(Blommaert, 2010, sec. 2.2). 
Regarding the dimension of time, Blommaert employs Fernand Braudel’s distinction 
between slow time, intermediate time and fast time: “Slow time (the durée) was the 
time of the climate and of social systems; intermediate time was the time of empires, 
dynasties etc., while fast time was the time of events such as battles or revolutions (the 
évènements)” (Blommaert, 2010, p. 147). The intention here is not to introduce merely 
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three “stories” (or levels) of time scales but to bring to attention that with different time 
spans human awareness and agency change: 
Few people are aware of the slow, long time of climate fluctuations (we now perhaps 
live in an era where people are quite conscious of it), and developments at this level 
are usually beyond the reach of individual agency. The time of empires has a higher 
level of consciousness and agency, and the fast time of events is within the reach of 
human individual agency and consciousness. (Blommaert, 2010, p. 147). 
The scale imagery brings with it the notion that higher scales outperform lower scales 
and it suggests that the ability to jump to a higher scale, outscaling the other person, is 
“a frequent power tactic: lifting a particular issue to a scale-level which is inaccessible to 
the other” (Blommaert, 2010, p. 36). With such scale jumping, one can observe “various 
kinds of semiotic transformations”: 
 
Table 3.1: Semiotic transformations between different scales according to Blommaert (2010, 
p. 35) 
Lower scale Higher scale 
momentary timeless 
local, situated translocal, widespread 
personal, individual impersonal, collective 
contextualized decontextualized 
subjective objective 
specific general, categorical 
token type 
individual role 
diversity, variation uniformity, homogeneity 
 
In a conversation between two interlocutors with the same religious affiliation, one of 
them could invoke some teachings or eternal truths held by their respective religious 
community and outscale the other. Similarly, a professor might quote university 
regulations or traditions in response to a Ph.D. student’s “private” opinion, and through 
such a scale jump claims a higher level of relevance, authority or validity (Blommaert, 
2010, sec. 2.2). This scale jump can be simply a matter of switching from singular to 
plural: “Well, we at the university do it like this…” or “In the Brethren Churches, we 
believe that…” Blommaert suggests that using the concept of scale 
has the advantage of introducing a layered, stratified model of society as a frame for 
the interpretation of such [communicative] phenomena. Power and inequality thus 
become incorporated into our ways of imagining such phenomena, and rather than 
seeing them as an exceptional aberration in social life (as in many analyses focused 
on power), they can be seen as an integral feature of every social event. (Blommaert, 
2010, p. 36). 
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However, the principle of outscaling is not necessarily always uncontested. A historical 
example would be the Peace of Augsburg of 1555. The conflicting parties accepted the 
principle Cuius regio, eius religio (Whose realm, his religion), which gave the local ruler 
the right to determine the religion of his subjects and effectively refuted the power 
claims of the Roman Catholic Church. These power claims, according to the logic of 
outscaling, could appeal to higher scales than local German rulers could. After all, the 
Roman Curia was older, thus had a more timeless quality, and it was without question 
more translocal and operated on a much broader collective scale. The Kulturkampf in 
the nineteenth century is another case in point. During that era, Bismarck used the 
power structure of the German state and rendered the Roman Curia’s efforts futile. 
Modern European states like France and Germany did succeed, at least for a period, to 
enforce their claims to represent the highest scale in their respective territories. In the 
age of globalization and transnational corporations, which are acting on the scale of 
global markets, nation-states are faced with new challenges. 
Adding another spatial parameter, namely proximity to the power center of the 
relevant chronotopes, however, can preserve the scale concept. The dissertation 
suggests using the imagery of the gravitational forces from the physical world to explain 
the seeming inconsistency in the scale model. The magnitude of the force F pulling 
between two objects with the masses m1 and m2 can be calculated with the formula 
              where G stands for the gravitational constant, and r is the distance 
between the two objects. The bigger the masses, the bigger the force, which is pulling 
both masses towards each other. However, the ensuing movement, i.e., the 
acceleration, depends on each object’s mass. The other very important variable is the 
distance between the two objects. The further away, the less force is pulling. The 
decrease is not linear but exponential with doubling of the distance resulting in a quarter 
of the force. In other words, there are two variables, which influence the magnitude of 














Figure 3.1: Gravitational forces dependent on distance 
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In the drawing depicted in Figure 3.1, the object A, even though C has decidedly more 
mass than B and certainly pulls A with some force, would still move toward B due to its 
proximity. Thus, a smaller planet can exert a greater gravitational pull on an object if it 
is close enough. Similarly, a chronotope on a smaller scale can outperform chronotopes 
on higher scales. Let us return to the example of the Peace of Augsburg and the 
Kulturkampf. The local German powers amassed enough political, military, economic, 
and other kinds of “weight”, which were enough to counter the influence of the Catholic 
Church. The issue of fields of tension created by chronotopes from different scales pops 
up, for example, again in Chapter 4 dealing with the competing influences of state and 
tribe. 
 
3.1.5 Mediated Discourse Analysis (MDA) 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, MDA emerged out of the endeavor “to move 
discourse analysis beyond the analysis of texts to consider questions about the actions 
people take with them, as well as with other cultural tools, and the social consequences 
these actions have” (Norris & Jones, 2005, p. viii). Hence, it fits well with the 
assumptions about discourse, which this dissertation is based on. It is also eclectic, 
borrowing from a broad range of sources, including but not limited to Goffman, Burke, 
Bakhtin, and Vygotsky who, as the next pages will show, had a significant influence on 
MDA. The result is a language useful for ethnographic descriptions and analyses. 
What makes MDA particularly attractive for this research is that it is not limited to 
and not even primarily focused on discourse. It regards discourse as merely one form of 
action and analyses it, therefore, also as “discourse in action” (Norris & Jones, 2005). 
Norris and Jones clarify this point: 
We also do not mean to suggest that discourse is simply an ingredient in action – 
that discourse is in action in the same way carrots are in a pot of stew. This view 
obscures the complex ways actions are taken through discourse and the ways 
discourse works its way into actions – sometimes through being ’resemiotized’ (…) 
as social practices, or ’frozen’ (…) in objects and other cultural tools. (Norris & Jones, 
2005, p. 8) 
It attempts to counter approaches which emphasize either discourse or action at the 
expense of the other and “seeks to develop a theoretical remedy for discourse analysis 
that operates without reference to social actions on the one hand, and social analysis 
that operates without reference to discourse on the other” (R. Scollon, 2001, p. 1). 
For Scollon, the central unit of research was the mediated action. Mediated action is 
social action, and the reason for him to call it mediated action was to emphasize the 
tension between the social agent (habitus, historical body) and the mediational means, 
which is another central concept in MDA. This has to do with the fact that MDA 
problematizes the concept of agency and is influenced in this regard by Burke. Burke 
was mentioned earlier as the other proponent (besides Goffman) to view the social 
reality as theatre, and he inspired both Scollon and Goffman. Using terms from the 
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theatre, he developed an interpretive tool which he called “dramatistic pentad” (Burke, 
1969). The idea behind this tool was that any action – in literature and real-life – could 
be viewed from five different perspectives. In the introduction to his book Grammar of 
Motives he explains: 
We shall use five terms as generating principle of our investigation. They are: Act, 
Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives, you must 
have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), 
and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which 
it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) 
performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. 
(Burke, 1969, p. xv) 
MDA uses partly different terms – the agent is called social actor, the act is referred to 
as mediated action, and agency corresponds to mediational means – but the logic is the 
same. Agency is distributed over Burke’s five perspectives, and from situation to 
situation, different perspectives play a more or less dominant role. In this paradigm, 
motives for specific actions are not merely referring to something “that led to these 
actions but, rather, we are defining situations and conceiving social actions in ways that 
others can understand and accept” and therefore “the discursive explanation and 
attribution of agency within social interaction, is, itself, a cultural tool for the con-
struction of identity” (Norris & Jones, 2005, p. 170). Social actors often find themselves 
in the tension between the motives of different agendas coming from those different 
perspectives. From the perspective of MDA, the question “Who is the agent?” is already 
based on the debatable assumption “that agency is a property of the individual, a body 
in a cultural, historical and institutional vacuum” (S. Scollon, 2005, p. 173). In fact, it is 
the primary premise of mediated discourse analysis that human action is never a 
matter of individual agency, but instead a product of the ’tension’ between the 
agenda of the individual and the agendas embedded in the mediational means made 
available in the socio-cultural setting and appropriated into the individual’s habitus 
as components of social practices. (Norris & Jones, 2005, p. 169) 
MDA uses the three terms mediational means, cultural tools, and semiotic resources to 
refer to the same object (or referent) in order to emphasize different aspects. However, 
the prominence of the concept of “mediation” is noteworthy not only for eponymous 
reasons – viz. mediated discourse analysis, mediated action, and mediational means – 
but also because it gives evidence of MDA’s indebtedness to Vygotsky’s ideas about 
mediation. Vygotsky was an early twentieth-century Russian psychologist whose 
writings had a significant impact on the development of social theory (Daniels et al., 
2007). Mediation is a theme that runs throughout his work as he was convinced that the 
use of tools, particularly of psychological nature, i.e., signs, is a distinguishing mark of 
human consciousness. In The Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky (Daniels et al., 2007), 
Wertsch explains: 
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Instead of acting in a direct, unmediated way in the social and physical world, our 
contact with the world is indirect or mediated by signs. This means that under-
standing the emergence and the definition of higher mental processes must be 
grounded in the notion of mediation. (Wertsch, 2007, p. 178) 
Thus, human action “typically employs ‘mediational means’ such as tools and language” 
and “these mediational means shape the action in essential ways” (Wertsch, 1991, 
p. 12). Based on these deliberations, Wertsch coined the term “mediated action” 
(Wertsch, 1998) that was employed intentionally by Scollon “to highlight the 
unresolvable dialectic between action and the material means which mediate all social 
action” (R. Scollon, 2001, p. 3). 
Mediational means have “semiotic potentials” (Wertsch, 1991), i.e., affordances and 
limitations. In other words, they differ regarding what one can do with them, which is a 
significant point because mediational means are polysemic and multifunctional. An 
example from pharmacology might help to convey this aspect. A particular chemical is 
used as medicine for a specific purpose but probably also has some so-called side effects. 
Chemically speaking, there is no difference between main effects and side effects. If the 
pharmaceutical industry or the doctor used the drug for one of the so-called side effects, 
it would become the main effect, and all the other effects would be side effects. 
Similarly, mediational means have their impact or force irrespective of the agent’s 
intentions. 
There are two kinds of properties of mediational means relevant in this regard. There 
are material properties of mediational means which encourage or prevent potential 
usages, and there are psychological or mental properties which, since mediational 
means emerged in response to various sociocultural forces, “have a predisposition to be 
used more easily for certain purposes than for others” (Wertsch, 1991, p. 38). 
Another term, which needs clarification, is the term “practice”. For reasons of 
analytical practicality, MDA scholars have been using the word practice more narrowly 
than in some other theories. It does not function so much in a generic sense but more 
as a count-word with a plural as in practices. What is commonly called practice, MDA 
suggests conceptualizing more as a kind of nexus “at which historical trajectories of 
people, places, discourses, ideas, and objects come together to enable some action” (R. 
Scollon & Wong Scollon, 2004, p. 8). Thus, MDA reserves the word practice for lower-
order things like greetings and using chopsticks, while it refers to higher-order practices, 
e.g., sheep farming and gift-giving, by the term “nexus of practice” because they consist 
of a conglomerate and chain of practices (Norris & Jones, 2005). 
A mediated action is a token of a (nexus of) practice and, as such, exists only as an 
actual occurrence. Therefore, it requires a “real-time window that is opened through an 
intersection of social practices and mediational means (cultural tools) that make that 
action the focal point of attention of the relevant participants” (R. Scollon, 2001, p. 3f). 
Scollon calls these real-time windows in time and space “sites of engagement”, and they 
share in the “real-time, irreversible, and unfinalizable nature of social action” (R. Scollon, 
2001, p. 3f). All sites of engagement are “complex aggregates (or nexus) of many 
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discourses which circulate through them” (R. Scollon, 2001, p. 14) All of these discourses 
have their historical trajectories, just like the social agents with their historical bodies 
and the mediational means. MDA underscores this historical dimension: 
Our interest as ethnographers is in social action and so for us a nexus analysis is the 
mapping of semiotic cycles of people, discourses, places, and mediational means 
involved in the social actions we are studying. We will use the term ‘nexus of 
practice’ to focus on the point at which historical trajectories of people, places, 
discourses, ideas, and objects come together to enable some action which in itself 
alters those historical trajectories in some way as those trajectories emanate from 














The use of the term “nexus analysis” allows Scollon to underscore the fact that such 
nexuses are complex aggregates where different layers of forces and processes meet, 
overlap, interact and together enable and shape social action. In Diagram 3.1, Scollon 
depicts the three main elements of social action and explains: 
A social action takes place as an intersection or nexus of some aggregate of 
discourses (educational talk, for example) – the discourses in place, some social 
arrangement by which people come together in social groups (a meeting, a 
conversation, a chance contact, a queue) – the interaction order, and the life 
experiences of the individual social actors – the historical body. (R. Scollon & Wong, 
2004, p. 19) 
Scollon borrows the term “interaction order” from Goffman, which refers to various 
possible arrangements by which people form relationships and social interactions. 
Goffman refers with this term to the fact that people behave differently if they are alone 
or in a company, and when they are in a company, it depends on the group, the occasion, 
and such aspects. People seem to know how to modify their behavior because they 
know the interaction order of different occasions and situations (R. Scollon & Wong 
Scollon, 2004, p. 13). 
Diagram 3.1: Three elements of social action. 
Taken from Nexus Analysis: Discourse and the 
emerging Internet (R. Scollon & Wong Scollon, 
2004, p. 20) 
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A few words are in order to problematize the relationship between two key concepts 
of the conceptual toolbox, which sometimes can be used for the same (semiotic) object. 
For example, “student life” can be viewed as a chronotope and also as a nexus of 
practice, viz. studying. In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to clarify how they are 
used in this study. 
The nexus of practice is, loosely speaking, a non-random conglomerate of practices 
that follow a normative sequence. Similarly, chronotopes are a non-random conglome-
rate of nexuses of practice and are “situated, i.e., specific and normative to certain 
situations” (Blommaert, private correspondence, 10-04-2017). For example, student life 
seen as a chronotope contains specific nexuses of practice like studying, debating, and 
presumably also going to pubs and partying (depending on the country). Studying, as a 
nexus of practice, contains lower level practices like borrowing a book from the library, 
which itself could be broken down in even lower level practices. The point is that it is 
hard with these concepts to draw a sharp demarcation line between practice and nexus 
of practice just as it is hard to decide when a hill becomes a mountain, and when 
precisely a mountain qualifies as a mountain range. This does not make the terms 
useless. After all, it is unlikely that people confuse a hill with a mountain range, and the 
distinction is undoubtedly useful. Thus, if we go in the other direction, i.e., to higher 
levels of nexuses of practice, the question arises where to draw the line between nexus 
of practice and chronotope. 
When the talk is about hills, mountains and mountain ranges, particular aspects help 
to decide how to categorize them. There is size, height, complexity, how they are located 
or positioned in relation to each other, and if they are connected by high ground. 
Regarding nexuses of practice and chronotopes, it is helpful to look at the size, height 
(i.e., the level), complexity, and how many of the phenomena are connected in what 
sort of way. Having a coffee at a local café might be seen as a “hill”, i.e., nexus of practice, 
while the Ottoman Empire resembles more a mountain range, i.e., a chronotope on a 
relatively high scale. It seems that nexuses of practice have more of a procedural nature 
or, to put it differently, the procedural aspect comes maybe more into focus. With a 
chronotope like the Ottoman Empire, the chronicle aspect is more at the center of 
attention. However, there is no need to link procedural narratives to nexus of practice 
and chronicle narratives to chronotopes in a fixed manner. 
The metaphors of hills and mountains, as helpful as they are, naturally have 
limitations. One particular blind spot from this perspective is the fact that chronotopes, 
including the codes and structures they contain, are continually changing, developing, 
and shifting. For that reason, the dissertation will now turn to the concept of indexical 
orders, which conceptualizes semiotic shifts and transformations. 
 
3.1.6 Indexical orders 
Linguistic anthropology uses four key concepts, namely form, use, ideology, and domain, 
to investigate “how signs communicate referential and relational messages as they are 
used in social and cultural contexts” (Wortham, 2008, p. 83). While the terms “form” 
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and “use” are relatively self-evident, “ideology” and “domain” might need a few 
explanatory remarks. Linguistic signs often cannot be understood wholly based only on 
the local context. One has to draw on “more widely circulating models of social world” 
which linguists call ideologies of language, i.e., “models of linguistic features and the 
speakers who characteristically use them, which people draw on as they interpret the 
social relations signaled through language use” (Wortham, 2008, p. 84). 
Within the semiotic framework of the present research, which includes but also 
transcends linguistics, one might actually speak of semiotic ideologies (Keane, 2018). 
Such ideologies are not evenly distributed throughout the population or speech 
community but have specific domains, i.e., a “set of people who recognize the indexical 
link between a type of sign and the relevant ideology” (Wortham, 2008, p. 84). 
For Silverstein, ideologies of language or semiosis are “metapragmatic” models of 
language and social relations which regiment particular uses of signs (Silverstein, 1985, 
1992; Wortham, 2008), and he calls the four fundamental concepts the “total linguistic 
fact”. Its crucial contribution is to establish a connection between the form and use of 
signs and ideologies, which provide the matrix enabling people to make the connections 
necessary to construct indexical semiotic units. According to Silverstein, this connection 
is “irreducibly dialectic in nature” and constitutes “an unstable mutual interaction of 
meaningful sign forms contextualized to situations of interested human use, mediated 
by the fact of cultural ideology” (Silverstein, 2003, p. 220). 
In his article “Indexical order and the dialectics of sociolinguistic life” (2003), 
Silverstein describes how shifts of meaning occur. His concept of “indexical orders” 
explains “how to relate the micro-social to the macro-social frames of analysis of any 
sociolinguistic phenomenon” (Silverstein, 2003, p. 193). The core of the concept 
indexical order is the idea that a sign with a specific meaning, or maybe not even a sign 
but only a particular property of a sign which in itself previously carried no meaning, 
begins to be perceived as pointing to something else (hence indexical), thus acquiring 
new meaning or function. The term “total linguistic fact” sounds as if it pertained only 
or mainly to language. It is, therefore, important to point out that the same logic applies 
to nonverbal signs just the same and one could label them “multimodal total semiotic 
facts” (Blommaert, 2014, p. 14), which for MDA purposes would probably be more 
fitting. 
This dissertation introduced the metaphor of scale earlier. Blommaert suggests that 
ideologies and indexical orders as such do not constitute the highest layer, simply 
because they operate “within the confines of a stratified general repertoire in which 
particular indexical orders relate to others in relation of mutual valuation – 
higher/lower, better/worse” (Blommaert, 2010, chap. 2). For these purposes, he 
introduces the concept of orders of indexicality, which “operate on a higher plane of 
social structuring,” and which intentionally evokes Foucault’s “order of discourse” 
(Blommaert, 2010, chap. 2). 
Foucault’s order of discourse (1981) suggests that discourses do not happen 
randomly and without order but that societies do control them using a whole set of 
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procedures and indexical orders (Foucault, 1981). Thus, similarly, orders of indexicality 
explain why some forms of semiosis are valued over others, and some might be ignored 
altogether. The concept of orders of indexicality is meant to raise awareness that the 
processes which ascribe value to different forms of semiosis inevitably “display traces of 
power and authority, of struggles in which there were winners as well as losers, and in 
which, in general, the group of winners is smaller than the group of losers” (Blommaert, 
2010, p. 38). 
 
3.1.7 Definition of voice 
A discourse, by its very nature, presupposes different voices. In the first instance, 
discourse refers to spoken or written communication and brings to mind verbal 
utterances. However, by now, it is evident that this dissertation employs a notion of 
discourse which goes beyond the purely verbal or linguistic realm. Even in a face-to-face 
discourse, to have a voice does not just mean to be able to make some intelligible 
sounds. Thus, this dissertation follows Blommaert’s approach, which he describes in 
Discourse: A Critical Introduction (2005), where he suggests that voice refers to 
the way in which people manage to make themselves understood or fail to do so. In 
doing so, they have to draw upon and deploy discursive means, which they have at 
their disposal, and they have to use them in contexts that are specified as to 
conditions of use. (Blommaert, 2005, p. 4) 
He elaborates further regarding what he means by “making themselves understood”, 
which for him consists not merely in “the capacity to accomplish desired functions 
through language” but more broadly entails “the capacity to create favourable 
conditions for a desired uptake” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 68). In line with his definition of 
discourse as comprising “all forms of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in 
connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns and developments of use” 
(Blommaert, 2005, p. 3; see also Section 1.2), he insists that “uptake is a fully social 
process, full of power and inequality” and underscores that merely “a linguistic 
description of what goes on in the interaction will not suffice to produce an analysis of 
voice” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 68). 
Due to the orders of indexicality, semiotic resources are not evenly distributed. Not 
everybody is in the same position to acquire the right kind of language or communicative 
skills to succeed in making herself understood or the required status symbols and access 
to the network of people to make herself heard (see also Swidler, 2001). “Difference and 
inequality,” Blommaert contends, “are two sides of a coin” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 69). In 
a continuously globalizing world with an increasing number of people who are forced to 
migrate, the issue of voice becomes ever more challenging: 
To summarise my argument: if we want to understand voice, we have to look into 
mapping of form onto function, for mobility of resources is lodged precisely in the 
capacity to realise intended or conventional functions with resources across 
different contexts, to keep control over entextualisation processes. Such processes 
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develop in reference to orders of indexicality that emanate from centring 
institutions, in a polycentric and stratified system that regulates access to resources 
as well as to contextualising spaces. Shifts across orders of indexicality as well as 
changes in such orders may cause rather drastic problems of understanding, of 
‘hearability’ or ‘readability’. (Blommaert, 2005, p. 78)  
While it is true that these are the challenges which many refugees are facing who come, 
e.g., from Africa to Europe (Blommaert, 2005, sec. 5.4), people do not necessarily have 
to move to find themselves in a foreign environment. A case in point would be 
Bourdieu’s description of what he calls hysteresis in his article “Making the economic 
habitus: Algerian workers revisited” (Bourdieu, 2000), which was already mentioned in 
Chapter 2. As we shall see in Chapter 4 on Jordan’s history, this country has undergone 
immense changes during the twentieth century. From this perspective, the following 
aspects will define voice for this dissertation: 
1 Voice is a matter of capacity and resources. A person needs to be able to use 
mediational means or semiotic resources to express herself, including words, her 
physical voice, clothes, gestures, odor, and any kind of mediational means that are 
charged with meaning within the relevant indexical orders. 
2 Voice is a matter of opportunity. A person needs to be able to participate in 
discourses and interactions which provide opportunities to express herself. This 
matter has a lot to do with the identity ascribed to a person and her role in certain 
chronotopes. 
3 A person’s identity has a further influence on another aspect of voice, which is also 
determined by a person’s standing. A person needs to have a position, status, or 
reputation, which renders her contribution to be taken seriously. For example, a 
child might be allowed to say all kinds of things, be loud, and even invade certain 
occasions. However, its input might not be considered as particularly utilizable for 
the discourse at hand. Similarly, people who are not considered of sound mind, e.g., 
due to mental issues or intoxication, are not considered accountable. 
4 Voice is a matter of freedom. A person needs to be allowed to deviate from the script 
which the society might expect her to follow. In other words, she must be 
empowered to participate in the re-shaping of the constructure of society. This 
aspect requires that she is given or is able to attain a certain degree of creative 
freedom and not be limited to a fixed role lest her voice becomes an instance of 
system ventriloquism where the voice heard is generated by the ruling powers of the 
society even though it appears to be an expression of a certain individual. 
While the first three points can be seen as formal prerequisites, the fourth point 
bespeaks a dimension of voice, which enables the person to exert a voice that shapes 
the constructure of society in a creative and transformative way. It became apparent 
earlier how important stories are in shaping the human world. Chronotopes construct a 
symbolic world but not in a static sense but more in the sense of a symbolic river bed 
where narratives can flow. They enable identities and plots. Since stories are so crucial 
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in shaping our human reality, there is, what Adichie calls in her TED talk, the “danger of 
the single story” which consists in making one particular story the whole and defining 
story of a reality which is much more complex and varied (Adichie, 2009). She relates an 
occasion where an American teacher criticized one of her novels as not being 
“authentically African”: “The professor told me that my characters were too much like 
him, an educated and middle-class man. My characters drove cars. They were not 
starving. Therefore they were not authentically African” (Adichie, 2009, 7:32). He had a 
single story about Africa, or one could say he had a very narrow chronotope about life 
in Africa that limited unreasonably how an African story could look. In her talk, Adichie 
points out the relationship between power and the single story: 
It is impossible to talk about the single story without talking about power. There is a 
word, an Igbo word, that I think about whenever I think about the power structures 
of the world, and it is nkali. It’s a noun that loosely translates to “to be greater than 
another”. Like our economic and political worlds, stories too are defined by the 
principle of nkali: How they are told, who tells them, when they’re told, how many 
stories are told, are really dependent on power. Power is the ability not just to tell 
the story of another person, but to make it the definitive story of that person. 
(Adichie, 2009, 9:37) 
In chronotopic language, power is the ability to shape the chronotope of another person 
or a whole group of people and make it the only chronotope in which these people can 
live their life stories. The question of voice is if a person is allowed to engage in reshaping 
the story and, ultimately, the chronotope, even to have the ability to help shape the 
relationships of chronotopes within the orders of indexicality. 
Ultimately, voice has also to do with what Palmer calls expressive acts: 
An expressive act is one that I take not to achieve a goal outside myself but to express 
a conviction, a leading, a truth that is within me. An expressive act is one taken 
because if I did not take it I would be denying my own insight, gift, nature. By taking 
an expressive act, an act not obsessed with outcomes, I come closer to making the 
contribution that is mine to make in the scheme of things. (Palmer, 1999, p. 24) 
Palmer argues that “[o]nly when we act expressively do we move toward full aliveness 
and authentic power” (Palmer, 1999, p. 24). From his perspective, voice contains ways 
to act defying the standards of instrumentalism which so often dominate and 
impoverish people’s lives and actions. This concludes the first part of the chapter, where 
some important theoretical concepts used in this dissertation were discussed and 
defined, followed now by the second part, which deals with the concrete and practical 
aspects of the research. 
 
3.2 Research questions 
The present research explores the multinormative nature of the Jordanian society. It is 
interested to understand how society’s primary orders of normativity operate, influence 
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each other, and shape the everyday lives of Jordanians. The following questions are the 
concrete expressions of this endeavor. Two strands of questions, one with a broader 
focus (research questions 1 and 2), and one focusing in on the gender dimension 
(research question 3 and 4), guided the research. The first strand concerns itself with 
the normative codes themselves and their relationships between each other within a 
multinormative framework: 
1 What are the primary normative codes in Jordan’s society, their distinct features and 
chronotopes within which they function? 
2 What is (and has been) their relative importance and influence on Jordan’s society 
and each other during the recent history? 
3 How do women in Jordan perceive and respond to their own situation? 
4 What are the implications of Jordan’s multinormativity for the voice of women? 
The data for this research were collected through ethnographic interviews over a period 
of roughly thirteen months, from March 2015 till March 2016. The process contained 
two distinct rounds of interviews with different sets of interview questions and 
informants. The remainder of this chapter presents in detail the rationale of the design, 
information about interviews and informants, and strategies to cope with different 
challenges, including privacy, anonymization, and analysis of the data. 
 
3.3 Designing the research 
It is helpful to recall some of the core insights from Garfinkel’s approach which were 
introduced in Chapter 2. One of his main points was that it is not just the professionals 
who do sociology, but that the social actors themselves are involved in practical 
sociological reasoning too. Hence, the reasoning of the actors, which Garfinkel (1967) 
called ethnomethods and accounting practices, should not be ignored but taken 
seriously and studied. If Garfinkel is correct by suggesting that actors are not driven by 
some internalized norms and not motivated by abstract values to pursue specific valued 
courses of action, and if he is right that they are instead engaged in “visibly-rational-and-
reportable-for-all-practical-purposes” actions (Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii), then it makes 
sense to create a space where these actors can talk and explain the reasoning behind 
their own actions and how they make sense out of the actions of others and their 
encounters. 
Thus, ethnographic interviews were chosen to be the primary way of collecting data 
for the present research. The dissertation does not operate on the assumption that 
interviewing is a foolproof way to gain insight. An ethnographic interview is not seen 
merely as a data query or an interrogation where one needs to ask the right questions 
to obtain clear and straightforward answers. Instead, an interview is seen more as a 
conversation or a “talk between people on a variety of topics” and not so much about 
questions, 
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because (as Hymes said in the beginning of his book) not all there is to be found out 
can be found out by asking. Not everyone has an opinion about everything, and 
sometimes, your question could be the first time they are asked to form an opinion 
about it. (Blommaert & Dong, 2010, chap. 4). 
This phenomenon is also apparent when people who are not trained formally in their 
native language (as teachers or linguists) are asked questions about its grammar. While 
we all “feel” what is right, it is much harder to formulate a rule because we usually do 
not think about our language in such abstract ways. Nevertheless, somebody with the 
necessary linguistic training will be able to extract and describe linguistic patterns by 
conversing with native speakers. 
Semi-structured interviews during which the informants would be encouraged to do 
some “practical sociological reasoning” out loud, were seen as the appropriate 
approach, because they guided the interview focus on specific subjects relevant to the 
research without limiting the informants as a fully structured approach would have done 
(Bernard, 2002, p. 205). If one takes ethnographic interviews to be talks on a variety of 
topics, then it is crucial to find something from the world of the informants which could 
trigger conversations about the topics which one’s research tries to understand, i.e., in 
the present case normative codes and structures. 
Before describing the process of designing the research, it is worth mentioning that 
any designing activity usually has a somewhat cybernetic approach, i.e., it makes use of 
feedback loops to achieve the best possible design. Similarly, the designing of the 
research took the input it generated seriously and adjusted or complemented its 
strategy when it seemed to increase the quality of the data. This process eventually led 
to two separate interview rounds with different sets of questions and with an entirely 
different set of people. What follows is a more detailed description of the three different 
interview strategies which were used to conduct the two rounds. 
 
3.3.1 Strategy one: Ethnographic interviews using grand tour questions 
Naturally, everything a person says during an interview (or otherwise) is in some way 
connected to her personal history and situation. The meaning of any utterance is at once 
historical and indexical – it is rooted in a person’s experience and refers to her 
multifaceted world. Trying to understand the meanings of an utterance or an action 
without taking into account an informant’s habitus and the symbolic world she lives in, 
is as futile as trying to understand emotions by performing an autopsy on a dead body. 
Data without their situatedness are dead data, even dangerous data because they can 
be made to mean anything the interpreter wants them to mean. For this reason, it 
seemed essential to start the interviews with some open ethnographic questions which 
Spradley (1979) calls grand tour questions. The first question focused on the informant’s 
general background: 
A Who are you? Tell me about yourself and your background. 
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As this research is looking to understand how norms work in everyday life, the first grand 
tour question was followed up by a short series of more questions about everyday life: 
B.1 How does a normal day in your life look like? 
B.2 How do Fridays [which is the week’s holiday in Jordan] and weekends look like? 
B.3 Are there special events you go to? 
These last three questions intended to obtain an idea about the sites of engagement 
and nexuses of practice the informant is involved in on a regular basis. 
 
3.3.2 Strategy two: Semi-structured interviews using a list of questions 
In line with the dissertation’s semiotically broadened notion of discourse, two sets of 
semiotic resources were utilized to stir or trigger such conversations. The first set was 
introduced already in the introductory chapter and comprised the three metapragmatic 
indicators of illicit behavior, viz. ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ and this section goes into 
some detail about how the first set of questions came to be formulated. The second set 
consists of historical pictures that depict people from Jordan and surrounding countries 
wearing different styles of clothes and also in different situations (Appendix 1) belongs 
to the third strategy described in Section 3.3.3. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the use of the three words ᶜayb, ḥarām, 
and mamnūᶜ have remained a constant source of bewilderment for me or to put it more 
positively a source of endless learning opportunities over the years. Focusing on 
incidents of norm violations is a strategy which was also employed by Garfinkel when he 
devised his famous breaching experiments to learn more about social structures and 
interactions (see Section 2.3.4). Due to their instructive properties, breaching experi-
ments are still being used in teaching sociology (Rafalovich, 2006). Although similar 
experiments as these were not conducted for the present research, it still focused on 
norm violations as a heuristic strategy for two reasons. 
The first reason has to do with the fact that people often are not aware of norms, 
particularly cultural norms, unless they are broken. The historical body absorbs the 
normative structures of its environment, and then, according to Bourdieu, in a natural 
fashion, “the structured structure” becomes the “structuring structure” (Bourdieu, 
1990, p. 53). Most of these regulatory processes take place on a less than conscious level 
and hence are not readily available for reflective introspection. It is mostly the breach 
of norms, which arouses strong reactions and not the adherence to them. Often people 
are not even aware that they are following a norm; they simply assume that what they 
do or how they live is “normal” or “natural”. This lack of awareness becomes quite 
evident in cross-cultural encounters or intercultural situations. 
There is an inspiring educational game which is used at workshops for intercultural 
awareness that illustrates this pointedly. It is called Intercultural Card Game, and it 
divides the participants into small groups playing cards with a set of rules that is different 
from the set of rules of the neighboring group. As the game is played without any verbal 
communication (talking and writing are prohibited), the players do not realize that each 
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group has its own rules. After some rounds, individual players from one table migrate to 
other tables, and the chaos unfolds. During the debriefing, the players come to know 
that they had been playing according to different sets of rules. The participants draw the 
lessons out of this game quickly, and the transfer to intercultural encounters comes very 
naturally. The salience of the breaching experiences makes it easy to talk about them 
and to reflect upon them. 
The second reason has to do with the fact that silence often is ambiguous. In 
conversations, silence can be mistaken for consent. The present study inquires which 
normative systems regiment the different domains and areas of life. For example, is road 
traffic of any concern to religion, or does the legal code concern itself with questions 
like what kind of car is (in)appropriate for a person’s status? In order to delineate the 
areas of “jurisdictions”, it helps to focus on illicit behavior and to investigate the usage 
of markers of norm violations. A behavior, which is allowed, receives the same reaction 
as the behavior which is not the concern of a particular normative code, namely no 
comment. However, if something is marked as illicit, it can be safely assumed that the 
respective normative code regards it as part of its jurisdiction. Just like in the field of 
geography where often borderlines are used to indicate on a map what belongs to a 
particular country, it is highly informative to see what is ruled out by the different codes. 
Although the introductory chapter already explained why these particular words 
were chosen, there remains the question if it had not been more appropriate to use a 
hypernym which would include all the different terms as hyponyms. However, that 
would have presupposed a sociolinguistic study itself, not unlike this one, or else one 
would run the risk of filtering out certain areas only. As the data will show, mamnūᶜ 
sometimes functions as hypernym and at times it refers to a category of norm 
transgressions of its own. 
Providing case studies and asking people for their assessment to see what words 
they would use has the same obvious limitation. The research might end up picking 
certain situations over others and, thus, unintentionally create a biased collection of 
data. Therefore, to use a fishing metaphor, it seemed more feasible to cast out three 
different nets that are being used by local people widely and to compare the results 
instead of relying on just one net. 
The first three interviews, namely with F01, M02, and the couple F03 and M04, stand 
out in their influence on the design process. Although the informants will be introduced 
in more detail in Section 3.5, this presents a good opportunity to introduce the coding 
of the informants which simply uses consecutive numbering accompanied by an F for 
female or M for male. When quoting interviews, the reference M11: 14 refers to the 
interview with M11, paragraph 14. Accordingly, F08: 1-5 refers to the first five 
paragraphs of the interview with F08. Generally, each informant was part only of one 
interview, usually producing one recording with the exception of F01 and M02 (both 
produced two recordings), and F16 who was part of two interviews, coaching F18 during 
hers. The encounter with them produced two short recordings each, F01-1, F02-2, 
M02-1, and M02-2. In the case of interviews with more than one informant, e.g., F16 
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and F17, the reference is, e.g., F16&F17: 54. In the case of the group interview with F45, 
F46, F47, and M048 (see Section 4.4.4 and Appendix 3), the reference is F45.46.47&M48. 
Coming back to the issue at hand, the first three interviews of the first round used 
only one broad question, besides the questions A and B.1-B.3, namely: “Is there a 
difference between ᶜayb, ḥarām and mamnūᶜ? And if yes, what is it?” Thus, in the 
beginning, there was no focus on gender issues. However, it became quickly apparent 
during the first two interviews, with F01 and M02, that the responses, particularly those 
dealing with ᶜayb, naturally brought up issues about gender differences and indicated 
that there was a societal discourse taking place regarding questions of disparity and 
injustice related to that concept. 
The third interview was conducted shortly afterward with the same question with 
F03 and her husband, M04. He initially only intended to be sitting in on the interview 
and eventually became fully involved as an informant. At the end of the interview, I 
asked about their opinion regarding the case of Rula Quawas, a professor at the 
University of Jordan. F01 had brought up her story during her interview and it seemed 
useful to hear a second opinion. 
Rula Quawas was the first professor at the University of Jordan to introduce courses 
on feminism. In 2012, female students from her class on feminist theories created a 
short video clip of two and a half minutes as a graduation project to raise awareness of 
the catcalling, groping in public places, and other forms of sexual harassment which, 
according to their experience, had become rampant on the university campus. When 
the young women uploaded their short video, it became national news and allegedly 
cost Rula Quawas her position as dean. At the same time, the university publicly 
disclaimed that her demotion had anything to do with the incident (The Jordan Times, 
2012). The New York Times summarized the events later as follows: 
In the video, students held up signs bearing printed comments, many of them vulgar, 
that men had directed at women on campus. “Can I take you home?” read one sign. 
“Hottest gal in the middle,” read another. 
The students hid their faces behind the signs. Their images were interspersed with 
scenes of men sitting on benches or standing along the sides of streets. 
“Women do not want to be seen as a piece of meat but as a soul — as a mind, as a 
heart,” Professor Quawas said of the film project. “I have faith it will happen. Not in 
my lifetime, but it will happen.” 
The video provoked a debate. Jordanian news media criticized her for encouraging 
students to confront harassment publicly, and conservatives on social media 
attacked her for allowing students to hold up signs with profane remarks. “I feel all 
of these eyes constantly piercing me, penetrating me, for something I believe in,” 
she said. 
University administrators and some of her fellow faculty members said the video 
harmed the image and reputation of the institution. (Sweis, 2017) 
F01 related this incident as an example of ᶜayb and how men and women were treated 
with different standards in society. Her point, though, was not just the story itself but 
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also an incident at her workplace related to this story. One day she and circa twenty 
female colleagues were discussing the case of Rula Quawas during one of the breaks. 
She recalled how surprised she was that about three-quarters of her female colleagues 
sided with the critics of Rula Quawas. Their point of view, according to F01, was that the 
video itself was filthy due to the words written on the posters. Her colleagues said that 
they do disapprove of sexual harassment but for the girls to make a video depicting the 
filthy remarks of the men was ᶜayb. F01 was visibly frustrated that her colleagues, even 
though they did not deny those female students had to suffer under these circumstances 
on campus, seemed more concerned about young women displaying publicly filthy 
language than about the perpetrators’ actions (F01-2: 9-12, i.e., the second part of the 
interview with F01, paragraphs 9-12). 
F03 and M04 not only strongly agreed with F01 and M02 that the ᶜayb code favors 
males, but also gave more examples of women supporting unjust norms against women. 
Moreover, they contended that this bias is not only a matter of ᶜayb, but also pertains 
to religion and state law. 
Thus, these first interviews suggested that in order to understand the different 
normative codes, it would be useful to implement questions about the gender 
difference within these systems during further interviews. Hence, the final set of 
question which was used during the remainder of the first round of interviews consisted 
of the following: 
C.1 Is there a difference between ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ? If so, what is the 
difference? 
C.2 Do you think there is a difference of ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ in regard to males 
and females? 
C.3 If so, do you think this difference is fair or just? If not, why do you think that? 
C.4 What do women do or could do who want to revolt against this system? / How 
would I recognize a woman who is revolting against the system? 
Several additional points need to be pointed out regarding these questions. First, even 
though the first three interviews used only C.1 from this set of questions, they did use 
question A and B.1-B.3 and produced a wealth of interesting insights. Therefore, they 
were integrated into the first round of interviews. 
Second, during all interviews, the questions C.1 and C.2 were posed, but it was not 
possible or appropriate to ask questions C.3 and C.4 in all of the interviews. Some of the 
informants had given plenty of examples, which showed how they view the role of 
women in their society. So to ask the question again seemed somehow pointless or 
redundant and could have made the impression as if the interviewer had not listened 
and was merely checking off a catalog of questions. In other cases, however, to pose a 
question like “Do you feel this difference is just?” or “What do women do who are 
opposing or revolting against this order?” felt inappropriate because it might have been 
perceived as rude or too provocative. In any case, usually, the entirety of the interview 
gave plenty of opportunities to determine which view an informant was voicing or, at 
least, which impression he or she tried to convey. 
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Third, the last question, i.e., C.4., turned out to be the most difficult of the four 
questions for the informants to answer. At times the questions had to be rephrased 
more along the lines: “If a woman was unhappy with the situation and wants to change 
the system, what could she do?” In some cases, it seemed helpful to ask the informant 
how one would recognize such a woman. 
Fourth, to avoid confusion, it seems helpful to point out that these questions are not 
the research questions. They are merely the interview questions and were formulated 
in a way to trigger reactions by the informants. 
 
3.3.3 Strategy three: Semi-structured interviews using historic pictures 
Another rich point related to norms, which was also mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, is the change which took place during the recent history in Jordan. Between my 
first visit to Amman in 1995 and the time when I started to work on the dissertation in 
2014, the society had been changing in front of our eyes. I remember witnessing several 
women from West Amman, which is the more Western and less traditional part of the 
city, how they started to wear a ḥijāb, e.g., our neighbor and one university professor. 
In conversations time and again, many mentioned that people had been dressing 
differently in old times (seemingly referring to the middle of the twentieth century) and 
how things had changed only recently towards a more religious attire. 
The interviews from the first round provided rich data, particularly about the 
present-day situation. Of course, there were references to the past. However, it also 
became clear that another round of interviews focusing exclusively on the past would 
help to avoid the trap of Saussurean synchrony which, as Blommaert put it, robs 
sociolinguistic reality “of the spatial and temporal features that define its occurrence, 
meaning and function in real social life” (Blommaert, 2010, Preface). A more focused 
inquiry into the social realities of the past would be beneficial to grasp better which 
historical trajectories contribute to the layered simultaneity of the present situation. 
This purpose was accomplished with the second round of interviews focusing on a new 
set with older informants. They would be able to describe the purported change within 
society from their own experience because of their age. Conducting this second round 
with another set of informants who were not part of the first interview, had the 
advantage that they were not primed by the first set of questions and could approach 
the questions with fresh ears, so to speak. 
The challenge of this approach is that human memory is not fixated and unchanging, 
like some data saved on a computer. This mutability seems to be true particularly for 
episodic memory, which is different from semantic memory or general conceptual 
knowledge as they are to any specific event. Memory can be seen as fundamentally a 
constructive process (McLelland et al., 2015, p. 288). McLelland and her colleagues 
explain: 
Some have proposed that memory distortions result from the reconstructive nature 
of episodic memory: when we recall an episodic memory, we piece together 
fragments of a scenario and recombine them to form the event (…). This form of 
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recall is thought to occur because when an event is experienced, its various elements 
and features are processed in topographically separate brain regions and this creates 
a pattern of activity that is distributed across the entire brain. During recall, it is 
therefore necessary to at least partially restore this pattern, often via the encounter 
of a cue or fragment of the memory that allows the brain to “complete” the rest of 
the pattern (…). (McLelland et al., 2015, p. 288). 
This kind of cued memory recollection is experienced when one finds an album with 
pictures from a bygone time, and suddenly memories come back which one did not 
know existed. The third strategy makes use of such a cued memory technique by using 
historical pictures. While many things have changed over the decades, not everything 
can be depicted equally in pictures. There is, however, one particular aspect of the social 
reality, which has to do with norms and is also easily detectable on pictures: dress style. 
Therefore, the second round used pictures taken decades ago in the Middle East which 
depicted people in various dress styles. 
The goal of using pictures was not to receive standardizable responses about the 
different pictures but rather to use them as some kind of historical witnesses in order to 
jog the informants’ memory and to trigger a conversation about how things were and, 
if possible, to find clues about when and why they changed. Accordingly, there was no 
point in insisting that the informants would respond to every single picture. An orderly 
linear response was not of interest and it was even hoped that they would wander off 
from one topic to another. As a result, some of the pictures produced more responses 
than others and some, particularly the ones at the end of the list, received naturally less 
attention. Also, the order of the pictures was of no particular interest. When an 
informant mentioned things that seemed to be visible in later pictures, that picture was 
presented right away even out of order to clarify the informant’s statements. 
Altogether, the research used 23 pictures out of which 18 can be found in 
Appendix 1. Pictures #19 till #23 stem from a private collection and, according to the 
owner of the pictures, remain unpublished (a short description is provided instead in the 
appendix). According to the sources, the first nine pictures were taken in Jordan 
between the years 1951 and 1979. The next four pictures, #10 till #14, are from a 
Palestinian context from 1928 till 1964, followed by three pictures from Egypt from the 
1940s and 1950s, and two pictures from Iran from the 1960s and 1970s. Pictures #19 till 
#23 conclude the gallery and show a Palestinian family living in Saudi Arabia in the 1950s 
and 1960s. A summary of the different dress styles and clothes will be given later, 
together with the presentation of the interview data (see Chapter 6). 
What follows is an explanation of the rationale behind choosing these particular 
pictures. Regarding the pictures from Jordan, the attempt was to find pictures with a 
variety of dress styles. The pictures depict people from different social backgrounds, city 
dwellers with modern clothing, and also people from a more traditional or conservative 
background. The pictures from Palestine were included for two reasons. First, they 
added some more variety, e.g., the traditional dress in picture #13. Second, in the years 
of 1948 and 1967, there was an immense influx of Palestinians into Jordan (see Section 
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4.4 for more details). Some of the informants, although Jordanian citizens, are of 
Palestinian descent. It would have been, therefore, a somewhat unnatural move to 
exclude pictures from Palestine. 
The connection to Egypt and its influence is not as strong but undeniably evident. 
Some of the informants have an Egyptian father or mother. Many Jordanians went to 
Egypt to pursue higher degree studies at a time when there were few opportunities in 
Jordan. Through the film industry, the Egyptian society and culture have always had a 
strong influence in countries like Jordan. Picture #15 is admittedly more liberal than any 
pictures about Jordan found during the search for suitable material. However, it was 
included because it allowed the informants to indicate where the lines of acceptable 
dress code were drawn in Jordan. In a similar vein, the pictures from Iran are testing out 
how liberal the Jordanian society was in that particular era by providing pictures which 
might be beyond Jordanian levels of acceptance. Finally, the Palestinian family living in 
Saudi Arabia is anything but an exception in those times. Many Jordanians and 
Palestinians moved to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and lived there for decades before 
returning home. Since the pictures were all taken either inside or in a safe space outside, 
they do not mirror Saudi culture, but instead depict Palestinians living in the diaspora. 
 
3.3.4 Disclaimer 
It is crucial at this point to offer a disclaimer, one which was announced already in the 
introductory chapter. It contains two points, and both have to do with the fact that this 
research is ethnographic in nature and it views the “practical sociological reasoning” of 
lay people as essential for understanding their social world which is being (re)produced 
continuously by its sense-makers, who make decisions and act based on the sense they 
make (cf. Section 2.3.4). In other words, the focus of the research and collected data is 
not some objective reality but the socially constructed symbolic universe of a particular 
population. Here are the two points worth stressing and singling out. 
The first thing is how religion is viewed and represented. Without a doubt, religion, 
particularly Islam, is central in this dissertation. However, it is not really concerned with 
“Islam” from a general or abstract perspective. Instead, it looks at a vernacular form of 
Islam. The concept of vernacular religion is used here in the way as Primiano defined it, 
who describes vernacular religion “as it is lived: as human beings encounter, understand, 
interpret, and practice it” (Primiano, 1995, p. 44) in contrast to a form of religion which 
is an abstract system. We are looking at Islam in Jordan which is a specific region with a 
particular history, through the eyes of “normal” people – most of whom consider 
themselves Muslims. 
Those who identify as Muslims, no matter how “orthodox” their beliefs might be 
according to any normative centers of their respective denomination or faction (or not), 
generally claim an inside, i.e., emic view and the right to voice their opinion about what 
they think Islam is or should be. They are part of a discourse, which shapes the 
vernacular Islam, which is reflected in this research. 
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The second point is the problem of bias. Without doubt, listening emphatically to 
experiences and repeatedly mulling over stories (which is what one does when analyzing 
such interviews) does not leave the researcher unaffected, especially when those stories 
are at times painful and contain injustice. Nevertheless, the dissertation tried to report 
without personal bias. However, even where it succeeded, that does not mean that the 
texts in the following chapters do not contain biased views and opinions – regarding 
religion, the status of women, and the state of social justice in Jordan. After all, according 
to the Austrian physicist and philosopher Heinz von Foerster, objectivity is the delusion 
that observations could be made without an observer, adding, that the appeal to 
objectivity is the denial of responsibility – hence its popularity (Von Foerster & Pörksen, 
1999, p. 111). 
This dissertation does not attempt to avoid responsibility. However, in its defense, it 
needs to be pointed out that the research deals with a constructed, interpreted social 
reality collapsing in moralized public gender relations seen, by the respondents, as 
controlled and shaped by moral codes. Thus, much of the bias found in the voices of the 
informants represent the ethnographic reality of observable, interpreted and enacted 




For roughly thirteen months, from March 2015 till March 2016, 39 interviews were 
conducted with 48 informants yielding 25 hours and 10 minutes of voice recording, 
which amounted to 150,556 words in transcribed form which will be made available to 
the reader through the platform of the Tilburg University in due time. The average 
length of the interviews (mean) was 38.7 minutes, with a standard deviation of 24 
minutes. Appendix 2 provides a detailed table about the interviews, listing the 
participants, length, setting, date, privacy, and which questions were posed. Section 
3.4.4 on the “Degree of privacy during the interviews” will address the issues connected 
to group interviews and how the different degrees of privacy might affect the data in 
more detail. 
Table 2 gives an approximate overview of the two rounds of interviews. (Complete 
data can be found in the appendix.) The shortest interview took place with M14 and 
took only 9 minutes because only the interview questions C.1-C.4 (see p. 54) were 
covered as I had conducted an entire ethnographic interview about his life for another 
research project at an earlier time and it did not seem necessary to include questions A 
and B.1-B.3 (see p. 51). The shortest interviews from the first round covering all three 
parts (questions A, B, and C) were 13 minutes long, with F18 from the Ajloun area and 
F32 from the Northern Valley. Altogether ten interviews were 20 minutes or less, fifteen 
were from 21 to 40 minutes, twelve interviews from 41 to 60 minutes, and five 
interviews were longer than one hour with the longest being 131 minutes, which was 
conducted with M11, a middle-aged man from Mafraq. 
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Table 3.2: Basic outline of interviews 
First round 
Focus: Inquiry into normative orders today using a list of questions 
32 informants: F01-F32 
29 interviews 
Strategy 1: Grand tour questions (Question A: Background & Questions B.1-B.3: Everyday life) 
Strategy 2: List of questions (Questions C.1-C.4) 
Second round 
Focus: Inquiry into the historical dimensions of normative orders using historic pictures 
16 informants: M33-M48 
10 interviews 
Strategy 1: Grand tour questions (Question A: Background) 
Strategy 2: Pictures 
 
3.4.2 Conducting the interviews 
All of the interviews, except the interviews with the two foreigners F37 and F39 in the 
second round, were conducted by myself in Arabic, i.e., in the local spoken dialect, even 
though some of the informants spoke excellent English. The use of English achieved after 
the independence (1948) the status of a sociolinguistic marker of higher class Jordanians 
(Bianchi, 2011, p. 68; cf. also Hamdan & Hatab, 2009). It frequently occurs in the form 
of intermittent code-switching (Alomoush & Matarneh, 2010). Since it is found mostly 
in the upper socioeconomic classes, it has come to express a complex code of identity 
politics: 
The mix of English and Arabic prevalent among youth in Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf 
has even been named Arabeezy (from ‘Araby, Arabic plus Ingleezy, English). 
Knowledge of these codes implies a life of privilege, including private education, 
travel abroad, and sophistication. (Brustad, 2015, p. 30; emphasis in the original) 
These observations explain why Arabeezy can be heard spoken unabashedly on some of 
Amman’s radio stations and why some of the informants used English words 
intermittently or switched back and forth between Arabic and English, even in mid-
sentence. In order to indicate what was spoken in Arabic and word, fragments, phrases 
or sentences were spoken in English, they will be set up by apostrophes. Accordingly, 
the apostrophes in the sentence “She lives in a ‘rural’ area” indicate that the word 
“rural” was uttered in English during the interview. 
All the interviews were recorded in full length, except for the introductory 
explanation of what the interview was all about and during which I also asked the 
informants if they consented to be interviewed and if they objected to the recording of 
the interview. Concerning the introduction given to the informants, all the informants 
were given the following information orally: 
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– I am a Ph.D. student at the University of Tilburg, and I am conducting research about 
Jordanian culture and society under their supervision, and I adhere to the standards 
of the British Association for Applied Linguistics (BAAL) (BAAL, 2006). I perform this 
study respecting the ethical code of conduct of Tilburg University, which can be 
consulted on this website: https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/intranet/legal-affairs/ 
privacy/research 
– Recording the interview will enhance my research greatly, but the recordings and all 
the information will be handled completely confidential, and only people who are 
directly involved in this research will have access to it, e.g., the professors mentoring 
me. 
– All the information from the interviews used in the dissertation will be anonymized 
in a way that informant’s identity is protected and that nothing they say can be 
traced back to them unless they explicitly wish to be mentioned. (However, none of 
the informants made any such requests.) 
– The information collected during this research will be used solely and exclusively for 
research purposes and never for any other purpose, e.g., for monetary gain, 
advertisement, or similar. 
Only after the informants gave their consent orally and expressed that they were 
satisfied with the conditions mentioned above, did I turn the recording device on and 
started the recording. The device was always in plain sight, and I always indicated when 
I turned it on or off. It was also positioned, whenever possible, in such a way that the 
informants could reach it, and they were told that they were free to turn it off (or to ask 
me to do so) whenever they felt uncomfortable being recorded. It was important to me 
that the informants knew that they had not lost control over the situation and that it 
was not some interrogation. However, during all the interviews, never did anybody 
make such a request. 
 
3.4.3 Challenges in the process of acquiring data 
Every endeavor to collect relevant, reliable, and nontrivial data through interviewing 
inevitably has its set of challenges. Interviewing people about issues related to religion, 
government, and the not-so-pleasant sides of their society is difficult enough in itself. 
As mentioned earlier, recording those interviews added to this challenge because it 
makes them easier identifiable if those recordings were to fall into the wrong hands. 
Clearly, such research is more delicate than inquiring about problems with public 
transport. Also, such interviews are more challenging in some countries than in others. 
According to the World Report 2019 of Human Rights Watch (2018, p. 320), “Jordanian 
law criminalises speech deemed critical of the king, foreign countries, government 
officials and institutions, and Islam, as well as speech considered to defame others.” 
The problem is not just freedom of expression. While it is true that all the interviews 
were recorded (audio) with the explicit consent of the interviewees before the 
recording, it is crucial to keep in mind that such interviews are not carefully written texts. 
When giving a written response, the author can take the time to ponder how the 
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utterance might be (mis)understood. However, spontaneous expressions of personal 
views and experiences are less carefully forged and can be easily misconstrued. Placing 
a potentially incriminating artifact like that, be it a picture or a recorded interview, into 
somebody’s hands is an expression of great trust in any society because such artifacts 
can be very damaging to a person in many ways. The fact that none of the informants 
refused to go on record bespeaks their courage and willingness to help a foreign Ph.D. 
student to understand the inner workings of their society. 
 
3.4.4 Degree of privacy during the interviews 
The possible legal consequences and the danger of state prosecution were not the only 
challenges. An interview is, as defined earlier, a conversation with a clear objective, 
namely, to obtain relevant information about specific topics. However, since social 
actors are always concerned about impression management, the information does not 
flow freely and unhindered but is always controlled and regulated. Front stage and 
backstage control are typical techniques to ensure impression management. Not 
everybody gets to see the whole “show”. 
Although there might be only two individuals present during an interview (i.e., the 
interviewer and the informant) it still can be considered as a performance conducted by 
two teams – even if each team consists only of one member, according to Goffman. In 
other words, the issue at stake is not merely the “presentation of self in everyday life” 
and the preservation of one’s face but also the presentation of the team (to which one 
belongs, e.g., family, tribe, or country) in public life (Goffman, 1956, chap. 2). After all, 
the information one gives (including the information one gives off) might eventually 
appear in a published dissertation such as this one. 
There are secrets of the team which the member is expected not to divulge. 
Disclosing such information could lead to the loss of face in front of a person’s own team 
and be seen as a betrayal and a lack of loyalty. Even if nobody from the own team is 
present at such an interview, a person might still feel inhibited by the mere fact that her 
team members know that somebody from another team is talking to her with the intent 
to gain insight into the team’s culture and way of life. 
At other times, however, the interviewer is viewed as one of the same team and in 
this case, the informant is more willing to share inside knowledge or even to talk about 
“hidden transcripts” (Scott, 1990). In case of subordinate groups such a hidden 
transcript “represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant” and 
conversely, the hidden transcripts of the powerful represent “the practices and claims 
of their rule that cannot be openly avowed” (Scott, 1990, p. xii). 
For example, most of the informants were Muslims, and I am a Christian. From this 
perspective, we were on different teams, and hence, according to Goffman’s view, a 
certain concern for impression management was to be expected. During a performance 
before another team, social actors do not only avoid embarrassing themselves but also 
protect the face of the member of the other team. Accordingly, no informant made 
potentially precarious statements, neither about Islam nor about Christianity. When 
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interviewing Christians or informants who had remained Muslims nominally, since it is 
not possible to change one’s identity from Muslim to Christian officially, but had 
adopted the Christian faith, I was usually treated as “one of us”, and informants felt safe 
to make critical remarks about “them” and Islam. 
For Goffman the social encounter, in other words, the interaction, is embedded in a 
social situation, which for him consists of the “full physical arena in which persons 
present are in sight and sound of one another” and the people present at such a social 
situation can be called “‘gathering,’ no implications of any kind being intended 
concerning the relationships in which they might severally stand to one another” 
(Goffman, 1981, p. 136). Obviously, the presence of other people, let alone a member 
from the same team, makes the issue of anonymity even more complicated “[f]or it 
turns out that routinely it is relative to a gathering, not merely to an encounter, that the 
interactional facts will have to be considered” (Goffman, 1981, p. 136). Further, he 
distinguishes two kinds of interactions between people: 
The first deals with unfocused interaction, that is, the kind of communication that 
occurs when one gleans information about another person present by glancing at 
him, if only momentarily, as he passes into and then out of one’s view. Unfocused 
interaction has to do largely with the management of sheer and mere copresence. 
The second step deals with focused interaction, the kind of interaction that occurs 
when persons gather close together and openly cooperate to sustain a single focus 
of attention, typically by taking turns at talking. Where no focused interaction occurs, 
the term unfocused gathering can be used. Where focused interaction occurs, 
clumsier terms will be needed. (Goffman, 1963b, p. 24, emphasis added) 
In summary, it can be said that there are mainly the following factors which influence 
how comfortable people feel to share their knowledge freely: 
1 Who is part of the encounter? It can be safely assumed that in an interview in which 
others are also partaking actively, people usually feel more monitored and thus more 
inhibited than in a one-on-one encounter with the interviewer. Interviews with 
couples fall somewhere in between. The individual probably does not feel as free as 
in a one-on-one interview, but the presence of the spouse or partner usually is not 
perceived as threatening to one’s face as with other people. 
2 Do others know about this interview and the nature of its questions? An informant 
who is aware that others know that she is being interviewed about issues which 
could lead to the disclosure of team (e.g., family) secrets, naturally feels more 
anxious not to divulge such information than a person whose interview is not known 
to anybody else. Especially, if she trusts the interviewer that the information given 
will be treated anonymously, she might dare to “spill her guts” and vent frustrations. 
3 Are there people present in the social situation and how much attention do they 
pay? In other words, does the gathering consist only of the interviewer and the 
informant(s), or does the gathering comprise other people, in which case two 
questions influence the interview. First, if the others are strangers or unrelated 
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people, they are of less relevance than say team members or people who know the 
informant. Second, it makes a difference if the interaction between the informant 
and the others is unfocused or focused. In the latter case, the informant will choose 
her words more carefully. 
4 Does the informant perceive the interviewer as a member of another team or as a 
member of the own team? If the interviewer is part of another team, then the 
interview will tend to be seen as an event of the front stage where secrets and insider 
knowledge are less likely to be discussed. If the interviewer is ascribed insider status, 
then the backstage talk will become an option. There are, though, two observations 
which need to be said in order to nuance these statements. First, the informant and 
the interview might be on one team regarding one aspect, e.g., religion, and another 
team regarding ethnicity or gender. Second, the interviewer might not be considered 
part of the team but assigned what Goffman calls a “discrepant role”, e.g., a 
mediator, non-person, service-specialist, or confidant (Goffman, 1956, chap. 4). Such 
persons are often entrusted with additional insight into the backstage realities 
without being members of the team. Along these lines, one could also mention the 
“wise” from Goffman’s treatment on stigma. These wise are  
persons who are normal but whose special situation has made them intimately 
privy to the secret life of the stigmatized individual and sympathetic with it, and 
who find themselves accorded a measure of acceptance, a measure of courtesy 
membership in the clan. (Goffman, 1963a, p. 28) 
Considering all these different aspects, it is rather difficult to construct a neat continuum 
of situations with different degrees of privacy. It seems best to talk about more or less 
private footing. An interview with an individual with no others present in the social 
situation which takes place without the knowledge of any persons relevant to the 
informant and where the interviewer is either considered a member of the same team, 
a confidant, or a wise, would be a highly private interview. On the other end of the 
spectrum, i.e., with the least degree of privacy, would be interviews with groups or with 
individuals where other team members are present and focused on the interview and 
where the interviewer is considered a member of another team. 
In the table of interviews in Appendix 3, information is provided for each interview 
which helps to assess its degree of privacy. Besides the location and the informants 
participating in the interview, including the relationship between the informants if there 
were more than one, information is given about a) if others knew about this interview, 
b) if there were others (besides the interviewer) involved in some sort of focused 
interaction with the informant during the time of the interview, and c) if there were 
instances of unfocused interaction. Further, where appropriate, it is also indicated if it 
was apparently probable or not that others might be able to overhear parts of the 
conversation. 
Of the 39 interviews, 26 can be categorized as completely private or reasonably 
private interviews with a single informant. Interview 4 with F05 is an example for 
complete privacy. Nobody knew about this interview. It took place in a private home 
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with nobody else in the “gathering” – neither focused nor unfocused interaction. 
Interview 7 with F08 is still counted as reasonably private with a single informant, 
although it took place in a public space, i.e., a coffee shop. Nobody knew about the 
interview, unless F08 told other people. However, it was not like in the case of interviews 
with F29 and F30. There the interview happened inaudibly and behind a closed door, 
but the informants knew that their colleagues are outside and fully aware of the 
interviews taking place. 
Although, in F08’s case, some other customers were sitting in the same room and 
unfocused interaction might have occurred, but none of them seemed to care. Further, 
the level of background noise was so high that it can be ruled out that anybody would 
be able to overhear the conversation of parts of it. The above-mentioned interviews 27 
with F29 and 28 with F30 were also still reasonably private, since both of them occurred 
with nobody else in the room and the door was closed. However, as already pointed out, 
the others from their team knew about this interview, which, as argued earlier, 
diminishes the privacy of such a conversation. 
Some of the interviews, such as interview 25 with F27 and 26 with F28, were 
interviews with single informants, but another person was sitting in the hearing distance 
in the same room and the door of the room was open. While there was not a single word 
of exchange between the person and the participants of the interview and formally it 
took place as an interview with a single informant, it was not counted as such because 
of the considerably diminished privacy. It must be assumed that the informant viewed 
this as a relatively public front stage event in front of their team members and, 
accordingly, would be rather careful in divulging information which might have the 
potential of causing face loss or embarrassment to the team. 
Then there were also interviews with more than one informant. Interviews 1, 2, 3, 
and 36 are interviews conducted with couples. These seemed, however, quite different 
from other interviews with more than one informant. While couples also might inhibit 
each other regarding openness towards the interviewer, also the opposite could 
happen, as in the interviews 1, 2, and 3, where one partner would encourage the other 
to share some relevant information. Generally, they seemed to be less concerned about 
face-saving than people being interviewed with other persons. Interview 16 with F16 
and F17 and interview 17 with F18 and F16 (who seemed to be coaching F18), were 
interviews with a conspicuously positive depiction of the everyday life. Interview 39, the 
last interview, was a group interview with three older sisters (F45, F46, F47) and M48, 
who is the husband of F46. There were adult children in the room. Interestingly, this 
interview seemed to be less stiff or formal than the interviews 16 and 17, which were 
described above. After all, the informants did not always agree, and different positions 
came to be apparent. It can be safely stated as an observation that a higher degree of 
privacy made it more likely that critical information about the society was divulged. 
However, this rarely included religion, at least not the one the informant(s) felt loyal to. 
Criticizing the religious code of the own team seemed a society-wide taboo. 
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3.5 Informants 
3.5.1 Finding informants 
While the research does not entail conversation analysis, it still has a decidedly 
sociolinguistic focus. From conducting ethnographic interviewing projects in Arabic in 
the past, it was evident that it would be enormously helpful to record the interviews 
because there is simply no way to preserve the richness and accuracy of the information 
during such interviews just by taking written notes. Based on that same experience, 
however, I was keenly aware of the political climate, particularly the fear of the secret 
police and the resulting suspicion of recording devices. Thus, it was necessary to find 
informants who had enough reason to trust a researcher asking delicate questions with 
a recording device in his hand. Otherwise, the danger would be to collect merely some 
innocuous talk that people might deem safe to be recorded. This challenge led to the 
conclusion that working through my private network and reaching out to people who 
knew me personally would be the best way to find informants. Eventually, however, only 
roughly one-quarter of the informants came to belong in this category. Friends asked 
their friends and colleagues, and so the list of informants ended up containing an 
impressively diverse set of people. 
One of the questions regarding the research design was if the research should limit 
itself to Jordan’s capital Amman. After all, with four million inhabitants, it is not only 
home to almost half of the country’s population, but also has more people than a 
considerable list of small countries. Moreover, as Chapter 4 will explain, Amman is quite 
different from the rest of the country due to its history. However, even if the research 
focus had been limited only to Amman then precisely its historical development from a 
village at the beginning of the twentieth century to a city of expansive size would be an 
argument to conduct research outside Amman because, at some stage in the past, it 
probably resembled in many ways the many small towns and villages outside Amman 
today. 
Fortunately, one of the informants’ work consists of supervising projects throughout 
the country, and because he was so fascinated by the research project and found the 
questions so interesting and helpful that he offered to introduce me to people outside 
Amman. Almost all informants outside Amman were introduced to me by him, and only 
because he vouched for me were they willing to give such generously from their time 
and share with me their views. 
 
3.5.2 Demographic overview over the informants 
For both rounds, 48 informants were interviewed, 26 women and 22 men. The appendix 
provides a more detailed overview of the informants in the form of a table listing the 
age, religious background, occupation, level of education, personal status, and the 
location of upbringing and current residence (Appendix 2). Figure 3.2 gives a demo-
graphic overview of the informants according to three parameters: if they live in Amman 
or outside Amman, their religious affiliation, and their personal status. 




















Figure 3.2: Informants according to residence, religion and personal status 
 
At the time of the interview, 31 out of the 48 informants were living in Amman. 
However, more than half of them, i.e., 16, did not grow up in Amman and spent at least 
a considerable amount of time of their formative years elsewhere or only recently 
moved to Amman. The list of locations where they had lived before includes different 
towns and cities in Jordan like Zarqa, Madaba, Mafraq, Irbid, Baq’a, Karak. However, also 
locations outside the kingdom, such as Lebanon, Kuwait, and Australia, were mentioned. 
Naturally, the two foreign informants, F37 and F39, did not grow up in Jordan. One of 
them grew up in North America and the other in Northern Europe. 
Seventeen informants lived outside Amman: one in Salt, Karak, and Aqaba; two in 
Ajloun and Irbid; six in a town in the Northern Jordan Valley; and four in a town south of 
the Dead Sea. Except for three, all were born and raised in the same town or region 
where they still lived at the time of the interview. M33, now living in the Northern Jordan 
Valley, was born just across the Jordan River in Beit Shean, roughly ten kilometers bee-
line away, but never had been able to go back and visit afterward. F27 lived the first 26 
years of her life in Zarqa, and F06 moved to Salt with her family when she was already 
an adult. 
All of the informants were Arabs, except for two foreign women, F37 and F39. Both 
were married to Jordanians (and are now widows) and were counted as Christians in the 
above diagram. Although they are not Arabs, it was decided to include them in the 
second round of interviews which focused on the historical developments because they 
both married Jordanians, one a Muslim and the other a Christian, moved to Jordan in 
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Having married into an Arab family while at the same time coming from a very 
different background, they experienced their first years in a very intense and conscious 
fashion – maybe even more than people who had grown up in the country and therefore 
were used to the circumstances. Therefore, while being aware of their background and 
taking it into account during the later discussion of the data, their contribution has a 


















Figure 3.3: Distribution of informants according to age 
 
As Figure 3.3 shows, in the first round the informants spread relatively evenly across the 
different ages. In the first round, 19 women and 16 men took part, with the youngest 
under 20 years of age and the oldest between 75 and 80 years of age. The focus of the 
second round was to find older informants who are able to remember a more distant 
past. It is worth noting, though, that in the second round, which consists of 16 
informants, only four informants are under the age of 60 and contains all three 
octogenarians. 
Figure 3.4 shows how the informants are distributed on the different educational 
levels of the International Standard Classification of Education of 2011 (see Appendix 4) 
according to the information given by the informants about themselves. The data 
indicate that women are represented stronger on the lower levels of education and men 
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Figure 3.4: Distribution and analyzing the data 
 
3.6 Processing and analyzing the data 
3.6.1 Transcribing the interviews 
For analysis, the recorded interviews had to be put into written form. It is worth noting 
that each region in Jordan and, in general, the Arab world has its distinct spoken dialect, 
which differs not only from other dialects but as well from Modern Standard Arabic 
(MSA), which is the version found in most modern print. Generally, the transcription 
attempted to render the actual recording. The only exception was the letter qaf (q/ق). 
Abd-el-Jawad recognizes three main dialects in Amman (and its surrounding), viz. the 
urban, rural Palestinian, and Bedouin and rural Jordanian whose grouping corresponds 
to the reflexes of the uvular stop /q/. The (q) is realized as a glottal stop [‘] in the urban 
dialect, as a voiced velar stop [g] in the Bedouin and rural Jordanian dialects, and as a 
voiceless velar stop [k] in the rural Palestinian dialects (Abd-el-Jawad, 1986, p. 54). In 
order to make it easier to read, a (q) was written in the transcription no matter how it 
was pronounced as after all phonetic variation was not the goal of the research, nor did 
it influence the contents of the reactions of the informants on the questions. 
Transcription also depends strongly on its purpose. In the case of conversation or 
discourse analysis, it makes perfect sense to transcribe and signify each “uhm” and 
laughter. Such a verbatim transcription, however, is not only very time consuming but 
also hard to read. If the interest lies more on the content than on the manner how it 
was said, then a verbatim transcription can be more distractive than helpful. 
Professional transcription sites offer besides “verbatim transcriptions” also “edited 
transcriptions” and “intelligent transcriptions”, which designate different levels of 
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more fluent or elegant style. Even though not every pause and “hrumph” is relevant for 
the analysis of the data, for this research a more conservative approach was chosen 
which could be called “smooth verbatim transcription”, where the “audio is transcribed 
word-for-word with light editing, meaning the removal of ‘ums’ and ‘uhs’ and inter-
viewer listening responses, such as uh-huh, um, okay, I see, etc.” (All You Need to Know 
about Transcription Styles, n.d.). Words, which were unclear or unintelligible, were 
represented by (.) in case of one word, and by (…) for several unintelligible words. In the 
case of code-switching between Arabic and English or when the informant used English 
expressions, the English words or phrases were marked by single quotation marks. 
 
3.6.2 Anonymizing data 
The third edition of Recommendations on Good Practice in Applied Linguistics published 
by the British Association of Applied Linguistics (BAAL) in 2016 stipulates in Section 2.3: 
Informants have the right to remain anonymous. Their confidentiality should be 
respected, and an attempt made to anticipate potential threats to both anonymity 
and confidentiality (e.g. by anonymising the data, making it secure, and sometimes 
even destroying it). (BAAL, 2016) 
The challenge with fulfilling this requirement is how to “maximise participant anonymity 
alongside maintaining the integrity of our data” (Saunders et al., 2015, Abstract). Tolich 
(2004) points out that the threat to anonymity (he uses the word “confidentiality”) 
comes from two different directions. He calls protecting the identity of the informant 
from being identified by people who are not part of the research “external 
confidentiality”. This threat to anonymity is probably the first challenge which comes to 
mind. Saunders et al. (2015) suggest several measures like changing names of the 
informants and making places unrecognizable. While these measures are not difficult to 
apply in the present research, some other suggestions pose a bigger problem. 
In some cases, the effacing of the occupation of the informant threatened to 
diminish the meaningfulness of some utterances. However, because of the small 
number of members belonging to specific occupations, it had to be withheld at times. 
Most challenging, however, is their suggestion to replace religious or cultural 
descriptions. They give an example where “Jaspal’s Hinduism” becomes “Jaspal’s 
religious faith”. In the present research, this was hardly possible as culture and religion 
are central subjects of the research topic. 
The other threat to anonymity, described by Tolich, consists of the possibility that 
different informants who know each other might be able to identify each other. He calls 
this “internal confidentiality” (Tolich, 2004). In this research project, there are a few 
people who knew about other people who took part. For example, the informant who 
introduced me to several of the other informants outside of Amman (mentioned earlier) 
might come closest to be able to identify other informants through their utterances. 
However, there are three reasons why this does not pose a real threat. First, his 
command of English does not make it probable that he would read an academic 
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publication like this dissertation. Second, he introduced me to several people at each of 
the places and to remember who these people were is not likely – particularly after 
several years. Third, even though most of these informants provided valuable 
information, none of them went on record with statements which would pose any threat 
to them. Informants who cannot be traced by other informants made the really 
precarious statements. 
 
3.6.3 Analyzing data 
The transcribed interviews were imported into MAXQDA©, which is a software solution 
for qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods of data analysis. It allows, among many 
other things, to code texts with different labels. The label can consist of only one word 
or phrases and sentences. Texts with the same label can be retrieved together and 
studied and compared in this way. The same word or text can be coded with multiple 
different labels and, as a result, appear in different contexts and queries. These labels 
can also be grouped and sorted in hierarchical structures. 
Using these possibilities, the transcribed interviews were read repeatedly with 
different strategies. Some readings were done with a specific question in mind, such as 
“What does the informant say about ᶜayb?” These places were coded, either with a 
specific code, e.g., “Example of ᶜayb for women” or “Effects of ᶜayb”, or just with a 
generic label “ᶜAyb”. In the latter case, the coding would be registered and could be 
eventually changed into a more specific code, for example, “ᶜAyb is strongest”. Often 
conspicuous statements were at first marked with a spontaneously created ad-hoc label. 
As more and more observations were made and patterns started to emerge, such 
uncategorized statements were grouped with other places and put under a common 
new label. 
The procedure above allowed for organizing different statements and texts without 
losing track of them and also their contexts. On the one hand, it allowed for intentional 
analyses of interviews with a specific question in mind. On the other, it made it possible 
to map the interviews with labels and make information which could not be classified or 
integrated into the existent structure retrievable. Eventually, the texts allocated to 
specific labels were used to organize and present the data as it is in Chapters 5 and 6. 










Before April 1921, there were no Jordanians simply because there was no Jordan. To be 
precise, even after April 11, 1921, the day when the Emirate of Transjordan was 
established, there still were no Jordanians, only Transjordanians. The country changed 
its name into The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan only in 1949. The Emirate of 
Transjordan, covering roughly the same area as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the 
year 2020, which is its legal successor, is not the beginning of the country as such. Quite 
the contrary, Jordan is “extraordinarily rich in archaeological remains of the Palaeolithic 
periods” as it lies “at the cross-roads between Africa, Europe and Asia, so that periodic 
expansions or radiations out of Africa passed through the region, leaving behind 
thousands of prehistoric sites spanning from c. 1.5 mya (…) to the Neolithic and later” 
(Al-Nahar, 2014, p. 94). Even over the recent millennia the region was anything but 
deserted. However, for the present research, it is not necessary to go back that far.  
Attempting to write a “history” (even if it is just a summary), one would wish that 
history could be told as a linear stream of events which one merely has to recount. 
However, this is not how human affairs operate, nor does history on a higher scale 
operate like that. Human life is braided out of different strands, different stories. There 
is family life, and then there is maybe work or university. There are family and work. 
There are friends, hobbies, faith, and many other things going on. A curriculum vitae 
gives a different account of a person’s life than the story she would tell a stranger during 
a long train ride. What happened in the area we call the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
also has different strands, and this chapter will tell it by focusing on different strands, 
i.e., chronotopes, one at a time. While this sometimes brings a little bit of overlap and 
repetition, it also helps to disentangle the different strands of the overall narrative plait. 
 
4.1 Chronotopes of religion 
Before it was occupied early on during the Islamic expansion in the years 633-637 CE by 
Muslim forces (Genequand, 2014, para. 2), the area of Jordan had been under Byzantine 
rule. During that time, Christianity “spread out to villages and the countryside, where 
monasteries and pilgrimage shrines were also built (a shrine to Lot near Zoar, a shrine 
to Harun near Petra and a shrine to Moses on Mount Nebo)” (Michel, 2014, para. 3). 
When the Arab and Muslim Umayyads moved the capital of the Islamic Empire from 
Medina to Damascus (661-744), the area of Jordan came into closer proximity to this 
power center. Thus, it enjoyed some of the benefits as the Umayyads reorganized 
Amman and the city of Aqaba on the coast of the Red Sea and built lavish residences in 
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the area (Ababsa, 2014, p. 166). Later, under the Muslim Abbasids, the capital moved to 
Baghdad. Eventually, the area came under the rule of the Crusaders in 1100 CE for 
almost a century, which left its trail mostly in the form of newly built castles (Devais, 
2014). In 1340, the Black Plague robbed the already thinly populated area between one 
third and half of its population (Ababsa, 2014, p. 166). During the Mamluk Sultanate 
(1250-1517), Amman became the capital of the vilayet or district Balqa in 1356 BE. 
However, over the next two centuries, its significance faded, and from the fifteenth 
century onward, it seems that the human settlement whose history started at least as 
early as 7250 BC was used only seasonally and mostly by Bedouins. The chronotope of 
religion, though, remained hale and hearty in the Ottoman Empire, which will be the 
subject of Section 4.2. 
Chapter 1 already explained why calling the area Islamic Middle East does have its 
drawbacks, but there is no denying that all three monotheistic religions originate from 
this region. They have been central and exerted a considerable gravitational force as 
chronotopes in the Middle East ever since their emergence. However, one has to be 
careful not to read anachronistic meanings into the word religion. In the West, the word 
“religious” is usually taken to be the antonym of “secular” which, of course, is a rather 
modern phenomenon because “our modern Western conception of ‘religion’ is 
idiosyncratic and eccentric,” as Armstrong explains. “No other cultural tradition has 
anything like it, and even premodern European Christians would have found it reductive 
and alien” (Armstrong, 2014, Introduction).  
Admittedly, the term “religion” is notoriously difficult to define. While substantivist 
definitions of religion roughly resemble our Western concept, mostly pertaining to what 
members of (particularly so-called world) religions believe and do, functionalist 
approaches “expand the definition of religion to include ideologies and practices – such 
as Marxism, nationalism, and free-market ideology – that are not commonly considered 
religious” (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 57f). It is vital when dealing with religious chronotopes 
to point out, as Cavanaugh does, that religion is a constructed category because it helps 
to avoid ascribing it some essence, which it does not have from an anthropological point 
of view (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 57f). 
In some Western countries, e.g., Germany, one can live an entire life without ever 
becoming part of any religion – at least in the substantivist sense of the word. One does 
not have to disclose anything about one’s convictions about such things at all. Some 
might even find it intrusive or indiscreet to inquire about one’s privately held 
convictions. It is safe to say that such an attitude is rare in Jordan. The question is not if 
one has a religion or if one is part of a religious group, but rather which one. Generally 
speaking, religion is not something one chooses, but one is born into a religion. Only in 
2016 did the Jordanian government remove the religion field from the new smart 
identification cards. It was still present on the old civil identification cards, stating each 
citizen’s religion. The step triggered some heated debates, although the information will 
not be erased – it remains saved on the chip, but will not be visible on the card itself 
(Al Bawada, 2016; Goussous, 2016). 
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When a person in Jordan declares that he is a masīḥy, i.e., a Christian, this usually 
does not necessarily provide any information about his personal preference or 
convictions. He was born as a masīḥy just as the Muslim was born as a Muslim, and his 
religious affiliation has almost the quality of ethnic affiliation. A similar situation can be 
found in Bosnia. There religious affiliations seem to have morphed at some stage into 
ethnic categories. That would explain the strange fact that next to the two “ethnic” 
groups, Bosnian Serbs (Serbian Orthodox), and Bosnian Croats (Roman Catholic), a third 
one is named after a religion – viz. the Bosnian Muslims (Friedman, 2018).  
It is essential to underscore that an essentialist view of religions and religious 
communities, as put forward by both opposing sides of an alleged “clash of civilizations” 
(e.g., Huntington, 1996; Ut Tahrir, 2002), are based on ideological rather than sound 
anthropological arguments. The religious chronotopes are far from being immutable, 
and throughout history, depending on other (sub)chronotopes, norms of religions, and 
even the definition of what it means to be a Muslim, a Christian or a Jew differed 
considerably. The question of who can call himself a Muslim is also hotly debated 
between proponents of the so-called Islamic State and its critics, which was categorized 
as a takfīri group (Hassan, 2017). The word takfīr is derived from the verb kafara, 
meaning “to be irreligious” or “to be an infidel” (Wehr, 1976, p. 832), and is “a 
theological declaration that a Muslim has become an apostate or a person is an infidel, 
or an act or idea constitutes a disbelief in Islam” (Hassan, 2017, p. 3). 
Early on during my stay in Jordan, I came to learn about the importance to be able 
to read the signs if somebody is a masīḥy and I learned a lot through contacts with 
people like Shadi (not his real name), the owner of a little alcohol shop not far from our 
apartment in East Amman. His religious affiliation was evident to everybody, as virtually 
everything about Munthir signaled that he was a masīḥy. It was the way he spoke 
because many Christians have a sociolect in which they avoid certain “Islamic” words 
and do not hesitate to reprimand even a 32-year-old Christian student of Arabic if he 
uses the “wrong” greeting, just like they do when little children use a “bad” word. It was 
the way he dressed, e.g., his large and visibly worn gold necklace. Gold, in general, is 
something most Muslim men in Jordan do not wear. Last but not least, the pictures he 
put on the wall of his shop, including pictures of the Virgin Mary, indicated that he 
belonged to a specific religion. There were other learning opportunities. 
When visiting people, we usually took off our shoes because this is what we had 
learned from some Muslim friends. We were surprised that some Christian friends were 
almost offended when we did it at their place, and they told us “We are not like them,” 
referring to the Muslim majority as “them”. When we visited, a Christian neighbor in 
Ashrafiyya (an area in East Amman), we sat together with the female members of his 
family. When we mentioned that in some Muslim homes, we had made a different 
experience because my wife and I ended up sitting in different rooms, he told us: “We 
are not like them.” These differences, regardless of the question if they were real or not, 
seemed to function as a set of verbal and non-verbal boundary markers that were not 
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meant to communicate religious beliefs but rather to index membership of the Christian 
minority with quasi-ethnic attributes which one had been born into.  
Far from being just some abstract concepts used for theoretical analysis of literature 
and society, chronotopes constitute an authentic experience for people who live in 
them. As they provide people with identities, chronotopes can evoke strong emotions 
depending on how central they are for individuals, i.e., how much gravitational pull they 
exert. Taking into account this strong emotional component in combination with the 
fact that chronotopes, as we saw earlier, invoke and enable a plot structure, characters 
or identities, and social and political worlds in which actions become dialogically 
meaningful, it becomes clear why chronotopes lend themselves to be used to legitimize 
claims to power. Both religions relevant to the area of the present research, Christianity, 
and Islam, indeed have done so, and religion and state often went hand in hand. 
 
4.2 Ottoman chronotope 
Around 1516-1517, the area which is now roughly the western and most populated part 
of Jordan (including Amman), was conquered by the Turkish Ottomans and remained in 
the Ottoman Empire for four full centuries (Irvine, 2016). The beginning of the Ottoman 
Empire itself lay at the end of the thirteenth century, and at one point it controlled much 
of South-eastern Europe, and parts of Western Asia, the Caucasus, North Africa, and the 
Hijaz (see Figure 4.1). It entailed a plethora of different languages, cultures, religions, 
and ethnic groups that all needed to be governed and integrated to a certain degree, at 
least administratively, into the Empire (Kia, 2008).  
However, during the four centuries when the populated parts of Jordan were part of 
the Empire, the Ottomans only rarely, if ever, seem to have found it worth their effort 
to get a tight grip on this area. Even apart from the challenges which this particular 
region posed to a centralized government, the Ottoman Empire generally was not 
interested in a strong centralization of its dominion until considerably late in its history. 
Originally it was “built on the principle of dividing the population of the empire into 
separate and distinct religious communities” (Kia, 2008, p. 105), which eventually led to 
the millet system. Masters (2009) explains: 
The word millet comes from the Arabic word for nation, milla, but in the Ottoman 
Empire it came to mean a religious community, specifically, non-Muslim religious 
minorities represented within the Empire by an official political leader. Official 
Ottoman correspondence dealing with the non-Muslims of the Empire in the early 
19th century consistently affirmed that non-Muslims were organized into three 
officially sanctioned millets: GREEK ORTHODOX, headed by the ecumenical patriarch, 
Armenians, headed by the Armenian patriarch of Istanbul, and JEWS, who after 1835 
were headed by the hahambaşı in Istanbul. (Masters, 2009, p. 383) 
  






















Figure 4.1: The Oman Empire in 1683, at the height of its territorial expansion in Europe 
(Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:OttomanEmpireMain.png) 
 
The millet system enabled the Ottomans, on the one hand, to allow their subjects to 
carry on their lives according to their own religious, cultural, and ethnic traditions and 
on the other hand to incorporate them into the Ottoman system on the administrative, 
economic and political level (Karpat, 1982, p. 142). In other words, the Ottomans 
allowed different religious chronotopes to exist on local scales, and they were content 
with exerting only a limited gravitational force as long as it was keeping these 
communities in the Empire’s orbit.  
The debate regarding specific questions about the origin and dissemination of the 
millet system is ongoing (see Braude, 1982, for a critical review). Nevertheless, modern 
scholarship suggests that understanding the idea of the millet system, as such, is 
essential for understanding the process of nation formation in the area 
not only in order to understand the dichotomy between nation and state, but also in 
order to evaluate, in depth, the socio-cultural characteristics of the national states 
in the Balkans and the Middle East born out of the millet matrix. (Karpat, 1982, 
p. 141) 
For our purposes, it is particularly noteworthy that the millets became “intermediate 
bodies between the individual and the State” which “were recognized as having 
jurisdiction over their own community not only in religious affairs but also in civil and 
penal matters”, and “were responsible for the collection of taxes” (Pacini, 1998, p. 5). 
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Even those Christian communities who were not recognized as millets (at least before 
the nineteenth century) – viz. the Maronites, Nestorians, and Syrian Orthodox – “for all 
practical purposes (…) functioned as autonomous religious communities under their 
own leaders” (Kia, 2008, p. 3).  
Thus, for the longest part of its history, the Ottoman Empire did not enforce a 
centralized and unified legal system. Instead, it generally preferred that all of its 
subjects, and not just some minorities, would rule themselves in domains, which were 
not relevant to running the Empire. In the second half of the eighteenth and through 
the nineteenth century, however, the pressure from the rising European powers grew 
for the Ottomans to modernize and centralize their system in order to become more 
competitive, particularly in the military domain. This phase of continuous reformations 
is known as the Tanzimat. One important outcome was the creation of the Majalla, 
which was “a comprehensive compendium of Hanafi fiqh (the ruling Muslim school of 
Islamic jurisprudence of the Ottoman Empire) to be administered in the new civil 
(Nizamiye) courts” (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 74).  
At this point, it might be in order to briefly explain what the sources of Islamic norms 
are considered to be. Although the Quran is viewed as the center of the Islamic religion 
and as the primary and direct revelation by God to Muhammad in the seventh century, 
it is, of course, impossible for such a text to cover all the areas of life and give answers 
to all the relevant questions. In order to find guidance, Muslims came to rely additionally 
“on accounts of Muhammad’s life (sira) and the good example of his Companions and 
their heirs (“the successors”) in MECCA and MEDINA” (Campo, 2009, p. 645). These 
accounts were collected and constitute the hadith. Together with the Quran, they 
provide the basis for orthodox religious practice, Sunna, and Islamic law, Sharia. Fiqh 
denotes in Islamic language the human understanding of the divine law and consists of 
the opinions of scholars who are seen as qualified to interpret the scriptural resources 
and derive laws (Vogel, 2000, p. 4). Within the Sunni regions, four major schools, namely 
the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and the Hanbali, emerged and developed their particular legal 
interpretations (Gordon, 2004, p. 4). 
The Majalla, a hybrid law, created based on the French Code Civil and the Hanafi 
school of legal interpretations, was the first legal system in Ottoman history which 
applied to all subjects, no matter what ethnic or religious background (Onar, 1955). 
However even in this unifying legal codex, and this is of crucial importance, did the 
Ottomans not embark on regulating the entirety of the life of their subjects but only that 
“which was essential to modernizing the Ottoman Empire versus that which maintained 
its ‘traditional’ cultural identity” (Massad, 2001, p. 51). The regulation of family law and 
inheritance law remained with the religious courts. These domains are not of minor 
importance; after all, inheritance laws by their very nature deal with distribution of 
wealth, which is without question a central issue in most if not all human societies. While 
it remains to be seen to what degree religious norms shape the everyday life of families 
and marriage, one thing is clear, namely that the performative acts transforming two 
people into a wedded couple are based on religious traditions. As central as these 
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matters were for the different groups and the individuals, the Empire did not see this 
self-ruling space as something that was threatening the state’s interests. The Majalla 
had a significant influence on the Middle East far beyond the existence of the Ottoman 
Empire. After all, it 
served as the civil code in a number of successor states (e.g., in Iraq until 1951, and 
in Jordan until 1952), and as a major source for the composition of a civil code in 
others (e.g., by the renowned jurist ’Abd al-Razzāq Aḥmad al-Sanhūrī in Egypt in 
1949, in Syria in 1949, and in Iraq in 1951, as well as in Israel, where several of its 
statutes are still in effect). It has even inspired the civil codes of several non-
successor states, such as Afghanistan and Malaysia. (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 74)  
In summary, it can be said that the Ottoman Empire operated in a polycentric and 
multinormative mode. The state accepted that other chronotopes existed under its 
umbrella and that these chronotopes contain other normative authorities, which 
regiment core domains of the everyday life of their subjects. The state did not expect 
that all of its subjects should live under the same law, at least in some domains. It did 
not view its role as interfering in those domains. This attitude was handed down to some 
of its successor states, including the state of Transjordan, on which more below.  
Toward the end of their long reign, the Ottoman’s interest in the area of Jordan 
changed. Wars, genocides, forced migrations, and persecutions tend to have a 
decimating effect on populations but, as sad as it may sound, Amman’s resurrection and 
phenomenal growth in the twentieth century owes much to such catastrophes. The first 
settlers of modern Amman were a small group of refugees escaping the Russian-
Circassian war (1763-1864), which was waging several thousands of kilometers away in 
the Caucasus. After arriving in Istanbul, the Circassian refugees were resettled by the 
Ottomans throughout their Empire. A few hundred were placed in the district of Amman 
as soon as 1868 (Natho, 2009, p. 474).  
The Hijaz Railway ran from Damascus to Mecca and was built by the Ottomans with 
the help of German engineers and money in the first decade of the twentieth century. 
It made Amman into a principal station, and the Circassians were sent here in order to 
protect it. It also helped to draw some Syrian trading families for whom this constituted 
merely a relocation within the Ottoman vilayet or province of Syria. Determining the 
number of inhabitants for that time is a notoriously difficult undertaking. Ricca suggests 
that in 1909, when the first municipal council was established, Amman numbered 
around 2,000 inhabitants (Ricca, 2007). According to Al-Wer, Ottoman records show 
that Amman had in 1906 roughly 5,000 Circassian settlers and virtually no Arabic-
speaking residents (Al-Wer, 2014, p. 31).  
The decline of the Ottoman Empire, which started in the late eighteenth century, 
ended in its defeat and dissolution in 1922. During the Great War (1914-1918), it fought 
on the side of Germany, against Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, which resulted 
in its final collapse, sealed by the Treaty of Sèvres 1920. Due to historical reasons, which 
go beyond the scope of the present overview, the two powers France and Great Britain 
succeeded in imposing a secretly negotiated agreement from 1916, known as the Sykes-
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Picot Agreement, and to carve up the Middle East according to their imperial interests. 
Eventually, these developments lead to the establishment of the British protectorate 
Emirate of Transjordan on April 11, 1921, with Abdullah I bin Al-Hussein as its ruler. 
 
4.3 Local chronotopes 
Lest the whole story becomes lopsided, it is necessary to talk about the history which 
took place in the local chronotopes and the shadow of the chronotopes on higher scales. 
The grip of the Ottomans Empire over this area was anything but firm. The chronotopes 
described in this section move on a lower scale. However, often they seem to have a 
greater gravitational pull on people’s lives than the events taking place in higher-scale 
chronotopes, such as (institutionalized) religion and state, which are easier to grasp 
from the perspective of historiography. After all, states and religions (at least the ones 
relevant to our study) tend to produce documents and monuments. Thus, they are 
naturally more visible to the historian. However, one should not forget that much of the 
world population lived “outside the immediate grasp of states and their taxes” until 
recently, as Scott explains: 
On a generous reading, until the past four hundred years, one-third of the globe was 
still occupied by hunter-gatherers, shifting cultivators, pastoralists, and independent 
horticulturalists, while states, being essentially agrarian, were confined largely to 
that small portion of the globe suitable for cultivation. Much of the world’s 
population might never have met that hallmark of the state: a tax collector. (Scott, 
2017, p. 14) 
Similarly, Stewart contends that it was “only within living memory” that the state was 
able to acquire the sort of power which we have come to expect from a state, 
particularly in certain areas like Morocco or the Arabian peninsula (Stewart, 1987, p. 73). 
He writes: 
During the long centuries of anarchy, the administration of justice in the countryside 
was no longer in the hands of the state. The Bedouin tribes, the villages, and even 
some of the small towns followed customary law. The law varied from one 
community to another. Everywhere it was influenced by Islamic law – in some places 
deeply, and in others only superficially. Since only a minority of the population lived 
in the cities, the law that really mattered for most people was the customary law. 
(Stewart, 1987, p. 73) 
Salibi speaks about a “bedouin [sic!] anarchy which came to prevail in Transjordan” by 
the end of the eighteenth century which was only occasionally interrupted, and writes 
further: 
Ottoman attempts to restore a semblance of law and order in Transjordan, 
particularly after the administrative reorganization of the vilayet of Damascus in 
1864, provoked a succession of tribal rebellions in the different parts. Considerable 
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efforts had to be exerted to pacify the country before the Hijaz railway between 







































Figure 4.2: The territories of Jordan main families and tribes in 1929 
(Source: https://books.openedition.org/ifpo/docannexe/image/5010/img-5.jpg) 
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Such descriptions do not contradict the earlier account, which saw the area under 
Byzantine and Umayyad rule. First, “stateness” should be seen as an “institutional 
continuum, less an either/or proposition than a judgment of more or less” (Scott, 2017, 
p. 23). Regarding the stateness of the Ottoman Empire, it is evident that it changed over 
time, especially when one compares its earlier centuries with the nineteenth century. 
Second, states come and go, and so does their control over areas.  
Without going into details about which tribes arrived in Jordan at what time during 
the Ottoman period, it seems apparent that the area east of the Dead Sea never 
acquired great importance for the Ottomans. Ruling this area was troublesome. The so-
called rulers even had to pay tribute to the local tribes, called khuwwa, in order to 
ensure the safety of Muslim pilgrims on their way from Damascus to Mecca, which 
seemed to have been one of their main interests in the area (Ababsa, 2014, p. 166). 
The fact that the Ottomans had to bribe the local tribes – nota bene, most of them 
Muslim – in order to protect Muslims who were fulfilling their sacred duty of pilgrimage, 
is revealing. Apparently, Islam provided not the only and often not even the most 
binding rulebook. As Stewart’s comment above suggested, the law varied from place to 
place and was influenced by Islamic law in different degrees.  
Kennett’s treatise on Bedouin Justice: Laws and Customs among the Egyptian 
Bedouin (2010) illustrates how much of life was regulated with surprisingly little 
reference to Islamic law. He suggests that laws and customs are shaped primarily by 
interests of the tribe not necessarily religion: 
At the back of all Bedouin Law and Custom lies the root idea, which is the 
maintenance of the fighting strength of the tribe. It will be found that the mentality 
of the Bedou and his attitude towards his womenfolk, his animals, and life in general 
are all subservient to this one paramount idea. (Kennett, 2010, p. 27)  
Besides, Shaham’s article (1993), which analyses the clash between Bedouin customs 
and Sharia law in the North of the Sinai, relates a case of a Bedouin woman who, based 
on Islamic laws, achieved the annulment of her marriage which was perfectly valid 
according to Bedouin custom. This example also illustrates how different these codes 
often were. These observations challenge statements about Arab society contending 
that “[a]ll custom and tradition are basically religious” (Patai, 1962, p. 288).  
Thus, it should come as no surprise that although people viewed themselves as 
Muslims, the real impact of Islamic teachings seems to have been often somewhat 
limited. El-Areef writes in his ethnography about the Bedouins of Beersheba: “Although 
they are Mohammedans most of them have very little actual knowledge of the Koran or 
the principles and teachings of the prophets” (El-Areef, 1944, p. 41). Apart from the 
question of how much knowledge Bedouins had about the doctrines of Islam (however 
defined), it seems safe to state that people, in general, were more influenced by 
vernacular versions of their religion. 
However, the population of Jordan did not only consist of Bedouins. From time 
immemorial, the population of Jordan was disseminated over three rather distinct 
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vertical segments of society: desert dwellers, villagers, and townspeople. Ababsa 
summarizes this era demographically as follows:  
In the early sixteenth century, the territory of modern Jordan had only 400 villages 
inhabited by 35,000 people, subject to seasonal attacks by the Bedouin. Before the 
army and taxation reforms in the mid-nineteenth century, villagers lived in extreme 
poverty, with barely enough to survive. Their population is estimated to have been 
225,000 at the end of the Ottoman Empire, including 103,000 nomads. (Ababsa, 
2014, p. 166)  
Desert, village, and town produced different ways of life, different identities, and 
enabled different kinds of stories and, for our purposes, can be seen as different 
chronotopes. This observation does not mean, though, that people were necessarily 
stuck in one of the chronotopes. As the existence of semi-settled tribes shows, they were 
at times oscillating between desert and village. 
The desert area in Jordan, called badia, is located in the Eastern parts of Jordan and 
covers roughly 80 percent of the kingdom. The desert dwellers, historically mostly camel 
breeding pastoral nomads, are called bedu, which is the plural of badawi, Bedouin, and 
have declined drastically over the last 100 years. At the foundation of Transjordan, 40 
percent of the population seems to have been pastoral nomads. In 1958, Harris and his 
colleagues reported that more than half of Jordan’s population, at that time estimated 
at around 1.5 million, were village cultivators, 400,000 were urban dwellers. Another 
200,000, which constituted circa 13 percent, were “bedouin pastoralists, ranging from 
the purely nomadic camel-breeders of the desert to the partly sedentarized groups on 
the margin of the sown area who mix herding of sheep and goats with seasonal 
agriculture” (Harris, 1958, p. 5). Antoun (2000), apparently relying on a source from 
1988, puts the nomadic part of the population under 3 percent and Baumgarten even 
assumes a nomadic population in the per thousand range (Benz, 2011, p. 144).  
The low and starkly declining proportion of nomads notwithstanding, the Bedouin 
chronotope received a disproportionately high degree of attention in academic studies. 
Eickelman bemoans that even though by the year 1970 the “pastoral nomads 
constituted only slightly more than 1 percent of the population of the Middle East, yet 
such nomadic societies have been more extensively studied by anthropologists than 
those in village or urban settings” (Eickelman, 1981, p. 63).  
The Bedouin chronotope played a disproportionately significant role also outside 
academia. Even though almost the entire population of Jordan has become sedentary 
and virtually nobody fulfills the original definition of being a Bedouin anymore, still 
roughly a third of the population employs this chronotope to construct its identity. In 
fact, in the second half of the twentieth century, a Bedouinisation of the national 
identity of Jordan took place, showing that while the number of people living as 
Bedouins became extremely low, the chronotope of the desert continued to have an 
immense influence on the national narrative of a post-nomadic society (Harris, 1958).  
Harris and his colleagues suggest that for the pastoral nomads, social existence took 
meaning in terms of the value placed on independence, freedom, leisure, honor, pride 
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in noble blood, bravery, generosity, hospitality, vengefulness, forgiveness, and loyalty 
to kin-group. Conflicts between tribes were formerly the dominant type of competition 
and droughts, locusts, thirst, hunger, shame, dishonor, and the menace of demons and 
evil spirits were, at the time of their research, still primary sources of fear and anxiety 
(Harris, 1958, p. 5).  
While villagers, many of whom had been nomads in earlier times, naturally shared 
quite a few of the Bedouin values, specific Bedouin values such as independence and 
freedom did not go well with their hard labor in the fields. That might be one of the 
reasons why Bedouins are said to despise farmers and villagers. Kinship ties, on the other 
hand, were maybe even stronger with the villagers.  
Interestingly, townspeople and city dwellers differ from villagers more than the 
villagers from the Bedouins. Life in the town brings about more anonymity, occupational 
diversity, class differentiation, and less social homogeneity. Townsmen and particularly 
city dwellers are also more exposed to foreign influence and therefore tend to be more 
cosmopolitan.  
Amman is, without doubt, a rather unusual place, at least when compared to most 
other places in Jordan. As mentioned earlier, nobody lived here for centuries, and only 
seasonally did Bedouins pass through. Later, at the end of the nineteenth century, it 
became a small settlement of Circassian refugees. Then, as it became the capital of the 
newly established state, it grew first into a town and eventually became a huge city. 
Today it is home to over 4 million out of 9.5 million inhabitants and the location where 
roughly 80 percent of the country’s economic activity takes place.  
When foreigners ask Jordanians who live in Amman where they are from, they might 
say that they are from Amman. However, when they are talking to each other, they 
virtually never say that they are from Amman. As Kassay points out, nobody will accept 
the answer “I’m from Amman” and probe for a “real” answer. Even if the person asked 
is born in Amman and has never even visited the place where her family comes from, as 
is the case for many Palestinians, she eventually ends up naming it as her origin where 
she comes from (Kassay, 2011, para. 3).  
Kassay suggests that the exclusion of Amman from Jordanian national identity can 
be explained from three mutually reinforcing perspectives. First, there is the historical 
development of Amman. The second angle is Jordan’s political history, including the 
emergence of the Armed Forces, which were not only recruited primarily from the rural 
areas but also became a central component in the construction of Jordan’s identity. The 
third aspect is the emergence of an anti-urban nationalism motivated by the rejection 
of the elite residing in Amman, on which more in Section 4.5 about nationalism.  
There is one particular chronotope, which was mentioned already but deserves some 
more attention. Several researchers (e.g., Alon, 2007; Fathi, 1994; Layne, 1987, 1994) 
point out that the tribal chronotope is quite crucial for understanding the history and 
society of Jordan. Four reasons can be listed for this, two of which can be found in 
Jordanian Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad’s book on the tribes of Jordan (Bin Muhammad, 
1999).  
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The first reason is its prevalence as “[a]ll Jordanians of East Bank origin (and many of 
Palestinian origin) who are ethnically Arab and either Muslim or Orthodox Christian 
belong to a tribe” – no matter if they are settled, semi-nomadic or Bedouin (Bin 
Muhammad, 1999, p. 9). Sometimes the two terms “tribal/tribe” and “Bedouin” are 
conflated and used as synonyms. According to Prince Ghazi, who was an advisor for 
tribal affairs to the late King Hussein and the present King Abdullah II for years, such 
usage does not do justice to contemporary Jordanian parlance where “the word ‘bedu’ 
refers to the Bedouins; the word ‘‘asha’ir’, is used to mean the ‘Settled Tribes’ (although 
it technically means all the Tribes, including the ‘Semi-Nomadic Tribes’ and the 
Bedouins); and the term ‘‘asha’ir al-badiya’ (meaning literally: ‘the Tribes of the desert’ 
– as the Semi-Nomadic Tribes live, in general, on the edge of desert) is used to mean the 
’Semi-Nomadic Tribes’” (Bin Muhammad, 1999, p. 9).  
The second reason has to do with the meaning and importance of the tribal 
affiliation, at least in the past. Prince Ghazi explains what it means to belong to a tribe 
as follows:  
What traditionally makes a person ‘belong’ to a tribe is not merely successive 
degrees of genetic relationships – which, after all, every family in the world has – but 
rather that a person and his/her tribe think the same way; believe in the same 
principles; assimilate the same values and ethos; act according to the same unique 
rules and laws; respect the same hereditary Shaykh (Tribal Lord); live together; 
migrate together; defend each other; fight together, and die together. In short, it is 
the consciousness of belonging to that tribe and behaving accordingly. (Bin 
Muhammad, 1999, p. 13)  
Irrespective of the question if this description should be taken as a purely scientific 
definition or rather as a sincere but maybe somewhat romantic expression of a 
prominent tribal leader, it reveals the chronotopic nature of the concept “tribe” in Arab 
thinking. In terms of scale, the tribal chronotope takes place on a lower level than 
empires and (nation) states, which interact on an international and worldwide platform. 
Tribes are generally more local phenomena, but that does not mean that they only come 
in small numbers. Some of the tribes count several hundred thousand members and 
easily outnumber smaller states like Andorra, with a population of roughly 86,000 (Bin 
Muhammad, 1999; Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). Regardless of the numbers, the 
decisive point is the strong gravitational force of this chronotope compared to the 
gravity of other chronotopes.  
The following two reasons cannot be explicated here fully and will be dealt with in 
more detail in the next section but shall be briefly mentioned here nevertheless. The 
third reason for re-tribalizing our understanding of Jordan is, on the one hand, the 
central role the local tribes played as indispensable pillars of the state and its survival, 
and on the other hand the ineradicability of tribal customs and their tacit acceptance 
and at times endorsement by government officials even if they openly contradict state 
law and human rights. For obvious reasons, the explication of this aspect fits better into 
Section 4.4 about the state chronotope.  
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The final reason on this list, which admittedly could be easily extended, is the role 
the tribal chronotope played in the process of nation-building and the construction of 
the national identity. One instance will be discussed in Section 4.5 about nationalism 
and the national chronotope. Another instance involves the three other local 
chronotopes to which the attention is turned now. 
 
4.4 The state chronotope of (Trans)Jordan 
The result of World War I and the above-mentioned Sykes-Picot Agreement was the 
creation of several political entities, which were not deemed fit to stand on their own 
feet just yet. Thus, in the newly created mandate system (1919), the League of Nations 
placed these entities under the authority of different Western powers. One of these 
mandates was the Mandate for Palestine, which put the territory between the Jordan 
River and the Mediterranean Sea (i.e., Palestine, later Israel) and the territory east of 
the Jordan River (Emirate of Transjordan) under British rule. While the territory of 
Palestine was eventually given to the Jewish people, Transjordan was established as an 
Arab Emirate and given to the Hashemite Abdullah bin Hussein (1882-1951). Under 
Britain’s tutelage, the new artificial polity of Transjordan was supposed to mature into 






















Figure 4.3: The region administered by the Emirate 
(Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Emirate_of_Transjordan.png) 
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Abdullah was the second son of Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi (1853-1931), who had been 
appointed by the Ottoman as the Grand Sharif and Emir of Mecca, whose role it was to 
protect the holy city and the pilgrims performing the Hajj, i.e., the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Abdullah, born and raised in Istanbul, had grown dissatisfied with his role in his father’s 
government and emigrated, so to speak, from the Arabian Peninsula, roughly 1,200 
kilometers south of Amman, with the ambition to become the ruler over the countries 
of Syria or Palestine, preferably both. Thus, ruling over Transjordan was initially only a 
temporary position and a rather disappointing one for him as well. Tell explains 
Abdullah’s difficult task well:  
An itinerant ruler in an artificial state, he had to construct ab nihilo “the usual 
foundations of royal authority: popular legitimacy and the networks of power 
relationships acquired over time.” The challenge was all the more daunting in that 
Trans-Jordan’s inhospitable political geography – a function of its location on the 
arid, uncertain frontier between desert and sown – meant that state-building was 
undertaken on unfavorable terrain, and among a population unused to the burdens 
of settled government or central control. (Tell, 2013, p. 3f)  
As the new state needed a capital, Amman was chosen, and the new status attracted a 
diversity of people from different places and for different reasons. Many came from 
other towns and urban centers within the borders of Transjordan, including many 
notables, in the early stages, particularly from Salt and later also from Karak and 
Madaba. Other migrants came from outside, e.g., Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Some 
were merchants, but there were also several political activists, i.e., Arab nationalists 
escaping French persecution in Syria, which had been put together in the Mandate for 
Syria and Lebanon under French rule.  
It would be unfair to suggest that Transjordan did not have educated people. 
However, the arrival of more such people helped Abdullah to “build the critical mass 
needed by the institutions of the emerging state” (Kassay, 2011, para. 14). Besides, the 
Hashemites had framed their revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916 also as an Arab 
nationalist move and had hoped to rule over the whole Arabian Peninsula, including 
Palestine and Syria. Thus, it was not surprising that Abdullah would invite nationalists 
from the area and give them high positions in his new state.  
With all these foreigners, the locals became increasingly disgruntled. According to 
Kassay (2011), it was not so much the educated Transjordanians from other towns who 
felt they were losing out, because they also could be found in growing numbers in the 
capital and thus received a share in the power. Instead, it was the tribal leaders outside 
Amman who felt they were left out. As time went on, Amman became associated with 
the elite – something that would play a significant role in the standing of Amman in 
decades to come. At times, the grievances of these tribal leaders led to mutinies such as 
the one conducted by the Adwan tribe in 1923. 
Great Britain decided that it was in her best interest to support Abdullah to stay in 
power. That was achieved by providing financial means and military support against 
internal and external threats and also through military training that successfully 
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transformed the Arab Legion into “the best-trained military force in the Arab world” 
(Terrill, 2010, p. 662). The Arab Legion 
was a separate unit to the Transjordanian Frontier Force (TJFF), raised later and also 
under formal British command. Nominally the Amir was Commander-in-Chief of the 
Arab Legion but a British officer exercised the day-to-day command and control. The 
first commander was General Frederick Peake (Peake Pasha) who was succeeded in 
1939 by his deputy, the better-known General John Glubb (Glubb Pasha), who 
remained in charge until his dismissal by Abdullah’s grandson King Hussein in 1956. 
(Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2009, p. 21)  
However, without Abdullah’s skill to deal with the tribes and his ability to provide them 
with a place in the newly founded state, which would give them a reason to fight for it, 
his rule probably would not have survived the first decade. Abdullah knew that he 
needed the tribes in order to succeed with his state project. A foreign power had 
appointed him to rule over a population which has been frequently “described as highly 
‘divided,’ ‘lawless,’ having no ‘central’ authority,’” and even the British concluded that 
“[d]ue to the inability and disinterest of the Ottoman state to administer (what became) 
Transjordan effectively, the ‘population’ (…) was unaccustomed to obedience to central 
authority” (Massad, 2001, p. 26). Abdullah managed to co-opt the tribes into the newly 
founded state and succeeded in building a country, which survived against all the odds, 
and today constitutes the only remaining country with a Hashemite ruler.  
Max Weber’s defined the state as “that human community that (successfully) lays 
claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory” 
(emphasis in original) so “that the right to use physical violence is attributed to any and 
all other associations or individuals only to the extent that the state for its part permits 
this to happen,” which makes the state “the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence” 
(Lassman & Speirs, 1994, pp. 310-311). His definition is a good point of departure for 
our purposes to track the development of the young state. There are four elements in 
this definition: 1) human community, 2) territory, 3) monopoly of physical violence or 
force, and 4) legitimacy. The dissertation will now have a look at Jordan’s history with 
these four things in mind. 
As mentioned earlier, when the Emirate of Transjordan was established in 1921, the 
borders of its territory were drawn according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, and the 
Hashemites accepted them only grudgingly, hoping to be able to redraw them according 
to their vision of an Arab caliphate. The occupation of the West Bank in 1948, taking 
place after the establishment of the State of Israel and the following fighting, and its 
































Figure 4.4: Zones of French and British influence and control proposed in the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement in 1916 with the state borders of 2011 
(Source: https://icsresources.org/map/03-sykes-picot-agreement/) 
 
When it comes to the “human community” aspect, attention was already paid to 
describing the composition of the population. It is estimated that it started at about 
225,000 inhabitants in 1921 and roughly doubled during the first 25 years, reaching 
450,000 in 1948. In 1948, during the war with Israel, the population of Abdullah’s state, 
which only two years earlier had graduated from a British mandate to a sovereign state 
and from an emirate to a kingdom, tripled overnight. Half of the increment consisted of 
the population within the occupied territory of the West Bank, which had a much higher 
population density than the territory east of the Jordan River. The other half of the 
increment was due to the people who had fled their homes, which remained under 
Israeli control and, thus, had to be received as refugees on the Jordanian side.  
The next significant development in terms of population and territory came through 
the 1967 war with Israel, during which Jordan lost all of its territories west of the Jordan 
River. However, at the same time, it had to absorb another wave of Palestinian refugees 
escaping Israeli occupation. In 1994, Jordan and Israel finally signed a peace treaty 
finalizing the borders between Jordan and Israel.  
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Due to the Palestinian support of Iraq (particularly through the official position of 
the PLO), as well as the position of the Jordanian King (Lesch, 1991), the Gulf crisis in 
1991, in which Iraq occupied the State of Kuwait, caused the “Palestinian’s third 
exodus”, and another wave of Palestinians of about 300,000 people arrived in Jordan 
within a few months (Le Troquer & al-Oudat, 1999). This time, however, they were not 
coming from Israel but returning from Kuwait as Jordanian citizens with Palestinian 
background from where they were being expelled.  
The 2015 population census showed that Jordan’s population had reached 9.5 
million, including 2.9 million guests, out of which 47 percent are Syrians (Ghazal, 2016). 
Amman rose in less than a century from a village-like population of 2,000 inhabitants by 
multiplying itself with the factor 2,000 and became home to four million people. The 
country’s population, according to the source mentioned above, experienced an annual 
growth from 2004 till 2015 of 5.3 percent, which accumulated in eleven years to 76.5 
percent. However, war is not the only reason for people to come to Amman. Besides 
push factors, there are also pull factors. Jordan’s population growth also provides many 
work opportunities. There are many immigrant workers, like the more than 630,000 
Egyptians and 80,000 domestic workers originating mostly from the Philippines and Sri 
Lanka (Azzeh, 2015; The Jordan Times, 2016a). 
Another pull factor is the relative stability of Jordan in a region of constant conflict. 
This stability caused many organizations like news agencies, developmental aid 
organizations, NGOs, and governmental organizations to choose Amman as a base to 
pursue their diverse projects throughout the whole Middle Eastern region. Jordan has a 
relatively well-developed health system, which also acts as a pull factor (Bookman & 
Bookman, 2007).  
Furthermore, Jordan’s climate attracts people. With its comparatively mild 
summers, it causes many Gulf Arabs and Saudis to spend the hot summer period in 
Jordan, mainly as Syria stopped being a viable option. Quite a few of them send their 
children to study at one of Jordan’s universities. At the same time, many Jordanians 
study in neighboring Arabic countries, in Eastern European countries, and Russia. If a 
family can afford it, many will prefer to send their children to Great Britain or the USA 
for university education.  
Many of those who live in the West, however, come back at some stage. Often one 
can hear as a reason that they want to bring up their children in an Islamic environment. 
As they come back after several years of studying and working in the West, they bring 
with them skills and ideas. They also bring with them a significant number of so-called 
hidden immigrants. These are children of Jordanians who spent their forming years 
abroad, e.g., in the USA or Britain, and later they were brought back to Jordan. Many of 
them, including Jordan’s King Abdullah II, speak English just as well as Arabic but never 
appear on any immigration statistic.  
Although it is true that all the mentioned influences notwithstanding, Jordan has 
remained a predominantly Arabic speaking community with the vast majority of its 
population considering itself Muslim, it is safe to state that from its earliest days, this 
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country has been going through a never-ending series of unsettled periods. There is a 
whole list of things and developments, which had a rather unsettling effect on Jordan’s 
society. It includes the constant coming, going and returning of people which led to 
phenomenal population growth, the ever-increasing availability of media and the access 
to the Internet, the increased activity of political and religious groups and institutions 
over the last three decades, and last but not least the political developments during the 
Arab Spring, which refers to a cascade of popular democracy movements starting in 
Tunisia in late 2010 (Howard & Hussain, 2013). It stirred up even Jordan’s society and 
added more violent conflicts in the area. Due to their unsettling nature, these 
developments also fueled societal discourses virtually about every aspect of life. While 
the majority of its inhabitants came from rather traditional and conservative back-
grounds, the Jordanian society is forced into negotiating and redefining which norms 
should be reinforced, especially in the public space.  
The aspect of the monopoly of physical force and its legitimacy are the third and 
fourth points of Weber’s definition mentioned above. These points pose for Jordan 
some significant challenges which are rooted in its history, particularly in the Ottoman 
period and the founding years, which set the course for developments that are still 
affecting Jordan as a state today. There is little doubt that the Hashemite rule would not 
have survived the different attacks, internally and externally, without the loyalty of the 
local tribes and the military support of the British, which ended only in 1957 (Salibi, 
1993; Tal, 1995a). Whereas usually “the autonomy and relative power of tribes is 
inversely related to the strength and authority of a centralized, bureaucratic state,” the 
Jordanian case constitutes an intriguing exception for the simple reason that “at its 
inception the state built its base on the allegiance of the tribes” (Fathi, 1994, p. 49). This 
gave the tribes, including their norms, a strong position.  
As mentioned earlier, Abdullah had to accept more interference than he cared for 
from Britain in the internal affairs of his state. However, without police and military, it 
was virtually impossible for Abdullah to conduct taxation and to create revenue for the 
young state. However, without revenue, the police and military could not be paid (Salibi, 
1993, p. 104). Until 1958, the police was under the military and the Ministry of Defence 
and was then moved to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  
Massad summarizes the first decade of Abdullah’s reign as “characterized by the 
British and the Amir’s attempts to set up a governmental structure, an army, a police 
force, and a bureaucracy followed by the establishment of laws that began to be decreed 
in 1927” (Massad, 2001, p. 11). Although Britain did support Abdullah, it could not afford 
to invest many resources into controlling the country because of its expenses during the 
Great War. Ironically, due to Britain’s atypically weak presence and the fact that it did 
not simply impose its system but allowed a local leadership personality to build the 
bridge between them and the local population, is seen as probable cause for the success 
of Transjordan (Alon, 2007, p. 62). 
More than 30 years later, Abdullah’s grandson, King Hussein, eventually was able to 
shake off British command of Jordan’s military. With this, one could argue, Jordan 
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implemented de facto its independence, which de jure had been declared already in 
1946. The removal of the British chief of staff Sir John Bagot Glubb and some other 
British officers in March 1956 and the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty in 1957 
surely did not solve the challenges of neo-imperialistic influences from the West. It did, 
however, formally make Jordan a sovereign state in the sense that no foreign power was 
allowed to exert physical force within its territory, and no foreign officers had control 
over its army. 
The military remained a top priority of the government, which explains why the Bonn 
International Center for Conversion ranks Jordan in his Global Militarization Index on the 
nineth place of the most militarized states in the world in 2018 (Bonn International 
Center for Conversion, 2018). The military spending between 1995 and 2015 has been 
between 6.6 percent and 4.3 percent of the national GDP, compared to the Netherlands 
which steadily dropped in the same period from 2.6 percent to 1.2 percent and Germany 



























Figure 4.5: Wandering territory of the major tribes in the 1950s 
(Source: https://books.openedition.org/ifpo/docannexe/image/5010/img-4.jpg) 
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Apart from the reason to protect the country from a possible attack by Israel, the military 
had another critical function. It was a way to integrate the Bedouin tribes who, in a 
sense, lacked a territorialized sense of identity and, due to their lifestyle, kept moving 
around and did not espouse high regard for state laws (Massad, 2001). Consequently, 
the central government had the interest to encourage Bedouins to settle down and to 
abstain from their unsettled Bedouin lifestyle in order to exert better control over them.  
The fact that the people of Transjordan came to accept the new state and Abdullah’s 
rule surely had to do with his ability to co-opt the tribes, giving them reasons to have an 
interest in the state’s survival. On the other hand, the state and its normative system 
had to be of a kind, which was compatible with the people’s previous worldview, 
lifestyle, and identity.  
In Turkey, after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk decided to pursue an 
unmistakably secularist route that would later become known as Kemalism. In 
Transjordan, such a course of action probably would have been neither feasible, because 
the population had not been exposed to the same ideas as Turkey over the eighteenth 
and the early nineteenth century, nor was it the Hashemites’ dream to rule a secular 
state. Quite the opposite, as we already pointed out, they were aspiring to re-establish 
the caliphate (Paris, 2003).  
Thus, while Turkey itself abandoned the Majalla as early as 1926, from the 
Hashemites’ point of view, the Ottoman legal system fit their immediate needs rather 
well. Consequently, the Majalla remained in effect until 1952. As a matter of fact, in 
some parts, it is still in effect in the second decade of the twenty-first century (Hayajneh, 
2012). The religious courts still “have jurisdiction over all matters of ‘personal status’” 
which includes “most family law matters such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and 
adoption or guardianship,” including “all inheritance matters” (U.S. Embassy in Jordan, 
2016).  
At this point, it might be useful to go into some more detail regarding the issue of 
guardianship, as it will keep coming back in later chapters. In classical Islamic law, it was 
through a guardian, the so-called wali or wali al-amr, that a virgin’s consent to the 
marriage proceedings was expressed (Baugh, 2016, p. 699). A woman’s guardian would 
usually be her father, grandfather, or anybody else from the male blood relatives 
appointed by the former or a court. In her book Gendered Politics and Law in Jordan: 
Guardianship over Women (2016), Jabiri explains that the institution of guardianship  
grants the father or another male relative the right to act on behalf of his daughter, 
or female relative, in matters of marriage. (…) The definition of wilaya in most of fiqh 
literature is: “The legal authority vested in a person who is fully qualified and 
competent to safeguard the interests and rights of another who is incapable of doing 
so independently.” (…) In holding such a meaning of legal authority, wilaya notably 
signifies the power of someone over another without the consent of those who must 
submit. (Jabiri, 2016, p. 3) 
The Jordanian Personal Status Law of 2010, which recognizes the Hanafi school as basis 
of guardianship for the validity of a marriage contract in Article 14, puts women under 
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30 years of age under such male guardianship “and extends such custody past the age 
of 30 if a woman is deemed to pose a risk to herself” (Jabiri, 2016, p. 15). 
From these remarks, it is abundantly clear that in Transjordan the state 
acknowledged two other normative forces – tribes and religion – that were older and 
more primordial than itself. The state’s constitution stipulates that Islam is the religion 
of the State (The Jordanian Parliament, 2018, Article 2), and it delegates essential areas 
of life to the religious courts (Article 104). In a sense, even the legitimacy of the 
Hashemites to rule the country is, at least partly, based on the “Hashemites’ ancestral 
ties to the Prophet Muhammed,” which presupposes an Islamic framework to be seen 
as valid (Brinch, 2015, p. 2; see also Kumaraswamy, 2019).  
What about the role and influence of tribal authority and norms, though? Indeed, 
the law of tribal courts from 1936 was officially abolished in 1976. Nevertheless, tribal 
norms, tribal reconciliation, and dispute resolution are still a vital part of the Jordanian 
culture and customs (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). The tribal norms strongly emphasize 
concepts such as hospitality, generosity, group loyalty, and protection of family honor 
(Antoun, 2000). The avoidance of shame and its removal is very central and strongly 
connected to questions of female chastity and the reputation of the sexual purity of the 
female members of the tribe and family. Violations of tribal norms, which result in loss 
of face and shame, often require either revenge or so-called honor-killings (Faqir, 2010; 
Salameh et al., 2018).  
While there are several laws, which still refer to tribal code, there are two things in 
particular which stand out as loopholes through which the tribal norms and procedures 
still can function. Firstly, as Furr and Al-Serhan explain, when it comes to criminal 
matters, the Jordanian legal system recognizes public and personal rights. These rights 
acknowledge the interconnection of the state and tribal law. If a person is convicted in 
the state system, the public right is satisfied. If the victim’s family agrees, usually through 
the tribally recognized procedures and the payment of “blood money” to relinquish its 
private right, the court can reduce the sentence to the minimum required by the state. 
The courts can reduce capital cases to imprisonment under this system. (Furr & Al-
Serhan, 2008, p. 23).  
Secondly, Article 98 of the penal code “excuses what can be termed ‘crime of 
passion’ because the person committing it is not acting rationally” (Sonbol, 2003, 
p. 323). It is essential to understand that although the law is an import from French 
criminal codes, it does not share the French definition of a crime of passion. In France, 
a person who, e.g., discovers that his wife is cheating on him, catching her with her lover 
in flagrante delicto, and kills her out of rage, might plead in mitigation. If he left the room 
to look for a weapon, then the judge would refuse the “crime under passion” plea. In 
Jordan, however, “a person could go a month before killing his victim and still be 
considered ‘out of his mind’” (Sonbol, 2003, p. 196). Similarly, Article 340 gives a 
“reduced sentence to just about any member of a clan who kills or harms a female 
relative for what he considers to be sexual misconduct” (Sonbol, 2003, p. 321).  
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Although there are more instances of the Jordanian law accommodating tribal norms 
and customs, these examples suffice to show that in Jordan, people live in a real 
polycentric multinormativity without the state law superseding all other codes in the 
form of a nested hierarchy. In fact, in early 2016, Kuttab (2016) described the handling 
of a murder case in the Jordan Times, which illustrates the overlapping hierarchy of 
norms. It is a case where tribal law blatantly replaced civil law through an atwa, which 
is a tribal agreement.  
The agreement, signed by Minister Mohammad Thneibat, declares without trial the 
guilt of the suspected killer, decides capital punishment for him and vows not to 
pursue any effort for clemency for him. (Kuttab, 2016)  
Furthermore, the tribal agreement includes a decision to deport all the relatives of the 
suspected killer, including decedents “up to his fifth grandfather”. The jalweh, or 
deportation, applies to tens of Jordanian families that must leave their homes and towns 
for three months.  
In return for this harsh and unconstitutional punishment, the families of the killed 
agree not to take revenge against the other tribe (Kuttab, 2016). By putting his signature 
under an agreement which spells complete disregard of civil law and human rights 
(United Nations, n.d., e.g., Articles 3, 10, and 13), the state, as represented by the 
minister, bowed to the tribal authorities and their customary laws. It also shows that, 
firstly, tribal law and civil law are not always compatible or smoothly complementing 
each other but often stand in direct contradiction to each other and, secondly, that it is 
not clear which one comes out on top.  
Although the tribal law was formally abolished more than 40 years ago, it has not 
ceased to shape societal life to the degree that the Jordanian cabinet approved a draft 
law in September 2016 which is supposed to curb tribal practices by integrating 
moderate aspects into state legislation (The Jordan Times, 2016b). It is a matter of 
debate if tolerating and even integrating tribal law into state law is a wise move or if it 
is a sign of a weak state (Haase & Schubert, 2016; Lousada, 2016). However, it seems to 
be clear to everybody that these normative systems are at odds with each other and 
that it is plain impossible to harmonize tribal law with human rights.  
It is worth contrasting the development in Europe with the development in Jordan. 
Although the situation today is starkly different from the past, one must acknowledge 
that this tide-like dance of norms, which is caused by shifting chronotopic gravitational 
forces, is not absent from the history of norms in societies like France, Germany, or the 
Netherlands. There the state with its legal norms came to assume a dominant and 
unique position in the hierarchy of normative systems, at least on the national scale, 
one might add. Bourdieu views the state as “the culmination of a process of concen-
tration of different species of capital” which even creates some sort of “metacapital 
granting power over other species of capital and over their holders” (Bourdieu, 1998, 
p. 41).  
According to Weber, Germany and other European societies went through a process 
of secularization and disenchantment. Aron points out that “[i]n a material and 
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disenchanted world, religion can only withdraw into the privacy of the conscience or 
vanish toward the beyond of a transcendent God or of an individual destiny after earthly 
existence” (Aron, 1967, p. 224). Thus, it is not surprising that some European states, 
including Germany, experienced what has come to be known as Kulturkampf, culture 
struggle, in the second half of the nineteenth century. During that period, questions 
about the role and authority of religion in the modern state, particularly the Roman 
Catholic Church, were settled in favor of the power of the secular state (Kent, 1978).  
These processes contributed to the concentration of capital of the state leading to 
the point that the state became something “which successfully claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over 
the totality of the corresponding population” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 40) and thus created a 
nested hierarchy of norms. Like Russian matryoshka dolls, where one doll is 
encompassed by the next in size, and the biggest contains them all, the state contains 
and claims precedence over all other normative codes. Other examples of a nested 
hierarchy would be biological taxonomies or the military command structure, where the 
commands from a higher level always trump the lower-level commands, and the military 
in its entirety has to submit to one commander-in-chief.  
Even in such a stringently organized hierarchy, there is normative pluralism and 
polycentricity. In fact, the very existence of different normative systems and centers of 
authority require the paradigm of nested hierarchies to be assigned unambiguous 
positions within such a hierarchical structure.  
However, as in the case of Jordan, there are other ways to regulate the different 
competing competencies and jurisdictions. They are different not only in terms of who 
is on top, but the whole structure looks less like a triangle but shows more peaks, is more 
polymorphic with changing jurisdictions depending on different factors. Generally, in 
such an overlapping hierarchy, relationships are more ambiguous.  
Part of this ambiguity is inherited from the Ottoman past. However, the “injection of 
Western forms into the region, either through colonial rule or local reformation 
movements, encountered and clashed with traditional forms, which gave way to a 
hybrid model of sovereignty” (Bacik, 2008, p. 2). Thus, when we speak of Jordan as a 
state, we need to be aware that this chronotope has a distinctly unique history, with a 
somewhat Middle Eastern flavor, and that the Western idea of a modern and sovereign 
state, similar to the refraction of light entering a different medium, was not merely 
adopted but absorbed and adapted. To use Bacik’s words, Jordan is not “a modern state” 
but “like a modern state” where the benchmarks of the Westphalian model do not 
necessarily apply. There is another “Western” influence, which also had an enormous 
impact on the area and which suffered a similar fate – the focus on nation and the 
emergence of nationalism, to which the dissertation will turn next. 
 
4.5 Nationalism and the national chronotope  
The focus on nations and nation-states emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, 
first in Europe and then in other parts of the world, including the Middle East, with all 
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kinds of groups of people who identified themselves as a nation claiming their own state. 
That is not to say that the concept “nation” is an entirely new construct. Taking into 
account ancient texts like for example the Hebrew Bible, it is evident that there existed 
human communities which defined themselves as a nation and “whose members 
possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of 
common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least 
among the upper strata” (Smith, 2009, p. 27).  
However, what existed as a linguistic and socio-cultural reality gained a political 
dimension. What was new is not the chronotope as such but rather that the chronotope 
of the nation moved center stage and merged with the chronotope of the state to form 
what we call nation-states. Whereas states and governments previously often derived 
their legitimacy from some divine sources, nationalism saw the nation as the highest 
value and authority. Thus, patriotism, something that pertains to a state which naturally 
has a territory, and nationalism, which pertains to a nation in the sense of a human 
community as defined above, become the same or at least overlap to the degree that 
they become conterminous.  
The Serbs and the Greeks, for example, both part of the Ottoman Empire, caught on 
to this new political nationalism early in the nineteenth century. The Arab nationalist 
movement developed somewhat later in the second half of the nineteenth and 
culminated in the middle of the twentieth century under Egyptian leadership with Gamal 
Abdel Nasser as one of the key figures. During the Great War, the British did not mind 
to support and to encourage Arab nationalism, at least in the Ottoman territories, as 
they saw it useful to drive a wedge between Arabs and the Ottoman Empire. Although 
it apparently played a role during the Arab revolt in 1916, it is essential to mention that 
it was more at home in the urban centers of Egypt and Syria.  
Just as the idea of a modern state could not be simply imposed but had to be 
transposed into a different political and socio-cultural reality, the chronotope of 
nationalism unfolded in its unique way when it came to the Arab world. As will be 
explained shortly, in Jordan, two separate chronotopes can be distinguished. One has to 
do with the broader form of Arab nationalism, which refers to Arabs as encompassing 
several hundred million people stretched over many different countries, and the other 
with the distinctly Jordanian nationalism.  
Focusing on the former, the question of who is an Arab remains debated until today. 
At its formation, the Arab League, established in 1945, defined an Arab person as 
somebody “whose language is Arabic, who lives in an Arabic speaking country, who is in 
sympathy with the aspirations of the Arabic speaking peoples” (Myhill, 2010, p. 20). 
Nevertheless, the question “Who is an Arab?” is by far not as clear to “Arabs” as the 
mutually contradictory and sometimes tautological answers illustrate which Ferabolli 
collected in several different Arab countries (Ferabolli, 2015, chap. 30).  
Even the concept of an Arabic language, which is so central in the definition of the 
Arab League, is not as straightforward as many non-Arabic speakers might assume. 
Many students of Arabic from German universities, coming to Jordan to advance their 
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language skills, were utterly flabbergasted by the “strange” language spoken by the 
people because nobody had told them that in everyday life, people do not use Modern 
Standard Arabic but a local dialect.  
Ever since Fergusson’s article “Diglossia” (1959), tackling the phenomenon that 
some speech communities use two varieties of a language, the relationship between 
forms of High Arabic (e.g., Fusha or Modern Standard Arabic) and forms of Spoken 
Arabic (in Jordan called ᶜāmiyya), has been hotly debated. A more detailed and nuanced 
description is beyond the scope of the present study. It can be found in De Ruiter and 
Ziamiri’s article (2018), which also considers recent developments influenced by the 
Internet and social media.  
Irrespective of the linguistic discourse about Fergusson’s term and possible 
ideological biases in its usage, Jordanians themselves (like most other Arabs) generally 
distinguish between two versions of their language and refer to them as fuṣḥa and 
ᶜāmiyya. The distance between these two forms should not be underestimated as an 
anecdote of Leila Ahmed, an Egyptian American professor at Harvard Divinity School, 
illustrates. She recalls an event from her childhood in Egypt in the year 1952 when she 
failed to live up to the expectations of her teacher who asked her to read an Arabic text, 
which, of course, was written in fuṣḥa. Fuṣḥa, however, was not the language she had 
learned as an Egyptian girl, and it sounded to her so different from her spoken Egyptian, 
i.e., ᶜāmiyya, that she perceived it as a different language. The teacher, who eventually 
slapped her in the face, was annoyed – how come that she, an Arab girl, could not speak 
Arabic?  
For Ahmed, that was not the right question to be asked, but rather – how was it 
possible that an Egyptian girl could speak Arabic? Arabic, for the young Leila, was not 
Egyptian, and she was Egyptian, so she simply could not – and would not – speak 
another people’s language – Arabic (Ferabolli, 2015, p. 57).  
As this story shows, children learn c āmiyya as their first language, and only later at school 
do they become acquainted with fuṣḥa. Ibrahim claims that Palestinian Arabs do neither 
learn nor process fuṣḥa the same way as ᶜāmiyya but much more like Hebrew, which 
they learn as a second language. He concludes that “from a psycholinguistic perspective, 
the literate Arabic speaker may be considered de facto as bilingual” (Ibrahim, 2009, 
p. 102). Based on these and some other observations explicated in her book, Ferabolli 
(2015) makes a distinction between Arabic identity and Arabic regional identity. The 
former is connected to the chronotope of Arab nationalism called qawmiyya, and the 
latter relates to Jordan nationalism, called waṭaniyya. Arab nationalism, i.e., qawmiyya, 
arose in two different centers and within two different contexts. In the Levant, it can be 
seen as a reaction to the changes within the Ottoman Empire. Traditionally, Arabs had 
not perceived themselves under “foreign” occupation, as was the case in Egypt. After 
all, the Ottomans were Muslims themselves and assumed the role of protectors of all 
Muslims and the Islamic holy places. 
However, the Ottoman Empire came under growing pressure from the European 
powers. Therefore, it tried to prevent a European intervention by regrouping itself 
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through a series of reforms, the Tanzimat, as mentioned above. These included the 
adoption and incorporation of French law. These measures caused dissatisfaction with 
some from the Muslim part of the population who started accusing the Ottoman Empire 
of deviating from Islam and being responsible for the relative weakness compared to 
the European “Christian” powers. It is noteworthy that the Arab nationalist movement 
in the Levant originally was not particularly Islamic, and many Arab Christians played an 
important role.  
In Egypt, things developed very differently. After the French invasion of 1798 and 
their subsequent defeat at the hands of Britain, Muhammad Ali, an Albanian general of 
the Ottoman army, charged by the Ottomans with liberating Egypt from the French 
occupation, turned against the Ottomans himself and built himself a dynasty in Egypt 
which would last till the Egyptian Revolution in 1952. However, massive national debts, 
caused by the building of the Suez Canal in the late 1860s, left the Egyptians vulnerable 
to foreign interference and eventually led to Muhammad Ali’s dynasty becoming a 
British puppet. Thus, in Egypt, Arab nationalism acquired a much more anti-imperialist 
focus, and the confrontation with Western influence (i.e., the British Empire) 
contributed to the factors which eventually triggered the foundation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which espoused a robust Islamic orientation. One of its main goals was to 
end Western influence, and it had a negative attitude towards Arab governments, which 
were seen to depend on Western powers and to collaborate with them.  
It is beyond the scope of this brief overview to explore the inherent contradictions 
and tensions between any kind of nationalism on the one hand (Tibi, 1997), which gives 
the nation a central role, and Islam on the other hand, which derives all authority from 
Allah and his prophet Muhammad. The Sharif Hussein of Mecca did not see these two 
perspectives as incompatible. He combined them in his accusation of the Ottoman 
Empire, as mentioned earlier, to have betrayed Islam and in his claim that it was time to 
establish an Arab caliphate under Hashemite leadership (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 
2009, p. 15f). 
His son Abdullah continued in his steps. As he kept aspiring a greater future for the 
Hashemites, which hopefully would include more than the Emirate of Transjordan, it 
comes as no surprise that building a specifically Transjordanian nation with its own 
identity was not on his mind, let alone on his list of priorities. The conflicts with Israel, 
whose existence, from the locals’ perspective, could be interpreted only as another 
manifestation of Western imperialism, further emphasized this chronotope. Arabs from 
the East Bank and the West Bank of the Jordan River, later referred to as Jordanians and 
Palestinians, fought together for roughly a quarter of a century side by side against the 
non-Arab enemy.  
Arab nationalism also came to threaten the Hashemites in the 1950s because its 
supporters detested Arab governments, which seemed to cooperate with Western 
powers. After all, the Hashemite rule had survived only with the help of the British, and 
King Hussein countered Gamal Abdul Nasser’s and other Arab nationalist’s accusations 
by distancing himself from British influence. The previously mentioned dismissal of 
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British officers from his army, including Glubb, in 1956 can be interpreted within the 
chronotope of Arab nationalism as a deliberate attempt to conduct an Arabisation of 
the Jordanian army to undergird his legitimacy as a response to pan-Arabists and 
Nasserists’ delegitimization of his rule.  
Arab nationalism as qawmiyya, however, waned after the painful defeat of the Arab 
forces against Israel after the 1967 war for several reasons, which cannot be pursued 
within the limited scope of our inquiry. The Arab Nationalist Movement replaced its 
“Nasserism” in favor of Marxism-Leninism, while Saudi Arabia propagated Islamism as 
an alternative.  
Since Abdullah saw his actions within the Arab nationalist chronotope and hoped to 
gain control over more Arab lands, he did not pursue building a (Trans)Jordanian identity 
even though there were some voices within the community of the East Jordanian 
population which asserted as early as 1923 that Transjordan was for Transjordanians. 
The tribal laws, which gave Bedouins a unique legal position, were pragmatic and 
temporary measures and consequently abolished in 1976. From Abdullah’s perspective, 
the population of the acquired territories west of the Jordan River and other Palestinians 
from occupied territories seeking refuge in Jordan were citizens of Jordan just as the 
East Bank population. The West Bank population even received the same number of 
seats in the Jordanian Parliament as the population on the other side of the river.  
The unity of Jordanians and Palestinians, as natural as it seemed within the pan-Arab 
nationalist chronotope, broke apart in the 1970s when an open conflict between the 
Jordanian government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) erupted. 
However, contrary to commonly held views, the events of the so-called Black September 
in 1970, after which the militant Palestinian organization named itself (Cooley, 2015) 
were not the result of a Jordanian-Palestinian divide but rather the cause of it (Fathi, 
1994; Kassay, 2011). Palestinians and Jordanians were fighting for both sides of the 
conflict. 
One reason that a divide between Jordanians and Palestinians developed or at least 
widened might be the fact that the Fedayeen, the Palestinian freedom fighters, were 
recruiting in Palestinian refugee camps in Amman and other cities to liberate Palestine. 
In contrast, the Armed forces recruited more in the countryside and with the primary 
goal to protect Jordan (Kassay, 2011). However, apart of juxtaposing Palestinians and 
Jordanians and triggering the development of a Jordanian national identity in opposition 
to the Palestinian identity, it also “consolidated the perception of rural Jordan as the 
protector of Jordan against the troublesome mudun” which is the derogatory term used 
to indicate urban people (Kassay, 2011, para. 32). The development it consolidated 
started much earlier and had socioeconomic roots. As was mentioned above, from the 
very beginning, many non-Jordanians flocked to Amman and acquired influence and 
positions – a fact which understandably let the local population, which lived 
predominantly in villages and the desert to worry. At the same time, the government 
used employment in the military and the police to integrate the rural people and the 
Bedouins and to get control over them.  
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Amman and other larger towns developed faster regarding their living standards 
than the rural areas, including medical care and education. Due to a different 
composition of the population, a higher level of education, and exposure to the outside 
world, certain revolutionary ideas – particularly Nasserism – also circulated more in the 
city. So when the army, which was recruited mainly from the East bank rural population, 
had to protect repeatedly the royal family and the kingdom from various attempts of 
coup d’etats and other threats to their rule, it comes as no surprise that “the military, 
and by extension rural Jordan, came to see themselves and to be perceived as the only 
true Jordanians who saved the country time and again by teaching a good lesson to the 
perfidious al-mudun (…), particularly those of Amman” (Kassay, 2011, para. 23). 
Kassey’s observations regarding the change of national discourse are very 
illuminating. He notes that the “reference to األ�ة األردن�ة الواحدة [al-usra al-urduniyya al-
wāḥida] – the one Jordanian family, was replaced by ة األردن�ة الواحدة -al-ᶜashīra al] العش�ي
urduniyya al-wāḥida] or the one Jordanian tribe. Al-Watan, or the nation, was replaced 
by al-Deera al-Urduniya الديرة األردن�ة [al-dīra al-urduniyya] or the Jordanian tribal 
territory” (Kassay, 2011, para. 40). This can be seen as a reason why, as Alon (2007) 
notes, tribalism and nationalism are not contradictory phenomena in Jordan and why, 
unlike the population in many other after World War II newly created states, the 
descendants of the original inhabitants of Jordan were able to identify with the state in 
an intimate way.  
It is evident that the government was actively engaged in constructing a Jordanian 
identity using the tribal and Bedouin chronotopes as the chronotope of Arab nationalism 
faded away, and the Palestinian chronotope had threatened to absorb Jordan itself 
(Alon, 2007; Massad, 2001). However, Massed is attributing the population in general, 
and the tribes in particular too passive a role in forming the Jordanian national identity. 
Shryock (1997) and Layne (1987) support Alon’s conclusion that “the Bedouinisation and 
anti-Palestinian sentiments should not only be seen as top-down processes or as a 
complete colonial invention as suggested by Massed” (Alon, 2007, p. 156).  
This chapter gave an overview of the history of Jordan, and it shows that the country 
is the result of a combination of numerous influences, both internal as well as external 
ones. Against the background of this description, the present research has been 










Chapters 5 and 6 present the data as collected through the interviews. The present 
chapter deals with the answers given to the interview questions C.1-C.4 (see Section 
3.3.2) during the first interview round. The following chapter presents the information 
gained through the second interview round, which used the presentation of pictures. 
Ideally, one would present the entire data, which in the present case consists of the 
complete transcripts with additional background information about the interview 
situation, in order to give the reader as much uninterpreted information as possible. 
With over 150,000 words of transcripts, such an approach proves inexpedient. However, 
presenting roughly 25 hours of recorded interviews in a manageable and digestible 
manner, entails a certain degree of interpreting, analyzing, and summarizing, which is 
simply inevitable during such a process. Still, these activities were kept at a low level in 
this and the next chapter. In other words, these chapters aim to present the data in a 
lucid and neatly organized manner, which gives the reader a balanced impression of the 
interviews and their content with as little interpretation or analysis from my side. 
Chapter 7, then, takes an openly analytical approach and addresses the aspects of the 
research questions of this dissertation as formulated in Section 3.2. 
The four questions that were used to trigger answers in the first round of interviews 
were formulated as follows: 
C.1 Is there a difference between ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ? If so, what is the 
difference? 
C.2 Do you think there is a difference of ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ in regard to males 
and females? 
C.3 If so, do you think this difference is fair or just? If not, why do you think that? 
C.4 What do women do, or could do who want to revolt against this system? / How 
would I recognize a woman who is revolting against the system? 
The following sections cover the answers to the four questions. It must, however, be 
said that it is virtually impossible to make sharp distinctions between the statements of 
the diverse informants on the four questions. Naturally, there is overlap, and therefore 
the reader is asked to take this into consideration while reading the chapter. The four 
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5.1 Question 1: Is there a difference between ᶜayb, ḥarām, and 
mamnūᶜ? 
The first question, if there is a difference between ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ, is quite 
innocuous and generally answered in the affirmative. M23, a Jordanian in his late 50s 
who grew up around Kerak and had been living in Amman for several decades, gave the 
following succinct answer: 
Martin: There are three words. I’m thinking about them and I’d like to ask you what 
is your opinion about them. Three words: ᶜayb, ḥarām, mamnūᶜ. Is there a 
difference or not? Or what is the difference? 
M23: ᶜAyb, ḥarām, mamnūᶜ – when I hear these words, I remember that I’m a 
Jordanian because from before we start to speak, when we were small 
children, we teach the boy that this is ᶜayb, but we didn’t tell him why it’s 
ᶜayb and what’s the ᶜayb in it. Only that this is ᶜayb – that’s it! ᶜAyb! And it’s 
even ᶜayb to debate why this is ᶜayb. So ᶜayb means “taboo”, you must not 
do it, you must not think. And the second word? 
Martin: Ḥarām. 
M23: Ḥarām is either pity, or it’s ḥarām because this thing is against God and the 
human. And the third “I forgot”. 
Martin: Mamnūᶜ. 
M23: Mamnūᶜ. If you say ḥarām and you say ᶜayb, there is nothing left for them 
which they prohibit us from except if we say: this is something mamnūᶜ. 
Why is it mamnūᶜ? Because I, who has the power, I am dominating, I am “in 
control”, and I tell you it’s mamnūᶜ. (M23: 1-6) 
M23’s reaction is not uncommon. During interviews and in countless informal 
conversations throughout the years of research, whenever I mentioned that I am 
interested in learning about the concepts of ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ, people’s face lit 
up with an intrigued smile, usually followed by a conversation during which the other 
person tries to explain her understanding of these concepts. All the informants 
confirmed both of M23’s assertions, namely that they play a central role in the 
“accounting processes” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii) of Jordanians and also that they differ 
substantially in their meaning and usage. In the next sections (5.2-5.4) specific 
comments on ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ are treated. 
 
5.2 Ḥarām: What does God say? 
From the three different words, informants usually found the term ḥarām the easiest to 
tackle. After affirming that the three words are indeed different in meaning, F01 explains 
that the  
general idea is that ḥarām is something connected to the religion, in the first degree. 
And the opposite of ḥarām is ḥalāl. Anything that is forbidden (lit. mamnūᶜ) in the 
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religion is ḥarām, and we must not do it. The reason is that it angers God. The issue 
is connected in a direct way to the relationship of the person to God. (F01: 17) 
F03 agreed that ḥarām is “not acceptable to do it because of God” (F03&M04: 42). As 
ḥarām means “to break one of the commands of God” (M11: 100), it is consequentially 
based on “a Sharia law or Islamic, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu or whatever law” 
(M02: 51). In fact, the only exception to this rule reported by the informants was the 
interjection “Ya ḥarām!” which expresses pity or sympathy.  
Christian informants generally agreed with the suggestion of ḥarām being an almost 
exclusively religious concept even though they point out that ḥarām, in its origin, is an 
Islamic term. M07, a middle-aged Christian man, suggested that even though one finds 
it in Christian circles “we need to remind people that in Christianity there is not this 
thought of ḥarām and ḥalāl” and ascribed the fact that Christians use this term to the 
influence of their Islamic environment (M07: 48). 
Nevertheless, Christian informants usually readily responded to the question about 
ḥarām by giving their view of ḥarām from a Christian perspective. Another Christian 
informant from an Orthodox background explained that he listens to the sermons at his 
church and that he learned that “if you go back to the real Christian religion in old times 
there were many things which were very ḥarām like the Ten Commandments, do not 
kill, do not commit adultery, do not covet the wife of another” (M15: 121; similarly also 
M14, M23). 
However, there was a clear difference in how members from both religions used the 
term. Being a good Muslim was sometimes described as “knowing what is ḥarām and 
what is ḥalāl” (e.g., F35: 242, F18: 14). The conceptual pair ḥarām and ḥalāl, a 
metonymical expression, referred only to the normative code of Islam and not 
Christianity. Christian informants never used ḥalāl, except for M07, and only when he 
talked about Islam. As expressed by him already earlier, particularly the typically Islamic 
classification of behavior into ḥarām and ḥalāl is not found in Christian thinking, 
suggesting that the clear delineation between ḥarām and ḥalāl does not have the same 
importance and relevance as in Islamic thinking. Muslims, on the other hand, insisted 
that ḥarām and ḥalāl are clearly discernible in Islam: “There is a hadith of the prophet 
which says: ‘The ḥalāl is apparent and the ḥarām is apparent.’ If we want to use it from 
the religious perspective, it’s apparent in the Quran, and the Sunna has clarified what is 
ḥarām” (F27: 40). 
These observations are very much in line with Al Jallad’s (2008) study who also treats 
the two words as an antonymic pair and confirms their religious context. He also points 
out that the word ḥarām can refer to “‘sanctuary, sacred place, wife, spouse,’ Haram al-
jami?ah ‘university campus,’ al-Haram al-aqsa ‘Jerusalem,’ al-Haraman ‘Mecca and 
Medina’” (Al Jallad, 2008, p. 79). However, the informants never used the word ḥarām 
with these meanings. 
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5.2.1 Examples of ḥarām  
The examples presented in this section were mentioned by the informants and are not 
intended to provide a complete or exhaustive catalog of all the things, which are ḥarām 
in Islam or the Christian faith for that matter. Quite the contrary. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, it is interesting to observe what examples informants actually gave 
because this research is concerned about vernacular religion. In other words, the 
insights derived from the interviews do not claim to apply to Islam and its norms in 
general but depict which norms seemed salient, and which ones came to mind 
spontaneously and seemed vital for the informants. From this perspective, it is 
enlightening to see which norms were mentioned more often than others. Even at the 
risk of sounding repetitive, it is crucial to emphasize that the exposition of the data 
regarding ḥarām must not be misunderstood as an essay on Islamic (or Christian) ethics 
but rather as an attempt to understand which norms and categories preoccupy the 
informants’ thinking regarding ḥarām. 
Since ḥarām was considered a religious term, it is natural and consequential that 
there were several mentions of behavior which can be seen as related to religious duties, 
like neglecting to pray and breaking the fast, or as overstepping religious taboos, like 
drinking alcohol. The sin of shirk, i.e., the practice of idolatry of polytheism, was also 
mentioned but only by one of the informants (F28: 122). Interestingly, however, 
compared with the entirety of the statements made about ḥarām, the category 
pertaining to religious duties and rituals was of rather marginal interest. 
The majority of the typical examples given for ḥarām dealt with behavior violating 
other persons’ rights, interests, or welfare like stealing, lying, killing, gossiping, and 
generally treating others in a wrong way. M25, for example, mentioned as one of the 
first examples of ḥarām neglecting obligations and duties toward the family or family 
members in need (M25: 71). 
All of the above examples relate to what MDA calls nexuses of practice in their 
entirety. Certain nexuses of practice, e.g., prayer, fasting, caring for relatives, are 
prescribed. Others, like stealing, killing, gossiping, are proscribed. There is no focus on 
who or where or when. Everybody is supposed to pray and fast. Nobody is supposed to 
kill anybody or to steal anything. However, ḥarām was also seen not to proscribe an 
action as such but to regulate what action is permitted for whom and with whom. In 
other words, it also regulated the interaction order. 
 
5.2.2 Focus on sexual conduct and related illicit behavior 
The most prominent categories of ḥarām and those, which informants tended to 
elaborate on more were those regulating sexual relationships. Ḥarām from this 
perspective could refer to norms, which defined which persons constitute possible 
marital partners or, more often, to norms which delineated sexual misconduct, 
inappropriate behavior, dress, and personal ornamentation according to the sexes.  
Zināᵓ was at the top of the list of all the examples. It denotes extramarital inter-
course, which could be translated as adultery if it is between two married people or a 
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married and an unmarried person. It can also refer to sexual intercourse between two 
unmarried persons, and in this case, it would be better translated as fornication. Both 
of these English words have a somewhat judgemental or pejorative ring, which is also 
true of the word zināᵓ, which was considered a grave instance of ḥarām in the 
interviews.  
According to the Quran and Sunna, “the prescribed penalty is flogging with eighty 
lashes or stoning to death if the offender is married” (Rasjidi, 1958, p. 422), but these 
punishments are never carried out in Jordan. There are indeed cases when a person 
suspected of having committed zināᵓ is killed. However, the motivation usually is not 
primarily (if at all) religious but based on the ᶜayb code, which explains why it happens 
virtually only to women. This issue will come up again later in the section about ᶜayb. 
For now, it is enough to point out that zināᵓ is of central importance in people’s thinking 
about ḥarām and that it applies to both genders without a difference. 
Ḥarām was also applied to breaking the religious norms, which define who is eligible 
as a marital partner and who not. Certain blood relatives are defined as muḥarram, lit. 
forbidden, and are excluded as possible martial partners. The circle of muḥarramīn (pl. 
of muḥarram) consists of 
one’s father’s wives (4: 22), one’s mother, daughters, sisters, father’s sisters, 
mother’s sisters, brother’s daughters, sister’s daughters, foster-mothers, foster-
sisters, mothers-in-law, stepdaughters born of women with whom one has had 
conjugal relations, the wives of blood-sons, and two sisters from the same family 
(4: 23) as well as all married women except slaves already owned (4: 24). (Kassam, 
2004, p. 266)  
Informants also listed other examples of ḥarām, which can be seen as sexual 
misconduct. Some consider greeting a woman not related to oneself presumably 
involving body contact, be it by a handshake or by a kiss, ḥarām. F16 and F17, two older 
widows living in a village close to Ajloun, suggested that if I had come to visit them and 
spent the evening at their house, it would have been ḥarām because I am a stranger. 
M21, F28, and F30 spoke of “sitting with the opposite sex” as ḥarām, which seemed to 
be a synonym for spending time together that could entail sexual intimacy, even sexual 
intercourse. All these things might be subsumed under the concept of ikhtilāṭ, literally 
meaning “mixing”, but also denoting disorder and promiscuity. Usually, the examples 
for ḥarām referred to external actions and not to some internal thoughts or emotions. 
M15, a young Christian man, provided the only exception by quoting the Ten 
Commandments and pointing out lusting after one’s neighbor’s wife. 
The examples of ḥarām, so far in this section, are considered illicit regardless of the 
gender or if somebody else witnessed the act. There is, however, a set of norms that 
deals with the behavior which is very much dependent on these factors, namely the 
norms of how to “dress according to Sharia” (F12: 74; F45ff: 644; M09: 92; M22: 229). 
These norms were not merely of peripheral interest. During the initial attempt to define 
ḥarām, six women mentioned the omission of women to cover their hair in public as 
examples of ḥarām. In other words, there is a whole set of norms within the religious 
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code that focuses on the use of the technical class of mediational tools, respectively, the 
lack thereof. These regulations concern predominantly females and their appearance 
outside the circle of the muḥarramīn.  
The Islamic dress code, according to the informants, is not only concerned about the 
head cover. Although in English, the word hijab (and in German similarly the word 
Hidschab) usually only refers to a veil covering the hair, some of the informants insisted 
that it was wrong to see the ḥijāb as a head cover in isolation of the rest of the clothes. 
The word ḥijāb is derived from the root ḥ-j-b, meaning “to veil, to cover” (Wehr, 1976, 
p. 156). The noun ḥijāb denotes in everyday usage mostly a “woman’s veil” but can also 
refer to “cover, wrap, curtain” or “screen, partition” (Wehr, 1976, p. 156). A woman 
veiling herself is referred to as muḥajjaba, lit. “veiled one”. 
Viewing ḥijāb as pertaining to the whole body, not just the hair, one of the women 
from the interview group (F45.46.47&M48) explained, “the correct ḥijāb does not depict 
and is not translucid. It does not depict the body (…) and is not translucid; that is, it’s not 
transparent and is not tight” (F45.46.47&M48: 347). From this point of view, the ḥijāb 
needs to be complemented either by a jilbāb (a long gown), or a ᶜabāya (a cloak). The 
ḥijāb in combination with tight or revealing clothes, which is not uncommon in Amman 
particularly with younger women and which can also be seen in conservative areas and 
outside Amman, was harshly criticized and dismissed by M38 as not being a real ḥijāb 
because “they think that the hair is ᶜawra and the rest is normal (meaning permissible)” 
(M38: 191). Ḥarām regarding the hijab, thus, does not refer to social actions, which are 
illicit as such but to the use of mediational means, i.e., the human body and the means 
used to cover it, in specific situations. Since it is the concept of ᶜawra, which lies at the 
core of ḥijāb and because the whole issue of dress code for women is so central in the 
societal life of Jordan and relevant to the inquiry of this research, the next section 
investigates it in some more detail. 
 
5.2.3 The concept of ᶜawra 
M38 complained that women seem to apply ᶜawra only to the hair and not to the body 
(M38: 191). M11 explained that according to Islam the woman is ᶜaura, which is why 
many people say to an unmarried woman “May God cover you!”, i.e., give you a husband 
(M11: 195-199). F24 saw not just the hair but the voice, and even a woman’s odor as 
ᶜawra and insisted that all this belongs under ḥarām (F24: 57). M25 mentioned ᶜawra 
twice, once referring to the woman’s voice and the second time denoting woman as 
such as ᶜawra (both times in F24: 100). He did so, however, in the context of explaining 
ᶜayb and not in connection with ḥarām. 
The fact that the word ᶜawra was not mentioned frequently during the interviews 
and only by four informants does not diminish its importance because, as will become 
apparent shortly, it is the reasoning behind the Islamic requirement to cover certain 
parts of the body in the presence of particular sets of people. Leila Ahmed suggests 
ᶜawra to be  
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one of those words whose complicated layered meanings and range of possible 
referents are richly suggestive of the androcentrism of dominant Arabic culture and 
of the connections it made between women, sexuality, and shameful and defective 
things. Its meanings include blind in one eye; blemished, defective; the genital area; 
generally parts of the body that are shameful and must be concealed; women’s 
bodies; women’s voices; and women. (Ahmed, 1992, p. 116)  
It seems worth pointing out – its apparent role within the religious chronotope 
notwithstanding – that the word ᶜawra and the notion of the “shamefulness of the 
female body” was evidently present in Middle Eastern culture long before the arrival of 
Islam and was not invented or introduced by neither Muhammad nor his followers even 
though it is used, at least in Jordan, mostly as an Islamic concept nowadays (Ahmed, 
1992, p. 35). 
Shamefulness here is different from the shamefulness of ᶜayb, as will become 
evident in the section about ᶜayb. ᶜAwra does not mean that something in itself is 
shameful but only displaying it to specific people or outside specific contexts. So what 
are the concrete regulations of ᶜawra in Islam? What must be hidden from whom? 
According to Islamic tradition, there are four categories: “what a man may see of a 
woman, what a woman may see of a man, what a man may see of a man, what a woman 
may see of a woman” (Bouhdiba, 2008, p. 37). Naturally, spouses are allowed to see 
more of each other’s body, particularly during times of intimacy when no one else is 
around. Other people, including those considered muḥarram, are not to see the private 
parts of each other. According to M02, for men, this area lies below the navel and above 
the knee (private conversation; cf. also Bouhdiba, 2008). In the fitness studio or at the 
swimming pool, the rule is usually not as strictly applied even by religious people, and 
only the area below the waistline and above the middle thigh seems to be treated as 
ᶜawra. On the street, however, a local male dressed with less than a t-shirt and shorts 
which are shorter than the knee is seen very rarely if at all. 
With women, the case is distinctly different. In the presence of men outside the circle 
of the muḥarramīn, many observant Muslims in Jordan consider most of a woman’s 
body, except hands and face, as ᶜawra. For this group, usually, the term ᶜawra includes 
a woman’s hair, and male persons are only allowed to see it if they belong to the circle 
of muḥarramīn. For this reason, it is considered by many ḥarām for a woman to leave 
the house without a ḥijāb as there is always the possibility that a male outside the circle 
of the muḥarramīn might see her. 
Going back to the notion of ḥijāb, in even more restrictive opinions also the face of 
a woman is to be covered, which then necessitates either the niqāb, covering the face 
and leaving only the eyes clear, or the burqa that completely hides the face including 
the eyes. 
The latter two, however, are less common in Jordan and seem to be more used by 
women from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, or in families who are influenced by specific 
interpretations of Islam like Wahhabism. 
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Ahmed’s explanations above already mentioned that ᶜawra extends even further 
and also pertains to the voice of a woman. “Me, as a man, I can raise my voice in the 
street, and I talk on the phone, but it is ᶜayb for a woman to talk with a loud voice while 
she is in the street. The voice of a woman is ᶜawra” (M25: 110). Bouhdiba explains:  
The voice of a Muslim woman is also ‘aura. Not only because the sweet words 
coming from her mouth must be heard only by her husband and master, but because 
the voice may create a disturbance and set in train the cycle of zinā. When one 
knocks at the door of a house, and there is no man or little boy or little girl to answer 
‘Who is there?’, a woman must never speak: she must be content with clapping her 
hands. (Bouhdiba, 2008, p. 39) 
M25’s statement above shows that the issue of a woman’s ᶜawra is also crucial in the 
ᶜayb paradigm. The overlaps between these paradigms and the interplay and cross-
fertilization of the religious and the social chronotopes will be discussed more at a later 
point. It is, however, not only the woman’s body and her voice, but even her scent which 
can be perceived as ᶜawra: 
F24: The voice of a woman, always the voice of a woman even during her work 
in her house, in the market place has to be low. 
Martin: And the man not? 
F24: No, for the man it’s normal to shout (…) 
Martin: Even in the house, her voice has to be low? 
F24: Yes. Low, very low. Always. With her brothers, with her husband, with her 
girls. Her voice needs to be low because the voice of a woman is ᶜawra here 
with us. How is it ᶜawra? Our Islamic religion like… Things like that are from 
zināᵓ. Also when she is perfumed, perfume or like… A woman who puts on 
perfume is considered a fornicator such a woman here with us. 
In a conversation about the term ᶜawra with another Jordanian, a Christian man from 
Amman in his early 30s, expressed the same notion, namely that some Muslims consider 
the scent of a woman ᶜawra. Since basically anything that can be perceived about a 
woman by a man could be ᶜawra, it is consequential that women as such would be 
described as ᶜawra (M25: 110). 
Although the concept of ᶜawra pertains primarily to the human body, the idea is also 
applied to the residence – in Jordan, not necessarily literally but in principle. 
Indeed, since the human body has its own ᶜawrah (private parts which must be 
covered) which can be revealed only to a few, likewise the house has its own ᶜawrah, 
that is, restricted and classified aspects, which can be seen and used only by certain 
categories of people and at appointed times. This is so because the house serves as 
the physical locus of human life. Some activities of the residents of a house can be 
shared with others, other activities are meant for the residents of a house alone, and 
yet many other activities in a house are neatly divided along the lines of gender, age, 
and the domestic status of its residents. Thus, each and every house ought to be 
On ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ  109 
 
planned and designed in order to cater for the complex needs of its residents. (Omer, 
2009, p. 69) 
Due to the delicate nature of the female ᶜawra, which is protected by a family’s 
residence, men often prefer to meet and socialize with other men outside their homes, 
at least in Amman, where there are plenty of opportunities to do so. Outside Amman, 
e.g., in the Northern and Southern Jordan Valley, informants explained that there are 
no such places available for them, like cafés or restaurants. In this case, the different 
zones protecting a house’s ᶜawra, which Omer (2009) mentions, become of paramount 
importance. Such is, however, not only valid for outside Amman but also for most 
houses in Amman which I have visited over the years. 
The home usually consists of three zones. There is a distinctly separated zone where 
male visitors are received. That room is called the reception room, ghurfat istiqbāl. 
Some houses or apartments even have two different entrances for that purpose, with 
one leading directly into this reception room for the male visitors, and another entrance 
for family and close friends who are allowed into the inner zone. Often one can also find 
a small toilet adjacent to the reception room very close to the entrance so that male 
visitors do not have to enter further into the living area. This room is usually not used 
by family members but instead kept clean and tidy in order to be presentable to visitors 
who might come unexpectedly. 
The next zone consists of rooms such as the living room, the dining room, and the 
kitchen where the life of the family takes place. Family members, also those who are not 
muḥarram, have access, and also good friends can be invited into this area. A door from 
the reception area often separates this zone. Sometimes there is also a connection 
between the reception area and the kitchen. While the male members of the household 
entertain male visitors in the reception room, in some families the female members will 
prepare, e.g., drinks and maybe a snack for the visitors and then call the male members 
to fetch the tray and offer it to the male guests. Other families, however, which consider 
the voice of a woman being ᶜawra, will allow a woman only to signal that the tea and 
the snacks are ready through a coughing sound or a knock at the door. 
The third area, often separated from the middle zone, sometimes by another door, 
contains the bedrooms. In most apartments, one will find not more than three bed-
rooms: one of the bedrooms is usually the master bedroom, frequently with its own 
bathroom, and the other two rooms can then be divided between the boys and girls. 
The notion of ᶜawra, especially regarding females, makes it necessary to protect her 
from the looks of men outside the circle of muḥarramin and also to protect the men 
from her enticing charms lest, as Bouhdiba put it, they would “create a disturbance and 
set in train the cycle of zinā” (Bouhdiba, 2008, p. 39). For this purpose, a combination of 
the different strategies and tools are used, be it covering the female body or creating 
spatial separations and privacy shields. 
It is worth pointing out that the norms prescribing when a female is required to veil 
herself are not simply congruent with a public-private divide. However, the distinction 
between public and private appears to be applicable in similar questions within the ᶜayb 
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chronotope, as will become evident later. Due to the ḥarām code, M21’s wife does not 
make a difference between activities like shopping in the public sphere of the market 
and sitting in the private home of her husband’s mother, where his brothers are present. 
Since she is not considered muḥarram for the male remembers of his family, she is 
required to keep her hair covered. 
 
5.3 ᶜAyb: What do the people say? 
When people were asked what c ayb is based on or who decides what c ayb is, the answer, 
in general, was that ᶜayb has to do with society and its traditions. ᶜAyb is based on 
customs and traditions (e.g., M21: 93), what people think (F01: 20), or whatever the 
society prohibits (M20: 19). F12 saw it as inherited by society (F12: 93); others even 
went a step further and equated ᶜayb with society (F10: 207) or with culture (F08: 30). 
The word ᶜayb is a derivative of the word ᶜāb, which can denote “to be defective, 
faulty, blemished, deficient” but is also used to convey more transitive and more 
abstract meanings like “to dishonor, disgrace” or “to blame, censure, denounce, decry” 
(Wehr, 1976, p. 660). Therefore, ᶜayb carries the corresponding meanings “fault, defect, 
blemish, flaw, shortcoming, imperfection; vice, failing, weakness, foible; shame, 
disgrace” (Wehr, 1976, p. 660). In Jordanian everyday usage, it is used predominantly in 
the two latter meanings, namely shame and disgrace. It is seldom if ever heard in any 
context other than marking human behavior as shameful or disgraceful. 
The dreaded negative consequence of doing something ᶜayb is that it might affect a 
person’s or her family’s reputation in a negative way. “People talk” – this brief but 
ominous phrase expressed an immense threat and was mentioned over and over again. 
Without people talking, there is no ᶜayb because, as M21 put it, “the horse or the riding 
animal of ᶜayb is the outrage (faḍīḥa), the ‘awareness’ which arises” (M20: 67). One 
could say that the phrase “people talk” often functioned as a synonym for ᶜayb. 
When asked what the effect of committing ᶜayb would be, M11 answered that a bad 
reputation caused by ᶜayb would make people refuse to deal with him (M11: 118-122). 
M21 describes it as a feeling being put in the corner (M21: 93). F18 suggests that people 
will scorn such a person and refuse to mix with him or to enter his house (F18: 42-46). 
Mainly, however, people will refuse to marry such a person and will not allow their 
children to get married to him or his offspring: “They would not mix with his girls, and if 
he asked for a bride they wouldn’t give him (one)” (F18: 42-46). No doubt, this can 
indeed happen due to the damage done to the family’s reputation, e.g., because the 
father went to prison (M23: 257). The most common and frankly most dreaded scenario, 
though, is that one of the daughters would not protect her honor, sharaf, since she is 
the “honor of the family” (M23: 8). 
There is a danger that the magnitude and severity of the consequences mentioned 
above are underestimated from the perspective of members of a society with other 
values. People from all societies are indeed vulnerable to different degrees to gossip and 
bullying. Generally, though, the emotional force or power of the phrase “the people 
talk” depends on the importance and centrality of the group for the life of the individual.  
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Over the last centuries, as cities grew larger and more anonymous, it became not 
unusual for people to have only occasional contact with one’s family of origin. Many 
have come to inhabit a world, which is fragmented in a way that other people only know 
as much as a person chooses to reveal to them. Colleagues might not have a really good 
idea about who their co-worker is in private because workplace and social life are often 
separated. It is not unusual in such societies that people from different domains of life 
do not mix. In a world of impersonal markets with megastores, online shops and online 
dating, ticket machines with increasingly anonymous transactions, in a world where 
family names convey no real information about a person’s background, reputability and 
creditworthiness – in such a world it might be hard to understand how much power the 
word ᶜayb and the phrase “people talk” can carry for people who live in a world where 
the social chronotopes of tribe and family are all-encompassing. There the reputation of 
one’s family will either taint or enhance the “deals”, which one will be able to make in 
essential areas like the job market and finding a partner for marriage.  
Before the data presentation turns to the concrete examples of ᶜayb, a brief 
disclaimer is in order. At this point, it would be appropriate, like in the previous section 
about ḥarām, to provide a more elaborate and detailed description of all examples for 
ᶜayb. It is necessary, however, to point out that what follows is only a limited selection 
of examples. The reason for this partial sampling is the fact that the remarks and 
statements of the informants about ᶜayb showed a conspicuously high preoccupation 
with gender-related restrictions, the vast majority of them relating to women. Hence, a 
more representative description would inevitably lead to the next section, which will 
present the answers to the question if there is a gender difference in the normative 
codes indexed by the three words. The dissertation shall, nevertheless, outline here the 
basic idea of ᶜayb, and an in-depth exposition of ᶜayb will be attempted in the next 
section. In principle, the word ᶜayb can be used for both sexes, and it marks behavior, 
which does not conform to a particular role or ideal. M11 explains: 
For example, if a boy, a young child is at home and there are guests, people are 
present. If he happens to play, then we tell him: “ᶜayb, there are people here, be 
quiet!” So the source of the word is negative, and I don’t know from where they got 
the word c ayb. Because it’s as if we have come to live in disgrace. Society… everything 
I want to do is ᶜayb. Every movement in my home is forbidden (mamnūᶜ) to have my 
freedom. I have to wear a mask. So there is this boy or I, myself, in the same house. 
I play. Now the guests leave and go back to their homes, and I go back to my 
personality. I need to be one person in front of visitors, and as soon as they leave, I 
am another person. This is why they use the word ᶜayb. (M11: 108) 
What M11 describes here is a central feature of c ayb, namely failing to produce a specific 
appearance in front of people which is connected to things such as a particular role, 
situation, relationship. In other words, ᶜayb has to do, in essence, with appropriateness. 
The question is not, like with ḥarām, is it right or wrong, good or evil, forbidden by God 
or allowed, but rather is it acceptable to behave like this in this particular role in this 
particular context? The behavior marked as ᶜayb could be as trivial as a child playing too 
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loudly in the presence of guests, as mentioned in the statement above, or leaving the 
house in pajamas which usually by itself is not an immoral act and it is not ḥarām, it is 
just embarrassing (M20: 21). What M11’s description also shows is that the word 
mamnūᶜ can be used in a generic sense. Something might be mamnūᶜ because it is 
ḥarām or, like in this case, ᶜayb – more about this in the section about mamnūᶜ.  
M21 provided another example, which exemplifies how the role of a person 
determines what is ᶜayb and what is not ᶜayb. A father is allowed to show his joy at his 
son’s wedding by dancing. However, if he did so on his daughter’s wedding, people 
would judge his behavior as ᶜayb because it could be interpreted as him being happy to 
have gotten rid of her. He is supposed to be perceived in a sad mood. Also, after she is 
married, he will need to be careful not to visit his daughter too frequently “in her 
husband’s home” (M21: 101). These notions, too, have nothing to do with religion but 
only with ideas about his appropriate role and behavior as the father of the bride. 
Let us go back to M11’s interview above, which continues with the following 
illustrations: 
For example, it’s also ᶜayb if I raise my voice at older people, older than me. There is 
also, sometimes, you sense that it is positive, like when I want to make somebody 
“stop”. For example, I see somebody in the bus, and he happens to swear using bad 
language, he says not good things, and there happens to be a girl in the bus and in 
our culture, for example, in our Eastern culture this talk, as they say in high Arabic, 
scratches her reputation then we tell him, for example: “ᶜayb that you talk like that!” 
That’s how the word ᶜayb is used. (M11: 108) 
These examples show that ᶜayb can also refer to unethical behavior. Similarly, M04 
suggested that immoral behavior such as going to night clubs, having illicit sexual 
relationships, stealing, and fraud is seen as shameful (F03&M04: 166). 
As mentioned earlier, most things, which are considered ḥarām are ḥarām no matter 
who does them and where they take place, like greeting a non-related person from the 
other sex with a kiss. The latter, though, can be perfectly acceptable from the 
perspective of ᶜayb in Amman but possibly endanger one’s life if done in some village 
with more traditional values outside Amman because there it might be considered ᶜayb 
and a severe infringement on a family’s honor (M20: 31). 
To demonstrate the context-dependent nature of what is seen as ᶜayb, M21 related 
a story from his childhood: 
I remember when I was little. My mother – God rest her soul! – and this story I 
remember always. We went to meet or to congratulate a daughter of a friend of the 
family. She graduated from university. So we went to congratulate her, and she got 
out a cigarette, Kent [i.e., the brand of the cigarette]. I was four years old. We’re 
talking about 54 years ago. She took a cigarette, Kent, and I told my mother, I told 
her: Mama, mama, she is smoking, look, she is smoking! And my mother turned to 
me and said like this, Never mind mama, it befits her, she is a graduate of AUB. “So 
it was OK”. Because she is a graduate of AUB, the American University of Beirut, it 
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rightfully befits her. She’s got the culture and what’s its name. “It was like,” the ᶜayb 
is always a rubber-like thing. It depends on the location, the neighborhood, the era, 
the social position. What the kings get, what they can do, the general public cannot 
do. (M20: 71) 
Later during the interview, M21 elaborated some more on the aspect of the importance 
of social position regarding ᶜayb by relating the following saying: “There is a Jordanian 
saying, a Syrian-Jordanian from the Levant, it’s: The pimping [lit. taᶜrīṣ] of the rich and 
the death of the poor is one [i.e., the same]. (…) Nobody hears about it” (M20: 65-67). 
And, so the logic, if nobody hears about it, then it is not ᶜayb because, as mentioned 
already, “the horse or the mount of ᶜayb is the outrage.” No outrage, no ᶜayb. 
The findings are worth comparing with Jallad’s observations: “A person is expected 
to feel ᶜayb, if he/she violates any social or religious rules. More specifically, it is typically 
associated with breaking rules of decorum and proper behavior” (Al Jallad, 2010, p. 42). 
The interview data generally confirm his insight except for his reference to religious 
rules. Breaking religious rules, according to the informants, constitutes ḥarām. 
Depending on the view of the group it can but does not necessarily result in ᶜayb. For 
example, from a strict reading of Islamic rules, smoking can be seen as ḥarām but was 
never, even from conservative adherents of Islam, mentioned as an instance of ᶜayb 
even though it is a wide spread habit. 
 
5.4 Mamnūᶜ: What do the powers-that-be say? 
The word mamnūᶜ is the passive participle of the verb m-n-ᶜ and besides the meanings 
“to stop, to detain, to forbid, to interdict”, Wehr lists further “to keep from entering or 
passing; to hinder, prevent, keep, restrain, hold back; to bar, block, obstruct; to 
withdraw, take away, deprive; to prohibit; to decline to accept, declare impossible or 
out of the question; to refuse, deny, withhold” (Wehr, 1976, p. 926). The variety of the 
listed meanings above, which all carry a similar basic idea but provide differently 
nuanced translations in English, suggests that m-n-ᶜ is used in a large number of 
contexts. This fact also became evident in the interview data. The use of mamnūᶜ is not 
limited to a particular domain, context, situation, or chronotope. It can be based on 
religious norms, i.e., on whatever is conceived to be ḥarām. One could even say that 
ḥarām is, in essence, a religious mamnūᶜ, as M07 suggested (M07: 48). The informants 
used it often and interchangeably with ḥarām when talking about religious norms and 
prohibitions. The very same holds, maybe even to a higher degree, for ᶜayb. Whatever 
is ᶜayb must, of course, be also mamnūᶜ. 
The following statement of M20 not only confirms these impressions but also adds 
another essential dimension, namely the connection between mamnūᶜ and law: 
“Mamnūᶜ always brings up the thought of authority and authoritarianism and the 
patriarchal society which forbids and the government and politics” (M20: 18). Mamnūᶜ 
is regularly used for prohibitions imposed by the family, the father, or any other 
authority like a teacher, the boss or the rules of the company. It is based, as M23 
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explained in the interview segment from the beginning of Section 5.1, on the power and 
domination, on who is in control, and it can be consequentially not limited to any 
particular authority or power.  
However, he and some other informants also established an immediate connection 
between mamnūᶜ, the law, and the state. F03, for example, answered the question of 
what mamnūᶜ is straightforwardly: “Mamnūᶜ is something one might get into prison for, 
or one gets a ticket, pays money, this is mamnūᶜ” (F03: 43). M15 also insists in his first 
sentence about mamnūᶜ: “When you say ‘mamnūᶜ’, you always think of legal [sic] 
directly” (M15: 117). Intriguingly, however, while F03 and M15 suggested that the legal 
aspect of mamnūᶜ is its first denotational meaning, the majority of informants do not 
even mention it as a connotational meaning. Section 7.2.1 presents a closer look when 
comparing different codes. 
 
5.5 Question 2: Do the different terms show a gender difference?  
5.5.1 Gender difference in mamnūᶜ 
While the question if there was a difference between men and women regarding ḥarām 
and ᶜayb produced quite a few responses, barely anybody commented on mamnūᶜ. 
Mamnūᶜ, as Section 5.4 has shown, can refer to: 
a all the different norms, including ᶜayb and ḥarām; 
b to prohibitions imposed by any kind of authority and not necessarily by a code, like 
the rules of a family and; 
c explicitly to the law.  
The case of (a) is dealt with in the following Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. The cases of (b) 
depend on the context. If it is a mamnūᶜ imposed by the family, then there might be a 
discriminatory element based on the notion of what males and females are allowed to 
do. Gender roles in the family, for example, are often defined by the ᶜayb and ḥarām 
codes. Again, this is tackled in Sections, i.e., 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. Other contexts, like 
company rules, could be the same for both genders. The ones which are the focus of the 
present section are the cases from (c), i.e., those which are related to the law. 
As mentioned, the connection to the law was made only in a limited number of cases. 
One informant who addressed the legal norms was M09. He suggested that the laws, as 
such, seem to be just to him, but how the society was dealing with women was not just. 
M20 suggested that there indeed exist instances of unjust treatment of women in the 
law and that women are discriminated against. He quoted two examples. First, a 
husband has the power to prevent his wife from traveling. F28 also mentioned the 
prohibition for a woman to travel without the permission of her husband, and also the 
prohibition for her to travel longer than three days without a muḥarram as examples of 
differences in the mamnūᶜ code (F28: 118). M09 mentioned the same prohibition but 
related it to c ayb (M09: 62). M20’s second example was that women are prohibited from 
marrying a man who is not a Muslim, while men are allowed to marry non-Muslim 
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women. He argued that if men and women are truly equal, then these laws are unjust 
(M20: 33). 
While one can agree with his logic and conclusion, the irony of this argument consists 
of the fact that these two cases in actually are based on the ruling interpretation of the 
Sharia in Jordan. As explained earlier (Section 4.2), Jordan is one of the very few 
countries that is still applying the principle of the Majalla, which was created by the 
Turks in the nineteenth century as a hybrid law trying to combine French civil law and 
Sharia. Within this hybrid constellation of different legal systems, the whole area of 
marriage, family, and inheritance were considered the domain of the religious courts 
that were given jurisdiction within that domain. When M20 uttered his criticism of the 
law, it seems that he was not aware that he was criticizing the religious code towards 
which he had voiced a very different opinion by suggesting that religious norms are just. 
A similar objection can be made regarding Afaf Jabiri’s book Gendered Politics and 
Law in Jordan: Guardianship over Women (2016) in which she investigates the 
construction of normative femininity in Jordan and “the ways in which the state’s 
adopted policy of men’s wilaya [guardianship] over women contributes to constructing 
women’s sense of femininity, and hence influences women’s conceptions of the Self and 
everyday practices,” showing clearly that “[s]uch treatment underlines a naturalization 
of normative femininity, whereby women are conceptualized as weak, dependent, and 
unreasonable human beings” (Jabiri , 2016, p. 3). 
From her data, it is evident that the wilaya is employed within the state chronotope 
resulting in detrimental effects for women. However, it is also just as clear that the 
concept of wilaya is rooted in the religious chronotope of Islam. The Jordanian state, 
just like the Ottoman Empire, basically only made decisions about which of the partly 
contradictory interpretations of the different Islamic schools would be considered 
authoritative within the modern context. However, the state did not invent the concept 
as such but adopted it from the religious discourse, which is much older than the 
Jordanian state. Therefore, also in this case, the unequal treatment of men and women 
is ultimately based on norms rooted in the chronotope of religion. M23 and M04 seemed 
to be very much aware of the hybrid nature of Jordanian laws. Both suggest that in order 
to make the laws more just for women, the state would have to abolish in principle the 
Majalla system and instead would have to put secular laws in place which are 
independent of the Sharia. 
 
5.5.2 Gender difference in ḥarām  
When it came to the question if there was a difference concerning things ḥarām for 
males and females, all of the Muslim informants insisted that ḥarām was just and fair in 
its treatment of the two genders. F06 suggested that in Islam “we all”, men and women, 
are equal, like the “teeth of the comb” (F06: 110). To prove Islam’s equal treatment of 
both sexes, often prohibitions of zināᵓ, i.e., adultery or fornication, or killing were 
quoted, which indeed seem to apply to both sexes equally.  
116 “Is the voice of a woman shameful?” 
 
Apart from the question, if all Muslims would agree with this claim, it is crucial to 
point out that the society does not necessarily live up to them, as we shall see shortly, 
and burdens the females with a much more substantial burden within the ᶜayb code 
regarding sexual transgressions. If one does not keep this fact in mind, many of the 
grievances of females regarding unjust treatment could be attributed to Islam because 
one might deduce that whatever is societal consensus must be Islamic.  
The opinion that the norms of religion are just and fair concerning the two sexes was 
not only put forward by conservative Muslims but also expressed by Muslim informants 
who took a more secular or liberal approach to religion as, e.g., M20, F10 and M09. F10 
was full of praise for Islamic norms and even said that she would love it if the society 
were more committed to Islam and its norms. What made this particular statement so 
interesting was the fact that she was evidently not complying with the Islamic dress code 
– according to her own interpretation. After all, she was sitting in public bareheaded and 
wearing short sleeves. Even though I tried hard not to show what went through my head, 
it might have been my puzzled look that caused her to add quickly, “but without the 
dress [code]” (F10: 159). 
Some admitted that Islam was making a difference between males and females, but 
this was not seen as unjust discrimination but rather as an adequate approach to the 
natural difference of men and women, which then logically results in gender-specific 
duties and rights. F28, who was quoted in the previous segment and who admitted that 
there was a difference in what women and men were allowed to do, did not seem 
disturbed by this difference and saw it as legitimate. 
Virtually all the informants, with a few exceptions like M04 and M20, seemed to be 
convinced that men and women are fundamentally different in an essentialist way and 
that this should be reflected in different sets of behavior, dress code, and marital roles. 
It is safe to say that most informants – Muslims and Christians alike – would agree with 
the basic views of hierarchical complementarianism which holds that while man and 
woman have equal value in the eyes of God, they are created for different roles and that 
men are ordained to be the provider and leader of the family while women’s role is to 
take care of the family and to submit to male authority. 
The Christians seemed to subscribe to this view as well. However, regarding Islam, 
they took a more critical view. M14 openly criticized Islam’s acceptance of polygamy. 
The harshest criticism of Islamic norms came from Muslims who had distanced 
themselves from their religion. M04 suggested to abandon the Sharia court altogether 
and to introduce civil marriage and M11 accused Islam of propagating a low view of 
women (M11: 127). 
 
5.5.3 Gender difference in ᶜayb  
Some voices denied that there are different ᶜayb norms for males and females – at least 
at first. For example, M22 initially denied gender differences in ᶜayb and argued that 
they, i.e., his fellow citizens, are all Muslims, men, and women and that they all have to 
follow the same norms. However, during our conversation, it became clear that certain 
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things, though acceptable for a man, were not acceptable for women, like being outside 
on the street after a specific time at night. It became quickly apparent that his initial 
statement was not tenable, and he went on to give several more examples of c ayb, which 
applied only to women (M22: 198ff). Also, F29 initially suggested that there is no 
significant difference between ᶜayb norms for men and women but then immediately 
added: 
In regard to the woman, there are more things which are ᶜayb. The man is allowed 
to leave the house by himself, he is allowed to spend the evening with his friends, he 
is allowed to live a normal (ᶜādiy) life, but for the female, there are things which are 
restricted, and she must adhere to them. (F29: 30) 
For the most part, however, informants readily acknowledged that there is a rather big 
difference between the restrictions imposed on females and the ones imposed on 
males, both, in number and gravity, as M23 put it, “what is forbidden for the girl is so 
because she is a girl because she is the honor of the family. It’s ᶜayb for a girl to imitate 
the young men” (M23: 9). Men not only have more “flexibility” when it comes to ᶜayb 
(F27: 46) but some informants even label the Jordanian society as a “male society” 
(F12: 109) or as “male culture” (M13: 48). M15 insists: “In regard to the man, there are 
not many things ᶜayb. He can do a lot of things” (M15: 216). As M13 explains, a man can 
wear all kinds of clothes, and “he remains a man, but for the girl, anything outside the 
traditional framework is ᶜayb” (M13: 50). M02 proposed precisely the same state of 
affairs and explained that there is even a Jordanian saying which captures the man’s 
immunity against ᶜayb. This aspect is so central to the full understanding of ᶜayb and 
how it affects women and men differently that it is worth quoting M02’s and F01’s 
explanation of this saying at length: 
M02: There is a proverb that says: A man is not shamed by shame. It means that 
if you saw a man and a woman make the same mistake, the ᶜayb for the 
woman is more. Because the man, well, in the end, he is a man. His life will 
go on even if he did something wrong. People accept him. 
F01: They forgive him. 
M02: They forgive him. But with a woman in the Arabic countries? No! It stays, or 
as they say: The mistake sticks to her wherever she goes. 
F01: It sticks to her. 
M02: It sticks to her. For example, if I and a girl went out on the street and walked 
“half-naked”. In regards to me, they will say: “What’s this? ᶜayb!” Yes, but 
they’ll forget it again. But for the girl? That’s it! It stays with her until her 
death. She will never live it down. (…) 
Martin: And this is not just the men gossiping about her…? 
M02: Even women. 
F01: Of course! 
M02: Of course, of course! 
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F01: Well, who is it who raises the men? Women, or not? And this is present in 
the rearing of boys and in the rearing of girls. You don’t raise a boy and a 
girl in the same way. And you raise the girl more on ᶜayb and more on fear. 
M02: Even in marriage. 
F01: Even in everything. 
M02: A man is allowed many things. The girl? (…) In the Arabic society, the man 
[i.e., husband] can make a mistake once, twice and three times. And her 
[i.e., the wife’s] mother and her father will keep telling her: “Never mind! 
Endure! Never mind! Endure!” And if the woman made one mistake – that’s 
it! (M02-2: 1-13) 
The dissertation will come back on several occasions to the issue of women being told 
by her own parents – also by the mother – to endure within difficult marriage situations 
when looking at what strategies are available to women who feel the need for change. 
For now, it is necessary to underscore the fact that women not only have to live up to 
much more restrictive ideals but that any mistake on their behalf can have devastating 
consequences for them and their families. Note that people do recognize that certain 
kinds of behavior of the man also constitute ᶜayb, as in the case of walking half-naked in 
the street, but it does not truly matter.  
The reputation of a girl is highly fragile like a pane of glass, which, once broken, 
cannot be fixed again. This is another Jordanian proverb, which several of the informants 
mentioned. The following segment from an interview with F16 and F17, two Muslim 
women, not only confirms what M02 and F01 said about the unforgiving nature of ᶜayb 
for women, but it also illustrates how women themselves are indeed propagating this 
logic.  
Martin: If a man does something ᶜayb, for example, a man goes out with girls. I don’t 
know… ᶜayb. And then he comes to repent and becomes good again. Will 
people forgive him? 
F18: Yes, all people. 
F16: (.) Lord! All the people will start to respect him and will say ma… 
F18: …shallah on him! He became agreeable, and he complied. 
Martin: Is it the same in regard to the girl? 
F18: The girl? No! 
F16: If she acquired a bad reputation… Like a pane of glass. If it cracks [not clear] 
or it breaks, will it go back to the original state? It will not. A girl is like that. 
Martin: Is there a way for her to fix the issue? 
F16: If a man stole or walked according to ḥarām or fraud or something and 
repented and said, O Lord, I repent [and turn] to you. What is there more 
than the turning back to God? And he obeyed. That’s it! Tell him, mashallah 
on him! He repented, and our God forgives him. 
F18: But a girl in the eyes of the people here remains… 
F16: That’s different. (F18: 53-63) 
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First, the two women insist that there is no difference between male and female in the 
ḥarām code and only minutes later explain that there is a natural and quite vast 
difference between males and females when it comes to the consequences of ḥarām. 
The informants did not seem to realize the dissonance of their statements, making it an 
impressive demonstration of the cogency of the metaphor “woman is a pane of glass”, 
which it apparently had for the female informants. In fact, their response could be a 
textbook example from Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2003, chap. 1) in which they suggested that metaphors are not merely literary 
devices but that they pervade our everyday language and life in a way that they co-
construct our reality. We live as if they were real and act accordingly. If the difference 
between males and females is due to females being panes of glass, then, of course, the 
difference is not discrimination but merely a natural consequence. According to this 
logic, different payoffs, often grossly disadvantageous for women, are nobody’s fault 
but only a natural state of affairs. 
 
5.5.4 It’s nature, stupid: Gender roles and inequality 
Instead of presenting the data purely in the form of a list, this section will start by 
introducing a more extended quotation from an interview whose statements, slightly 
augmented by a few explanatory notes, serve as a rough sketch of some basic cultural 
premises which help to understand and to interpret many if not most of the ᶜayb norms 
presented in the following sections.  
Although M07 made the following remarks as a response to the question if the 
disparity of the various codes regarding men and women was to be seen as just and fair 
– something M07 had openly acknowledged, albeit not condoned during the interview 
– his remarks still fit well in the current context. He explained how society views males 
and females as having very different qualities and roles, which result in very different 
rights, duties, and prohibitions: 
M07: Look, maybe we need to look at the issue from a broader perspective. 
Society looks at the woman as the weak party and whatever afflicts her also 
afflicts the honor of the family. The society acts within this. There are many 
times when the society oppresses (or wrongs) the woman, and sometimes 
it gives “favor” to the women. 
Martin: Can you give me examples? For the injustice and for what they give her… 
M07: Yes. How they wrong her is maybe clear. For example, the woman is forced 
to sacrifice her career due to engagement in the family, while the man is 
allowed to neglect the family in order to succeed in his work, for example. 
The man is allowed to rage and to argue with a loud voice, and they consider 
this manliness, and for the woman it is impossible to raise her voice and to 
defend her opinion, for example. The man is, for example, given many 
financial opportunities or opportunities in the workplace or even in regards 
to inheritance. He takes much more than his share because he is responsible 
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for a family while the woman, according to the Sharia, they give her here 
only half of what is the right of the man. But sometimes they coerce her to 
give up her right [of inheritance] altogether. You know? This is injustice, and 
there is no doubt that there are many examples with us here. The woman 
is oppressed. (…) 
 But as I told you there are other sides, there is a bit; sometimes they care 
for the woman because of her being a woman. She is allowed to express her 
feelings at certain times because she is a woman. She cries, she screams, 
she is excited, “sometimes” she is not very rational, or she depends on what 
she wants, while the man always has to be reasonable, for example. The 
expectations of him are that he must be composed. For example, there is 
this notion in our society that it is ᶜayb for a man to cry. So he doesn’t cry 
but gets a stroke [M07 laughs] because it gathers up inside. As another 
example, if a woman drives a car in the street and she encounters a 
problem, a puncture and she stops, there are many people who comply and 
with good intentions help her because they deem it not appropriate that a 
woman who faces a problem with the car should remain to wait. But if a 
man faces a puncture, he takes care of himself [M07 laughs] You understand 
me? In this perspective, the woman is in need of a kind of protection and 
care. (M07: 73-76) 
There are several interesting observations to be made in these explanations. Right at 
the beginning, M07 establishes and confirms that society operates under the notion that 
family honor is linked to the female. This makes the female – or rather the publicly 
perceived chastity of the female – a central value, which the ᶜayb code tries to protect. 
Females are also seen as weak. The data gives plenty of indications that this alleged 
weakness goes beyond pure physical weakness but implies an ontological weakness on 
different levels. 
M07 mentioned two sets of privileges, one for men and the other for women, which 
are built on the premises as mentioned above. His first example is the clear division of 
labor between the sexes. It suggests not only that a complementarian view of marriage 
is widely accepted, but the gender roles also constitute a case of hegemonic masculinity. 
The domain outside the house with all the career and financial opportunities is ascribed 
to men. At the same time, women are expected to sacrifice their careers for the family, 
which, of course, leaves women dependent on their husbands and cements male 
domination.  
It must also be mentioned that husbands are seen to be responsible for providing for 
their family, while the wife – if her husband allows her to work – can keep her income 
for herself according to Islamic rules. Thus, the Islamic law of inheritance treats men 
favorably by giving them a double share compared with their female sibling, which is 
explained by the man’s responsibility to care for his family (Engineer, 2008, p. 83ff).  
There is another Islamic norm, which is misused by some men to extort their sister’s 
rightful inheritance from her. This immoral practice surely was not the intention of the 
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religious law. However, since a woman cannot go and simply marry somebody by herself 
but needs a male relative who must act as her guardian, as explained in Section 4.4, she 
can effectively be extorted into losing her inheritance. F05 explains how this sometimes 
works: 
And then there are people who are rich. Their father is rich; he got a lot of money 
and whatnot. And they got sons and daughters. They want to marry. For example, 
the father is dead and left them the money. There comes a groom, and he wants to 
ask [for the daughter’s hand in marriage]. What do the brothers of the girl say to 
her? No! This man is greedy for the money. There is no marriage. Give up your right 
[of inheritance], sign over the money to us, and we’ll let you marry. (F05: 147) 
Another privilege of the man is that he is allowed to assert his authority as the head of 
the family, to enforce his will with a loud voice and a show of anger. At the same time, 
the wife is expected to endure this display of male power silently and to submit docilely 
to the bidding of her husband (F07: 75). Note that this is not just a privilege but even an 
expression of his nature, of his manliness. 
According to M07, the list of privileges of women includes the concession by the 
society for her to be emotional, to express her feelings, and to cry, which is considered 
ᶜayb for a man. She is allowed to be irrational at times while the man is expected to be 
always rational and composed. The question arises, however, if raising one’s voice is not 
also an instance of showing emotions and if getting into a rage is not the opposite of 
being rational and composed. In any case, the concession that females are allowed 
sometimes to act based on emotions and irrationally is a doubtful privilege since it 
reinforces the image of women to be weak and makes them effectively less eligible for 
leadership positions. Similarly, M07’s last example of female privilege underscores the 
image of the strong and self-reliant man (at least outside the house). It perpetuates the 
image of women being weak and in need of protection and help. 
When it comes to the different ᶜuyūb (pl. of ᶜayb) concerning men and women, 
informants had a hard time coming up with examples of things which are ᶜayb for a man 
but not ᶜayb for a woman. M07 already mentioned crying, and so did M22 (M22: 248). 
To be seen to “carry a broom in his house” or to do anything which has to do with 
household chores, like helping in the kitchen or mopping the floor, will invite derision 
and is considered ᶜayb (M26: 123). This does not mean that no Arab men ever help with 
household chores. M26 underlined that what he reported is not his personal opinion but 
the opinion of the public and that he thinks that it is okay for a husband to help his wife 
in the household. M21 even said that he sometimes does help and found it not only 
perfectly acceptable but commendable. However, he also conceded that if other men 
saw him, they would scorn him (M21: 130).  
Generally, the consensus was that when it comes to clothes, there is not much, which 
would be considered ᶜayb for a man – which, of course, is radically different for a 
woman, as will become apparent in the following sections. However, there are a few 
things which men should not wear. In old times, F19 remembered, it was shameful for 
men to wear shorts, but nowadays, it seems more acceptable (F12: 86). F30 said that 
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some young men wear their shirts open with a necklace visible. That and wearing rings, 
something which is perfectly acceptable for women, is seen as ᶜayb (F30: 68). Finally, 
F10 suggested that being “gay” is seen as ᶜayb because it is not manly.  
From these examples, one might conclude that if a man does something, which 
makes him look like a woman, it is shameful for him. However, as already mentioned, 
the ᶜayb rules for men are few and far between, and even if a man commits a code 
violation, he “stays a man” and will be forgiven. Women, though, are confronted with a 
wholly different situation, and to the limits imposed on women, we shall turn now. 
 
5.6 How ᶜayb restricts and limits women but not men 
The different gender roles and ideals for males and females help to understand why 
differences are naturalized and accepted as the natural state of affairs. The previous 
section already mentioned a few aspects of how the ᶜayb code restricts women in 
particular. However, the interviews are full of such examples, and it became evident that 
there must be a whole section focusing on how ᶜayb restricts women if this dissertation 
is to do justice to the collected data, trying to portray an answer to the question about 
the difference between ᶜayb for men and ᶜayb for women. 
After sorting and categorizing the different limitations which the ᶜayb code imposes 
on women, it seemed best to start the list with those norms, which were the most 
restrictive ones in terms of limiting the movement of females and their participation in 
public life. There is a difference between restrictions, which virtually result in a kind of 
house detention, and less restrictive limitations such as to which places are to be 
avoided and at what time one is being expected to return home. Following several forms 
of ᶜayb for women are presented, based on the analysis of the data. 
 
5.6.1 Not mentioning her name 
A quick search on YouTube with the words ism umak, lit. the name of your mother (but 
it only works if written in Arabic, اسم امك), produces an impressive list of clips in which 
one can watch Arab men wriggle for an answer to avoid disclosing the name of their 
mother. Some are just unwilling or reluctant, but others find it inappropriate and even 
offensive to be asked about the name of their mother, based on the notion that her 
name should be “secret” or at least unspeakable for people outside the family circle.  
M02 related in a private conversation that in his childhood, he and other boys used 
to tease each other by saying: “I know the name of your mother!” Clearly, he added, this 
has nothing to do with Islam because, after all, the fact that the name of Muhammad’s 
mother is known is not perceived as shameful. 
The touchiness about knowing or mentioning the name is not limited to the mother, 
however. There are some traditional families, M07 explained, whose wedding 
announcements do not carry the name of the bride. While the groom is mentioned by 
name, on the bride’s part, one finds the father’s name with the addendum “his 
dignity/honor” (karāma), referring to his daughter, who is about to get married. He also 
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related the following incident, which shows that this way of thinking is present within 
the younger generations. There is a bicycle hire in the Sport City in Amman. It requires 
people to leave behind either their identity card or driver’s license for the bicycle, which 
they are given back after they returned the bicycle. M07 witnessed how a young man 
with his sister returned the bicycles, and now they were waiting for their identity cards 
(M07: 57). When the owner of the rental place asked for the name of the woman, the 
young man snarled at him: “How do you expect me to tell you the name of my sister?” 
To which the owner replied: “So how do you expect me to give her back her identity 
card if you don’t tell me her name?” Of course, the taboo of mentioning a woman’s 
name is restricted only to some presumably more traditional sections of society. 
Nevertheless, it is another instance of removing females from the public sphere. 
 
5.6.2 Leaving the house is ᶜayb  
One of the restrictions to prevent code violations of ᶜayb is to declare it ᶜayb for a female 
to leave the house. Just as with the previous point, it is essential to point out that this 
pertains only to specific segments of society. For example, M15, a young Christian man, 
insisted that his wife has the same right to go out just like him (M15: 52ff) And F10’s 
husband, who is a Muslim, had no concerns to let his young wife meet a perfect stranger 
in a Western coffee shop in order to conduct an extensive ethnographic interview. 
Outside Amman (and also in more conservative areas inside Amman), some families 
take a more restrictive position. In the Northern Valley, M26 explained that his wife is 
mostly at home but that, in principle, she is allowed to go out by herself. However, for a 
recently married wife, things are different: 
M26: (…) Here with us, for a wife at the beginning of her marriage, it is ᶜayb for 
her to leave the house by herself. 
Martin: Aha. 
M26: At the beginning of her marriage! 
Martin: OK. 
M26: She has no children yet, and she has no and so on… Her leaving the house, 
well, we see in it as a kind of chastity [or shyness]. But after some time she 
has children and so on, it’s not wrong if she leaves to go to the market with 
her children to go shopping if she leaves to go to the neighbors to sit with 
them in the house. It becomes a normal thing, it’s accepted, nothing wrong 
with it. 
Martin: So there was a change in regard to… 
M26: With the passage [of time] there is 
Martin: There are phases, OK, there are phases. 
M26: Yes, there are phases after the wedding… Initially, she does not know the 
area; she doesn’t know the market, the neighbors, the friends. With the 
passage of time, she will have children, and so on. There are neighbors; 
there are friends within the neighborhood, relatives. (M26: 37-52) 
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The other informants from the same town gave similar accounts. M25 reported that his 
wife only leaves the house for specific occasions and only with him (M25: 62). M22’s 
wife usually only leaves the house to visit the family or friends but is free to do so by 
herself. 
Things are changing, however. Not too long before the interviews took place, a gym 
started operating in town. According to F32, this gave women a new place to meet 
outside their homes. Besides the gym (which costs money) and visiting each other in the 
homes, there is no appropriate place in their town to meet outside of the house for 
young unmarried women, and for a girl to go about by herself is considered ᶜayb by the 
local community (F32: 35). Therefore, in order to get out of the house, at least on 
Fridays, young women of F32’s age sometimes go on outings together without male 
guardians. They would rent a bus and, for example, go to the Dead Sea or visit a 
university campus.  
F31, the mother of M22, is an older widow living in a village near Irbid surrounded 
by her children and grandchildren. When I told her that a young woman from Amman 
(referring to F08) complained to me that she feels imprisoned by society, she assured 
me that she did not feel like that. She explained her view as follows:  
We protect the woman; we protect her in every regard. But no, it’s not mamnūᶜ for 
her to leave [the house], it’s not mamnūᶜ for her to leave. She leaves to make a visit; 
she leaves for happy occasions [i.e., weddings or somebody gave birth to a child], 
sometimes she leaves for mourning ceremonies. No, it’s not mamnūᶜ. She goes out 
for shopping. If she has to go on a trip, she goes. It’s not mamnūᶜ. But there are some 
places, there are some situations, she herself would not accept, so she doesn’t go 
there. When my husband was retired, I go with him to receive my salary [probably: 
pension], I pass by some shops, which I wanted to visit and buy something. (M31: 66) 
However, she conceded that she avoided leaving the house by herself and tried to go 
out with her husband when he was still alive in order to remain “blameless” (F31: 96) 
and also suggested that a girl should never leave the house alone, i.e., without another 
relative, either a male guardian or her mother (F31: 92). From this perspective, the 
restrictions of the customary code under which she had lived her whole life and which 
she also endorsed during the interview were just as restrictive as the ones in the 
Northern Valley.  
The above examples are all taken from interviews conducted outside of Amman. As 
we have been living in Western Amman for almost two decades, I can confidently attest 
to the fact that this strategy, i.e., keeping women inside the house, is not entirely absent 
from city life. There are quite a few families within our neighboring buildings where one 
can see only the male members of the family on the street. Men are seen leaving the 
house and walking to the mosque, standing and chatting outside at times, or going to 
the car to drive off. At night, one can find groups of male adolescents and young adults 
in our street either sitting on the curbside or, if they are a bit older, sitting in their cars 
even at 2 am. In fact, over several years of working at my desk with a window looking at 
the entrance and the parking lot of our neighboring building, which is the home to two 
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rather conservative families, I have never seen their wives’ faces. Even during the rare 
occasions when they are seen to leave the house – usually with their husbands or 
another male member of the family – to go to the car, they are wearing a niqab covering 
their faces. It is, however, hard to say if the motivation is the desire to follow religious 
norms or avoid incidents that would cause damage to the family reputation, a 
combination of both or even maybe some other reasons. However, such families seem 
to be influenced not just by local customs since the niqab does not belong to the 
traditional attire of the area. 
 
5.6.3 Prolonging the outside stay is ᶜayb  
Even if a family prefers that its female members stay in the house or at least never be 
outside the house without a guardian, such situations cannot always be avoided. 
Sometimes a woman or a girl will have to walk alone, e.g., from the house of her relatives 
to her home or go to the market to do some shopping. In such cases, F24 explains, the 
directive is to stay outside not longer than necessary: 
My family is very afraid for me. Due to their great fear, they always need to look after 
the girl. How do they look after the girl? (…) It’s mamnūᶜ for you to go to the market 
and prolong your stay there. You have an hour for the market, you finish all your 
business, and you come straight back. (F24: 47)  
M11, born and raised in a village close to Mafraq, describes a similar ideal of decent 
behavior often endorsed by the community in more rural areas: 
There are girls – she walks with their head down, her head bent down, mamnūᶜ for 
her to lift her head, she walks quickly home. Mamnūᶜ that she moves in a certain 
way, mamnūᶜ for her to enter shops or to buy something that she wants. She goes 
home and then she tells her family what she wants or to her brother and her brother 
goes and brings it or her younger sister goes and brings it. Mamnūᶜ if somebody met 
her on her way and she stays [or lingers] to meet somebody, “Hello, how are you?” 
No! Mamnūᶜ, for example, like this usually. That’s in the villages. (M11: 193) 
Although both accounts use mamnūᶜ, it is clear from the context that they refer to the 
ᶜayb code. Both report that a girl is to move quickly, not to be held up by anybody on 
her way, not to linger or to stroll, but to make her appearance outside as short and 
inconspicuous as possible. Apparently, this includes also the way she dresses and 
behaves. The above quote from M11 already contains some interesting clues to which 
the dissertation will return shortly. 
 
5.6.4 Certain places are ᶜayb  
The word for mixing, ikhtilāṭ, also carries the meaning “to be promiscuous” (as 
mentioned earlier) and was used repeatedly this way in the interviews. Therefore, places 
that provide opportunities for “mixing”, of genders that is, have a dangerous ring to 
them for some people. Rather conservative or protective families considered (and some 
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still do) specific actions or practices ᶜayb because the female would have to leave the 
house and go to a site of engagement, which eludes the supervision, and protection of 
the family. As M11 already mentioned, the traditional role for a woman was to become 
a wife and mother and find her fulfillment in a housewifely existence. Hence it was 
widely considered as ᶜayb for women to seek employment outside the home. For some 
people, this still seems to be the case (M15: 94). Several of the informants, however, 
have suggested that the situation is changing, not least because of economic pressure 
and the necessity for the woman to contribute to the household income (F39& 
M40: 212-221). M22 also suggested that working outside, i.e., looking for employment, 
was considered ᶜayb in his area (Northern Valley) previously. A woman was supposed to 
be at home and take care of the family. 
Many schools, i.e., all governmental and some private ones, are therefore 
segregated – at least after a certain grade (usually after the third grade). In fact, for many 
conservative families, segregated schools are a prerequisite to let their daughters go to 
school. Letting a young woman study at a university poses additional problems. Not only 
are these institutions co-educational, but for students from outside bigger towns or 
cities, it also entailed living outside the parental home, possibly at some dorm. It is not 
hard to see why going to a university was also regarded as ᶜayb. In M22’s opinion, this 
was one of the main ways of how women were deprived of their rights. However, he 
added, this is also changing now – at least in his area.  
Change does not come easy or without struggles. F30, who lives in Ghor Safi, had to 
fight to be able to go to university. She kept insisting and nagging that she wanted to 
study. Finally, her parents gave in but only under the condition that she would choose a 
university or college to which she could commute daily. She agreed and is now, after 
graduation, working in an NGO, which is only a short walking distance away from her 
parents’ home: 
Martin: You studied at the university – something they said is ᶜayb. But you studied 
nevertheless. You studied even though it was ᶜayb. Was there a problem 
after that? 
F30: No, nothing happened. On the contrary. If my sister had been successful [in 
finishing school], they were going to agree to let her study. Nothing to it [lit. 
ᶜādi / normal]. Because I left and ᶜādi, nothing happened. 
Martin: Nothing happened. 
F30: What happened, on the contrary, now they are happy and proud of me: she 
is working, mashallah! And nothing happened. (F30: 92-95) 
The daughter of F28 from the same town was not only allowed to study at a university 
but also to live in the dorm adjacent to the university. However, her mother requested 
from the matron of the dorm that she would always be informed if her daughter leaves 
the premises and where she goes. It is needless to say that no male visitors are allowed 
into the dorm (F28: 134).  
Besides the nexuses of practice “work” and “study”, there are also places where 
people go to meet other people, to hang out, to shop, to do sports or body care, and to 
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enjoy food and entertainment. Some of these places are exclusively reserved for one 
gender. The places for women only are virtually hermetically sealed spaces, which are 
supposed to shield off any male gaze. Places for men, like the shisha café close to my 
house, resemble more an aquarium – with a huge glass front. Segregated fitness studios 
for men and women show the same features, respectively. 
Entering the reserved spaces for the opposite gender also has very different 
meanings. I still vividly recall the evening when I was sitting with an Arab friend in 
aforementioned shisha café which is frequented exclusively by Arab men, when a young 
Western woman seemingly oblivious to the local customs, walked into the café. One 
could feel all the eyes pointing at her, and everybody, including my companion, was 
visibly distracted by her presence. Nobody was upset, and people seemed to find it 
rather amusing. However, probably none of these men would want his sister to pull a 
similar stunt. 
However, the same sort of places, like cafés, gyms, and schools, also exist for a mixed 
audience. Clearly, there are different ways of “mixing”. In other words, the purpose of 
the practice and the interaction orders employed by it makes a big difference. At some 
of these places, one can also find the consumption of alcohol and other activities, e.g., 
flirting, which make such a place not only ᶜayb but also ḥarām. Examples are pubs, bars, 
and nightclubs. It is safe to say that probably the larger part of the population would not 
want to be seen at such a place.  
Some places are not disreputable as such, as a cinema. F43 recalls that during her 
childhood and teenage years, boys and men could go to the cinema without compunc-
tion. Girls, however, were only allowed to go there as a class organized by the school 
(43: 270). Another such place would be cafés in a Western-style or even restaurants. 
Often, one will even find areas in restaurants that are designated for “families only” 
where men are only allowed if they accompany their families.  
Things have been changing, however, in recent decades. This change took place not 
only in West Amman but there definitely at a higher speed than outside the capital or 
even in the Eastern part of the city. Shortly after we arrived in 2001, I went out with a 
Jordanian to a Western-style café in West Amman. As we sat between groups of young 
people, many of them mixed gender, he reminisced that just a few years earlier, it would 
have been unthinkable for young women to sit in such a café and smoke a water pipe 
publicly. Now, several years further, one can find many such places like cinemas, cafés, 
and pubs in West Amman with a mixed clientele. In places where alcohol is served, such 
as pubs, it is hard to find women with a headscarf. In so-called narghile cafés, it is very 
common to see a group of young women in conservative attire, including headscarf 
sitting together and enjoying their water pipe. However, sometimes just half a kilometer 
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5.6.5 Coming home late is ᶜayb  
As mentioned earlier, some women are allowed to leave the house, as is common for 
many families in the city and particularly in West Amman, be it for work, school, and 
university, to visit family and friends or even to hang out with people at a public place 
like a restaurant or a café or to smoke a water pipe. However, coming home late after a 
specific time is an entirely different story. That is something which endangers her and, 
of course, her family’s reputation. That is undoubtedly true for rural areas but also for 
Amman itself. Even F10 who lives her life in many ways similar to Western standards, 
working a full-time job at a bank and whose family and husband do not mind if she goes 
out sometimes after work with female friends or female colleagues, has to take into 
account her family’s opinion: 
If there is a wedding, one is compelled, and the wedding does not end [early]. So, 
no, there is no problem even with my family if I came home at midnight. It’s 
acceptable, even if it is just by myself. But in other cases, my family is used to it [i.e., 
to 10 pm]. “No, come back at 10!” My family is different. With my husband, it’s OK; 
there is trust. But my family: “No, stick to it so that people don’t talk about us and 
when somebody comes to ask about you [meaning: considering to marry her] so that 
he will know that you are good [i.e., respectable] and not immodest.” Because those 
who come home late, nobody sees them [i.e., where they go] or knows about them, 
you understand what I mean? Because of that, the family is afraid, and they tell her: 
“No, come home at 9, come home at 10!” That’s how they were. And not every day! 
When I lived with my family, it was not acceptable [to go out] every day. (M10: 60) 
What is important to point out here is that the reason for endorsing an early curfew for 
women is the protection of her reputation so that she will not suffer disadvantages 
when the time comes to look for a marital partner. Another problem, which she pointed 
out during the interview, was that women who are seen alone in a car on the street after 
9 pm run the risk to be followed by men driving in cars and who would try to make her 
indecent proposals (F10: 85). 
The curfew, however, is for many women much earlier than 10 pm. F08, a young 
Muslima in her mid-twenties, complained that she was expected to be at home at 7 pm 
and that all the additional freedom she could eke out for herself as a woman over the 
years was still confined to daylight hours. Even if girls go out as a group, according to 
F06, they are nevertheless expected to be back at 10 pm if they went out without a male 
guardian. For men, no such rules apply: 
For the man, it’s allowed to go out at night and to come back late, even if it was in 
the grey of dawn. For the woman? Impossible! If a woman came back late at night, 
they talk: “Who knows where she might be! Maybe she did something wrong.” That’s 
what they think. (F05: 138) 
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5.6.6 To be alone and without supervision is ᶜayb  
A female must also not be alone. When she leaves, it is preferred for her to be with 
somebody from the family, like her mother, mother-in-law, husband, brother. Never-
theless, even if a group of young women goes out together, people might still be 
suspicious when they come home late if they did not have a male guardian with them. 
Based on the same logic, it is also not acceptable for a woman to live by herself. Even if 
her family agrees, she might face fierce resistance by the other residents of the building 
in which she is renting her apartment. Here is a story told by F06 about a 27-year-old 
Muslima, not wearing a headscarf, “very beautiful” and holding a job at an airline as 
ground staff: 
My father owns an apartment, and one time came a woman and rented it by herself. 
She was a young woman [lit. girl, meaning here unmarried women] by herself, 
nobody with her, not married, and no family with her. Believe me! The whole 
building, all of its residents were gossiping about that young woman. They call my 
father and tell him: “This is impossible! She comes back home late!” So it’s not just 
your family who is your authority, even the society gets to be your authority. Their 
surveillance is so intense to the degree that they know when does she leave the 
house when does she come back home. “By God, she came home, for example, 
2 o’clock [at night]. Where does she work if she comes back so late? Does she work… 
They started to be sarcastic by saying: “Does she work in a hospital as a doctor?” Of 
course, we don’t know about the background of the young woman, and when it 
comes to us, it’s none of our business. But they, since they live in the same building, 
they started to talk about that young woman, and most of the persons who gossiped 
about her were men. I was surprised. I said those who gossip about her, who want 
to get rid of her presence, are the women living in the building. On the grounds that 
she is a single woman and there are men in the building, and maybe a woman is 
afraid for her husband because of her. But the truth is that those who were gossiping 
about this young woman were the men of the building, mostly, and those who were 
calling were men of the building. “She leaves the house… she comes back… she did 
this… she closed…” Imagine! She has a veranda, and she closed the veranda. So they 
said: Why did she close the veranda? Surely she wants to bring people [implying male 
visitors] to her home! Do you get it? Even to this degree. So you escape the authority 
of your family just to get under the authority of the society, which is even harsher. 
(F06: 110) 
Eventually, the young woman had to leave the apartment building. What is noteworthy 
in this example is that it was not her family who put the pressure on her but the 
neighbors. The last sentence in the segment summarizes F06’s point. A woman might 
somehow convince her family to allow her to do something, which is considered or at 
least was considered ᶜayb until recently. The question is, however, if the society at large 
will accept her behavior. Particularly in cases like these, where the female is not under 
constant supervision. Several times during the interviews, informants suggested that 
130 “Is the voice of a woman shameful?” 
 
often it is not so much that the family distrusts the female, but that they fear what 
people might be saying about them. This might explain why F08’s father had a harder 
time with her sisters living in the dorm in Amman then with her sister, who lives and 
studies in Germany. One can say that there she lives with relatives and nobody can 
actually check. In Amman, they are under constant surveillance – not just by her family 
but by the people. 
 
5.6.7 Specific actions or behavior are ᶜayb 
So far, the focus was mainly on limitations of movement, spatial restrictions, and 
concerning interaction orders. There are specific actions or behavior as such, which are 
considered ᶜayb for females. Section 5.6.3 already quoted M11 at some length but it 
seems useful to reference the relevant part of his statement again here: 
There are girls – she walks with their head down, her head bent down, mamnūᶜ for 
her to lift her head, she walks quickly home. Mamnūᶜ that she moves in a certain 
way, mamnūᶜ for her to enter shops or to buy something that she wants. (M11: 193) 
The idea is clear: any nonverbal behavior, which might draw attention to her as a female 
and possibly entice sexual desire is ᶜayb. M07 explained: 
Sometimes they say it is ᶜayb for the girl to behave in a way, which brings out her 
femininity. It’s ᶜayb for her to behave in a feminine way, in a “feminine” form, which 
shows her passions and emotions because such exposure would undermine her, or 
the uncovering of her person is interpreted as seduction. (M07: 57) 
This idea can be applied to virtually any aspect of a person, the clothes, the way she 
moves, and (as already seen in the section about ᶜawra) even her scent. Indeed, ᶜawra 
is seen predominantly as an Islamic term, but it was also pointed out that the concept 
was not an invention by Muhammad or his followers. There are several things in which 
the ḥarām code, i.e., Islam, and the c ayb code differ and even contradict. However, there 
are also some considerable overlaps, which are not surprising given the fact that the 
Arab culture (of the early Islamic period) is the sociological setting where the ḥarām 
norms originated. The dissertation has a closer look at both, the relationship between 
the dress style over the decades and the different codes and also at the cross-
fertilization, particularly between ḥarām and ᶜayb in Chapters 6 and 7. Even though the 
ᶜayb norms relating to women were predominantly related to sexuality, there were also 
things, which belonged in other categories. M09 and M27 suggest that smoking in public 
is ᶜayb for a woman (M09: 64; F27: 40). M22 adds that it is not only shameful for her to 
smoke in public but also at home in front of her family or her husband, and particularly 
in front of the family of her paternal uncle (M22: 213-219). 
 
5.6.8 Romantic relationships outside marriage are ᶜayb 
To disregard one of the above restrictions can have quite severe and long-term 
consequences as we have seen, but a particularly perilous issue is the matter of romantic 
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relationships. As mentioned before, this is also addressed by the ḥarām code, but in the 
ᶜayb code, usually, only the female side comes to bear the costs: 
They give the young man, for example, his freedom, so he is self-assured, whatever 
he wants to do he does it. He leaves [the house]. The young… the majority of the 
young men, for example, have sexual relationships before marriage, and it’s not, it’s 
not… Well, it’s ḥarām, but it’s normal [ᶜādi, i.e., accepted]. He lives his life normally 
[ᶜādi]. His family might know about it. Normal [ᶜādi]. Now, this has to… this is an 
injustice. It’s wrong. They should not let the girl allow to do the same, but don’t let 
the young man do that. They should “point the fingers” at him; they should be 
pointed at him: No! This one is like that! They should talk [gossip] about him because 
this one is like that, and they should not allow him to marry their girls. (F10: 237)  
F08 agrees and also sees it as a double standard: 
There is a very big difference, even in relationships. The girl who is in a relationship 
with a guy must hide it. But he? No! He can tell his family about it. He can tell his 
friends because society supports him and backs him up. (F08: 62) 
Such opinions, however, were not only voiced by female informants but also were 
confirmed openly by male informants as this example shows: 
If a man or a young man had a relationship with a girl, if his family knew about it, 
they punish him, something small. And maybe they tell him: No! This is wrong, and 
ḥarām and mamnūᶜ that you do that. In some families, they might tell him: Good! 
Our son has become mature. Good. There are families like this. But the girl – they 
consider her a frail vessel or like something delicate, they say. So this male view of 
the woman means that she is less than him. Because our society has many low views 
of women – even if it is his mother, even if it is his sister. (M11: 126) 
The cost mentioned above might be even fatal – mostly only for the girl or the woman, 
however. The subject of honor crimes was mentioned only rarely in the interviews. 
However, in some families, this is a possible result for a girl or woman who allegedly 
damaged the family honor. The logic of these intrafamily femicides, also known as 
“honor killings”, is illustrated by a story that F05 remembered from her youth (private 
conversation). She recalled the events concerning a young woman who somehow had 
damaged her family’s reputation through some sexual misconduct and then managed 
to escape from home. However, her family lured her back home with some promises 
and killed her for the sake of family honor. While such so-called “honor killings” happen 
more or less regularly, one detail of this particular case stuck to her memory. It was the 
fact that the family drenched some white cloth in the blood of their dead daughter and 
put it up on the roof of their house like a flag to signal: We washed our shame away! 
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5.6.9 Divorce is ᶜayb 
It is crucial to point out that this section is exclusively about divorce in the Muslim 
community since divorce between Christians never came up in the interviews. In the 
Catholic Church, divorce is impossible, and although it is possible in some churches, 
divorce remains much more difficult in Christian churches than in Islam. The process for 
a Muslim woman to file for divorce, though, is also somewhat problematic. 
Generally speaking, divorce is considerably more ᶜayb for women than for men, and 
its consequences are staggeringly more costly for the female than the male party. 
Divorce is not viewed as an achievement for the man either or something which anyone 
is proud of. However, from the perspective of the “customs and traditions”, there can 
be no doubt who loses more: 
The consequences [of divorce, MK] are that she returns to her family’s home. If she 
returned to her family’s home, she might not be able to marry a second time. Why? 
Because the people see her as a divorcee. Maybe she made a big mistake. Maybe 
she slept with another man? Maybe she betrayed her husband? Maybe she is not a 
good girl? A family wants to protect its reputation, and because they want to protect 
their reputation, that is the honor [sharaf], because of that, they are so meticulous 
in this regard. If this problem happens and the girl separated, then it’s as if there was 
something black, a black spot came on their girl, their honor [sharaf]. They see it as 
dishonor and disgrace. That’s why they try to keep the girl from getting divorced or 
put pressure on her: Don’t! Continue with your life [as it is]! Or sometimes, she might 
even be pregnant, or she has children, and she gets beaten. Such a beating that she 
needs to go to the hospital. Or something not good. She becomes psychologically 
and physically exhausted, and they still put pressure on her: No [i.e., don’t 
separate!]! Because we, none of us can come up for your expenses. That’s also how 
they sometimes think. I don’t have the possibilities – this brother will marry, and that 
brother will marry, so there is no space for her. It is also mamnūᶜ for her to live alone. 
This point is also very present. If a girl got divorced, it is mamnūᶜ for her to live alone. 
Why? Once she was married, after a while, she will start thinking about a man to 
sleep with him. So, if she lived by herself, she might go looking for men, and she will 
fornicate and will get into bad relationships. And that’s why they tell her: It’s mamnūᶜ 
for you to go and live by yourself! So they take her, and she lives maybe in her 
father’s home or her brother’s or her sister’s. And they deal a lot with her, the 
divorced woman, they deal with her violently. Mamnūᶜ for her to go out with a 
stranger or, I don’t know, sit with people. If she wants to go, somebody must go with 
her, a guardian: her brother, her sister, her mother. Somebody must be with her. It’s 
mamnūᶜ for her to walk alone. (M11: 69) 
In other words, according to M11, many divorced women feel like damaged goods and 
will enjoy even less freedom in their now degraded status then they had before because 
they are viewed as a liability to the family and a problem that needs to be fixed. 
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A woman who is unhappy in her marriage and considers leaving her husband or filing 
for divorce is often told – even from her own mother – to remain in her unfortunate 
situation and to endure. This attitude of the families towards such women is not only 
found inside and outside Amman, but it also transcends class levels. It was already 
mentioned by M02’s description above when he explained the difference between ᶜayb 
for men and women. One mistake by a woman would seal her fate, but a man could 
cheat on his wife repeatedly, and she might still be told by her own family to endure. 
M13 confirms that this practice of discouragement and emotional disempowerment and 
says that a woman's own family will tell her: 
“Keep living with your husband! Endure, endure!” And so she is forced to endure and 
the majority of women or many of the women who suffer, have this problem that 
there is nobody who would stand by her side. Her family does not stand by her 
because the idea of a divorced woman belongs to the things which are ᶜayb in our 
culture here. So the thought to have a divorced woman present in the house is not 
accepted. (M13: 70) 
A divorced woman is not only a drain on a family’s symbolic capital but also on the 
finances, as M11 points out. Since the majority of women do not hold a job or have their 
own income, in most cases, the woman has no other option than to move back to her 
family, and she usually ends up depending on her family also financially. For many 
people, this can be a real challenge.  
However, even if she had the means to live on her own and to support herself, living 
by herself is often not an option. As explained in an earlier section, this is regarded as 
ᶜayb. For divorced women, this restriction becomes even more applicable because, as 
M11 explains, a divorce often puts a woman under general suspicion in people’s opinion 
who will speculate what she might have done to be divorced. Some people even have 
the notion that a woman who once experienced sexual intercourse will not be able to 
control her awakened libido and threaten the family’s reputation. All this does not mean 
that there are no cases of families who accept their divorced daughters’ choice to live 
by themselves (e.g., F10: 168). As already shown in Section 5.6.6, the notion of a woman 
living by herself is still not widely accepted in society.  
In principle, a divorced man can start looking for a new marriage partner right after 
his divorce (or, in case of polygamy, even earlier). A divorced woman is not allowed to 
become available to a new husband for ninety days, according to Sharia. However, that 
is only the religious aspect. Since she disgraced the family, some of the families take a 
punitive stance and say that her voice must not be heard. On the one hand, her value 
on the marriage market decreased significantly due to the divorce, and the family is 
embarrassed and keen to limit any further damage to the family’s name. On the other 
hand, the family feels under pressure to marry her off again for financial reasons and to 
avoid any opportunity for ᶜayb incidents (F10: 165). Thus, the divorced woman might 
have to settle for a lesser choice, like for older men, since young men might prefer virgins 
and not somebody who had been married already (F18: 69-77). 
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5.6.10 Raising her voice to defend herself in public is ᶜayb  
The value attributed to the integrity of a female’s reputation is so great that every so 
often conflicts arise between tribes due to related issues. At times even whole areas are 
threatened to descend into civil war, creating situations such as in Madaba in the first 
week of May in 2018 when two families’ brawl went on for days, filling the streets with 
thousands of people from both sides. Considering how many people were mobilized by 
this particular incident of harassment, one might expect that women will defend 
themselves at every occasion when they feel violated. However, even when women are 
harassed, they will often prefer not to speak out because, as several informants 
reported, they might not be believed by the public and could even be blamed that they 
actually might have provoked the abusive behavior. Confronting the offender could 
damage a woman’s reputation because her name would be brought into the context of 
sexual misconduct (even though she was not the perpetrator).  
It is not just the personal apprehensions about the strategic perils of the concrete 
situations which discourage women from speaking out. There seems to exist an 
expectation that women would refrain from defending themselves in public and let the 
men of the family and the tribe handle the problem – just as happened in the case above 
in Madaba. M04 explained: 
M04: Now, there is a thing in the Jordanian culture. A woman, a girl, defends herself 
through her tribe. I defend myself by myself and also my tribe comes 
“automatically”, you understand how? But by God, they don’t have a problem 
if [I do it] in the street, but “if she fights in the street”, OK, but the people say 
she is not right because she needs to talk with her family and her family 
comes. If a girl yells, its ᶜayb for her. 
F03: [They would call her] Gypsy! (F03&M04: 118-119) 
Not all women agree with these expectations. F10 voiced strong opposition even within 
her own family. She recalled an incident when she got into a brawl with another woman. 
Her brothers tried to tell her to go inside and let the men deal with the issue. But she 
felt patronized: 
F10: I told them: No! This I criticized because no I’m not used to this. In my family, 
if somebody wrongs me, I talk. It’s not like I don’t talk. I talk even if I am a 
girl. Not just you, the young man. I talk because I have an opinion, I’ve got 
principles, I’ve got a way, a manner of talking. I might convince the person 
in front of me or shut her up or…, you understand? It’s not like you own the 
truth, and I don’t. 
Martin: OK. And your father and your mother agree with you on this? Are they with 
you on this one? 
F10: In regard to this, no. Mom is like: “Don’t!” She is different. “Don’t! Be quiet, 
and let dad talk!” Or, for example: “That’s it! Let daddy talk! None of your 
business! Don’t interfere so much! Don’t talk!” Like that. 
  
On ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ  135 
 
Martin: And your father is happy or rather: “No! Be quiet!” 
F10: He’s not happy. (F10: 93-97) 
This example illustrates the struggles of a young woman with her own family who 
expects her to be quiet and passive and let the male members of the family fight for her. 
It confirms the case of Rula Qawwas, which was mentioned already in Section 3.3.2. 
Young female students were publicly vilified because they dared to raise their voice 
against rampant harassment on the campus of the University of Jordan. As described 
earlier, the majority of F03’s colleagues agreed with suppression of their complaints and 
the dismissal of their professor, Rula Qawwas, which happened allegedly due to her 
young students’ graduation project, because such behavior is ᶜayb for women. During 
the discussion of this incident with F03 and M04, he turned to his wife and said: 
Isn’t it like your sister Zaina? Well, we were talking, and I was defending Zaina, the 
rights of the woman, and she says…, well, I… do you remember? She got angry and 
left, and I’m defending her. (F03&M04: 130). 
Deena Dajani is a native Jordanian who earned a Ph.D. in Social Sciences with her 
dissertation Between the Mediated and the Performed: An Empirical Contribution to 
Understanding Arabic Public Spheres (2010). She was involved in social activism 
regarding women’s rights in Jordan. During a private conversation, discussing the 
phenomenon of some women criticizing other women due to their opposition to gender 
injustice and inequality, she related the following: 
I’m as confused as you. And it’s something we suffer from incredibly. Like, even I 
mentioned my work with the feminist movement in Jordan. And it’s like, women tell 
us: What are you doing?  
We are speaking up against women being murdered. Women will come and tell you: 
Watch your manners! What are people going to say about you? They start to look 
down at you because you are speaking up against injustice. And you don’t 
understand it. And it’s just this, you know,… So it exists. It definitely exists. (…) 
This exists, and it’s a huge percentage and to just not let their comments get to us 
because they comment a lot on us. They call us names. Like, when we had an activity 
a couple of years ago now, and they held up signs in a main street in Jordan, it was 
women calling them names! (Dajani, 2010) 
 
5.6.11 Actively searching for a partner is ᶜayb 
Another and final situation where women are expected to be passive and shy and let 
men initiate and play an active role is the chronotope of courtship. A young woman 
cannot just go out and ask a man, but she has to wait for a suitor to appear at her 
doorstep, similar to a flower who can only stand there and try to attract a butterfly. That 
is, seemingly, how F10 felt. She criticized that not only does she feel it to be wrong that 
women are always reduced to their reproductive role of motherhood even if they are 
successful in their career, but they are also at a disadvantage because they are pressured 
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into accepting any young man who happens to ask for their hand in marriage. If she 
refuses, then she gets blamed if she remains single because, after all, she cannot get out 
like a man and search for a partner. 
 
5.7 Question 3: Do you find this difference fair or just? 
The first round, which consulted 32 informants, focused on the comparison of the three 
words. As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, which introduced the interview questions, it did 
not seem wise to insist on asking all four questions explicitly each interview if some of 
the questions were already answered and also if some questions would have risked 
offending the informant, considering the fact that several of these interviews were 
conducted in the home of the informant. Nevertheless, there was sufficient information 
in the data that indicated their position on the relevant issues. 
Roughly two-thirds of the informants viewed the situation of women in their society 
straightforwardly as unjust or unfair. Five seemed to acknowledge negative aspects for 
women but also tried to point out privileges women are enjoying. Six informants seemed 
to be content with the situation. Now about each group separately.  
All of the people who saw the situation of women as unjust viewed the customary 
code, i.e., ᶜayb, as problematic. Nobody expressed a critical view of his or her own 
religion except those who had distanced themselves from Islam and adopted a Christian 
perspective (F03, M04, F05, and M11). They and the Christians at times also criticized 
Islam but refrained from voicing criticism regarding their religion, i.e., Christianity, 
except for M04, who also expressed criticism towards views of Christians. The state law 
was seldom mentioned. M09 suggested that the law was just, which constituted an 
exception. The others, if they mentioned the law, took a more critical view. M04, M11, 
and M23 criticized the law for being complicit with religion. M20 contended that religion 
is just concerning gender questions, but the law is not, as we have seen in Section 5.5.1, 
while at the same time quoting examples of injustice which are based on religious law. 
The six people who reported that they felt society to be just or fair concerning 
women consisted of one man, M25, and five women, namely F16, F17, F18, F29, and 
F31. All of them lived outside Amman. M25 was an older man in the Northern Valley and 
openly explained that he supports the culture of c ayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ because they 
keep chaos at bay:  
By God, I’m in favor of the existence of a culture of ᶜayb, mamnūᶜ and ḥarām, like I 
say, so that the human life is right and to give the woman all freedom is, in my 
opinion, wrong.  
[Interruption. Somebody brings juice.] 
I’m in favor of the existence of the culture of ᶜayb and ḥarām so that it organizes the 
life of a person and the life of the family and the life of the society. Or else the 
situation will be all-permissiveness, and there will be escape, and there will be 
convulsion, and there will be chaos. If I don’t have authority over the woman and the 
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woman has nobody to constrain her, or if she is not restricted, there will be 
permissive conditions in everything, and it will be a mistake. (M25: 153-155) 
Three of the women, F16, F17, and F18, were interviewed in the Ajloun area in two 
sessions with two of the informants present each time. The first interview with F16 and 
F17 took place sitting in public on the side of a street. It was quite clear that this public 
front stage meeting of representatives from two different teams would make it highly 
unlikely that the informants would say anything which could make them appear to be 
fouling their own nest. The interview then proceeded to be indeed a somewhat idealized 
description of Jordanian society and culture. The message was roughly (and I 
summarize): “Yes, there was a not so ideal and not so distant past due to the jāhiliyya 
[i.e., the pre-Islamic time of ignorance], but now everything is changed, and now there 
are no problems here.” The second interview in the same village, i.e., with F18, did not 
take place in public but a private garden. However, F16 was present during the whole 
interview and interfered on several occasions. It seemed that she was “coaching” F18 
and protecting her from disclosing things, which a stranger like me has no business to 
know. Still, they openly affirmed differences between men and women regarding the 
normative codes, which caused others to suggest that the situation of women in the 
society is anything but just. 
F29, a young Muslima from Ghor Safi (south of the Dead Sea), and F31, an older 
widow from Irbid area (northern part of Jordan), both were interviewed alone with 
nobody else in the room. However, just as people do not show the ugly places of their 
town when a tourist asks for a tour, similarly, these two women seemed to try to help 
their interviewer understand the culture and society of Jordan by showing its brighter 
side. When confronted with the fact that a woman in Amman complained that she feels 
imprisoned by the normative codes, F31 replied that she does not relate to that because 
the norms mirror the people’s concern for women and their safety (see also Section 
5.6.2). The interview with her remained rather formal and a little bit stiff, just like the 
interview with F29, who insisted that all is good, and this is the way how they were 
brought up and how they are used to it. I also probed the statement of her colleague 
F28, who at first also was saying that everything is okay as it is, with a similar follow-up 
question: “So you are OK with the fact that your brother is allowed to go out at night 
while you have to stay at home?” Suddenly, the tone of her voice changed as she 
became more agitated and started to divulge details of the everyday life, which clearly 
showed how unhappy many women are with some oppressive aspects of the normative 
codes. 
Comparing the four interviews (16, 17, 27, and 31; cf. Appendix 3) with other 
interviews, one could easily get the impression that they were perceived as front stage 
events. In all four interviews, there was a conspicuously strong emphasis on 
broadcasting the message that all is well in the Jordanian society and culture in all four 
of the interviews. 
The group who took the position of a more mitigated critique, pointing out the 
privileges of women within the normative codes, consisted entirely of men. M26, an 
138 “Is the voice of a woman shameful?” 
 
older man from the Northern Valley, never openly answered the question if he viewed 
the state of affairs as just. He described the situation of women as changing and tried to 
explain that men were pressed to behave in a certain way if they did not want to be seen 
as weak. As shown in Section 5.5.4, when a man is seen helping at home with the chores, 
he will lose his face in front of people, and they would say that his wife is riding him. 
Women’s role and position have changed over time, and as she is helping her husband 
in the field, she also, at times, gains more influence and a say in decisions. However, 
while it is acceptable for a man to accept a women’s help with male tasks outside the 
house, i.e., working in the field, he conceded with a sheepish laugh that men still resist 
helping the women at home. 
Three of the other four men were Christians and, except for M14, who is an older 
Christian man from Kerak, they all were from Amman. All of them saw their own 
religious tradition as impeccable in regards to gender roles. The problems were ascribed 
to the customary code and society and, in the case of the Christian informants, 
sometimes also to Islam. However, they did not share the harsh assessments of society 
as voiced, e.g., by F05, who said: “There is no justice for women!” M13 suggested that 
the situation has been changing and that women in Amman are living under much better 
conditions than women outside of Amman. In his view, this was due to the better 
education of the husbands. He was under the impression that the majority of women 
were happy and content with their role. M15, just like F31, suggested that some of the 
restrictions were not discriminatory in essence or against women but rather necessary 
for protection. M15, however, also acknowledged that in general, women are valued 
less by the majority of the society. M07 also conceded that overall, women are treated 
unjustly and carry a heavier burden than men in society.  
 
5.8 Question 4: About resisting women 
The last question of the first round was: “What do women do or could do who want to 
revolt against this system?” It was motivated by the intent to learn from the informants 
if they thought whether there are women who revolt and, if so, how that looks like. As 
mentioned in Section 3.3.2, where the interview questions were introduced, this last 
question of the first round, proved to be the most challenging for the informants. 
 
5.8.1 Are there women who revolt? 
M25, who saw the whole culture of ᶜayb and ḥarām positively, felt that although some 
women are revolting, the majority of women, maybe around 70 percent, are happy and 
content with their situation and position. He insisted that the minority of those 
demanding women’s rights and equality consists of educated women whose number is 
so small that they would never reach a position of power or influence in the country to 
be able to change anything. 
M13, although having a much more critical view on the ᶜayb culture, also suggested 
that many women are happy and content. However, he was not able to give exact 
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numbers or percentages. He suggested that what women want is merely a family and 
that their husbands do not despise them or treat them with contempt. However, some 
women, he admitted, do suffer grave injustice such as physical and verbal abuse, and 
often divorce is not an option because it is considered c ayb. As was mentioned until now, 
several times throughout this chapter, they are told – even by their own family – to 
endure in their circumstances because of the children. 
Generally, F18, just like her friend F16, who coached her during the interview, tended 
to give a somewhat positive picture of the society. However, she, too, stated that many 
women are unhappy with their husband because he is prohibiting them from leaving the 
house or restricts them in other ways. Nevertheless, many do not pursue a divorce, and 
they often stay because of the children. They simply would have no resources if they 
decided to leave their husband and would end up penniless. She went on to explain that 
women usually cannot count on the support of their families in such situations.  
M21 observed that most women “follow the traditions” and do not revolt. Some 
individuals with a “strong” personality who do not care about people might revolt but 
will be despised by society at large. However, there are some courageous women with 
whom his organization is working. These women did what was unheard of in earlier 
times, namely running a charitable organization as women all by themselves, and they 
proved the voices wrong who were claiming that it cannot be done by women. F16 and 
her friends restarted an organization, which had been initially headed by men, but – 
they pointed out, not entirely without gloating – it failed miserably. Then the women 
picked up the pieces without the help of any men and made it successful. Similarly, F27 
and F28 started an organization even against the will of the mayor. However, as they 
have been working successfully with UNICEF, UNESCO, and Habitat for Humanity over 
the years, it became evident that they are competent, and the skepticism turned into 
respect.  
They have also been busy trying to empower women through all kinds of projects 
and were involved in awareness-building campaigns educating women about their rights 
in Islam. However, F27 admitted with some regret that the ratio of women who really 
do something to change society is not big – at least, where she lives right now south of 
the Dead Sea. She herself opposes certain limitations imposed by customs, like the 
notion that it is ᶜayb for women to leave the house. She regularly goes to Amman by 
herself and even stays there overnight. Another widespread opinion, which she found 
rather deplorable, was the notion that it is ᶜayb for a wife to vote differently than her 
husband. She votes as she pleases and also encourages other women to do the same. 
F30 was younger and from the same town. She would not give numbers or 
percentages but contended that there are women who want change. Looking at her 
biography and her words, it is not hard to see that she is apparently one of them. She 
argued that there needs to be change because the lifestyle, which her family and other 
families insist on, fits the old days, but times have changed. She herself successfully 
challenged the family dictum and negotiated an agreement, which made it possible for 
her to obtain the education she wanted. Now, she says, her family is even proud of her 
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and would not mind giving her sister the same opportunity if she put the work into it 
and studied (see the more detailed account in Section 5.6.4). 
Inside Amman, people seemed more disposed to talk about women revolting against 
norms, which they perceived as oppressive. When asked what a woman who wants to 
revolt could do, F10 contended baldly: 
F10: By the way, all are revolting. 
Martin: All are revolting? 
F10: Well, all are against… If you come and talk to her, you know that she knows 
what is right and what is wrong. She knows – just like I do, all the ones I 
know surely do, too – that it’s not OK that he controls me. Why does this 
husband of mine control me? For example, my family annoyed the heck out 
of me that I have to come home early. Come on, what am I doing? I’m not 
doing anything wrong. – All [women] talk like that! All talk like that! They 
say, why does my cousin go and have [sexual] relationships with girls, and 
then they come and marry him to me! What’s that?! It’s wrong! That’s not 
OK, they say. (F10: 250-252) 
Thus, she was suggesting that just because women do not revolt openly does not mean 
that they do not feel oppressed. Her comments gave a brief glimpse into the world of 
“hidden transcripts” of women in Jordan (Scott, 1990). F08 confirmed the same 
impression and said that many women feel unhappy but are overwhelmed by a “feeling 
of helplessness”. Also, M09 confirmed this notion: “I know people, well, they don’t 
revolt, but they surely try to, they try. But in the end, they become weary. That’s it. ‘It's 
not a fight they can win. Eventually, they give up’”. They give up and “try to be content 
with what they have” which is their children (M09: 78-80). 
Very few become activists, and some take on views, which M07 found too extreme, 
as they seem to deny that there is any difference between males and females. Judging 
from the data, it is safe to say that such a remarkably egalitarian opinion is the view of 
a tiny minority. M07 explained that some can get away with living a liberal, i.e., Western 
lifestyle. Others leave the country to avoid societal control. However, many who can 
neither live out their vision of freedom from oppressive norms nor have access to the 
resources and opportunities to leave the country, try to live out freedoms secretly and 
lead a kind of double life, lying to their family:  
There is a lot of lying; many girls lie. All the girls at the university and at school lie. 
Go and look, for example, at the coffee shops or those… You’ll find them, holding 
their school bags and going out with their male friends. OK, does your father know 
about this? (F10: 264) 
Also, F05 reported how many friends of her daughter at the university who wear a 
headscarf, do many secret things hidden away from their families. Even within her own 
family, her daughter is shunned and ostracized because she does not wear the ḥijāb 
while at the same time she and her daughter know for sure that these same girls live a 
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double life. This impression was confirmed by examples given by the interview group 
(F45.46.47&M48). 
F12 divides the women who try to oppose the system openly in two categories. There 
is one group, which is taking the more extreme and aggressive approach. These women 
or girls do as they please without caring about circumstances and about how people 
react. Then there is the other group whose members approach the issue with more 
patience and in a more moderate way, while still voicing their opinion and claiming their 
rights. Both groups are perceived as rebels, but the latter group experiences less 
resistance than the former. There are even some who support it. 
F05 described women who can resist as strong personalities. She suggested that it 
helps if they look attractive, are educated, and are self-composed. They have 
empowering circumstances, not only a wealthy but also a relaxed family, i.e., a family 
who does not control or restrict them.  
F06 also spoke of strong personalities, people who live their lives as they please. 
However, this is not just dependent on the personality of the woman. It also has to do 
with the fact that their families seemingly do not mind if they sit at cafés all by 
themselves, alone and for long times. They go to malls and go shopping without a male 
guardian, and “nobody asks them where they were or when they come back” (F06: 116). 
Such women or girls take the liberty to move around, not just in the city, but even take 
public transport to go to another city to visit friends – something her family would never 
allow. All these things by themselves, however, cannot be interpreted as signs of 
resistance, according to F06. Just like young women, smoking a water pipe in public is 
not necessarily an act of rebellion – only if it is done against the wish of the parents. For 
a young woman to live by herself, however, seemed to have a different quality. 
According to F06, this was broadcasting the message: “I don’t want to live with my 
family! I’m free!” 
F08 insisted that rebellion against the system should not be equated with a specific 
dress code and ḥijāb does not necessarily mean that a woman does not oppose societal 
rules: “The ḥijāb covers my head but not my brain!” Rebellion becomes more visible 
when a woman refuses decisions made by her family, e.g., what subject she will study, 
or which partner she will marry. 
 
5.8.2 How do they or could they revolt? 
A recurring theme, which was brought up time and again, was the notion that women 
were not sufficiently organized in movements of resistance. M11 felt that there is no 
real movement, and the resistance consists mostly of individual voices, which is not 
enough. M13 said that there are movements of women’s rights but that many women 
are simply not convinced. M04’s words showed that he was extremely critical of 
Jordanian men’s attitude and behavior toward women. However, at the same time, he 
argued that the real problem is the women themselves because they generally accept 
their fate instead of uniting and rising against the oppression. He reasoned that some 
probably do not realize their misfortune. He suggested they might suffer from some sort 
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of Stockholm syndrome, which is a “psychological response wherein a captive begins to 
identify closely with his or her captors, as well as with their agenda and demands” 
(Lambert, 2019). 
To support his point, he gave several examples of occasions where he was defending 
women and their rights with the result that the female relatives of F03 attacked and 
accused him. Other reasons for their lack of action might be that they do not have the 
conviction that a unified women’s movement is necessary, or they simply lack the 
necessary resolve and courage to create it.  
M14 accused women of being complicit in their own oppression. Some women talk 
about feminism and women’s rights, but when they go home, they treat their sons 
differently from their daughters. It is acceptable for boys to fool around with girls, but 
when a girl does something similar, it is a great scandal. He found this to be hypocritical 
– also for the mother. 
Similarly, M23 saw it also as pivotal for women to unify in order to fight the injustice. 
A primary goal, in his opinion, of their fight, should be to change the law, and he invoked 
Tunisia as a supportive example of his opinion: 
The problem is that you can’t go to somebody who is beaten and tell him that he 
should do something. The problem is that it should start with the constitution. The 
problem is that it should start in the system. For example, a state like Tunis – because 
the one who founded it as a state, Habib Bourguiba, the first president after the 
liberation, was an open-minded man who studied in France. The first thing he did 
was giving freedom to the woman. He prohibited polygamy, and nowadays, there is 
nobody in Tunis who’s got two wives. The woman has rights in area of politics, in 
business and in life just like the man. That is why the women’s movement in Tunis is 
more developed than in any other Arab country. The constitution! It should start 
with the laws because the laws are that which gives a stick and power to the 
authority to subdue the people. (M23: 31) 
F08 also argued that women must unite so that each of them can see and realize, “I am 
not alone.” She pointed out further that an essential condition for change and 
improvement in the society would be to lower the importance of “the talk of people”, 
which effectively means to disempower the ᶜayb code. Finally, she saw a supportive 
marital partner as essential for empowering women and encouraging them in their 
struggle against unjust structures.  
M11 also underscored this last point, and he insisted that the supportive attitude of 
husbands plays a significant role in the advancement of women in public offices. In his 
family, two brothers support their wives’ involvement in political life. One of them even 
became an elected member of the municipality. However, this was met with resistance 
from some members of his family. Some complained: “She is not one of us! Not from 
our tribe!” Others opposed it because they found that it was disgraceful for women to 
be sitting with men in those meetings. Even his mother complained: “You disgrace us!” 
He explained that such women need to be “strong” and not mind being called “strong”, 
which can be used in a derogatory way and sometimes is even used by women to 
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denounce other women who decided to play a more active role in public life. They also 
must be able and willing to lead a life “outside the flock” and to “sing outside the 
swarm”. 
Some of the informants suggested educational or awareness-building measures. 
M13 believed that education would ultimately solve the problem of injustice in society. 
F10 felt that it was not so much the women but mainly the men who needed to learn to 
empathize with the women and proposed a concrete and rather curious suggestion. She 
had watched a French video, called Majorité opprimée (Oppressed Majority) by Eléonore 
Pourrait (2010) in which women rule society and where the gender roles are flipped. On 
what seems to be just another ordinary day, a father and househusband suffers through 
the sexism and sexual violence of the matriarchal society depicted in the video. F10 
suggested that this video should be remade for the Arab context, since it had some 
unacceptable scenes, and felt that it would help Arab men to understand how she and 
other women feel. 
F27 and F28 also firmly believed that change comes through awareness building, 
albeit they pursue it through other means like lectures and workshops. F27, however, 
also insisted that awareness building depends heavily on countless home visits she and 
the others performed over the years. Moreover, she encourages women to take an 
active role in political life and was proud to report that they had already succeeded in 
getting two women elected into the municipal council 
It should be mentioned, though, that resisting the system can result in severe 
consequences. Time and again, informants alluded to these consequences. Scarcely 
anybody put it so bluntly like F08. According to her, the resistance for some women may 
result in death, particularly if it is connected to a love affair. If not death, society hates 
and despises her. Also, the damage to her family might be immense, and they might be 










As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), the data were collected through two rounds of 
interviews. During the second round of interviews, informants were presented with a 
number of pictures (see Appendix 1). While they were generally presented in the 
numbered order, this was not essential for the research process as they were used more 
as tools to jog the informants’ memory and cues for conversations about the past. Thus, 
when an informant mentioned a particular clothing style that was not visible on the 
current picture but another picture, that picture was displayed to see if he or she was 
referring to something similar to it. The goal of the interviews was to have conversations 
about the past and not so much to gain detailed and systemizable responses about 
particular pictures. 
As a consequence, it makes little sense to present the data sequentially in a rigid 
order, picture by picture. Different elements in the pictures triggered responses, mostly 
related to clothing items. The following provides, first, a description of the dress styles 
visible in the pictures and then a summary of the reactions to the different phenomena. 
 
6.1 Description of clothing style in the pictures 
As the origin of the pictures and the rationale behind choosing them was given already 
in Section 3.3.3, the following two sections provide merely a brief description of the 
clothing styles presented in the pictures. Although the pictures themselves are not what 
the observations and conclusions of the dissertation are based on, they are nevertheless 
important because they are what triggered the informants’ responses. They contain 
mainly two different kinds of clothing styles for both sexes: one traditional dress code 
and a modern style with similarities to Western urban styles. 
 
6.1.1 Men’s clothes in the pictures 
Regarding the traditional style, on two pictures (#2 and #4), older men are wearing 
traditional clothes – consisting of a kaffiyah (scarf), ᶜaqāl (black headband), and a 
traditional cloak. One picture (#16) shows a man wearing a fez, a traditional hat with a 
cylindrical and peak-less form, which was widespread in the Ottoman Empire. These are 
all the pictures containing men in traditional clothing. 
Three pictures show men in uniform, but for the most part, men appear wearing civil 
but formal attire, like a suit, sometimes with a tie. In some family pictures, men are seen 
dressed more casually only with a shirt but always wearing cloth trousers. Only boys are 
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wearing short trousers except for one man in a picture from Cairo (picture #14) from 
1941 who seems to be wearing some kind of uniform with short trousers, just above the 
knee. From the group of men dressed in modern fashion, nobody wears any kind of head 
cover, except for the men in uniform and one civilian wearing a hat in picture #14, maybe 
a Fedora. 
In summary and taking into account the age of the men wearing traditional clothing, 
one could say that the collection of pictures suggests that the dress code for men was 
undergoing a change from traditional Arabic dress code to a modern or urban possibly 
Western style, including military uniforms. Compared to present times, it is worth noting 
that much of the attire, which the men are wearing in the pictures, could be easily worn 
in the streets of Amman today, which is not to say that the style has not changed since. 
 
6.1.2 Women’s clothes in the pictures 
As with men’s clothing, there are two clearly distinguishable clothing styles in regard to 
women found in the pictures. In pictures #4 and #8 two women can be seen wearing 
traditional clothes and a traditional Arabic head cover called madraqa. The woman in 
picture #9 is wearing a dress with traditional embroideries but no madraqa, only a 
headscarf. All three women covered their hair entirely. Picture #13 shows a group of 
girls, sporting traditional dresses with embroideries and white shawls covering only part 
of their hair. None of the traditionally dressed females show the back of their neck, and 
those who show the front of their neck are wearing dresses with a high neckline. All the 
traditional dresses are kept in darker colors. 
When it comes to the modern or urban dress style, it is noticeable that none of the 
women or girls is wearing any kind of head cover except for two women with a sort of 
hairband, which leaves most of the hair exposed in picture #22. Most of the women are 
wearing their hair between shoulder length and chin length, mostly loose and only 
sometimes put up.  
None of the women depicted is wearing trousers, and all of them are either wearing 
dresses or skirts combined with a blouse or a jumper. Colors could be light, dark, in 
between or mixed. The sleeves are predominantly long, but there are also some sleeves 
only reaching to the elbow, capsize, i.e., they are practically sleeveless but cover the 
shoulder, and some are sleeveless. One of the women in picture #6, which was taken at 
a beauty contest, is wearing a dress with long sleeves and showing her shoulders. When 
it comes to the neckline, most of the women are wearing clothes with a high neckline, 
not showing the collarbone. Only the dress of one woman in picture #22 drops the 
neckline some centimeters below the collarbone, but no cleavage is visible.  
Picture #5 shows three women with dress lengths above the knee, picture #18 shows 
(at least) three women wearing dresses or skirts only mid-thigh, and then there are 
several pictures with women wearing knee-length attire. Most of the latter are taking 
part in a beauty contest. The majority, however, is depicted in dresses and skirts with 
calf-length. 
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Furthermore, there are pictures #15 and #17 with bathing suits. In picture #15, one 
woman is wearing a bikini with the bottom part in boyshort style, i.e., similar to men’s 
boxer briefs with short legs extending below the crotch. One other woman in the same 
picture is wearing a strapless one-piece swimsuit. Picture #17 shows a woman with a 
one-piece swimsuit but wearing its straps a bit off-shoulder. 
 
6.2 Memories and responses 
M33 was born on the Israeli side of the Jordan River, close to what is called today Bet 
She’an. After the expulsion in 1948 (see Section 4.4), he grew up on the Jordanian side 
of the river in the Northern Jordan Valley and has lived there his whole life. According 
to him, women never dressed like the woman in picture #1 in his vicinity. In fact, none 
of the women in all the other pictures, except for those containing women in traditional 
clothes, resemble women from his environment.  
According to him, women always have worn a headscarf, much like the woman in 
picture #9. The women wearing modern clothes he called “urban, not Arabic, not 
Bedouin” (M33: 95) and explained that Amman has always been different from the rest 
of the country. This probably has to do with the fact that Amman, as described in 
Chapter 4, was the gathering point for people coming from other more urban areas of 
the Levant, such as Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. 
M34 pointed out that in 1948 Jordan experienced a significant influx of people, and 
the more modern and progressive urbanites usually came to settle in Amman while the 
more traditional people often stayed in the camps, which by now have also turned into 
towns and even cities. Some developed into suburbs of Amman itself. Also, the villages 
outside Amman remained rather conservative, and women like in picture #8 would be a 
regular sight there, and often only the schoolteacher would be dressed differently. F35 
and M36 said that there are women in Bedouin villages who dress like this until today 
and that the girls in picture #13 do indeed reflect traditional Palestinian dress. M34 also 
suspected a political agenda in that picture, expressing a revolting attitude and the 
intention to preserve cultural heritage as if to say: “We are Palestinian women and 
preserve this robe and proud of it” (M34: 119). 
The influx from other places into Jordan, however, did not start in 1948 but much 
earlier. From before the foundation of The Emirate of Transjordan, people came to 
Jordan from the places mentioned above. M34’s family is a point in case. He is roughly 
the same age as M33 (both around 70 years old) and the son of an educated man who 
came from Lebanon in 1920 because he had to flee from the French who had imprisoned 
him for a short period due to his political activism. Since Amman was very small at that 
time, he worked for some time as a schoolteacher in the Karak area, which is where M34 
spent his childhood before moving with his family to Amman in the early 1950s. 
Something similar happened to the family of M44 that arrived from Syria in the 1920s. 
Because his father deemed Amman as not yet sufficiently developed, they first moved 
to Karak and later in the 1930s to Amman.  
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Contrary to M33, M34 has memories of his sisters dressed exactly like the woman in 
picture #1. As a matter of fact, he remembered his sisters looking very much like the 
young women in picture #5, which some other informants refused as an authentic 
representation of Jordan at that time. F35 and M36 found picture #5 strange and 
surmised the women might have been models. M38 contended that the young women 
in the picture could not have been from a Jordanian family. However, it might have been 
the somewhat provocative pose of the women, which sparked his opposition more than 
the actual dress. M44 also declared the picture to be “propaganda” (lit. diᶜaya) without 
explaining any further what he meant by that. 
However, M41 and F42, a Christian couple from Madaba, responded to picture #5 
by recalling that it was normal for young women to wear short skirts. According to their 
memories, it first started with women wearing calf-length and later even above the 
knee. Some young women even sported so-called “mini-jobs”, i.e., mini-skirts and even 
“micro-jobs” (supported by F19, M20, M21, and the group interview with F45, F46, F47, 
and M48). F43, who always had lived on the eastern and more traditional side of 
Amman, remarked that there were indeed people who dressed like this in the 1960s but 
added that it depended very much on the area of the town. She explained that if one 
had a nice car (like the one in the picture) and a nice house, it meant that that person 
was wealthy, in which case she was free to dress pretty much as she pleased. The group 
interview, mentioned above, mirrored this difference of opinions. Some speculated it 
might have been girls from Egypt but then also conceded that women did indeed dress 
like this in the 1960s and confirmed F43’s opinion that different sections of society 
dressed differently. Some suggested that this kind of clothes was usually worn inside the 
house, but others insisted that it was also acceptable outside. 
The latter opinion was also shared by M34, who recalled that women dressed in 
modern fashion like the ones in the pictures and were a typical sight in those times. The 
majority of people in Amman dressed like this, according to him. Looking at picture #16, 
which was taken in Egypt in 1954, he recalled how his sister visited Egypt in 1955 and 
brought home pictures: “They all were dressed like this.” Women were wearing 
“Japanese”, i.e., sleeveless dresses, and décolleté, i.e., dresses and blouses with a low-
cut neckline. 
Particularly regarding the issue of wearing a head cover, it seems that there were 
areas in Amman, where this was a rare sight. F39 married an Arab and shortly after came 
to live in Jordan in 1954: 
F39: I remember when we used to go shopping, my late husband and I used to 
go shopping down because there were no shops around, we had to go 
downtown, you know where the Cairo-Amman-Bank over there is was the 
market. “Wow! She is white and blond and has blue eyes.” Because I was 
very blond, to be honest, because in London you don’t see the sun really. 
So anyway. Sometimes they wanted to go and touch my hair. So, in the end, 
I used to put a scarf on. 
Martin: So at first you didn’t have a scarf on? 
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F39: No, no. But people were not like today. Nobody put a scarf on the head. I 
only put it on so as not to touch my hair. It wasn’t like this today, no! I 
remember my late mother-in-law, she went to Hajj. I don’t know how many 
times and so did her relatives, her sisters and... None of them ever put a 
scarf on the head. Not like now… (F39: 28-30) 
Similarly, F35, who was born in 1961 and went to school in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
confirmed that the ḥijāb was worn only for special religious occasions, like reading 
Quran during religion classes (F35: 242). 
Some nexuses of practice and their corresponding sites of engagement seemed to 
have had a more avant-garde flair. Picture #3 was taken at the Jordan radio station 
where M34 used to work, and he described the culture there as more progressive than 
the rest of the country, at least in those times, and the conservatives often criticized it. 
Nevertheless, working there, also as a woman, was not without a certain prestige. He 
explained that if one heard his daughter on the radio, one was proud of her, on the one 
hand. However, on the other hand, there was a conflict because “people were talking”. 
After all, she would go where many men were and mixed with them. According Abeed 
Al-Najjar, this has not changed sigjnificantly since “[i]deal professions for women are the 
ones perceived to be ‘an extension of the care-giving role’ (Peebles et al., 2004, p. 24), 
namely, nursing and teaching” (Al-Najjar, 2013, p. 419). In terms of dress code, F35 said 
that her relatives, mother, and aunts wore such clothes but had to put something on 
their heads. F37 remarked that women usually were not completely sleeveless and, on 
the street, usually wore something with long sleeves. 
A beauty contest, too, was more on the progressive side of the spectrum. Picture #6 
was taken at such an occasion, and these events were not without critics, even though 
the clothes were actually not too revealing, according to M38’s assessment. M34 also 
felt that this kind of clothes would have been “very normal” for women in those times, 
but taking part in a beauty contest as such was perceived as somewhat disreputable. 
Naturally, the conservatives would be against it even though, as M34 remarked a bit 
wistfully, they were not as strict and rigorous as they seem today. However, he also said 
that his own father, all his progressive views notwithstanding, probably would not have 
allowed M34’s sister to partake in such a contest, just as he did not allow her to go to 
the cinema. The reason for such prohibitions had nothing to do with religion (M34 
described this father as having no interest in religion) but everything with the reputation 
of the family. 
Everybody agreed, though, that the nexus of practice depicted in the pictures #15 
and #17, showing women at the beach in swimming suits, was unthinkable in Jordan at 
the time the picture was taken, i.e., in the 1960s. M34 suggested that only tourists would 
do that. These particular nexuses of practice aside, according to his memory, virtually all 
the women in the time of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were without ḥijāb and only a 
small portion of women in those times was wearing a headscarf which, he figured, was 
often a residue from Ottoman times. His mother was quite religious, and a point in the 
case, but eventually, his father, M34, and his siblings succeeded in convincing her to 
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swap her traditional scarf for something lighter, which also showed some hair. 
Interestingly, though, one of his sisters started to wear a headscarf and to become more 
religious later in her life after her husband died. M34 could never understand this 
change and remains puzzled as to why exactly this happened. 
As mentioned, the villages were more conservative and also stayed conservative, 
changing from a traditional way of clothing into a more Islamic one. Amman itself started 
as a small village, but at some stage, the transition from traditional to modern and 
Western style was swift. Besides the influence of urban people from Palestine and other 
places bringing with them a different fashion of clothing, M34 suggested that there was 
something at work, which one might describe as a mood sweeping the area, with Egypt 
being a strong and dominant propagator of a new lifestyle. The way he describes the 
atmosphere is worth quoting verbatim. Following is his response to picture #7, which 
depicts a demonstration of women in the streets of Amman in 1968: 
M34: Yes, it was a very important phase in the history of the Arab nations. Abdul 
Nasser when he came, did not come only with a coup in Egypt, but he came 
carrying thoughts with him, which were very progressive to shake off the 
dust of the Ottoman era in which we were strapped to backwardness. 
Martin: That means that Abdul Nasser was also one of the causes or…? 
M34: He was one of the main causes because Egypt is the main power, the 
superpower. And the Egyptian films, in all of them you see only non-veiled 
women, and there are always parties, the women drink, and they smoke. 
Very ordinary. One of the well-known Egyptian films was The Cigarette and 
the Glass. It was very ordinary.  
Martin: Egypt was one of the main causes. What else do you think was a cause for 
the people? You said that there was a competition with Egypt. [This remark 
referred back to an earlier place in the conversation (para. 17) where M34 
talked about the role of the radio and its contribution to building Jordan’s 
identity which was “a new country and there was a competition with Egypt 
[to assert] that I [meaning Jordan] have an independent identity and I will 
not be the tail of Egypt in regard to culture.”] 
M34: No. There was competition – we wanted to grow an identity, and there is a 
competition about being open-minded maybe. There is competition 
regarding “openness”, regarding liberality, regarding Westernization. 
Because of the Western values, there was a “conflict”. Although we shook 
off colonization but not [i.e., shake off] the social values of colonization or 
the fashions. We wanted the values but not the hegemony, OK? This was 
the state of mind. “Not the whole package.” As it is going on right now. We 
don’t want the West, entirely, anything which has to do with the West, but 
we want the iPhone and technology – that we use. “That’s it.” But in those 
times, we wanted everything Western, we desired everything in the West, 
but we also wanted to exert governmental freedom itself… (M34: 81-85) 
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This mood or atmosphere of “competing with Egypt” about being open and Western, 
which at least was supported if not initiated by the ideas of people like Abdul Nasser 
and the secular Arab nationalist movement, which he stood for, was not limited to Egypt 
and the Levant according to M34. He recalled visiting Iran in the year 1973 or 1974 as 
he looked at the picture #18 (which was taken in Iran), displaying young women in mini-
skirts. He remembered how astonished he was at the liberation of women there. In 
Jordan, there was also liberation, he said, but “with respect” – one still would get up in 
a bus to allow a woman to take a seat. In Iran, young women, dressed like in the picture, 
were fighting viciously in the street over a taxi, and nobody stopped them. M34 
remarked cynically: “They were really equal then.” 
This open mood was soon to be superseded with another mood, in the swing of the 
pendulum to the other side. Looking at picture #9, which contains a woman with a ḥijāb 
as it is often seen nowadays and was taken in the year 1979, i.e., the year of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, M34 exclaimed: “This was when religion started.” The rise of 
Khomeini in Iran and the Islamic Revolution was, according to M34, one of the biggest 
reasons for the religious rekindling and for “the motivating of the religious impulse”. 
Just as there was a competition with Egypt to be open and Western, now there arose a 
competition with Iran to be Islamic. 
When M41 was asked what he saw as the reason for the change in the time since 
the 1960s and the appearance of ḥijāb in such a widespread manner in the society, he 
started to talk about Iran and Khomeini and the effect he had on the region. So I asked 
again: 
Martin: That means… Iran changed in 1979, 80. Right? That’s the revolution. It 
changed and became very Islamic. And that impacted Jordan? 
F42: Of course! 
M41: That impacted not [only] Jordan – it impacted all Arab states!  
 (M41: 147-149) 
There is another narrative thread, which emerged in the interviews related to the 
conservative turn in Jordanian society, and it has to do with the Palestinian guest-
workers in the Gulf. M36 explained that the Gulf had been more conservative than 
Jordan, and women were generally wearing the ḥijāb. When F35 married him, she was 
not wearing any kind of headscarf, let alone a ḥijāb. She explained that religion did not 
play a significant role in society at large. Everything was about ᶜayb. So, when she went 
to the Gulf after she married her husband, who had lived there with his family for a while 
already, she continued at first to go out and visit people in her usual attire, i.e., without 
a ḥijāb and in short dresses and skirts. However, this brought her into embarrassing 
situations. “Wherever I went, they brought me a towel. (…) They covered me: This is 
ᶜayb. There were people if I wanted to go out, for example, my mother-in-law would say 
to me: What’s this?” (F35&M36: 226-228). When she came home for visits and also later 
when they moved back to Jordan for good, she kept the new style. She recalled that 
women started wearing a ḥijāb in the 1980s in Amman, but she firmly insisted that it 
had nothing to do with religion. It was a fashion, she said. 
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Other voices from the first round, like M07 and M20, support the impression that 
the return of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the 1990s constituted a significant 
influence on the Jordanian society. They brought money, and they were used to certain 
urban phenomena unknown to the Jordanian society, e.g., the shopping malls. Amman 
became more urban than before. However, they also brought with them a different 
dress code. 
However, it was not only the influx of Palestinians returning from the Gulf in the 
early 1990s, which had an impact on Amman. The city had been growing continuously 
over the twentieth century. M34 pointed out the higher degree of anonymity in Amman 
as it was growing with new kinds of nexuses of practice, like going out and shopping, 
and the corresponding sites of engagement, like shopping malls and Western cafés, 
brought with it the phenomenon of sexual harassment. M07 pointed out that there 
were virtually no Western cafés and shopping malls before the 1990s. F13 qualified this 
statement somewhat and argued that there were some places even before the 1990s 
but agreed that there certainly was a considerable increase from the 1990s and onward. 
Another relevant thread in this story seems to be the change in the school 
curriculum, which took place over the decades, and the availability of Islamic education 
at the universities. F35 and M36 pointed out that religious education in earlier times 
was not strong and that nowadays children are much more educated at schools about 
Islam than in their times and that media at large also are influencing the public in Islamic 
ways: 
We took one hour of religion in a week at school. One hour. (…) This was the [level 
of] awareness. That’s how much we understood, not like today. I’m telling you, now 
I could grab my grandson, he is seven years old, Wasfi, and he knows more [about 
Islam] than my father. Now, now awareness arose. Now they have come to know 
this is ḥarām and ḥalāl. ᶜAyb stopped. The thought of ᶜayb, they made it be less; the 
thought of ᶜayb is not present like it was earlier. But earlier, everything was ᶜayb. 
(F35&M36: 242) 
F01 and M02 affirmed this as well. Even though they are observant Muslims and eagerly 
observe Islamic norms, they complained in a private conversation about the curriculum 
at schools because it focused almost exclusively on Islamic texts. “Do we not have other 
great literature besides the Quran and the hadith?” 
The availability of studying Sharia at the university also contributed to the spread of 
Islamic knowledge as it resulted not only in academic knowledge but impacted the 
population as the story of F43 shows. She recalled how she got under the influence of a 
young woman who had studied Sharia law at the University of Jordan: 
Martin: Did you wear the ḥijāb when you were little? 
F43: When I was little? No. Only when I grew up. 
Martin: When did you start wearing? 
F43: (.) Maybe when I was 18 years old. 
F05: Lucky you! 
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Martin: Do you mind if I ask why? 
F05: You were 18 years old, my sister? 
F43: Yes. 
F05: [with loud voice] And us? Why did they make us wear a mandīl [certain kind 
of head cover] when I was little? 
F43: When I started to wear it, it was because of a teacher. Her name was Hind 
Abadi. Her brother was the director of the Endowments [Awqaf]. [Referring 
to the head of the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs and Holy 
Places.] 
F05: Hm. 
F43: The minister of Endowments. 
Martin: And he was living close to you? 
F43: No, he was living here in Jebel Hussein. At the Firas circle, a bit further. His 
sister had recently graduated from the university, having studied Sharia. 
And she told us about religion, and we veiled. 
Martin: So, you started to wear the ḥijāb because you became convinced? 
F43: Yes, convinced. Ḥalāl and ḥarām. And our family was also strict and made 
[us] wear, but I didn’t like to wear it at first. But then I became convinced. 
(.) 
F05: [to Martin’s wife who was also present during the interview:] Why am I 
surprised that my sister said 18 years? 
F43: My brothers were still little. 
F05: They weren’t happy. They were scolding us and when [another sister’s 
name], the poor thing, was wearing a blouse and trousers and went out. 
They came and made a big fuss. 
F43: I was wearing something on my head. 
Martin: Why? What was the problem? [regarding the brother’s reaction] 
F05: Because she was dressing like that. Wearing trousers… Impossible to wear 
something like that. Just like that. Forbidden! 
F43: We were wearing something on our heads. Even I was wearing something 
on my head. But the long ḥijāb, a cloak – I wasn’t wearing that. 
Martin: Do you mind? How were you wearing the ḥijāb? Like this, like now? 
F43: No, no. 
Martin: Or was some of the hair visible. 
F43: Visible, visible. 
Martin: So, not in an Islamic way. 
F43: Not in an Islamic way. 
Martin: Just in a traditional way. 
F43: Yes, yes. As my family wanted it, like that. If some of the hair was visible 
from here, no problem. I was wearing it as they wanted me to wear the head 
cover, but the ḥijāb and the long clothes reaching to the ground, I’ve been 
wearing only after I turned 18. After the tawjīḥi. [Tawjīḥi refers to the 
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General Secondary Education Certificate Examination in Jordan, which is 
roughly equivalent to a High School Diploma.] 
F37 remembered that not a single female teacher who came to the job interviews in 
1980 when she opened her school, was wearing a ḥijāb. Meanwhile, almost all, including 
the ones who started in those times, are wearing a ḥijāb, but she was always too 
embarrassed to inquire why they changed. Her non-Arabic friends who had married an 
Arab did not wear a ḥijāb in those times, but nowadays, many non-Arab women married 
to Arabs are wearing one. The mood has changed in such a way that recently, some 
Muslim parents refused to let their children take part in Christian celebrations at school. 
According to F37, that had never been an issue in the past. 
However, the account of change based on religious conviction is not uncontested. In 
the exchange detailed above, it becomes evident that the motivation or pressure to 
wear the ḥijāb was anything but purely religious. The pressure of the family, which often 
had to do more with appearance and reputation than with following Islam, was not only 
present in older times but seems to play an important role even today. M38, himself 
Muslim, was very convinced that the vast majority of ḥijāb wearing was not religiously 
motivated: 
There are many people, many people who were not wearing a ḥijāb and who now 
went back and started wearing a ḥijāb – let me say this – not because of religion. 90 
or 80 percent. I don’t want to generalize. 80 percent not because of religion. (…) 
Right now, right now I’ll call you any of my veiled co-workers – she does not have 
any relation to ḥijāb, it’s just mascara [i.e. makeup], you know? They think that the 
hair is ᶜawra and the rest is normal, do you get it? And it became like… fashion, 
model, a fad. By God! An acquired fad. (M38: 191) 
In fact, F35 also suggested that the ḥijāb started as “moda”, i.e., as a fad. M38 contended 
that this is what it remained until today because if the motivation to follow the Islamic 
principle of veiling was the cause, the women could not possibly combine it with tight 
clothes, which leaves little to the imagination. Young women in Jordan seem to be quite 
aware of the discrepancy of their “half and half” veil, according to Mihret Woldesemait 
(2013, p. 73) who conducted her research in Amman. The shifting ethics and aesthetics 
of veiling over the recent decades pose particular challenges for the Jordanian women: 
Establishing an agreement or balance between piety and fashion/ethics and 
aesthetics in veiling is significant for contemporary urban residents of Amman. 
Furthermore, this balance has social significance and guides social and cultural 
interactions. Harmony, however, is not easily achieved; pious fashion is a com-
plicated maze that is carefully navigated by veiled women. (Woldesemait, 2013, p. 5)  
In their article “Women’s participation in the workforce: Challenges and characteristics 
in Jordan”, Khalaf et al. (2015) describe how often times it is the company or employer 
who dictate a certain dress code – prohibiting or prescribing the ḥijāb – adding to the 









This chapter represents the center of the study. Out of the initial research interest, 
concrete research questions were developed. Chapter 3, then, devised strategies to 
collect data, which would help to answer those research questions. Among other things, 
several interview questions and a list of pictures were compiled, which were used in 
ethnographic interviews for creating a space where the informants could conduct 
“practical sociological reasoning” about relevant issues.  
The data collected through these encounters were processed and presented in the 
previous two chapters, each round producing a separate chapter. These two chapters 
attempted to present the information in a descriptive fashion, as much as possible, 
without going into more abstract interpretation and deeper analysis, which are the 
objective of the present chapter. It uses both the data from both rounds and integrates 
them to answer the research questions. 
Research question 1 (see Section 3.2) focused on the normative codes as such. It 
asked what the primary normative codes in Jordan’s society and their distinct features 
are and within which chronotopes they function. Section 7.1 summarizes what has been 
said so far and complements it with further analyses and conclusions.  
Research question 2 shifted the focus to a higher scale with the question about the 
relative importance of the various normative codes and their influence on each other 
and Jordan’s society within recent history. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 provide detailed 
responses to these matters. 
The last two research questions address the gender-related issues. Research 
question 3 enquires about how women perceive their own situation and react to it. The 
final question is interested in the implications of society’s multinormativity for Jordanian 
women. Both questions will be tackled in the final part of this chapter, Section 7.4. 
 
7.1 Insights regarding Jordan’s normative codes 
The data suggests that three particular codes are operating on a larger or higher scale 
chronotope, viz. religious norms, state laws, and cultural customs, and one code is 
operating on a lower-scale level, which is the family or household. The correlations 
between the words, particular codes, and chronotopes were relatively unambiguous in 
two cases. Ḥarām indexed religion and the religious chronotopes, both Islamic and 
Christian. ᶜAyb always evoked the chronotope of societal life with “customs and 
traditions” as keywords. Mamnūᶜ sometimes functioned as a hypernym, subsuming 
ḥarām and c ayb, and seemed to be used almost like a synonym for ḥarām and c ayb when 
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talking about prohibitions in the realm of religion or customs and traditions. However, 
it also tended to evoke the idea of an authority proscribing certain things. Therefore, it 
was also directly connected either to legal norms (which operate on a state-wide scale) 
or, at other times, to the rules and norms set down by authorities in individual families 
and households.  
The next section presents a comparison of the structures of the fields in which the 
three higher scale codes operate. This way, more insights are gained into their 
similarities and differences before taking a closer look at each of the codes separately. 
 
7.1.1 Comparison of field structures 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, the fields of religion and state in Jordan are relatively 
homologous in their structure and operation, particularly regarding their norms. After 
all, religious and governmental norms are based on texts, i.e., some sort of written 
canonical collections of norms and stories, which provide standards and principles with 
possible consequences and sanctions. These can be debated, interpreted, and applied 
to today’s life and questions. Further, both fields produced institutions dedicated to 
these activities, which are conducted by experts who usually have to go through a 
formalized training process.  
There are also noticeable differences. After all, legal texts, like for example the 
constitution or the criminal code, are not immune against changes while religious texts 
were canonized and fixed a long time ago. Therefore, religious texts cannot be changed 
in the same way as legal texts. However, the difference is not as big as one might 
presume at first. Religious texts also must be interpreted and translated into today’s 
language and applied to today’s political, social, economic, and cultural world. In many 
cases, a straightforward and literal application is not possible or acceptable, and the 
original regulations must be amended or adapted. 
Members of the respective religions, even if they are aware of such adaptations, 
often think nothing of it. M26 was able to name apparent discrepancies between the 
Sharia and the norms of his society. For example, the fact that the Sharia requires 
(according to his view) that the hand of a thief be cut off while in Jordan, they are merely 
put into prison, did not seem to trouble or alarm him (M26: 115). There are procedures 
and mechanisms in place, which make it possible for somebody like M26 to recognize 
such discrepancies without sensing a cognitive dissonance. Such examples show that 
even in the religious context, people are not merely at the mercy of some ancient and 
unchangeable texts but have their ways to mitigate and reframe the text’s claims. 
Due to these homologous structures, it was conceivable and feasible for the 
Ottoman rulers to mesh these two codes together in the Majalla, as explained in 
Chapter 4, on which the Jordanian state still runs in principle. Consequentially, there are 
not only governmental courts and judges but also Sharia courts and judges. There is not 
only a Ministry of Justice but also a Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs, and Holy Places. 
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The social field, in which ᶜayb is used, is decisively distinct. Religious and legal norms 
are based on texts, but ᶜayb has no “written laws” (M02: 53). M23 stated: “There are no 
texts in ᶜayb. There is custom, ‘tradition, habits’” (M23: 37). And M21 explains: 
There are no written texts, but there are inherited traditions. Maybe through stories. 
I remember, for example, that my grandmother would gather us and tell us stories. 
From them we learn ᶜayb. For example, I remember she wanted to teach my sisters 
to be kind to their husbands. Stories – oral tradition and not written tradition – which 
conveyed ᶜayb. (M21: 61) 
When asked if there were any experts similar to religious or legal experts, he answered: 
“No, there are no experts for ᶜayb. There is only the society in its entirety, which decides 
in a nebulous way what ᶜayb is” (M21: 63). So, ᶜayb is based on a customary code, which 
is collectively created in some obscure and untransparent manner. The negative 
consequences, which are part of the ᶜayb norm mechanism, consist primarily of the 
damage done to a person’s and her group’s reputation.  
This damage usually occurs not through some public announcement but “people 
talking”, i.e., gossip, which itself is a process which is not controlled by anybody – neither 
the initiation of a rumor nor the dynamics of its dissemination can be controlled. In fact, 
people could be talking even if there is no objective reason for their gossip. That means 
that a person’s reputation can be destroyed with no wrongdoing from her side at all. 
Once the damage is done, the repair is often hard, if not impossible, to achieve – 
particularly when it concerns females. 
The “people” make the laws. The “people” pass the judgment – often without real 
or objective cause. The “people” also carry out the sentence, without a fair trial or the 
chance of the accused to defend herself, with no possibility of appeal, with no clear or 
fixed norms and no experts or institutions. In other words, there is no separation of 
powers when it comes to ᶜayb. The people hold the legislative, the judicial, and the 
executive power at the same time. All of this happens in an opaque discursive manner. 
 
7.1.2 Ḥarām 
Ḥarām indexes the chronotope of religion and, thus, automatically invokes and primes 
divine norms and values, which it also marks as inviolable. The religious narrative 
provides a very distinct plot. Our lives take place in a mortal world under the eyes of an 
almighty and all-knowing ruler on whose approval all humans depend – in this world, in 
order to be blessed and in the world to come to be rewarded. While this constitutes an 
admittedly basic description, it still does catch the main gist of both religious 
chronotopes. Ḥarām is used as a marker to orientate us, which strategies are not 
acceptable to the divine authority and need to be avoided. 
Consequentially, ḥarām as a religious term refers to the highest scale superseding all 
other scales. God, after all, is the highest being and the ultimate authority. Committing 
ḥarām means angering God and inviting divine punishment, be it in this world or in the 
world to come. However, ḥarām’s superiority over other codes is not only based on the 
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view that God as the author and upholder of the religious norms, is more powerful than 
any other power but also on an ontological difference of religious norms – at least from 
the perspective of a believer. 
Norms from other chronotopes are seen to be mere human constructs. The 
superiority of ḥarām in this view is based on the notion that ḥarām is something “real” 
and belongs to the objective reality, which is independent of humans and their thinking 
(F01: 20). Ḥarām belongs to the same reality as natural laws and not to the reality 
created by humans, where one can find family rules, governmental laws, or ᶜayb norms. 
Ḥarām refers to a divine reality, which precedes all other reality and is the ultimate 
ground and thus has eternal and unchanging attributes. 
The notion that ḥarām is related to an independent reality that needs to be 
discovered became clear to me in a concrete way while accompanying M02 one day as 
he had to run some errands. On one occasion, as he was waiting for his turn at a counter, 
he observed how some people came and tried to cut in line. M02 turned around and 
explained that he discovered [sic!] that queue-jumping is ḥarām. That shows that ḥarām 
is not something that is agreed upon by people but is based on God’s commands and his 
will and, therefore, independent of humans and their thinking, just like the laws of 
nature are created by divine decree. They are unchangeable and can be discovered, not 
unlike scientists discovered gravity and other natural laws. They are discovered based 
on the Quran and the hadith, which are considered to be divine revelations, and not 
through some natural scientific methods. Still, the logic remains the same. Divine 
commands operate on a higher scale than customary and legal codes, which are seen as 
purely human constructs. 
Committing acts, which are ḥarām, affects each person on a very personal and 
individual level. It is, as F01 put it, “directly connected to the relationship of the person 
with God” (F01-1: 17). God will individually pass the final judgment, and nobody can pay 
for the sins of his brother according to the Quran (Sura 6,164; 17,15; 23,62; 35,18; 39,7; 
53,38). Throughout Islamic history, there have been rather vivid descriptions of what 
kind of punishment the different sins will entail. Many such ideas are still widespread 
and our daughters, who went to local schools, sometimes came home and reported 
what they had learned from their Muslim teachers and friends about such punishments, 
e.g., that girls who do not wear a ḥijāb would be hanged by their long hair, dangling over 
the hellfire.  
What this shows is that there is a widespread notion that committing acts of ḥarām 
would entail negative personal payoffs in the afterlife. Sure, God can also punish people 
already in this life. However, what is essential for the argument at hand is that viewed 
exclusively from this perspective, ḥarām could be perceived as a purely personal matter, 
and one might presume similarities with certain secularized societies of Europe where 
individuals might consider religion to be of great importance for them personally but 
where the society relegated religion to the private sphere. Compliance with religious 
codes (or the lack to do so) is seen from this perspective as a matter solely between the 
believer and the deity. There might be a general and vague appeal to some values, which 
Jordan’s multinormativity: The integral picture  159 
 
are somehow connected to religion but taking religious books and their norms as a basis 
for public policies is rather unlikely in such societies. 
The situation in Jordan is very different. Only a few informants, e.g., M23, a Christian, 
and M04, a Muslim who had adopted a Christian worldview, advocated a separation of 
state and religion. M04 was very much in favor of abolishing the Sharia court altogether. 
However, from the group of informants who identified as Muslims, nobody suggested a 
separation of state and religion or that religion was a private matter.  
The claim to rule not only the private conduct of individuals but also the norms and 
institutions of society is certainly not something foreign to Islamic thinking. After all, 
Islam’s founder Muhammad himself was a ruler, and many of the Quranic verses were 
given as norms for the emerging community of believers. Over the years, time and again 
Muslim friends quoted to me in private conversations the principle of “commanding 
good and forbidding evil” as a duty of Muslims which is also mentioned in the Quran 
several times:  
Ye are the best 
Of Peoples, evolved 
For mankind, 
Enjoining what is right, 
Forbidding what is wrong, 
And believing in Allah. 
(Sura 3:110; cf. also 3:104, 9:71, and 112, 31:17, quoted according to Ali, 1996)  
A well-known hadith expresses the same attitude: 
I heard the Messenger of Allah (SAWS) say: 
Whoever among you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand (by taking 
action); if he cannot, then with his tongue (by speaking out); and if he cannot, then 
with his heart (by hating it and feeling it is wrong), and that is the weakest of faith. 
(Muslim, 2007, pp. 143-144) 
Therefore, in the religious chronotope, the payoff of ḥarām is not just something, which 
will somehow catch up with the individual through divine intervention, be it in this life 
or the one after, but the Muslim community also has a role in effecting the negative 
payoff for behavior marked as ḥarām. If it fails to do so, it becomes guilty itself. 
In this regard, ḥarām and the chronotope, which it indexes, are different from the 
other transgressions. In the legal chronotope, punishments usually pertain to the 
individual who committed the wrongdoing. An exception would be where the state 
accommodates tribal mechanisms, such as the jalweh (Kuttab, 2016; see also 
Section 4.4). In the social chronotopes of ᶜayb, the negative payoff is virtually always of 
collective nature, i.e., deviance from the social code usually reflects negatively on the 
family and its reputation. In the case of ḥarām, the payoffs are perceived to be on both 
scales, and even though sins will be punished ultimately by God in an individual manner 
on the Day of Judgement, if the society views itself to be Islamic, it is only logical that it 
will take action against deviant behavior. 
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With the rise of political Islam, new indexical orders emerged. With a strong wave of 
modernization and orientation toward a Western lifestyle in the Islamic world, the 
abiding by the ḥarām code is not just a purely spiritual or religious act but can easily be 
read as an expression of a political stance, viz. refusing the West with its allegedly 
degenerate norms and harmful influence. 
 
7.1.3 Mamnūᶜ  
Mamnūᶜ is the most polysemous word of the three words under investigation. As 
mentioned earlier it can often substitute for the other two words, ḥarām and ᶜayb, and 
when it does it naturally is based on a conventional code, since both, religion and 
customs, can be seen as such conventional codes, as opposed to natural codes (which 
are transferred biologically, e.g., DNA) or artificial codes (e.g., computer language; see 
Posner, 2004). 
Mamnūᶜ also functions in the absence of any conventional code and can be used just 
like the English word “to forbid” or to “prohibit” without referring to codes of a higher 
scale. For example, a company or organization can outlaw or ban certain things or 
behaviors. In this arbitrary, code-less way (so to speak), mamnūᶜ finds a use particularly 
in the family chronotope where the parents tell the children, e.g., that it is mamnūᶜ to 
open the door when somebody rings without asking who is there (M07: 46). Another 
example from the interviews would be a father who prohibits smoking for his children 
and expects even his adult sons to comply with his will (F08: 30).  
As suggested by M23 at the beginning of his interview, this kind of prohibitions is 
“different from house to house” and is often arbitrary in the sense that is not 
(necessarily) based on any kind of conventional code. Therefore, the motivation to obey 
such rules is primarily given through punishment, “they beat you,” but not through the 
society (M23: 12).  
While the content of mamnūᶜ in these cases might be arbitrary and not relevant for 
the society at large, the right of certain people in the society, e.g., the father or the 
husband, to decree rules and then impose (even physical) punishment, is of course 
based on conventional codes. One might be punished because of disobedience or 
merely out of arbitrary measure. This holds not only for children but also for wives (e.g., 
Al Nsour er al., 2009; Al-Badayneh, 2012).  
“Why is it mamnūᶜ?” asked M23 rhetorically and then explained: “Because I, who 
has the power, I am dominating, I am ‘in control’, and I tell you it’s mamnūᶜ” (M23: 7). 
Thus, the ability to declare something as mamnūᶜ is not just about having others comply 
with a person’s will in a concrete situation but is also connected to an indexical order, 
pointing to and reconfirming specific authority structures. F05’s husband had promised 
before the wedding to let her finish high school, and after the wedding broke his promise 
and said “Mamnūᶜ!” I was curious to know if it had to do with one of the three higher 
scale codes, law, religion, or customs and asked why her husband forbade it: 
Martin: Why did he forbid it? 
F05: He doesn’t want to. 
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Martin: Was there a reason? 
F05: No! Just like that. He doesn’t want me to leave the house to go and study. 
Maybe there is something in his mind, but they don’t tell, here with us, the 
men [don’t tell]. God knows what the reason is, but he [referring to her 
husband] did not respond. And he also does not want me to come and go, 
nor to go and visit my family. Since I married, my life was hard. (F05: 21-24) 
In such cases, the sheer refusal to give an explicit justification might serve as an index of 
the nearly absolute power, which some husbands seem to be claiming for themselves. 
By demonstrating that the expression of his will is reason enough, the husband (or any 
other person in power) highlights and reconfirms his position, which is ultimately based 
or at least supported by religious and customary codes. 
The higher-scale chronotope with a special connection to mamnūᶜ is the state. There 
seems to exist a connection based on structural homogeneity, or at least similarity, 
between state and family. The Syrian-born sociologist Barakat writes in his book The 
Arabic World: Society, Culture and State (1993): 
Also, rulers and political leaders are cast in the image of the father, while citizens are 
cast in the image of children. God, the father, and the ruler thus have many 
characteristics in common. They are the shepherds, and the people are the sheep: 
citizens of Arab countries are often referred to as ra’iyyah (the shepherded). A 
central psychosocial feature of Arab neopatriarchal society, as Hisham Sharabi has 
pointed out, is “the dominance of the father (patriarch), the center around which 
the national as well as the natural family are organized. Thus between ruler and 
ruled, between father and child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings 
the paternal will is the absolute will, mediated in both the society and the family by 
a forced consensus based on ritual and coercion.” (Barakat, 1993, p. 117)  
Consequently, as Whitaker put it, the Arab family can be seen “as a microcosm of the 
Arab state, and the Arab state as a family writ large” (Whitaker, 2011, chap. 2, para. 2). 
Anderson’s quote exposes the justification behind the claims to power in the state and 
family chronotope. Just as the shepherd protects and cares for the wellbeing of the flock, 
those authorities are granted their position because of their allegedly necessary function 
for the group. According to Anderson, the father metaphor is also an essential part of 
how Jordanian textbooks relate the Hashemite national narrative by depicting the 
Hashemites as “patron-fathers of the Jordanian people” and the monarch as the 
“patron-father king” (Anderson, 2001, pp. 10-12). 
All parallels and similarities notwithstanding, it certainly would be an overstatement 
to suggest that the state interferes with the life of the citizens in the same way as the 
family. After all, the state does not prescribe which profession the individual is to choose 
or who will marry whom. Mamnūᶜ in this chronotope marks the strategies, which are 
prohibited by the state because they are deemed disadvantageous for the state and 
presumably for the society at large. 
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7.1.4 ᶜAyb  
By now, it has become abundantly clear that ᶜayb, without doubt, is connected to the 
most intricate dynamics and social processes from all three words. Looking at the data, 
one particular concept from Goffman’s sociology comes to mind: stigma. According to 
Goffman, a stigma by definition makes us believe that “the person with a stigma is not 
quite human” and based on this assumption “we exercise varieties of discrimination, 
through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances” (Goffman, 
1963a, p. 5). There seem to be some similarities between stigma and ᶜayb, and the 
present section will compare Goffman’s concept of stigma with the findings. However, 
since all deviant behavior has a potentially stigmatizing effect, it is also necessary to look 
at ḥarām and mamnūᶜ.  
Concerning ḥarām, as shown above, it is related to divine law and does not change, 
in principle, depending on its context (frontstage or backstage). It does not matter if 
somebody knows about an act. Ḥarām is also not about being accepted or rejected by 
people, even though there are situations when the religious community might pass 
judgment on offenders and reject him for breaking divine laws. 
Furthermore, regarding stigma, what counts as discreditable is up to the discourse 
in society and might change over time. A society can choose all kinds of things and 
declare them discreditable. Thus, a society can declare things from the ḥarām code as 
something discreditable – that is, causing rejection and not just a superficial frown. As 
the section on historical perspectives will show, there seems to be indeed such 
conflation of ḥarām standards and ᶜayb dynamics particularly in recent decades. 
Nevertheless, none of the informants identified the rejection by the people or 
society as an inherent part of ḥarām. Quite the contrary, this was one of the main points 
of difference, unlike ᶜayb, ḥarām is ḥarām no matter what people say, and it does not 
change. Ḥarām, they said, was real while ᶜayb was something invented by people. 
The data show that mamnūᶜ can refer to something that is forbidden because it is 
discreditable in the eyes of people; in other words, because it is ᶜayb. However, that is 
not its core idea. As mentioned, people even might find it ridiculous to comply with 
mamnūᶜ based on law if the authorities are not present. Speeding or running over a red 
light does not lead to stigmatization, not even tax evasion necessarily does so. On the 
contrary, some might look at such a person with a bit of admiration because he is shāṭir, 
i.e., cunning, or shrewd. Pointing out that something is mamnūᶜ, without reference to 
the possible punishment by the authority, which issued the prohibition, is usually no 
effective way to motivate people to adhere to the norms. As a legal term and as a term 
denoting prohibitions imposed by other authorities, it has nothing to do with rejection 
but with punishment.  
Regarding ᶜayb, things are very different. As Section 5.3 clearly showed, ᶜayb is 
mainly about appearance, decorum, and impression management. A comparison 
between Goffman’s description of stigma and the collected data leads quickly to the 
conclusion that ᶜayb carries in many ways the same meaning as the word stigma. The 
example of zināᵓ, which is ḥarām even if nobody knows about it and becomes ᶜayb when 
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it appears on the front stage has shown how essential the distinction between front 
stage and backstage are in ᶜayb. 
There is, however, a difference between the semantic fields of stigma and ᶜayb. 
Goffman’s stigma is broader than ᶜayb. That becomes apparent when one takes a closer 
look at the three categories of stigma, which he described, namely abominations of the 
body, blemishes of the individual character, and the tribal stigma (see Section 3.1.1). 
The comparison does not only show that ᶜayb is used in a narrower scope but yields 
some other interesting insights. The study will start with the last one since it is the 
easiest to assess.  
Examples of the tribal stigma, as Goffman calls it, are race, nation, and religion, and 
these things are transmitted through lineages and contaminate all the members of the 
group equally (Goffman, 1963a, p. 4). ᶜAyb can indeed be, and in fact, most of the time 
is a problem, which concerns the whole group. The shameful behavior of one member 
of the group reflects on the whole group. A father who was convicted of child 
molestation or a sister who is seen as a loose girl, both cases have devastating effects 
on the other members of the family. However, ᶜayb was never used by any of the 
informants to refer to race, nation, or religion even though such stigmas do exist in the 
Jordanian society (Jureidini, 2005). It might be a stigma to look like a person from Sri 
Lanka (which is where many maids come from), but nobody would ever say that it is ᶜayb 
to be Sri Lankan or to look like one, for that matter. 
Goffman’s category of abominations of the body refers to the various physical 
deformities. Such phenomena, no question, are a stigma in the Jordanian society. 
Disabilities, no matter if physical or mental, are a reason to feel ashamed, and some-
times people with such disabilities are hidden away – banned from the front stage, 
tucked away in the backstage. However, to have such a disability is not labeled as ᶜayb.  
Goffman’s category of blemishes of individual character includes things as weak will, 
domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, a 
record of mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, 
unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behavior. Although not all of 
these examples were mentioned as examples of ᶜayb, instances of moral misbehavior 
(and the consequences like prison) were seen in general as ᶜayb. Although mental 
disorder and suicidal attempts would also cause the person and her family to feel 
ashamed, it would not be labeled as ᶜayb. Such things might fall more into the category 
of disabilities. Homosexuality, though, is a clear example of ᶜayb. 
It is also noteworthy that people can be de-stigmatized (so to speak) in the c ayb logic. 
A man who was a womanizer and drank alcohol could change and be rehabilitated. A 
man who abused his wife and cheated on her might be welcomed with open arms, even 
by his wife’s family if he changes. For women, as we have seen, the situation is entirely 
different. Here the logic of the broken glass comes into play – particularly if her ᶜayb was 
connected in any way to her sexual purity (see Section 5.5.3). 
The metaphor of broken glass betrays a deeply “material” or bodily dimension of 
female ᶜayb. The ᶜayb of a girl or woman is not merely a stigma of character, which could 
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be fixed (like in the case of male misconduct), but it affects her in the essence of her 
womanhood: she is damaged. Her chances on the marriage market are critically 
diminished, maybe even nonexistent – and not just hers but also those of her (female) 
siblings.  
That is not to say that the things connected to c ayb are the only things that determine 
the value of a potential marriage partner. Apart from family background, aspects like 
income, wealth, and religiosity can be factors for assessing if a man is a suitable match 
for one’s daughter (F10: 265). After all, a husband’s role is seen as the breadwinner, and 
anything, which enhances this role, can be an advantage. Generally, a hereditary disease 
running in the family is something which decreases the chances of its members finding 
a marriage partner.  
Women are responsible for the reproductive aspect, and although it may sound 
vulgar or cruel (which is not the intention of this statement), a woman’s fertility and 
ability to give birth to children (preferably boys) is one of the main criteria and certainly 
a deal-breaker for most people if diminished. To assess her suitability for her son, a 
mother might visit the potential bride’s family in order to inspect her. In the course of 
such visitations, a young woman might be asked by her potential mother-in-law to take 
off her headscarf to assess her health. Having thin hair or other indicators which might 
point to bad health or possible problems with childbearing, might be seen as stigmas 
and decrease a woman’s value or desirability on the marriage market, but they would 
not be called ᶜayb. Anything that casts a shadow on a woman’s chastity, though, has a 
distinctly stigmatizing effect. Metaphorically speaking, it is like a field which was 
contaminated and thus lost its appeal for a farmer. From this perspective, the data 
appear to make the most sense.  
Continuing for a moment in this image, it makes sense that a farmer could spread his 
seeds over different fields – that does not contaminate him (or his family). It only proves 
that he is in possession of seeds and is able to disseminate them. Therefore, polygyny, 
i.e., having several wives or female mates simultaneously, is not seen as a problem. 
Polyandry, however, the practice of having more than one husband or male mates 
simultaneously, is utterly unthinkable. Being a divorcee is a problem for women but 
much less so for men. Furthermore, as M11 reported, the family of a young man starting 
to get sexually active might find it even reassuring to see that their son is healthy and 
“mature” (M11: 126). That, of course, would be utterly unacceptable regarding their 
daughter.  
For a daughter, being the field in this field metaphor, things are entirely different. 
The field must be protected from receiving any semen except the (future) husband. 
Furthermore, even the shadow of a doubt has to be avoided that the field has been 
messed with. It is of utmost importance that she be perceived as a virgin and untouched 
– that her sharaf (i.e., honor) is intact.  
Another aspect is how agency is distributed and who is expected to be active or 
passive. While men are expected to find a partner, women are expected to wait 
passively, just like a field is waiting to be sown or a flower to be pollinated. A final parallel 
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to the field metaphor, worth mentioning here, is the fact that the produce or fruit of the 
field belongs to the farmer and not to the field. Similarly, the fruit of the sexual union 
within matrimony, what in German can be called the Leibesfrucht (i.e., the fruit of the 
womb), belongs to the husband and is seen as part of his family’s lineage. 
Thus, the female ᶜayb does not fit neatly in one of Goffman’s categories. One could 
argue that it has to do with the blemishes of individual character inasmuch the female 
has failed to preserve herself sexually for her (future) husband, but this focus on 
character does not account for the preoccupation with female chastity (or the 
appearance thereof) epitomized by the intact hymen (Abder-Rahman, 2009; Human 
Rights Watch, 2004; Salameh et al., 2018). The intact hymen serves like a seal. If the seal 
is broken, the goods are damaged.  
These deliberations raise the question of how to categorize ᶜayb compared to ḥarām 
and mamnūᶜ. One could simply categorize ḥarām as religious, mamnūᶜ as an authority-
based and thus often legal concept, and ᶜayb as a “cultural” matter. However, with all 
the data and insights so far, it is possible to say more about the nature of ᶜayb than 
merely leaving it at this generic and somewhat inflationary used category. For reasons 
explained shortly, this dissertation suggests treating ᶜayb as an aesthetic concept. 
Viewing it as such, it actually has much in common with morality: 
To philosophize about questions in Aesthetics or Morality [sic!] is first and foremost 
to reflect upon and scrutinize value. Aesthetic and moral value, perhaps more than 
any other kinds of value, answer to our sense of what we consider to be of genuine 
importance in life, the kind of persons we want to become, and what aims we deem 
truly meaningful. (Schellekens, 2007, p. 13)  
Due to their focus on the nature of value, Grünberg (2000) regards them both as 
subcategories of axiology. Admittedly, the term aesthetics is used in this dissertation in 
a broader sense than merely defining it as the philosophical study of beauty and taste 
(Munro & Scruton, 2018). Etymologically, aesthetics derives from a Greek word 
(aisthesis), which means to be “concerned with sensuous perception” (Fowler, 1985, 
p. 13). However, no matter how broad or narrow one might define aesthetics, one of its 
core questions remains why certain things, i.e., their perception or sensation, are 
enjoyed or appreciated, and others are dismissed as repugnant, ugly, or off-putting. As 
we have seen earlier, ᶜayb is very much about perception. If things are not perceived 
(e.g., heard or seen) by others, then they are not ᶜayb. 
These observations lead to the question of how people decide what is attractive, 
beautiful, or ugly and repugnant. People have a specific idea or ideal about how things 
ought to be – for example, how something or somebody should look or how something 
should taste. One might love the taste of steak but presumably would not enjoy it when 
biting into an apple. Similarly, things which are deemed appropriate or even attractive 
with a man will not necessarily be perceived the same way with women – and vice versa. 
Ultimately, such judgments are a matter of taste and have little to do with moral or 
ethical categories. They also seem entirely immune to the question of justice and ideas 
of equality.  
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An example, which makes this obvious, is the clothes men and women wear at the 
swimming pool. A person might hold strong feminist views and insist on the equality of 
men and women and regard any form of discrimination as injustice. Still, the same 
person might prefer for women to wear a top and not go topless in a public bath. One 
does not necessarily have to do anything with the other.  
Similarly, the ideal body image, for example, does not only differ from society to 
society, but also changed over the centuries quite considerably. A study in the history of 
body images is a study in relentless recreations of indexical orders because certain 
bodily features of a specific group or class of people, presumably at the top of society, 
became the beau ideal for the rest of the society, which is why the rich and the beautiful 
so often end up being the same people eventually (Sentilles & Callahan, 2012).  
The word “decorum” seems, in fact, to be a rather fitting term for our purposes as it 
means “in literary style, the appropriate rendering of a character, action, speech, or 
scene” (“Decorum,” 1998). Clearly, this ties in well with our chronotopic approach, 
borrowed from the literary sciences, and Goffman’s dramaturgical approach to society, 
who also uses the term “decorum”, albeit slightly different from the definition above 
(see Section 3.1.1). Therefore, I argue that ᶜayb takes its aesthetic norms from the ideal 
types of roles and identities rooted in particular chronotopes, which prove to be of 
foundational importance — for both, our ethical and aesthetic norms.  
After having shown how ᶜayb can be seen as an aesthetic concept, one might ask 
why these observations are important or relevant. Why not simply speak about the 
cultural nature of c ayb? Is that not already a good enough word? A similar question could 
be asked about the term “chronotope” and if the word “context” is not sufficient. 
Blommaert’s response to this objection also applies in the case of the aesthetic nature 
of ᶜayb: 
One answer is general and refers to a practice that is at the core of scientific work. 
We need new terms, or renewed terms, often for no other reason than to check the 
validity of old ones. Neologisms, from that angle, are crucial critical Gedankenspiele 
that remind us of the duty of continuous quality control of our analytical vocabulary. 
And if the Gedankenspiel is played well, it often enables us to see how the existing 
concepts they critically interrogate have become flattened, turned into a passe-
partout or a rather uninformative routine gesture in talk and writing. (Blommaert, 
2018b, p. 2)  
Another application lies in the area of paramount importance, viz. societal change. 
Change within areas governed by the rules of aesthetics takes place in a very different 
way from the areas governed by religion or law. Beauty ideals and fashion fads do not 
change because of rational debates and logical arguments. The “texts” used in the 
aesthetic discourse are usually multimodal and often do not even use words. The 
dynamic of change within these aesthetic domains is tied to the power of association. 
Since aesthetics, by definition, is about perception and the value of things perceived, it 
lends itself very much for the creation of indexical orders which are about “how to relate 
the micro-social to the macro-social frames of analysis” (Silverstein, 2003, p. 193). It 
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explains why people, although admitting that they find the norms of c ayb unjust or unfair 
according to their own standards, still adhere and even propagate them because they 
sense that they have no way of changing these norms. 
Humans indeed live their lives in pre-existing chronotopes with predefined roles (see 
Section 3.1.2). However, that does not necessarily mean that social actors are without a 
choice. There are different chronotopes they can choose to be the primary one – e.g., 
career or family, politics, or religion – and within these chronotopes, they often can 
choose from a variety of roles. In this context, Adichie’s observation that “[p]ower is the 
ability not just to tell the story of another person, but to make it the definitive story of 
that person” becomes very relevant (Adichie, 2009; see also Section 3.1.7). From this 
perspective, the ᶜayb code wields enormous power over women in Jordan because it 
defines a narrow female chronotope, which is also accepted as the only chronotope for 
the life of a woman by a significant part of the population.  
Furthermore, this power consists of defining an aesthetic ideal of females that is not 
only limiting, but extraordinarily fragile and leads to overcaution regarding her conduct 
– by herself and the other members of the family – because the damaged perception of 
the female by the public is virtually impossible to be redeemed. The fact that the 
discourse defining and negotiating these chronotopic ideal types is not carried out like 
the discourses about religious and legal norms, but forms through nebulous group 
dynamic processes, makes it difficult for people to influence them intentionally. 
 
7.2 Insights regarding Jordan’s multinormativity 
Research question 2, which is the concern of the present section, shifts the focus to a 
higher scale beyond the individual code to society. It was formulated as follows: “What 
is (and has been) their relative importance and influence on Jordan’s society and each 
other during the recent history?” Or, in other words: What is the role and significance 
of the different codes within society, and how do they influence society and each other?  
First, in Section 7.2.1, the study will look at an intriguing asymmetry in the data 
regarding informants connecting mamnūᶜ to the semantic field “state”, which provides 
crucial insights about the weighting and relevance of the different codes. The following 
section (7.2.2), then, particularizes the different views of informants regarding the 
question of which normative code takes the most dominant role. Finally, a historical 
perspective (Section 7.2.3) provides insights why the most prominent code is not 
necessarily the most dominant one and how the different codes feed off each other and 
how the rise of Islamic practices, even if not motivated by originally religious motives, 
nevertheless might lead eventually to a more religiously Islamic society. 
 
7.2.1 The absence of the state chronotope outside Amman 
We have seen that mamnūᶜ can be used in different chronotopes. A considerable 
fraction of the informants, however, namely ten persons (see Figure 7.1), established a 
direct connection between mamnūᶜ and the law. A closer look at this group yields two 
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fascinating observations. First, apart from F03, they were all men. Second, except for 
one person (M14), they were all living in Amman. Considering that 17 out of the 31 
informants are female and 16 out of the 31 informants resided outside Amman, these 
findings are conspicuous, notwithstanding the limited number of informants. 
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Figure 7.1: Visualization of where a connection between law and mamnūᶜ was made 
 
A somewhat similar impression emerges when one looks at other words connected to 
the state chronotope like law, state, and government. The word used for law is qānūn 
and together with the plural (qawānīn) and the derived adjective qānūniyy and adverb 
qānūniyyan occurs 119 times in the interviews of the first round. However, not all of 
these occurrences are relevant to the present research. For a start, 30 of the 119 are 
utterances made by the interviewer. Furthermore, some of the occurrences were 
directly primed by the interviewer using one of the words, i.e., they were responses to 
a question using one of the words, and therefore should not be counted as genuine 
indicators of how strongly the word mamnūᶜ is connected to laws. Finally, the word’s 
lexical meaning is not limited to the legal field, but it can also mean rules or regulations, 
e.g., societal rules of c ayb (07: 49), regulations of ḥarām (M11: 242) or rules of the family 
(F12: 93).  
After weeding out all these irrelevant occurrences and adding the four occurrences 
of the English word law(s), one mention of legal and illegal, respectively, 58 occurrences 
remain. These can be attributed to 13 informants and are relevant for this investigation. 
Together with the words derived from qānūn, these words are represented by the word 
field “law” in Figure 7.2. Four informants outside Amman mentioned these words 14 
times; inside Amman, nine informants used them more than three times as much, 
namely 44 times. Outside Amman, none of the females used any of these words in 





























Figure 7.2: Mentions of words belonging to the domains of government, state and law by each 
informant 
 
The Arab word for “state”, dawla, was used solely in the meaning of state or 
government. Its derived adjective dawliyy was used only in the meaning of “pertaining 
to the state”. After a similar procedure as with the words of the word field “law” above, 
filtering out irrelevant occurrences, there remained 29 from the 35 occurrences. Inside 
Amman, it was used 24 times altogether, two women used it once, i.e., each once, and 
six men mentioned it 22 times. Outside Amman, it was only mentioned by one man one 
time and by one woman who used it four times. 
Finally, the words government, ḥukūma, and governmental, ḥukūmiyy, occurred in 
the above relevant way altogether 23 times. The word governmental was mentioned 
only twice and only in the phrase “governmental school”. The word government was 
mentioned almost exclusively in Amman, with only one woman outside Amman 
mentioning it once. Inside Amman, it was used 22 times, by two women who used them 
each once and by four men using them 20 times. 
It certainly is wise to treat the comparatively smaller female ratio regarding using 
words related to the state chronotope with caution since the number of informants is 
admittedly too small to make any conclusive and exact statistical statements. Neverthe-
less, they should not be entirely ignored. A cautious attempt at explaining why women 
referred less frequently to the state chronotope might employ pointing out that in 
everyday life, women deal with the government less often than men. The nexuses of 
practice and sites of engagement pertaining to the state chronotope have traditionally 
been less frequented by women than by men. For example, in our whole time of almost 
two decades in Jordan, my wife very rarely had to go to official places like ministries, 
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adopted local customs. In fact, most women in Jordan will avoid going to such public 
places, which are considered more of a male domain. 
Furthermore, the under-representation of informants living outside Amman in 
regards to all the instances described above is very noticeable and invites more 
consideration. To summarize the above findings, only 10 percent of all informants 
connecting mamnūᶜ to one of the legal code or government live outside Amman. From 
another angle, over 50 percent of the people from Amman made this connection 
compared to only 6 percent of people living outside of Amman. 82 percent of all the 
different words combined are found in interviews, which took place with residents of 
Amman. 
One possible explanation to consider would be the professional background of the 
informants. Maybe more of the informants in Amman work for the government? 
However, this turns out not to be the case. On the contrary, four of the male informants 
outside Amman were employees of the state, two former military, and two teachers 
employed by the government. In Amman, only two had been employees of the 
government. Still, looking at the interviews, one gets the impression as if the state was 
virtually non-existent in the symbolic world of the people living outside of Amman. The 
state appears to be a distant chronotope with little gravitational pull. 
With the history of the region in mind, it seems reasonable to suggest that this 
absence of the state chronotope outside Amman is related to the fact that over the 
centuries the central state power of the Ottoman Empire was barely ever effectively 
present in areas such as the one now covered by Jordan (Kurani, 2017). The population, 
as described in an earlier section, was left to self-govern itself according to religious or 
tribal norms. While the Jordanian state is naturally quite present in the state capital, it 
seems to have a much-diminished role in the thinking of people living outside Amman. 
Interestingly, pictures of the king adorning the streets like election posters are found 
mostly outside Amman. This fact can be interpreted as support of the above-described 
observation because the less the state is present in the symbolic world of the 
population, the bigger the need to remind the population of the government. 
 
7.2.2 The dominance of the ᶜayb chronotope  
The preoccupation of the informants thinking about ᶜayb more than any of the other 
words can be seen already numerically. ᶜAyb was mentioned 697 times by all informants 
in both rounds, compared with 417 mentions of ḥarām, followed closely by 391 
occurrences of mamnūᶜ. Mamnūᶜ, evidently, only occasionally invoked the state and its 
laws and predominantly referred to either family rules or often serves as a synonym in 
everyday talk for ᶜayb and ḥarām which adds to the count of ᶜayb and ḥarām and makes 
the gap between the three chronotopes even bigger. There is, however, other evidence 
besides these numbers. 
ᶜAyb has a central role in the raising of children. Right at the beginning of the 
interview, M23 pointed this out by saying: 
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When I hear these words, I remember that I’m a Jordanian because from before we 
start to speak, when we were small children, we teach the boy that this is ᶜayb, but 
we didn’t tell him why it’s ᶜayb and what’s the ᶜayb in it. Only that this is ᶜayb – that’s 
it! ᶜAyb! And it’s even ᶜayb to debate why this is ᶜayb. So ᶜayb means “taboo”, you 
must not do it, you must not think. (M23: 2; see also Section 5.1 for the extensive 
quote). 
He underscores later that he felt that he was expected to raise his children the same 
way and how much effort it took him to change his own thinking. M11 confirms the high 
frequency of ᶜayb: “The word ᶜayb, in every house you can hear it tens of times, ᶜayb, 
ᶜayb” (M11: 86). M21 suggests that sometimes people tell their children something is 
ᶜayb, even though it might be neither ᶜayb nor ḥarām because they know that the 
children respond to ᶜayb more than to ḥarām (M21: 93). 
The importance of c ayb is not only recognized for child-rearing but society as a whole. 
In some cases, informants would express spontaneously – i.e., even without the 
interviewer inquiring into the hierarchy of terms – that ᶜayb is the strongest one. Such 
was the case with M02, one of the first informants, who concluded the first interview 
with the unexpected statement: “ᶜAyb is bigger than all of them [meaning the other two 
words]. For sure!” (M02: 53). Partly prompted by M02’s statement, I then sometimes 
asked the informants which of the words they felt is stronger or more dominant in 
society, as I did in the interview with M23. M23 did not have to think even a fraction of 
a second about the question and responded immediately with an emphatic “ᶜAyb!” 
So far, this section quoted only men, but what about women’s assessment? F08, a 
young single Muslima from Amman in her mid-twenties from a conservatively religious 
family, explains her view as follows:  
Now, in the local Jordanian society, the fundamental authoritative source is culture 
and not religion, meaning, the popular culture, the Jordanian culture. And ᶜayb is the 
culture. But if I want to do a thing and I want to determine if it is right or wrong and 
somebody said to me that it is ḥarām, then the authoritative source is religious. And 
the ḥarām is the religion. But the ᶜayb is the culture, tradition, customs, and 
traditions. (…) 
However, in the local Jordanian society, the most dominant is the ᶜayb. The ᶜayb 
dominates over the ḥarām. Now, if I may give an example, maybe I am late at night, 
and I arrive at home at 12 o’clock, let’s say. This is considered ᶜayb because the 
society: no! The girl must come home early; a girl must not be late, the girl – we are 
worried about her, the girl – talk of the people [meaning people talk about her] and 
like that. But in regard to religion, religion does not have a problem like the people, 
but it’s the culture, which limits many things. (F08: 30-31) 
It is noteworthy that she, too, suggests that “ᶜayb dominates over ḥarām” and goes on 
to illustrate it with an example. F12 is another Muslim woman who makes a very similar 
point:  
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The attribute ᶜayb has a reality and influence bigger than ḥalāl and ḥarām for one 
reason. Sometimes it is ᶜayb; you cannot wear a short skirt. Even though it is actually, 
if one wants to debate it, it’s a religious issue or based on religion, but the religious 
matter is overridden, and it becomes analyzed and proscribed depending on the 
society. (…) I know families, let’s say, where drinking is forbidden not on a religious 
basis but on the grounds of ᶜayb or because it is not accepted socially while “under 
cover” the drinking is still existent. It is allowed as long as it is not known to the 
public. (F12: 93) 
F08’s example dealt with a situation about which the ḥarām code was silent, i.e., it 
would be ḥalāl for a girl to come home late and she pointed out that ᶜayb nevertheless 
curtailed her freedom which effectively meant for her private life that ᶜayb proved to be 
the more dominant force in many situations. F12, however, refers to matters, which 
undoubtedly belong to the religious domain, for example, the question of how short a 
skirt should be or the issue of drinking alcohol. So, in this case, there actually are norms 
available from the religious code, but these issues are nevertheless decided based on 
ᶜayb and if they are acceptable in society or not. Ḥarām, in other words, happens to 
coincide with ᶜayb and thus seemingly is adhered to – at least in public – but in reality, 
the motivation for that behavior comes from the domain of ᶜayb. According to F12, in 
much of society, the religious prohibition is rather irrelevant, and the main concern of 
people in such cases is the question if, for example, their drinking alcohol is publicly 
known, in which case it becomes ᶜayb. 
Another short, inconspicuous but remarkably and succinctly revealing statement 
from F06 supports the same idea. As she tried to explain the concept of ᶜayb, she said: 
“Adultery [lit. zināᵓ] is known to be the most ᶜayb, and especially if we discover it. If we 
don’t discover it, it is ḥarām. But if we discover it, it is ᶜayb” (F06: 90). As adultery and 
fornication belong to the most central issues in both codes, viz. ᶜayb and ḥarām, the 
point she is making is crucial. Assuming that F06’s statement does not suggest that 
adultery stops being ḥarām when it is discovered and transformed into ᶜayb, one can 
conclude that the classification of something being ᶜayb overshadows its classification 
as ḥarām.  
The following text from M26’s interview goes even one step further as it shows how 
ᶜayb can even suspend ḥarām: 
There is something we call custom here. The custom sometimes overshadows the 
religion. How does the custom overshadow it? For example, a man mixed with a girl, 
just as an example. That’s ḥarām, it’s ḥarām, and he must be punished. And the 
punishment is deadly. But here with us the custom, according to the custom, they 
will bring them, and they will agree to a contract and will marry them to each other. 
You see how? (M26: 114) 
Apart from the fact that sexual intercourse between unmarried people does not carry 
the death penalty according to Sharia but instead is punishable with 100 lashes, M26’s 
statement still proves the point since lashing is not part of Jordanian legislation either. 
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Similarly, in some cases of theft, the cutting off hands (e.g., Saudi Arabia) would be a 
Sharia-compliant punishment (e.g., Otto, 2008). In these cases, the suspension of Islamic 
norms in favor of customary or more lenient local legal codes is certainly welcomed from 
a human rights perspective.  
However, in other cases putting customary code over Sharia sometimes results in 
disadvantages, especially for women. For this reason, F28, a middle-aged Muslim 
woman who is working in a Jordanian NGO in a town in Wadi Araba (the region between 
the Dead Sea and Aqaba) concerned about women’s rights, was involved in a program 
which propagated “The Five Laws”. This program was designed to teach women about 
their rights in Islam, which they are so often deprived of in society, e.g., their right to 
inheritance. Other examples were already mentioned like the lenience young men are 
shown when flouting sexual norms, while women have to bear the full brunt of the ᶜayb 
code.  
Even though not every informant made such clear statements about the dominance 
of the ᶜayb code over other normative codes, it is fair to say that the vast majority 
affirms, either explicitly or indirectly, through their descriptions, this general hierarchical 
order. There are, in fact, only four informants who suggested that either religion or law 
was more dominant than the other terms. One of them was M14, a priest in his early 
sixties from Karak. He responded to the question if there was a difference between the 
three words as follows:  
Yes, there is a difference. Ḥarām is the strongest. If it is ḥarām, I mustn’t do it. If it’s 
shame, I can do it, but “I have to handle the shame”. If it is mamnūᶜ, I overlooked it. 
If there is a traffic light, I violate it. (M14: 2) 
With his comments on the law and the lack of commitment to it, M14 did not condone 
the lack of compliance of his fellow citizens but rather sarcastically described the state 
of affairs, which he later criticized more directly. Regarding his suggestion that ḥarām 
was more important than other codes, he came to concede later during the interview 
that “[t]he culture of ᶜayb is dominant and those who follow it are more. The culture of 
ḥarām is less but more important. The culture of laws hasn’t arrived here yet. I wish it 
will come” (M14: 12). From the overall interview, therefore, it became clear that for 
M14, ḥarām is more significant personally, as M23 pointed out, “if you are religious, 
then the ḥarām is stronger.” However, M14 also had to concede that society at large did 
not live according to that. 
The second person is F35, a Muslima, who grew up in Jordan and then lived a big 
part of her adult life with her husband in the Gulf where she raised her children and 
from where they came back a few years ago. She readily acknowledges that when she 
grew up, there simply was no ḥarām: 
F35: It was ᶜayb, the concept of ᶜayb, which controlled people. We were raised 
on ᶜayb. My father was, for example… I wear pants, and I wear a teddy. OK. 
But if I wear a skirt which goes till here – no! ᶜAyb! Not because it’s wrong, 
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no, ᶜayb, it’s ᶜayb. That’s all. All the people were controlled by the concept 
of ᶜayb, by nothing else. There was no religion. No, there was no religion. 
Martin: And later, even in the eighties, when religion or the headscarf came, you 
said that people were still thinking in terms of ᶜayb and not about religion, 
just about ᶜayb. 
F35: Even our families. I’ll tell you something. My father is now 80 years of age, 
OK? Even today he’s got only a slight tendency towards religion. You’ll find 
more religion with my son, who is 30. He knows more about religion than 
my father. Because our children were raised on religion. Religion, ḥarām, 
ḥalāl, God watches us, God punishes, there is paradise, there is [hell] fire. 
Our families? No! My father, until now, for example, if he sees a woman 
who is not wearing, he says ᶜayb. He does not say ḥarām until now. Even for 
example me, I could wear something like this, he does not oppose, you 
know? The only thing is that it’s ᶜayb if a woman would undress. That’s all. 
Later, at the end of the interview, she came back to comparing the importance of ḥarām 
and ᶜayb in old times and today: 
Now there is [religious] awareness. Now it has become that they know this is ḥarām 
and ḥalāl. ᶜAyb stopped. The idea of ᶜayb – its usage is getting less. The idea of ᶜayb 
is not present as in old times. But in old times everything was ᶜayb. (F35: 242) 
Three things seem to be noteworthy. First, going back only thirty to forty years – 
according to F35’s words – religion and ḥarām played a marginal role in people’s lives. 
Everything was based on ᶜayb. Second, her children were raised differently – not in 
Jordan but in the Gulf. Third, the role of religion has changed, and its influence has 
increased in recent decades. However, is it really as she suggested that “ᶜayb stopped?” 
ᶜAyb is a moving target. It differs from place to place and also changes over time 
significantly. After all, when women stopped wearing traditional clothes and turned to 
more Western and modern attire in the middle of the twentieth century, the ᶜayb code 
was fully operative, even according to F35’s words. What was considered ᶜayb had 
simply changed, but avoiding ᶜayb was still central. F35 also suggested that the 
emergence of the ḥijāb in the 1980s – at least from her experience – had nothing to do 
with religion but was fashion, a fad (lit. moda). M38’s complaint that the majority of 
women who started to wear the ḥijāb do not seem to be committed to comply with 
Sharia’s instructions regarding the rest of the dress code (at least according to his 
opinion) but rather implement only certain aspects selectively, like a fashion statement, 
suggests that the society looks more Islamic than it is in reality. 
Religious norms, one might presume, are followed for religious reasons, legal norms 
for legal reasons, and social norms for social reasons. Instead, as pointed out in 
Chapter 2, things are not so straightforward. Legal norms are sometimes adhered to for 
social reasons and not primarily because of the legal consequences (Braithwaite, 1989). 
What F35 and M38 describe strongly suggests that wearing a ḥijāb in many cases is not 
merely a religious duty motivated by religious convictions or commitments within the 
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religious chronotope but rather is resemiotized within the fashion discourse (as is the 
case with Palestinian women in Israel, according to Mizel, 2020). Similarly, McDermott’s 
study Modernization of the Hijab in Amman, Jordan: A symbol of Islam and Modernity 
(2010) suggests 
that modernization will (1) push some women to wear the hijab for less religious 
reasons but more so for fashion or cultural reasons and/or (2) allow women to 
choose to wear the hijab for purely religious reasons to symbolize their faith despite 
pressure from a traditionally secularizing notion of modernity. (McDermott, 2010, 
p. 3) 
In his study Godless Arabic: How Lack of Belief Affects the Inherently Religious Arabic 
Language (2018), Atwa showed that other semiotic resources from the religious domain, 
such as religious expressions, can also be resemiotized: 
These results suggest that, regardless of one’s non-theism, religious expressions 
seem to be indispensable to Jordanian Arabic speakers. Rather than conveying literal 
religious meaning, these expressions are used to convey politeness, and to present 
the speaker as trustworthy, sincere, and moral. (Atwa, 2018, p. iii)  
M40 reported that he had been wondering why some of his employees pray, and others 
don’t, that maybe it is perceived as ᶜayb not to pray (F39&M40: 140). When I mentioned 
that another informant complained about many men skipping the Friday sermon and 
only appearing at the end of the gathering for the prayer itself, M40 suggested: 
M40: Because they want to be seen.  
Martin: Aha. He says why are you coming now? [Referring to the other informant 
which remained unnamed in this exchange.] 
M40: This in Amman is maybe not as common, but in rural areas, I know this for 
a fact. They want to be seen in the mosque on Friday. 
F39: If I want to be seen, I want to be seen from the beginning.  
M40: They don’t care about the khuṭba [i.e., the sermon]. He’s at the Friday 
prayers. This is important for lots of communities. I know this from Aqaba, 
for example. People go in the community mosque, in the neighborhood, 
because he wants to be seen, so they don’t say Muhammad or Ahmad or 
whoever doesn’t pray. So he is being seen every Friday in the mosque.  
Martin: So it’s important for him as a… for his reputation. 
F39: It’s not the matter that he wants to pray; it’s just a matter of covering his… 
M40: I have a friend of mine, a good friend of mine, he drinks every night, but he 
goes to the Friday prayer. That’s the only prayer he goes to. Because he 
wants to be seen. He doesn’t even believe in god. (F39&M40: 147-154) 
M40 also reported how making their wives wear a ḥijāb is seen by some men as an index 
of patriarchal power: 
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It can happen that they say: what kind of man is this? “He can’t control his wife.” He 
is not able to veil her. “I know because one of my friends at one point, he turned 
religious. And they all went, and they had their wives wear ḥijāb. And then the ones 
who were new to religion eventually they all removed the ḥijāb.” (F39&M40: 137) 
Another point in case is the fasting during Ramadan. M04 reported in a private 
conversation how he knew from his father and grandfather that in earlier times, they 
used to drink alcohol and sometimes did not realize that it was Ramadan until two weeks 
into the month. Nowadays, Ramadan is taken rather seriously, also by M04’s family, and 
anybody eating in the street during daytime risks to be arrested by the police and put in 
prison. However, over the years, I asked countless Jordanians what they thought about 
how many people really fasted, adhering strictly to the Islamic rules. I have never met 
anybody suggesting a proportion of more than 50 percent because “[a]lthough one may 
be legally required to keep the fast in public, how one maintains it in private and in 
socially sustained forms while constructing the action as personally meaningful is highly 
diverse and contested” (Tobin, 2016, p. 75). People usually suggested that not more 
than one third or even only one-quarter of the Muslim population is fasting (in the strict 
sense). F15 confirms this impression: 
Before I started to work here, I was working in the “down town and you see lots of 
things. During Ramadan all my colleagues” and the guys around me “they don’t fast. 
But what they do, they bring some sandwiches and all of this and they go up to the 
roof or somewhere like in the other room, and they start eating, you know?” 
(F15: 111-113) 
In summary, it is undeniable that certain phenomena from the religious domain, like 
praying and the ḥijāb, have increased considerably throughout society. However, this by 
itself is not proof enough that ᶜayb has stopped and that ḥarām has taken over its place. 
Instead, ᶜayb might have morphed yet again. Later, when looking at the historical 
development and interaction between the two codes, this hypothesis will be 
investigated further. 
The third person is M04, a man in his late twenties. Although his mother is a 
Christian, he is considered by Muslims to be a Muslim because of his Muslim father. His 
father did not accept his decision to identify himself as a Christian. M04 came under 
considerable pressure by his father and, according to his words, by some government 
officials. Through the persecution, which he suffered, the issue of religion became one 
of the biggest problems in his personal life. It is reasonable to assume that his contention 
that religion is stronger than the ᶜayb code does not represent the average experience 
of Jordanians. He related a conversation during which his father told him: “Just recount 
the shahāda [i.e., the Islamic confession] in public so that people see that you are 
Muslim. I don’t care how you live and what you do.” If this is correct, it would suggest 
that even the person who was at the center of his troubles, demanding that he would 
come back to Islam and repent, was not primarily (if at all) motivated by religious 
conviction but by the damage his son’s behavior would do to his family’s reputation. 
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Furthermore, there is M20, a Muslim man in his early sixties with a seemingly secular 
outlook on life. He suggested that mamnūᶜ, i.e., the law, is the strongest of the three 
words, and he offered the following explanation for his reasoning: 
The forbidden… In economics, I have a solution. Because the punishment of mamnūᶜ 
comes now, if it catches you, it punishes you. The punishment of the [religiously] 
forbidden comes later. So it’s delayed. “So you tend to discount it. See, we have the 
time value of money. So future payment is worth much less than the present. And 
so a future punishment is worth much less than an instant punishment.” (M20: 87f) 
There are two reasons, apart from M20 being the only informant suggesting that 
mamnūᶜ is the strongest, that this might be an idiosyncratic reading of the society. First, 
M20 spent decades of his adult life outside Jordan, partly in the West, and has been 
working on and off for the government which means that he was in environments where 
the government and the law have a stronger influence than in the daily life of most 
Jordanians. Second, according to his own logic of instant punishment, it seems that, for 
example, the punishment of ᶜayb in everyday life is delivered more frequently and more 
instantaneously than governmental sanctions. After all, how often does it happen to an 
average Jordanian to be caught by the government doing something forbidden 
compared to being shamed by family or neighbors for something considered ᶜayb? 
All of the above is not intended to paint a monochrome black-and-white picture of 
Jordan’s society. Not all the situations and possible contexts in Jordan are dominated by 
ᶜayb, and there are, of course, plenty of occasions where one of the other normative 
codes will dominate. In the Sharia court, one can expect that the religious code will 
outstrip any other normative system. In a state court, correspondingly, one would be 
surprised if the state’s organs would not give the state laws priority over other codes. 
That is what the concept of gravity from Section 3.1.4 is meant to express.  
However, representatives of the same state when they are conducting the state’s 
business in the streets of Amman might find it challenging to uphold the norms of the 
state chronotope against and above contradicting “customs and traditions” of the tribal 
chronotope. It is even more challenging, far away from the capital in some small village 
in the Jordan Valley. When a bus driver is pulled over by police for inspection and the 
officer discovers that they are qarāba (i.e., kin), the encounter quickly ceases to be a 
token of the nexus of practice called traffic inspection, which is part of the state 
chronotope, and is transfigured into an instance of a friendly chat within the tribal 
chronotope. 
However, not just state officials face such challenges. In their book Wasta: The 
Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society (1993), Cunningham and Sarayrah recount the 
story of a university teacher Shtayan whose cousin Muwaffaq moved to a town close to 
him so he could enroll in Shtayan’s university expecting that “[i]t would be easier, 
Muwaffaq said, because a professor would not fail his cousin” (Cunningham & Sarayrah, 
1993, p. 108). Eventually, it became clear that Shtayan was committed to upholding 
academic standards without regard to the person, which meant that Muwaffaq might 
fail the class:  
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Muwaffaq’s father called in shock. He told Shtayan that he would never speak to him 
again if his son failed. Shtayan tried desperately to reason with Uncle Ahmad, 
offering to pay the fees that Muwaffaq paid for the course. Muwaffaq failed, and 
Shtayan’s uncle still turns his face away in disgust when he sees Shtayan. The story 
of failing the cousin spread like fire in the hometown and among the tribe in other 
towns. (Cunningham & Sarayrah, 1993, 109f) 
All these situations are not simply ruled by one code or the other. Instead, they are 
instances of layered simultaneity where different trajectories and various chronotopes 
interfere with each other, superimpose each other and often contest dominion with 
each other. At times these influences merge, to use an image from chemistry, into a 
solution or at least into some homogeneously looking suspension. At other times, they 
relate to each other more like substances in an emulsion where they stay visibly 
distinguishable and one on top of the other.  
Therefore, if one had to draw a map of norms for all the different situations using a 
color to represent a different normative code, one might start with three colors, each 
representing a normative code. However, one would realize quickly that the three colors 
are not enough. The reason is that situations usually could not be represented by only 
one of these colors. Instead, one would have to choose an approach using a color wheel 
where the colors are mixed according to the ratio of how strong or dominant each code 
is. The interview data suggest that the different shades related to the color representing 
ᶜayb would dominate such a map of the Jordanian society. 
 
7.3 Historical disentangling of chronotopic synergies 
In earlier sections of the present chapter, it became evident that there are correlations 
between the different markers of illicit behavior and specific chronotopes. Using the 
data about those markers as indicators, the study discussed how these chronotopes 
relate to each other on a higher level of orders. Naturally, due to the collected 
ethnographic data, the focus was mainly on the present situation. However, if the goal 
is to understand the intricacies of layered simultaneity of concrete interactional 
situations and the state of society in general, it is necessary to trace the different 
trajectories on the different levels which together form and shape reality. The following 
presentation aims at untangling some of the main factors and discourses in place, based 
on the data provided by the informants. 
 
7.3.1 Three phases or moods 
Broadly speaking, a picture of three distinct phases in recent history emerges from the 
data: a traditional phase, a Western phase around the middle of the twentieth century 
(maybe starting in the 1940s), and an Islamic phase (starting to emerge in the 1970s), 
which lasts until today. Maybe it would be more appropriate to talk about moods in the 
sense of Stimmungen instead of phases. The German word Stimmung “does not allow a 
translation into the English notion of ‘affective mood,’ but rather is simultaneously an 
Jordan’s multinormativity: The integral picture  179 
 
internal and external state, subjective (involving the ‘I’) and objective (involving 
attunement [einstimmen] to others), enveloping both content and form” (Borneman & 
Ghassem-Fachandi, 2017, p. 105). Such moods can be almost irresistible and decide the 
fate of nations. They also influence the Lebensgefühl. The German word Lebensgefühl 
means “feeling of or for life” and is often translated as “awareness of life”, “attitude 
towards life”. A positives Lebensgefühl refers to a positive attitude, while neues 
Lebensgefühl could be translated as “new lifestyle” or “new life attitude”. Naturally, 
such moods are hard to measure, and it is equally hard to define when a mood starts or 
ends. A mood can linger on and survive in parts of the society while another mood 
becomes dominant. In the concrete case, one can still find quite a few people in Amman 
who still seem to be living in the Western mood. Thus, the timeframes mentioned above 
are only rough estimates. With this in mind, this dissertation keeps using the term 
“phase” to avoid overly complicated language. 
The traditional phase falls mostly into the time of the Ottoman Empire. Stewart’s 
quote from Chapter 4 about the “long centuries of anarchy” and the Bedouin tribes, 
villages, and small towns which followed customary law, and the varying influence of 
Islamic law, singles out three normative systems, viz. state, religion and customary laws. 
The relative position of these normative codes to each other and in the society was 
already discussed to some extent earlier. Further, Section 7.2.1 suggested that there are 
still after-effects from those times. Section 7.2.2 showed that the social chronotope of 
ᶜayb, and with it the customary law, still plays a dominant role in people’s everyday life. 
The present section attempts to put the findings within the historical context by paying 




















Picture 7.1: Bedouin couple, Adwan 
tribe, created/published between 1898 
and 1914 (Source: Library of Congress, 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/matpc.06
830/) 
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It is the unambiguous consensus of the informants that the traditional clothes, often 
worn particularly in rural areas, were not based or dictated by religion. With traditional 
clothing, it was possible to discern which geographical area a person came from, while 
at the same time, it usually was not possible to tell a Christian woman from a Muslima 
from her attire, according to some informants. Seemingly, the differentiation between 
Muslims and Christians was not vital enough to warrant different clothes for both 
groups. While both, men and women, tended to wear some sort of headgear, the head 
cover which was worn by women often allowed them to show some of their hair, which 
is visible in picture #5 and also in picture #13 of the pictures used for the second round 
(Appendix 1).  
The requisite for women to cover their hair, however, is an essential feature of the 
Islamic head cover (as viewed by many Jordanians). Thus, the informants made a clear 
distinction between traditional head cover, referred to as isharb, and the Islamic head 
cover, called ḥijāb (see also Abdallah, 1995).  
The effect of increased exposure to Western societies can be readily seen in the 
pictures from Egypt and Palestine (e.g., picture #10 from the year 1928). One could 
attribute this development to growing globalization. Growing Arab nationalism, too, was 
not an Islamic phenomenon but, in essence, a secular movement with many Christian 
Arabs playing a leading role. Placing the nation at the center is in a way in conflict with 
Islam, where God is the supreme lawgiver. Such influences came to bear on Jordan 
through an increasing influx of people from Palestine and other areas of the Levant, like 
Lebanon and Syria. Thus, one particular aspect of Jordan’s history, which is of paramount 
importance for the discussion of the development of norms, is the fact that throughout 
the whole twentieth century, it experienced the repeated and massive influx of people 
from other Arab countries, particularly Palestinians. Even since the time before the 
foundation of Jordan, new people moved to Jordan from Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon 
for different reasons. Many of them were educated and had a comparatively modern 
outlook on life, including different social norms. Some moved first to Karak, like, e.g., 
the families of M34 and M44, and only later to Amman. According to M41, who was 
born 1930 in Madaba, people who wanted to educate their children beyond the first few 
school years had to consider sending them to Palestine due to the limited opportunities 
even in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948 brought people again to Jordan, and it is 
essential to point out that most of them were not Bedouin but either peasants or 
urbanites. The pictures from Palestine from the first half of the century show an evident 
Western influence, and this more progressive habitus was also brought to Jordan. There 
were also plenty of refugees who were traditional or conservative Palestinians, but, as 
M34 suggested, the refugees from urban backgrounds generally came to settle in 
Amman. 
The extraordinary growth and distinct evolution of Amman must be recognized as a 
crucial chronotope contributing to the development and interaction between different 
normative codes. Over time, seemingly not later than the 1950s, Amman became a place 
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which was very different from the rest of the country. No doubt, conservative strata and 
segments of the growing population inhabited parts of Amman. However, other parts of 
Amman saw the complete disappearance of traditional clothing and the broad adoption 
of Western-style attire for men and women.  
These developments were not just a change of dress code, but they displayed a 
mood of openness, a desire to get rid of the “dust from the Ottoman era”, and an 
atmosphere of renewal. There was an endeavor to create a new and distinct identity for 
this young nation, and for that purpose, many people oriented themselves towards 
countries that they perceived to be more progressive and advanced and operated within 
the framework of an Arab national identity, which was distinctly secular. David Aikman 
describes the Middle East of the mid-1950s as “a region rocked by the volatile 
combination of Egypt’s popular Gamal Abdel Nasser and a broad upsurge of pan-Arab 
nationalism” (Aikman, 2009, p. 90). Nasser was viewed as a threat by the Jordanian 
regime because  
his republican, socialist policies constituted a direct challenge to the monarchical, 
conservative leadership of Jordan and other kingdoms in the region. Moreover, 
Nasser enjoyed support within the country itself and it was only through a royal 
clamp-down on Jordanian Nasserists that a coup was averted in 1957. (Wagemakers, 
2016, p. 5)  
The number of political parties with a secular worldview in Jordan in the 1940s and 
1950s is telling. The results of party representation in the fifth House of Representatives 
in 1956 allocated 16 out of 21 seats to secular and leftist or left-leaning parties and only 
five to Islamist parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (four seats) and Hizb ut Tahrir 
(one seat) (Al Rantawi et al., 2017, p. 52f). The secular mood and nationalist atmosphere 
from the 1950s and 1960s were dealt a massive blow through the six-day war in 1967. 
Dawisha, who sees Arab nationalism on a downward slide already in the decade before 
the six-day war, describes its status after the war with the following words: 
As the Arabs lay in emotional tatters, stunned by the overwhelming reversal of 
fortunes, for which they had not been psychologically prepared, Arab nationalism, 
even if people were not fully aware of it then, was reaching the end of its 
extraordinary journey. Like an old pugilist, whose days of glory were now a thing of 
the past, Arab nationalism lay on the floor battered and benumbed waiting for the 
count to ten to begin. The sun, which had shown so brightly on Arab nationalism, 
had finally set. (Dawisha, 2016, p. 251)  
Albert Hirschmann, inquiring into the structure and patterns of epochal mood swings, 
points out the role of a collective disappointment for such mood swings and suggests 
that an incision must be marked for such a mood swing to take place (Bude, 2016, p. 72). 
The disenchantment with Arab nationalism in the wake of the crushing defeat through 
a state, which had always been viewed as a Western proxy, viz. Israel, certainly was part 
of the collective disappointment. After the humiliation of 1967, the war of 1973, a 
surprise attack of Egypt and Syria on Israel to recapture the territories lost to Israel in 
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the previous conflict, did not achieve what they had hoped for. However, it was 
“successful enough to shock Israel and the world into realizing that Israel was not, after 
all, invincible” (Ahmed, 2011, p. 77). Islamists framed this success in a religious 
narrative, suggesting  
that the Egyptians had been successful on this occasion, in contrast to their defeat 
in 1967, because this time they had gone to war not for Arab nationalism or some 
other secular cause but in the cause of religion. This time, it was said, they had gone 
to war shouting “Allah Akbar!” (God is Greater). (Ahmed, 2011, p. 78)  
Interestingly, Fadwa El Guindi, an Egyptian anthropologist and a contemporary witness, 
reports that “[w]omen in this new style of dress [i.e., ḥijāb] suddenly became a very 
noticeable presence, particularly) (…) immediately following the 1973 October war with 
Israel” (as cited in Ahmed, 2011, p. 77). The critical stance of the Arab governments 
toward Iran, notwithstanding, the defiance of the Western powers through the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in 1979 which entailed the excruciatingly humiliating hostage crisis 
(this time for the West), which “may now be seen as one of the crucial events in the 
modern history of both the United States and the Middle East” (Kinzer, 2014), seems to 
mark the turning point of the pendulum in Jordan. 
The turning point is only the beginning of the countermovement, and it is therefore 
not surprising that in the year 1980, all the female teachers appeared for their job 
interviews at a new private school without ḥijāb. One swallow certainly does not make 
a summer, but in hindsight, it is rather intriguing that a seamstress from the group 
interview (F35&36&37&M38) distinctly remembered the first time somebody appeared 
at her shop to order a jilbāb: it was a young female student from the Sharia department 
of the University of Jordan, and it was in the year 1979 (F45-M48: 297ff). 
 
7.3.2 Change in local chronotopes and emergence of new sites of engagement 
When returning the focus on the 1950s, there is another thread of developments in 
more local chronotopes, which contributed to the different changes. It is essential to 
point out that the fact that women in West Amman dropped traditional clothes so 
thoroughly and quickly must not hide the fact that people were still living according to 
the logic of the ᶜayb code, which is an aesthetic code concerned about what other 
people think and say. In the description of his father’s attitude, who reportedly had no 
religious inclinations at all, M34 leaves no doubt that he had strong opinions about what 
was ᶜayb and insisted that his daughters adhere to them. What changed was what was 
seen as ᶜayb, not the dynamic itself. Before it was ᶜayb not to wear certain traditional 
clothes, now it was acceptable, even preferable to leave that style behind and to 
embrace modern and progressive attire, which, however, still prescribed certain limits 
of decency. Wearing traditional clothes would not have been considered ᶜayb. However, 
women came increasingly under pressure to adopt the new style, as can be seen in 
M34’s memories about how he and his siblings pressured their mother to leave her 
traditional dress style behind (M34: 65). This new style can be viewed, therefore, as a 
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descriptive norm, just like any other fad or temporary fashion, which lacks the 
prescriptive force of social norms (Bicchieri, 2006). Such descriptive norms can, over 
time, develop into more stable social norms, but this is not how the story continued in 
Amman. As the original village of Amman evolved into a town and later into a city with 
respectable size, unprecedented everyday situations emerged. They posed new 
challenges while at the same time many, maybe even most, of Amman’s inhabitants 
held on to strong family ties and traditional values, which is also the reason for the firm 
grip of the ᶜayb code on social life. 
The work outside the house comes quickly to mind as an example of such new and 
unprecedented situations. After all, in so-called developed societies, modernization and 
urbanization were usually accompanied by increased participation of women in 
economic activity. The joining of the workforce naturally entails pursuing employment 
outside the house (Bordoloi & Sarmah, 2012). However, anybody who might have 
expected that the process of urbanization and modernization in Jordan would bring 
about high female participation in the labor force surely must be disappointed because 
the female participation rate remains under 15 percent and is considered as one of the 
lowest worldwide. USAID suggests that “traditional beliefs and cultural restraints 
enforced by family and community networks” are the reasons for the plateauing of the 
numbers (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2018). Section 5.6 gives plenty of 
examples for such “traditional beliefs and cultural restraints enforced by family and 
community networks.” 
 
7.3.3 The emergence of new kind of educational sites of engagement 
When it comes to education, however, the numbers look very different. After all, 
“Jordan achieved gender parity in primary education enrolment in 1980, and women are 
enrolling in secondary and tertiary education at higher rates than men.” (QRF Fact Sheet, 
2018). 
As mentioned earlier in Section 7.3.1, educational opportunities beyond the first few 
school years were rare and far between in Jordan before the middle of the twentieth 
century. In 1914, there were 21 Ottoman state elementary schools in the area of today’s 
Jordan with approximately 1,000 students, including 59 girls in two girls’ schools. 
Additionally, there were traditional Kuttab schools for Muslims and a handful of small 
church and missionary schools for Christians (Layne, 1984, p. 6). In the school year of 
1945/46, there were 73 public schools of all types, with roughly 10,000 students out of 
which circa 20 percent were female. In the same year, there were 100 non-government 
schools: 64 for boys, 21 for girls, and 15 coeducational with 6,472 students, of which 
circa 40 percent were female (Salman, 1986, p. 50). With an estimation of roughly 
350,000 inhabitants (Beaumont et al., 2016, p. 408), this constitutes less than 5 percent 
of the population. As a matter of comparison, in the school year of 1973/74, the total 
number of students was 497,125 and grew to 842,415 students in the scholastic year 
1982/83 (Salman, 1986, p. 42). Salman estimates that in the latter case, the school 
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population was about 35 percent of the total population of 2.4 million (Salman, 1986, 
p. 41). 
The governmental schools eventually came to outnumber the non-government 
schools. According to the report of the Ministry of Education in 2019, 2,111,719 students 
were registered – 50.4 percent being boys, 49.6 percent girls. Of them, 552,530 
students, i.e., 26.1 percent, were enrolled in private schools (Administration of the 
Queen Rania Center, 2019, pp. 17-19). According to the same report, 98.2 percent of the 
private schools were coeducational (Administration of the Queen Rania Center, 2019, 
pp. 20-22). 
When it comes to universities, all the institutions are coeducational (Adely, 2012, 
p. 95). King Hussein established the first university in 1962, viz. The University of Jordan, 
which was followed slowly by other public universities, with the next established 
university being the Yarmouk University in 1976 (Bataeineh, 2008). Due to the 
establishment of private universities, the 1990s saw an immense increase in universities. 
According to Jansen (2006), in the first ten years, the number of universities rose to 21, 
and the number of university students nearly quadrupled.  
Not only the number of total students but also the ratio of female students increased 
at that time immensely (Zughoul, 2000). As long as the female participation in public life, 
including education, was mostly limited to “‘privileged’ classes and only the daughters 
of the well-to-do went to university, this was not a societal concern but rather a matter 
that involved individual families and men” (Taraki, 1995, p. 648). However, by 1991 this 
had become such an important issue that “Islamist deputies presented memoranda to 
the ministers of Higher Education and Education demanding that coeducation in schools, 
community colleges, and universities be banned” (Taraki, 1995, p. 650). She continues: 
I believe that the key to understanding the Ikhwans increased militancy on the 
gender issue lies in the fact that the social groups which make up the constituency 
of the Ikhwan are finally experiencing for themselves the social implications of 
certain socio-economic trends which have been underway in Jordan for the past few 
decades. Specifically, they are caught up in social dilemmas arising from the 
increased labour force participation of women, and from the steady gains being 
made in female education, particularly at the higher levels. As women from these 
largely conservative milieux are being thrust into the public domain in increasing 
numbers, the questions about women's place in society which may have troubled 
only a few one generation earlier acquire increased urgency now. (Taraki, 1995, 
pp. 650-651)  
In other words, in the second half of the twentieth century, girls and young women, 
together with their Jordanian families, were increasingly confronted with the fact that 
they found themselves in classes with strangers of the opposite sex, which Taraki labels 
as “social dilemmas” in the quote above. That, however, was a very different situation 
from M23’s school experience in a small village near Karak in the 1960s. Although he 
went to the small coeducational school of his village, all the pupils either came from the 
same extended family or belonged to the village and well-known families. In her book 
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A Quiet Revolution: The Veil’s Resurgence, from the Middle East to America (2011), Leila 
Ahmed proposes a causal relationship between the effects of the substantial increase of 
students, particularly among women, on the nexus of practice “going to university” and 
the emergence of the ḥijāb in Egypt: 
These overcrowded conditions were particularly hard for women. Young female 
students, often from rural backgrounds, who found it culturally uncomfortable and 
inappropriate to be in close quarters with strange men, now had to join them in 
crowded lecture halls and in congested public transport. All of this was occurring, 
moreover, during a time of worsening economic conditions, and when lavish 
consumerism was practiced only by the wealthy few and when many of the goods 
filling the markets, including clothes and Western fashions, were well beyond the 
means of most young women.  
This was the time that the new veil and Islamic dress – a distinctive and arrestingly 
different form of dress that always included a head covering or hijab – began to make 
its appearance on the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities. (Ahmed, 2011, p. 77) 
According to the informants, however, it was not just young female students who found 
it culturally uncomfortable and inappropriate but even more so their families, who 
would sometimes impose the ḥijāb as a prerequisite for permitting their girls to study at 
the university. 
Ahmed’s comment (above) also brings up the economic chronotope, and she argues 
that becoming a muḥajjaba, at least for some women, also could mean to make a virtue 
out of necessity. Wearing a ḥijāb and a jilbāb, from this perspective, would have the 
added benefit of face-saving instead of admitting that one simply does not have the 
means to join the fashion contest. One of the informants from the group interview 
(F45.46.47&M48) related a story, which demonstrates that such considerations are not 
simply plucked out of thin air. She works as a seamstress, and one of her female 
customers always came to her with a ḥijāb and a jilbāb. After the customer graduated 
from university, she appeared in the shop of the seamstress, but this time surprisingly, 
without ḥijāb and dressed in modern clothes. The informant said that she was very much 
confused by such a profound change and she expressed her bewilderment to the young 
women who explained that she had worn the ḥijāb and the jilbāb solely in order to save 
herself the trouble of doing her hair and to have to decide what to wear to university 
each day. However, now after graduation, she decided to go back to her previous 
clothes. Admittedly, this might be a somewhat extreme example, but it illustrates that 
tacit practical considerations are sometimes part of the equation. 
 
7.3.4 Women join new nexuses of practice: Visiting malls and Western cafés 
There is another aspect to the economic development worth pointing out. It confirms 
Ahmad’s notion from above about the ḥijāb being a strategy, which was partly chosen 
because the ḥijāb lent itself so naturally to reconcile the demands of new situations with 
requirements of old values. In the 1980s and 1990s, other sites of engagement, besides 
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education and employment, emerged, which were built for social practices entailing the 
mixing of unrelated young people from both genders. While malls were existent in 
Western countries roughly thirty years earlier, the concept “mall” emerged in Jordan 
only in the early 1990s (Akroush et al., 2011, p. 171) and by “the late 1990s the city was 
plagued with a series of shopping malls, some even in the eastern, less affluent part of 
the city” (Daher, 2008, p. 55). The influx of Palestinians from the Gulf in the early 1990s 
– this time with money in their pockets – helped the newly emerging Western coffee 
shops, restaurants, and other sorts of entertainment to take root because these new 
refugees had been exposed to said phenomena in the Gulf. They brought not only the 
appetite for them but also carried the means to pay for its satisfaction (M20: 54f).  
It is easy to see how the growth of the city with all these new opportunities not only 
created new types of sites of engagement where young people from both genders could 
hang out and mix but also increased the anonymity of the rapidly increasing number of 
such encounters. Earlier, the neighborhoods functioned much like villages and small 
towns where females were protected by the men of the neighborhood (F43: 289). The 
bigger the city became, the more anonymous it became, and sexual harassment became 
a real problem for many women and girls (M34: 176ff). Women are sexually harassed 
and even assaulted, no matter how they are dressed. The following comments are in no 
way meant to suggest that women are inviting such crimes or are to be blamed for male 
misbehavior. Nevertheless, according to the experience of the women with whom I 
talked, including my wife and daughters, covering one’s head and wearing cloaking 
clothes seem to be part of particular indexical orders. They seem to indicate explicitly to 
non-related Arab men, particularly in more traditional domains, that a woman considers 
herself to be “respectable” (muḥtarrama) and that she is not in search of any sexual 
adventures. 
There is another effect of the influx of Palestinians in the 1990s, which should not go 
unnoticed. Just as the first wave of Palestinians brought with them their habitus and 
many of those who came from urban centers brought to Jordan a more modern and 
liberal style, now many returned and had adopted more Islamic forms of dress. F35 
described that she left Jordan without a ḥijāb and dressed in a short skirt to the Gulf. 
Due to embarrassing situations where people brought her a towel to cover her knees 
during some visits, she adapted to a more Islamically conservative dress code. When she 
came back to Jordan to visit and eventually moved here, she stayed with it. Her children, 
too, were brought up in an environment with more Islamic orientation than in Jordan at 
the same time and so their daughter also grew up with a ḥijāb.  
 
7.3.5 The role of Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood 
Although the landscape of political parties gives a strong impression of the secular 
atmosphere in the country in the 1950s, it would be a mistake to overlook the presence 
of Islamist organizations and parties. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) established itself in 
Jordan in 1946 under the patronage of Abdullah I. Although there were ups and life and 
society. Most importantly, in 1957, when King Hussein prohibited almost all political 
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parties, the MB remained in good standing. Since they were, on the one hand critical of 
Nasserism and on the other hand more moderate than other alternative Islamist 
movements (which were deemed troublesome for the kingdom), the MB was supported 
by the state and given high positions in the government (Kumaraswamy, 2019; 
Wiktorowicz, 1999). 
Notably, their impact on the educational sector and the push for Islamizing the 
school curriculum should not be underestimated since, according to Bourdieu, “one of 
the major powers of the state is to produce and impose (especially through the school 
system) categories of thought that we spontaneously apply to all things of the social 
world – including the state itself” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 35). While the universities became 
a “vital political arena for the Brotherhood” (Tal, 1995b, p. 142), it is also crucial to 
recognize that several ministers of education and directors of the curriculum were 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood:  
Unlike other Arab nations, Jordan recognized the Brotherhood officially, and its 
members were frequently co-opted into prestigious positions. In the 1950s, the 
former Minister of the Awqaf (Islamic Affairs and Holy Places), Kamil Ismail al-Sharif, 
was one of the MB leaders in Egypt. The Brothers had substantial influence in the 
Ministry of Education. Ishaq Farhan, the former leader of the IAFP, was the Minister 
of Education (1970-73), president of the University of Jordan (1976-78), member of 
consultative council, and member of upper house of parliament. (Moaddel, 2002, 
p. 533)  
Over the decades, the curriculum became Islamic to the extent that a critical review and 
revision was deemed necessary. Al Arabia quoted a former official from the Education 
Ministry: 
“ISIS ideology is there, in our textbooks,” said Zogan Obiedat, a former Education 
Ministry official who published a recent analysis of the texts. If Jordan were to be 
overrun by the militants, a large majority “will join IS because they learned in school 
that this is Islam,” he said. (Al Arabiya, 2015)  
Obeidat, who supervised the curriculum while at the Education Council from 1991 to 
1998, argues that this process of Islamic infiltration of the curricula “has been ongoing 
since the 1980s, facilitating political and religious extremism” (Al Sharif, 2016).  
In an article titled “What will become of you, Oh education,” Jordanian writer and 
educator Zuleikha Abu Risha bemoaned the state of the Jordanian education system 
with similarly strong words: 
The poisoned Islamist tree, planted in the 1960s, has borne fruit – in the form of an 
educational system that opposes creativity and asking questions, sanctifies the past, 
does not deviate from its [rigid] path, detests logic and anything new or innovative, 
levels accusations of heresy, and incites to hatred, violence, and killing – to the point 
where students have become robots who recite prayers to keep themselves from 
harm, instead of investing efforts in finding solutions. (…) Private schools teach 
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children to pray day and night, before [teaching them] to use their brains and 
challenge their thinking. (As cited in The Jerusalem Post, JPOST.COM STAFF, 2015)  
The textbook reform did not go down without a public clash of the different camps. The 
objections were partly religious “because they don’t want us to follow the Prophet” but 
also based on political views: “They want these changes so that people don’t think of 
[Occupied] Jerusalem” (Ammon News, 2016). Particularly intriguing were objections 
which indicate a conflation of customary code and religion: 
Atef Al-Numat, a union member in Ma’an, called the changes a “disaster for our 
children and our values.” He particularly objected to an image of a man vacuuming 
a house, a crucifix hanging on the wall behind him. Jordanian men do not sweep their 
homes, he said, and the cross is a “clear message” that “conversion is possible.” 
(Ammon News, 2016) 
Sweeping a home seems to be considered ᶜayb by some people, as became evident in 
the previous chapters, but the informants also made clear that there is nothing in Islam 
that prohibits men from doing domestic work. Moreover, since there is an indigenous 
Christian Arabic minority present in the country, it is debatable if the cross is intended 
as a message that conversion is possible or merely the attempt to mirror demographic 
realities. However, the above statement and slogans like “Obama and Clinton’s schools 
are not for us!” clearly suggest that the issue is not purely a religious one but touches 
on questions of identity and the feeling which many Arabs have, viz. that Islam and 
Muslims are under attack. To be fair, the different wars in the region during the last 
three decades in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria and the support of Israel by the Western 
powers does lend itself to shape a chronotope where such narratives flow smoothly.  
In their article “A clash of emotions: The politics of humiliation and political violence 
in the Middle East,” Fattah and Fierke point out that, “numerous scholars have 
highlighted the pervasiveness of a discourse of humiliation, and its relationship to the 
swelling ranks of recruits who are willing to act as human bombs” (Fattah & Fierke, 2009, 
p. 69) and they argue: 
Islamists have given coherent meaning to emotions of humiliation and betrayal, 
within a narrative of ‘paradise lost’, and, in the historical analysis that follows, how 
this has provided a framework for giving meaning to a range of national, regional and 
international interactions, particularly since 1967. (Fattah & Fierke, 2009, p. 69) 
They start their article with two epigraphs. The first quote is from Osama bin Laden who 
expresses that the Islamic world “has been tasting this humiliation, and this degradation 
for more than 80 years.” The second quote is even more noteworthy because it is from 
Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, who certainly cannot be accused to share Bin 
Laden’s political views: 
Arabs and Muslims feel humiliated and despondent and devoid of the ability to 
redress the imbalance of US foreign policy and US public opinion, just as they feel 
humiliated, despondent, and unable to stop the violence against the Palestinians, 
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which they see in part as the result of US support for Israel. (As quoted in Fattah & 
Fierke, 2009, p. 68)  
In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has a prominent role in Jordan, the issue 
of humiliation by Western powers and its concern for reclaiming dignity is evident from 
its very origins. Its founder Hassan Al-Banna, according to his own words, was 
approached in 1928 by a group of people framing their request for his guidance in the 
following words: 
We have heard and we have become aware, and we have been affected. We know 
not the practical way to reach the glory of Islam and to serve the welfare of Muslims. 
We are weary of this life of humiliation and restriction. We see that the Arabs and 
the Muslims have no status and no dignity. They are not more than mere hirelings 
belonging to the foreigners. (As quoted in Armajani, 2012, p. 49)  
Muhammad Qutb, the younger brother of one of the most influential Islamists, Sayyid 
Qutb, took refuge in Saudi Arabia after his brother’s execution and continued to 
propagate the ideas for which his brother had died. In his book Islam: The Misunder-
stood Religion (1980) he explains: 
Islam, in a word, means liberation from all sorts of slavery such as may inhibit the 
progress of humanity or may not allow it to follow the path of virtue and goodness. 
It means man's freedom from dictators who enslave him by force or fear, make him 
do what is wrong and deprive him of his dignity, honor, property or even life. (Qutb, 
1980, chap. 2) 
 
7.3.6 Summary: A perfect storm 
The present section attempted to disentangle the different chronotopic strands and 
threads. It will be useful to reflect on the insights described above using Diagram 3.1 
from Section 3.1.5, which depicts the three elements of social action, viz. historical body, 
interaction order, and discourses in place. Several discourses were mentioned that co-
shaped social action over the last hundred years. One central discourse is concerned 
with the question about how to respond to the challenges, which emerged in recent 
history. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, nationalism, with its focus on 
national identity, became a potent force also in the Arab countries and Jordan. 
Interestingly, it did not lead to a revival of folk culture but rather to the abandonment, 
e.g., of traditional dress while at the same time adopting what might be labeled 
Western-style clothes. Notably, around the middle of the twentieth century, a fervent 
discourse regarding a modern Arab identity emerged, which picked up concepts and 
ideas from the European and Western world and tried to respond to it. 
However, there was also a diametrically opposed answer to the questions offered 
within the same discourse. The answer suggesting to return to Islam, which was present 
from the beginning of the twentieth century, did not take center stage from the 
beginning, though. Only later after the disenchantment of Arab nationalism in the 1960s 
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and the disappointment with the Western world, did the region witness the steady 
revival of the Islamic perspective, which also provided an identity grounded in its 
narrative. Naturally, as Garfinkel (2006) pointed out, identity shapes our actions. 
Other discourses also gained importance, such as the desire to secure a better future 
in a situation where many people experienced an increase in prosperity worldwide. One 
essential answer was to provide education for the younger generations, using Western 
education as a model. Thus, particularly from the 1980s onward, many private schools 
and universities with co-educational practices were established. Such institutions 
employed an interaction order, which differed sharply from more traditional institutions 
with segregated policies. Similarly, the whole discourse around consumer items and 
entertainment gained new dimensions when shopping malls and Western-style cafés 
were introduced. Here, too, novel interaction orders emerged where male and female 
met regularly and in situations, which required strategies which were appropriate and 
compatible with existing societal values. At the same time, the new possibilities brought 
with them affordances to develop novel micro-hegemonies, which enhanced the 
creation of multinormative identities. 
Clearly, before the arrival of these kinds of sites of engagement, men and women, 
girls and boys, interacted also outside the house. However, those encounters happened 
in much smaller communities where everybody knew everybody. The enormous and 
unprecedented growth of Amman and some other towns into cities lead to a degree of 
anonymization, which added to the explosive nature of such newly introduced types of 
interaction. 
For obvious reasons, the discourse of courting and search for a partner never 
receded in the society, and the historical body of virtually all social actors partaking in 
all these encounters remained steeped in the ᶜayb logic, which is strongly connected to 
this discourse as we have seen earlier. The aesthetic norms ruling the marriage market 
morphed, often in a hybridized fashion, because historical bodies are not something 
fixed and finalized but are subject to constant change. Notably, more extended periods 
of exposure to other societies – be it more conservative or religious societies, like the 
Gulf, or more liberal and secular ones, like the USA – left their imprint on many 
Jordanians and Palestinians who decided to move (back) to Jordan.  
It is undeniable that the ḥarām code has grown in importance or, maybe, one should 
put it more cautiously, in prominence. When we look at the different mediational tools 
and nexuses of practice, it seems fair to say that several elements from the religious 
chronotope are being employed more frequently and more visibly in public now than 
some decades ago. This observation is undoubtedly correct for some semiotic resources 
like specific articles of clothing (e.g., ḥijāb) and also for specific nexuses of practice like 
prayer, mosque attendance on Fridays, and observance of the Ramadan fast in public. 
What can be observed here, however, is not simply a re-Islamization of the society. In 
other words, it is not merely a return to a specific chronotope. It remains even doubtful 
if the religious chronotope has come to dominate over the other chronotopes. An 
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interplay of different norms and discourses apparently led to reconfigurations within 
the orders of indexicality.  
The ḥijāb might have originated in the religious chronotope, but that does not mean 
that it can not be employed by other purposes from a scenario that is not Islamic. 
Mediational tools, no doubt, do have their affordances. If employed in another 
chronotope, semiotic resources always carry the potential of importing something from 
their own trajectory. In other words, a ḥijāb probably will not lose its religious 
connotation even if it is resemiotised, but it is nevertheless possible to embed it in 
another context.  
The motivation might be grounded more in the social realm, e.g., the concern for the 
reputation of the female, or it might just be born out of the wish to follow a particular 
fashion trend. Indexical orders are notoriously unstable, and a micro-social concrete 
phenomenon can suddenly acquire new indexical connections to a new macro-social 
frame of analysis.  
As explained in Chapter 3, indexical orders relate micro-social sociolinguistic 
phenomena to macro-social frames of analysis (Silverstein, 2003, p. 193; see also 
Section 3.1.6). Thus, micro-social phenomena, which originated from within one 
chronotope, e.g., ḥijāb, can become related to macro-social frames, which are rooted in 
other chronotopes, e.g., construction of national identity.  
It seems that this did indeed happen in many instances, according to the informants 
themselves. If the ḥijāb was an unquestionable expression of a woman’s commitment 
to Islam, goes their objection, why do so many ignore all the other regulations and rules 
from the same religious code? Of course, this is not to question that many women do 
take their religious duties very seriously and try to adhere to the whole set of relevant 
norms. However, according to the informants, there is an overwhelming part, which 
does not seem to belong in this category. As a matter of fact, at least at the beginning 
of this change, the motives of many women, even those who view themselves as 
religious by now, were anything but religious. Similar questions can be raised about 
other Islamic elements that were mentioned above.  
Thus, the observations presented in this research, and particularly in this section, 
suggest that the embrace of Islamic practices, e.g., the Islamic dress code for women, is 
the product of a “perfect storm”. It seems highly unlikely that the developments can be 
explained simply within one chronotope. The way many women incorporate the ḥijāb 
into their dress style even strongly suggests that we are dealing with a layered 
simultaneity. It is crucial to keep in mind that humans are also products of layered 
simultaneity. They navigate the ever-changing terrain of indexical orders from different 
discourses at the same time, which can lead to “hybridized, fragmented and polymorph 
identities” (Blommaert & Varis, 2013, p. 144). We become heteroglossic expressions 
ourselves in polynomic situations, and the following illustration helps to express what 
this means. After working through the data, I told F01 in a private conversation that it 
seems that many young women who combine ḥijāb and tight clothes are giving off mixed 
signals to prospective marital partners (and their mothers) with the message: “Look! I’m 
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a Muslima, and I’m honorable – but I’m also sexy.” She smiled and said: “Exactly!” The 
question of how much of Islamic dress is enough – to avoid upsetting the family or to 
satisfy personal religious convictions – remains highly contested (Tobin, 2016, chap. 4). 
We have seen earlier that the ᶜayb code remains the dominant normative force, and 
such newly emerged indexical orders create hybrid norms, where a specific behavior is 
disjointed from its original chronotope and resemiotized within another chronotope. 
This way a religious symbol, like the ḥijāb, can become a fashion article. The dynamic, 
however, can also be harnessed the other way around. If the goal is to move people to 
submit to religious norms, declaring noncompliance with such norms as ᶜayb is a 
possible strategy. The data presented above suggest that both dynamics are at work.  
Ultimately, the data do not give enough information to conclusively state how much 
of the motivation of the people in Jordan was based on ᶜayb, political frustration, or the 
other factors. More research would be helpful in this regard. However, it does raise an 
important question what the adoption or reappropriation of such symbols and rituals – 
and be it for non-religious reasons – does to a society and the self-concept of people.  
In his book Ritual, Politics, and Power (2003), Kertzer suggests how ritual is employed 
to affirm or reinforce power, legitimacy, group solidarity, or national cohesion in human 
societies around the world. These processes do not have to be deliberate but can also 
happen unconsciously. 
A particularly intriguing and relevant thesis of Kertzer is the notion that rituals are 
an essential way to produce political convictions (Kertzer, 2003, p. 98). He suggests that 
the social pressure during the Nazi time in Germany led people to adopt the so-called 
Hitlergruß, i.e., the Hitler salute, which in turn seemed to have affected people’s 
attitude, causing them to identify more with Hitler’s politics and his cause. Kertzer 
employs the theory of cognitive dissonance of Leon Festinger (1957) to explain this 
phenomenon. In this theory, he proposed that a person holding two contradictory 
cognitive experiences – in the case of the Hitlergruss this would be performing a ritual 
expressing loyalty toward the Nazis combined with a personal attitude of possible 
indifference regarding the Nazi ideology – experiences an aversive motivational state. In 
order to reduce this unpleasant state, the individual, mostly unconsciously, tries to 
reduce the dissonance by changing his or her cognitions, or by including some 
justification into his or her thinking which would reconcile the difference (Good, 2006).  
In the light of the above-described perception of antagonism between the non-
Muslim and Muslim societies, another possible way of attempting to explain this 
phenomenon could be by employing social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) and self-
categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) which are used to explain why group norms 
are used as behavioral standards (Christensen et al., 2004). More research is necessary 
to investigate how much certain religious practices caused religious convictions and 
attitudes, which generally are assumed to be their actual motivation. 
 
  
Jordan’s multinormativity: The integral picture  193 
 
7.4 About women – their feelings, their actions, and their voice 
Research questions 3 and 4 approach the situation and position of women from two 
different but complementary angles. Because they are intertwined, the following 
section applies itself to answer them together. For the convenience of the reader, they 
are restated here: 
3 How do women in Jordan perceive and respond to their own situation? 
4 What are the implications of Jordan’s multinormativity for the voice of women? 
Hence, research question 3 addresses a relatively concrete and also quite subjective 
dimension: it enquires about the perspective of women, a) what they think and feel 
about their situation (as women), and b) what they do about it. 
Coming from a different angle, research question 4 poses a more abstract question 
about the voice of women, as defined in Chapter 3. It requires an analytical answer from 
a more objective perspective. 
As was stated before, the study does not claim objectivity or to be unbiased in any 
absolute sense. After all, it aligns itself intentionally with the objectives of CDA, which, 
as stated in Section 1.2, focuses on the interconnection between social problems, 
discourse, power abuse, and domination and “does so from a perspective that is 
consistent with the best interests of dominated groups. It takes the experiences and 
opinions of members of such groups seriously, and supports their struggle against 
inequality” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 96). The study does, though, try to take a step back, listen 
to the different voices, and look at the whole data from different perspectives and 
scales. 
This section will proceed as follows. First, in order to answer the first part of research 
question 3, viz. how women perceive their own situation, it recaps relevant findings, 
particularly from Section 5.8 which contains a detailed presentation of the informants’ 
opinions regarding the question if the difference of the normative codes for men and 
women is fair or just. The second part of research question 3, viz. what women do about 
their situation, will be addressed together with research question 4 about the 
implications for the voice of women. 
Section 3.1.7 defined four parameters of voice, which were 1) voice as a matter of 
capacity and resources, 2) voice as a matter of opportunity, 3) influence of a person’s 
standing on her voice, and 4) voice as a matter of freedom. Starting with subsection 
7.4.2, the study interrogates the interview data using these four parameters while at the 
same describing how women deal with the different challenges. 
 
7.4.1 How do women perceive their own situation? 
When it comes to the question of how women perceive their situation, there are, 
basically, two groups of women. One of them assesses the situation and position of 
women sweepingly in a positive manner. Its message could be summarized as follows: 
“There is no inequality and whatever difference there is between men and women, is 
good and appropriate. No change is needed. Everything is fine.” F31 and F29 are 
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examples. They criticized neither the ᶜayb, ḥarām nor mamnūᶜ code. The system as it is, 
is working fine and doing its job well. The differences in norms are there to protect 
women. 
The contribution of the other three women, who voiced a similar opinion, is more 
complex. For starters, F16 was present in both interviews, interview 16 with F16 and 
F17, and interview 17 with F18 and F16. In both interviews, F16 played a leading role. It 
is, therefore, hard to say what the other two informants, F17 and F18, would have said 
about the situation of women in a one-on-one completely private interview. 
Even though such interviews might prevent people from voicing critical opinions, 
they are still very valuable because they often attempt to present an “ideal image”. In 
other words, one can learn about what informants regard as ideal and just norms. The 
impression one acquired from these two interviews was that society is good now, that 
is after Islam has changed it. In earlier times, referring to the time of their childhood and 
youth, there were problems and immorality, but things have changed for the better – at 
least in the village where these interviews were conducted. 
They did not deny differences between the sexes, but those were normal or natural. 
As described earlier (Section 5.5.3), the same informants were convinced that the notion 
that men could be easily forgiven their sins but women could not to be a completely 
natural state of affairs.  
F16 expressed how the difference between man and woman is something some 
women not only tolerate but cherish. For some, even acts of male violence seem to be 
reconfirming displays of masculinity: “A man came to propose to my daughter but she 
didn’t like him. She said to her father: ‘Father, I don’t want one like this. I want one who 
will slap me, one like you’” (F16&F17: 657). 
Now, this must not lead to the conclusion that Jordanian women like to be abused. 
The interviews cannot be taken as representative, even though, according to several 
studies, the problem of intimate partner violence is not a minor issue in the society 
(Al-Badayneh, 2012). 
The interesting thing about this interview is the following: as explained earlier, it can 
be seen as a rather ideal depiction of the society and in this context a husband slapping 
his wife was reported as something desirable. 
On the other hand, these women (particularly F16) were no timid and milquetoast 
characters with an inferior self-image. They proudly told the story of how they as 
women, without the help of men, reinvigorated a failed charitable society, which had 
been headed by men originally, and brought it to success. 
The first group, however, represented a minority of the female informants. All the 
others regarded the situation and position of women as less than ideal, with some even 
passing scathing verdicts. It is worth noting that only one male informant agreed with 
the first group. Several men (but no woman) took a neutral stance, expressing that 
women have areas of disadvantage but also some advantages. The majority of men, 
however, agreed with the second group. 
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This second group, basically, agreed on these points: there is inequality and it is 
unjust. Change is desirable and needed. Another point where most female informants 
agreed was that that the ḥarām code, i.e., religion, was not to be blamed. The vast 
majority saw the c ayb code as problematic. Some, in fact, even seemed to use the ḥarām 
code to overcome negative consequences of the ᶜayb code for women as will shortly 
become evident. Only F03 and F05 seemed to see also the ḥarām code as problematic. 
The members of this group held roughly three positions: 
a “I cannot do anything about it. I arrange my life accordingly and live a compromise.” 
F05 would be an example for this position. However, if the estimation of some of the 
informants, male and female, is not mistaken, then she is not alone in the society. 
The fact that women who suffer under their husbands often have neither the 
material means nor the support from their family (material or psychological) – even 
her parents will urge her: “Endure, endure!” – effectively renders them extortable: 
if she revolts she might lose her children and face a bleak future. 
The other two positions could be described as follows: 
b “I try to change my personal situation.” An example would be F30 who successfully 
convinced her parents to let her study or F08 who is contemplating to escape her 
predicament by pursuing further studies in Germany. 
c “I take action which will help not only myself but also others, possibly changing the 
system.” F27 and F28 are prime examples for this kind of attitude. They and the other 
examples will resurface in the next sections. 
 
7.4.2 Voice as a matter of capacity and resources 
Are women able to use all the mediational means or semiotic resources as men are? The 
legal code (as much as the informants reported) does not seem to have to say much 
about this question. According to the majority of the Muslim informants, the religious 
code requires a woman to veil herself, which is, as we have seen, what the word ḥijāb 
means. The ḥijāb adequately understood, as several of the informants insisted, pertains 
not only to the hair but to the whole body. Sure, men also have to cover their ᶜawra and 
should not walk naked on the street. However, the requirements for women are without 
question much more restrictive. While a man is allowed to expose everything above the 
navel and below the mid-thigh area, a woman is allowed to show only her hands, feet, 
and face, according to current and widespread opinion on these matters in Jordan. 
Additionally, the clothes should be “veiling” in the sense that they should be neither 
revealing the body shape nor be transparent. Apart from these restrictions, the ḥarām 
code does not seem to impose restrictions on the use of mediational means, which are 
not also applicable to men. For example, the prohibition of alcohol, smoking, or pork is 
valid for both sexes, just as stealing, lying, or killing. It would be fair to say that according 
to the data, this seems to be the majority view of the Muslim informants. 
There are, however, the mentions of ᶜawra which do not entirely support this notion 
since three out of four informants expanded the concept ᶜawra beyond the body areas 
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mentioned above and declared the voice of a woman, her odor, and even the woman as 
such as ᶜawra (cf. Section 5.2.3). From this perspective, one would have to conclude that 
(at least the vernacular form of) Islam does not so much prohibit women from using 
specific semiotic resources but instead problematizes any semiotic engagement of 
women with people outside the circle of muḥarramīn. However, this appears a rather 
extreme reading of the Islamic notion of ᶜaura. In order to gauge how many people 
indeed hold such an opinion, more research would be necessary.  
The ᶜayb code, in comparison to the ḥarām code, is more restrictive in some aspects 
and more lenient in others. Generally speaking, the ᶜayb code is, without a doubt, more 
restrictive for women than for men. There is never the talk about a man’s sharaf being 
threatened by anything he does. As M02 said, a man could walk naked on the street, 
and, of course, it would be considered ᶜayb but not in the same devastating and lasting 
way as in the case of a woman. The mediational tools which are ᶜayb for a man are 
mostly those which make him look like a woman and contradict a specific image of 
masculinity – things like wearing jewelry or carrying a broom. The latter, though, must 
be qualified because a man is allowed to clean with a broom if he does so at his 
workplace, e.g., a shop or restaurant, or if he works as a street cleaner. He is also allowed 
to use a kitchen knife and to cut vegetables for the salad while he works at a restaurant. 
However, if he is sighted to be doing these things at home, then it might be considered 
ᶜayb. By implication, one can say that it is not about the mediational tools as such but 
which role in a specific chronotope or nexus of practice the use of the mediational tools 
index. 
Similarly, some regard the smoking of cigarettes as ᶜayb for a woman in the presence 
of her husband or her father. For these people, it is a sign of disrespect. In the same way, 
a son is not supposed to smoke in the presence of his father or to speak much in a 
meeting where his father is also present. In these cases, certain mediational tools and 
the practice connected to them are perceived as ᶜayb because they constitute indexical 
orders referring to positions in the hierarchy of society. If an unauthorized person uses 
them, people might interpret it as challenging the social order and counter it with a 
“ᶜAyb!”. 
Apart from the ᶜayb prohibitions, which protect hegemonic structures, women are 
limited by ᶜayb – and this seems by far the more prominent use of this word – in order 
to protect her reputation and her sharaf. What counts as ᶜayb is more fluid than what is 
to be regarded as ḥarām. In the Western phase (or mood), ᶜayb did not disappear, but 
what counted as ᶜayb changed significantly. The change during the Western phase was 
substantial, and women were allowed to wear quite liberal clothes. In the presence of 
relatives or friends, a woman was allowed to wear more revealing clothes than in public, 
however. F35 explained how her aunts covered their arms on the street but immediately 
removed the items of clothing when entering the house. Thus, the ᶜayb code allowed 
women more freedom than the ḥarām code because the latter does not discriminate 
between public and private but only between the circle of the muḥarramīn and those 
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outside of the circle. In some areas, women wearing short sleeves and short skirts 
became a familiar view, even in public. 
Notwithstanding the questions regarding ᶜawra (viz. if it is to be regarded as a purely 
Islamic or also a social term and if a woman’s voice is ᶜawra or not), women face social 
restrictions regarding their physical voice in much of Jordan’s public sphere. Generally, 
it is ᶜayb for a woman to speak with a loud voice on the street or to laugh loudly. In 
mixed meetings, they are also not supposed to sit straddle-legged, nor should they move 
in a fashion which could arouse men. In public, they are expected to avoid direct eye 
contact with male strangers. In summary, thus, it must be concluded that women are 
limited significantly in their use of mediation tools compared to men. 
 
7.4.3 Voice as a matter of opportunity 
The second point to be assessed is the question of opportunity. In other words, do 
women have access to situations where they can contribute to discourse? The attempt 
to answer this question brings us back to the topic of chronotopes and nexuses of 
practice. Without recapitulating in detail what was discussed in Chapter 3, it is probably 
helpful to point out the main points relevant in the present context. Chronotopes are 
non-random conglomerates of nexuses of practice. Both of these stipulate on different 
scales who can do (or even must do) what, when, where, and to whom. As a result, they 
populate the different sites of engagement and decide who may or should be there and 
who does not belong there. Referring back to the “student chronotope”, one can see 
that a student has specific opportunities to engage in discourse. Usually, she does not 
lecture or teach a seminar, but she might be able to discuss subjects in class or debate 
with her colleagues in a pub or the library. Thus, there are specific opportunities and 
limitations regarding the voice of a student. Let us go back to the topic at hand, which is 
the voice of the woman in Jordan. 
Considering the previous comments, the question can be reformulated. Of which 
chronotopes can a woman be a part and how is her particular identity within that 
chronotope, her sub-chronotope (if you wish), shaped within the broader chronotope. 
In other words, what role does she play, and what rights and duties does that bestow 
on her?  
Regarding the state chronotope and its legal code, there were no statements from 
the informants, which would suggest that women are limited concerning their 
opportunities. That is not to say that there are no gender-based limits but simply that 
informants were not aware of them or did not want to speak about them. Naturally, a 
woman cannot become the highest authority in the state, which is the king. None of the 
42 prime ministers until 2019 was a woman, just as none of the presidents of the USA, 
one might add. Still, there seems to be a difference between these two examples, as 
Jabiri suggests in her book Gendered Politics and Law in Jordan: Guardianship over 
Women (2016). She emphatically contends that women are very much restricted in the 
state chronotope. Even if they are granted access to the chronotope of parliamentary 
life their femininity is somehow suspended, and women MPs are seen to be “masculine 
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in their political dealings”, which shows that there is still a certain uneasiness about 
female politicians (Jabiri, 2016, p. 2). Jabiri’s critique seems well-substantiated, but, as 
pointed out earlier in Section 4.4, she attributes these grievances (particularly those 
related to male guardianship over women) to the state chronotope while there are good 
reasons, as was shown, that they are in reality rooted in the religious chronotope. 
According to the informants’ views, the religious code imposes fewer restrictions on 
women than the ᶜayb code. While it is ᶜayb for a woman to come home late, it is not 
ḥarām. As a matter of fact, women like F16, F17, F27, and F28 used to battle the 
restrictions of the ᶜayb code by insisting that it is not ḥarām for women to work, to start 
and to operate an NGO or to become members of the city council. From this perspective, 
insisting that the religious chronotope should overrule the social chronotope and its c ayb 
code, is a way of how women claim access to opportunities which they were deprived 
of previously. However, even these emancipatory women all agreed that according to 
religion, their first duty is to be a wife and a mother and that these duties must not be 
neglected in the pursuit of other goals and careers. They all praised their husbands for 
allowing them to do what they do and even to support them.  
Thus, it seems undeniable that there are apparent gender-based differences in the 
opportunities and restrictions on mobility in the religious chronotope. It is not ḥarām 
for a woman to go to work as long as the husband agrees because her first duty is to 
take care of the family and the children. A woman is allowed to travel, but her husband 
can easily prevent her from doing so by telling the authorities that he is prohibiting it. 
Also, women are not to travel alone, i.e., without a guardian, for longer than three days. 
It is true that these restrictions are not always applied and that some of them, e.g., 
hindering women from leaving the country, are executed by the state (for how women 
are restricted in their travel by their husband (see Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, 2005). Still, they are based on the religious code and, in principle, must be taken 
into account when assessing the opportunities of women in that chronotope. 
When it comes to ᶜayb, Chapter 5 provided a detailed list of the limitations which 
narrow women’s opportunities to engage in discourse. The limitations are significant, 
and the list is long, and it seems unnecessary to repeat it here. Depending on how 
conservative a woman’s family is, she might be effectively living under a kind of house 
arrest or be free to travel the world on her own. However, in the better part of Jordan, 
even in the majority of places in Amman, a woman is more restricted than a man – be it 
in her movement (space or time) or and regarding the interaction order. In other words, 
there are places where she simply does not belong; the places which are accessible to 
her are usually so only during a limited time; in virtually all places, will she face gender-
based limitations regarding what she is allowed to do and how she is expected to behave 
based on her gender. All this is nothing new, but only a summary of the findings in 
Chapter 5. 
The explanation and reasoning behind these limitations is the fact that the female 
chronotope which society imposes on girls and women is narrow and deviations are 
costly. It seems justified to indeed speak about the female chronotope in the singular. A 
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girl will usually learn that her purpose in life is to marry and to become a mother, 
preferably of boys. Society not only shapes the female chronotope as wife and mother 
but makes it the definite chronotope. 
 
7.4.4 The influence of a person’s standing 
An issue is the question of how serious others take a person’s contribution or expression 
based on this person’s standing. Due to the limited input on the legal chronotope, it is 
hard to come to any conclusive statements based on the interview data regarding the 
question of how seriously women are taken in the state chronotope. The examples from 
F27 and F28 in the southern part of Jordan and M11’s account of his sisters-in-law in the 
region around Mafraq, suggest that in principle women have the chance of being viewed 
as coequal if they have the support of their family, particularly their husbands, and can 
overcome ᶜayb related challenges. Jabiri’s account (Jabiri, 2016; see also Section 4.4) of 
how male MPs regard femininity as weakness seems to indicate that strong prejudices 
against women prevail. When the female “MP Hind al-Fayez erupted in anger as she 
defended herself against claims that her seat was allocated through non-democratic 
means which prompted a fellow parliamentarian to yell ‘sit down Hind!’ several times” 
(Writer, 2014), the story went viral as it was seen as emblematic of the attitude some 
male MPs seem to have towards female MPs. Outside of parliament in public 
discussions, females at times face similar attitudes. An “ex-Jordanian MP has caused a 
stir by storming off DW’ s ‘Shabab Talk’ television set after a woman talked about sexual 
assault” (Winter, 2017). The young Jordanian woman shared her experience of sexual 
harassment and assault, and for this, the former lawmaker publicly insulted her. Such 
incidents, however, have less to do with the state chronotope and the legal code but 
seem to stem from the image of women from the other chronotopes. 
In the religious chronotope, the issue of guardianship of men over women conveys 
the perception of women as not being capable of safeguarding their own interest and 
rights without male assistance (Jabiri, 2016, p. 3, cf. also Chapter 4). The fact that the 
Quran stipulates that the testimony of two women is necessary to challenge that of one 
man (Sura 2:282, cf. Faizer, 2004, p. 758) was never brought up during the interviews. 
Only M04, whose personal history led him to a critical view of the Sharia court, pointed 
out how difficult it is for a woman to obtain a divorce from her abusive husband.  
In an article, Al-Badayneh admits that the “Jordanian social culture accepts the use 
of violence with children or women as a kind of discipline, and this acceptance is 
supported by cultural and social norms” and that “Jordanian women are victimized 
physically, psychologically, and sexually by a wide range of behaviors that occur in a 
variety of cultural and social context (i.e., family, university and workplace)” 
(Al-Badayneh, 2012, p. 369). A study conducted by Al Nsour et al. with 356 women 
between the age of 19 and 49 in the Balka area (north of Amman), confirms Al-
Badayneh’s assessment: 
The vast majority (87%) of women reported different types of IPV [intimate partner 
violence, MK] against them in the last 12 months. The most common types of 
200 ‘Is the voice of a woman shameful?’ 
 
reported violence were emotional abuse (47.5%), followed by wife beating (19.6%). 
Almost one third of women justified wife beating by husbands. Older age, younger 
age at marriage, rural residence, and nonworking status were significantly associated 
with supportive attitudes towards wife beating. The study shows a high prevalence 
of IPV against women during the past year, and a high rate of justifications for wife 
beating. (Al Nsour et al., 2009, p. 569)  
Al-Badayneh insists that violence against women is not based on religion because 
“hurting the individual, or harming them (physically, sexually or emotionally) is not 
accepted religiously as Islam urges people to be kind to animals when slaughtering them 
for food” (Al-Badayney, 2012, p. 369). Instead, he contends, it is the “patriarchal system 
that pervades the Jordanian society” which is responsible not only for the wife-beating 
itself but also for the high percentage of women justifying the violence used against 
them (Al-Badayney, 2012, p. 372). Al Nsour et al., however, concede that “[i]t is likely 
that religious dogma, patriarchy or both have some bearing on this phenomenon (Douki 
et al., 2003)” (Al Nsour et al., 2009, p. 573). The article which they cite as support (Douki 
et al., 2003), insists that the wife-beating and violence are not based on a proper reading 
of the holy texts. However, they openly acknowledge that many Muslims who beat their 
wives do indeed quote Islamic sources in their support (Douki et al., 2003, p. 168). Thus, 
from this perspective, it would be a misguided vernacular religion that is contributing to 
the problem. 
It is debatable if the stipulations of the hadith that it is not permissible to strike 
anybody’s face and that the permissible striking must be such that leaves no mark on 
the body “makes it clear that this law does not permit anything we would label ‘physical 
abuse’, ‘family violence’ or ‘wife-battering’ in the 21st century,” as Douki et al. suggest 
(2003, p. 170). However, there remains an important question. Parents or teachers are 
given the task to discipline or educate their children or students because they are seen 
in some respects (like knowledge, maturity, rationality) on a higher level than their 
children or students. It is hard to erase the impression that the same logic applies to 
man and woman if it is only the husbands who are given the task of disciplining their 
wives and not the other way around.  
Even at the risk of sounding repetitive, it is of the highest importance to emphasize 
at this point that the dissertation is not interested in some authoritative version of Islam 
(as declared and taught by Islamic scholars) but in the vernacular form of it. It is in the 
context of this vernacular form of Islam in Jordan that the following assertion of M04 
needs to be seen. He recalled listening to an Islamic radio channel when a woman called 
in to report her grievances. She told the sheikh who was giving religious counsel on the 
air that she had been beaten by her husband and also by her father. The sheikh inquired 
about the faith of her husband and her father if they abstained from drinking and if they 
were good Muslims, praying, and fasting. After she answered in the affirmative, she 
found herself reprimanded by the sheikh that her husband and her father were in their 
right and that she should be thankful because they were disciplining her. The question 
which this dissertation is asking is not if this is the proper and real Islam and if doctrines 
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and beliefs held by Muslims are correct but instead what they believe and how these 
beliefs shape the religious chronotope.  
M11 paints a similarly dark image of the vernacular Islam, which he experienced. 
One should keep in mind that M11 abandoned the Islamic religious worldview, which he 
grew up with, and accepted a Christian view. Thus, he has a personal history that led to 
his critical view of Islam:  
She does not have a say; the decision is not hers. And her decision at the end… Or as 
they say: Take their counsel [shurūhun, i.e., of the women], that is, take her opinion 
but counteract them. I take her opinion, but I do the opposite. There is something 
like that. There is a hadith like that. (M11: 127). 
This dissertation is an ethnographic attempt at describing what people believe and how 
they live and not what they should believe and how they should live. This ethnographic 
view leads to a mixed image of the religious chronotope. While there are women who 
use the religious chronotope to battle negative consequences of the social chronotope 
and its disadvantageous ᶜayb code as shown in the previous section, there are aspects 
of the same chronotope which are being used to discredit the personal standing of 
women, i.e., to depict them as less rational than men. 
The ᶜayb code is, in its whole approach, entirely preemptive and cautionary. It takes 
no risks and will radically reduce the opportunities for possible dangerous engagement. 
Informants, including the female ones, reiterated time and again that this is to protect 
the woman because the family (or community) is afraid for her. However, according to 
M11, society is not only afraid for the woman but also afraid of her: 
M11: It is forbidden for the girl to leave the house by herself. Or, it is forbidden 
that she leaves the house at night. 
Martin: Why? 
M11: Because society is afraid for her or they are afraid of her. That’s why. 
Martin: How are they afraid of her? 
M11: They are afraid that she might go and do something wrong. Maybe she goes 
and visits people she is not supposed to visit, or she talks to people she is 
not supposed to talk to. (M11: 90-94) 
We also heard F05 complain earlier about the general suspicion women are under in the 
society. A man can come back home any time he pleases, but when a woman does the 
same “they talk” and say: “Who knows where she might be! Maybe she did something 
wrong” (F05: 138). Moreover, M07 explained how society perceives men and women 
differently regarding their emotionality and rationality: 
She is allowed to express her feelings at certain times because she is a woman. She 
cries, she screams, she is excited, “sometimes” she is not very rational, or she is 
depending on what she wants [meaning of word unclear], while the man always has 
to be reasonable, for example. The expectations of him are that he must be 
composed. (M07: 76, cf. also Chapter 5) 
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In summary, all these statements indicate unmistakably that women are thought to be 
less rational than men, and that emotion controls women more than men which is also 
confirmed by the Jordanian linguist Abd-el-Jawad: 
Traditionally, women are viewed as physically, mentally and spiritually weak by 
nature. As a result, they are stereotypically referred to as / naaqiṣaatu -ʕaqli wad-
diin/ ‘limited in mind and religion’ and they are also believed to be / ħabaa?ilu 
š-săyṭaan/ ‘the snares of Satan’ or they are / ḍilʕun qaaṣir/ literally ‘deficient rib, i.e. 
incapable and powerless’. (Abd-el-Jawad, 1989, p. 307) 
One result of this is that society feels a need to control them, e.g., through the 
guardianship of men over women in the legal and religious chronotope or through 
preemptively prohibiting them from engaging in possibly dangerous situations. The 
result is that they are not taken as seriously as men and thus limited regarding their 
voice. 
 
7.4.5 Voice as a matter of freedom 
In the year 1943, a Danish architect discovered the difference between freedom within 
a structure and the freedom of constructure. While that might be a bit of a catchy 
overstatement, still something like that happened. After he had laid out many 
conventional playgrounds for children, 
he noticed that most children were tempted to forsake the limited possibilities of 
the swings, seesaws, carousels, and sliding boards for the excitement in the street 
and to steal into actual building sites or vacant buildings and use the materials they 
found there for purposes they invented on the spot. (Scott, 2012, p. 57)  
This new “adventure playground” became a success and was copied at other places 
around the globe. Its secret is simple and was already stated above: there is a qualitative 
difference between the freedom to move within a fixed structure and the ability to 
shape that structure. So far, the present chapter showed that the resources and 
opportunities available to women to move within the structure are limited. How much 
freedom, though, do women have to break out of those structures or shape them 
according to their wishes and needs? 
The consequence of breaking a legal norm, i.e., to deviate within the state 
chronotope, is either a ticket or imprisonment and, in the worst cases, the death 
penalty. These are the official consequences. Apparently, people fear other unofficial 
consequences. Such fears are, according to the Amnesty International Report 2017/18, 
not entirely groundless and can amount to torture, ill-treatment, and other human 
rights grievances (Amnesty International, 2018, p. 218). However, these are not the 
subject under discussion because even those who touched on this delicate topic during 
the interviews did not do so in the context of gender-related issues.  
Moreover, Jordan does not have an Islamic Religious Police, as e.g., Saudi Arabia, and 
as the state claims (and asserts) its monopoly over the use of force, the institutions of 
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the religious chronotope, e.g., the Sharia court, are not in the position to execute 
punishments like flogging, amputation of hands or capital punishments. The present 
study has, on several occasions, pointed out the conflation of the state and religious 
chronotope, which seems to have its origin in the Ottoman Majalla. Thus, the state 
ultimately assumes the execution of particular religious laws and regulations, e.g., 
enforcing the observance of the Ramadan fast in public places. 
The ᶜayb code is the most dominant of the different codes discussed and, thus, 
constitutes the most potent inhibition against deviant behavior. At times, one can hear 
people complain about the ubiquity of the ᶜayb code and its restrictiveness with a 
sarcastic comment like: “ᶜAyb! Everything is ᶜayb! Even breathing is ᶜayb!” From the 
perspective of an older man with a big family and a good reputation, the ᶜayb code has 
few if any disadvantages and instead functions as a stronghold against moral decay and 
social chaos (e.g., M25: 153ff). The overwhelming majority of informants, though, was 
not so enthusiastic. The fact that it assigned women virtually only one narrow 
chronotope where the stakes were high and even a relatively small mistake could cost a 
woman the future she was hoping for, helps to understand why some women even felt 
imprisoned by it. 
The case of F30, who convinced her parents to allow her to go to university, 
exemplifies that change is possible. After all, her action caused her parents to change 
their opinion. They did not only grant F30 an exception but were willing to let also her 
younger sister follow the same path. In this case, a young woman’s voice was able to 
reshape not just her own story but the chronotope, at least a little bit. Also, the story of 
F27 and F28, who, the skepticism of their mayor and other men notwithstanding, started 
a successful NGO and worked to create awareness among women and to empower 
them, is another example. It seems that these are women who did not just accept the 
limiting structures they found themselves in but went to work to change them. The story 
of the women around Ajloun bespeaks a similar story, even if not as dramatic. 
However, if one takes a closer look at the story of these women, as courageous and 
admirable they are, it is not a story of abolishing the ᶜayb code but of overcoming some 
of its limitations by replacing it with another normative code, viz. the religious code. 
None of these women challenged the religious norms, and all accepted the identity 
ascribed to women, including the fact that their husbands and families constitute their 
primary duties. All of these women were strong Muslimas, and it seems very unlikely 
that they could have achieved what they did without the symbolic capital, which their 
apparent devoutness bestowed on them.  
Therefore, one could argue that these are cases where women found ways to battle 
the severe limitations of one normative system with the help of another from within the 
same multinormative structure. Despite all the insistence of the informants on equality 
in the religious chronotope, the study has shown that there are quite considerable 
differences regarding the liberties and rights assigned to the different genders.  
In order to be able to go beyond these norms and to challenge them, women 
regularly need either the support of their family or the necessary financial resources and 
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ideally both. Of course, only a small percentage of women live in such conditions. The 
story about the scandal caused by the young single woman living by herself, which was 
mentioned earlier, illustrates that even women in such a favorable position still might 
face an uphill battle against stern resistance by society. Thus, F05 suggested that if a 
woman is looking for freedom, the easiest way might be to leave the country altogether. 
The level of awareness and dissatisfaction evidently varies within the female 
population. We have heard F10 contend, “By the way, all [i.e., women] are revolting” 
(F10: 250). Informants described how some women might try but eventually all give up 
and settle for a compromise: becoming a mother and sacrificing freedom. Sometimes, 
in cases of physical and emotional abuse, it is not just freedom but even the claim to 
dignity and respect which women have to give up in order to live inside the narrow 
female chronotope. 
However, a considerable number of women seem to accept gender-related violence 
not just as normal but as justified. Many of those who do acknowledge problems in 
society insist that they must not be tackled in a manner, which would be ᶜayb for 
women. Effectively, this means that they are willing rather to endure grave injustice than 









8.1 Review and summary 
The dissertation explored how different normative systems contribute to the complexity 
of Jordan’s multinormative society, particularly to its heteroglossic and polynomic 
aspects and what challenges this poses in particular for the voice of women. A cluster of 
“rich points” triggered the research. These are, as Agar explains (2006a; see also 
Section 1.5), surprises and departures from expectations when one lives in a different 
language and cultural environment, which “give direction to subsequent learning” (see 
Chapter 1). The cluster consisted of questions about: 
a the norms linked to the three highly common and frequently used metapragmatic 
verbal indicators of illicit behavior, viz. ᶜayb, ḥarām, mamnūᶜ; 
b how these norms are connected to the conspicuous developments in recent 
history, which went (at least in a considerable part of the society) from a traditional 
way of life at the beginning of the twentieth century to a Western outlook in the 
mid-century and finally turned to a more Islamic lifestyle in the recent decades; 
c how these norms regiment male and female behavior. 
These rich points and the research interest, which arose from them, led to the 
formulation of the four research questions, which guided the study (see Chapter 3). It 
operationalized Garfinkel’s (1967) notion that social agents engage in “practical 
sociological reasoning” and that norms are neither some quasi determinative supra-
individual forces creating social order (contra Parsons) nor are they merely game-
theoretical equilibria emanating from self-interested reasoning (contra Bicchieri, see 
also Chapter 2). The study views norms as originating through the interactional co-
construction by social agents, which transforms situated behavior into recognizable 
patterns of meaning “for another first time” (Garfinkel, 1967). Such norms are 
considered essential tools for the continuous (re)constructing of social order and the 
expression, creation, and interpretation of meaning. Further, these interactions are not 
merely of linguistic nature, and the dissertation adopts a cultural semiotic under-
standing of discourse (Blommaert, 2005). 
Adopting Garfinkel’s view that social agents conduct “practical sociological 
reasoning” underpinned the approach to conduct semi-structured interviews to collect 
data about the life of norms in the Jordanian society. The salient nature of norm 
breaching events and instances, which is what the first round of interviews focused on 
by asking questions surrounding ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ, allowed for highly 
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informative conversations (which is what the dissertation regards interviews to be) with 
32 informants. With the help of historical pictures from several decades of the twentieth 
century, which depicted people from the area in different dress styles, another 16 
informants of an older age average were able to complement the data of the first round 
with profoundly insightful responses about developments and changes in recent history 
as they have witnessed and experienced them. 
The analysis and interpretation of the data were based not merely on Garfinkel’s 
sociology but on an entire repertoire of concepts which complemented Garfinkel’s 
approach, e.g. Goffman’s (1956) dramatism and his insights on stigma. Both Garfinkel 
and Goffman have much in common and can be seen as providing “sociologies of 
everyday life” (see Section 3.1.1). In order to balance out their particular focus and to 
overcome their limitations, the study drew on Bakhtin’s concept of chronotope, which 
can be roughly described with the metaphor of a riverbed. Just like a riverbed enables 
the flow of a river, chronotopes enable stories to happen and provide, e.g., the 
necessary identities, norms, and plots. The benefit concerning the limitations mentioned 
above is that they allow for embedding concrete interactions in a broader societal and 
historical perspective. Blommaert’s (2010) concept of scales provided a way to imagine 
such chronotopes as being located on different levels. It enabled us to treat situations 
as layered simultaneities. 
Chapter 4 sketched a brief history of Jordan in order to provide the necessary context 
for interpreting the data given by the informants. It drew on the concepts of chronotope 
and scale to provide a historical overview of Jordan and its population. It showed how 
chronotopes like religion, state or tribe, stretching over different times and spaces, 
together shape the present reality of Jordan. The Ottoman Empire, located on a higher 
scale than a tribal chronotope, influenced a larger space and over a more extended 
period than a local tribal chronotope. Often such higher-scale chronotopes do outscale 
lower-scale chronotopes and suspend the normative claims of the lower ones, which is 
particularly true if the interaction takes place close to the power center of the higher 
scale chronotope or firmly within its reach. On other occasions, though, chronotopes on 
a lower scale can outperform higher scale chronotopes because the power center of the 
former is closer. For example, in the badia, i.e., the desert area of Jordan, the influence 
of the Ottoman chronotope was evidently faint and easily outperformed by the norms 
of local tribes. In order to explain this phenomenon, the notion that chronotopes have 
a gravitational field was developed. Thus, the tribal chronotope, his smaller scale 
notwithstanding, exerted a stronger gravitational pull on the social agents than the 
Ottoman Empire in some circumstances. 
Chronotopes can be used for phenomena, which are quite different, running the 
gamut from the Ottoman Empire to visiting a café. Therefore, it seemed useful to 
introduce a differentiation of chronotopes which bespeaks the different dynamics of 
such chronotopes. For this purpose, the dissertation borrowed a distinction from Beach 
et al. (2016) who speak of procedural narratives and chronicle narratives. An example 
of the former would be how-to manuals, and examples for the latter would be novels, 
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which are more structured around a timeline. Correspondingly, chronotopes can be 
more or less procedural or chronicle in nature. 
Ronald Scollon (2001) integrated many of the ideas and concepts mentioned above 
in his Mediated Discourse Analysis. For this reason, it made much sense to use the 
language he created to describe phenomena during Chapters 5 and 6. To avoid 
confusion, though, the dissertation clarified how this study understands the relationship 
between nexuses of practice (MDA concept) and chronotopes, proposing that just as a 
nexus of practice is essentially a non-random conglomerate of practices, similarly a 
chronotope is a non-random conglomerate of nexuses of practice. The introduction of 
Silverstein’s (2003) concept of indexical orders and Blommaert’s (2010) orders of 
indexicality provided a way to relate micro-level phenomena to macro-level structures 
like language ideology or chronotopes. 
 
8.2 Findings and contributions 
Chapter 7 enumerated and expounded the answers to the research questions based on 
the data presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The present section does not reiterate all the 
findings in detail but merely highlights key aspects of the most important insights 
yielded by this study. 
 
8.2.1 Correlations between words and specific normative codes 
Ḥarām indexes almost without exception transgressions of the norms belonging to a 
religious chronotope and is used by Muslims and Christians alike. These norms are 
perceived as having divine authority and thus share in a quality of reality, which is 
superior to other norms which are perceived to be merely human-made. The religious 
chronotopes, where these norms are rooted have written texts, specialized experts and 
dedicated institutions for the interpretation, application, and enforcement of the 
norms. 
The other word, which correlated consistently with a specific normative system, is 
ᶜayb. It invokes unmistakably social chronotopes whose norms are referred to as 
“customs and traditions”. Such customs and traditions are shared by a wider group of 
people than merely within a family and are usually recognized either within the own 
tribe or even throughout the entire society. These social chronotopes – tribe or society 
in general – differ from the religious chronotope in that they have neither written texts 
nor formally trained experts or institutions like the religious chronotopes or the state. 
While the religious norms are seen as divine and in principle fixed and true, social norms 
are viewed as invented by humans, as relative to the group, the area, and as changing 
over time. 
The use of mamnūᶜ is polysemous. The word is not limited to only one particular 
normative code and can express that something is off-limits because it is ᶜayb, ḥarām or 
forbidden by any other authority and reason. In other words, it sometimes functions as 
a hypernym. However, it can also invoke specifically one chronotope, which is the state 
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and its legal norms. In some ways, it shares with ḥarām and the religious chronotopes 
some features like written texts, experts and institutions for interpreting, applying and 
enforcing norms. 
 
8.2.2 Aftereffect of the Ottoman Era 
The data shows that the legal norms and the state chronotope as such was invoked only 
rarely outside of Amman. In other words, from the gathered data one might get the 
impression that outside of Amman the law plays almost no role in people’s reasoning 
about illicit behavior. While not all the informants in the Amman mentioned the law 
either, the proportion of informants was substantially and significantly higher. As 
already mentioned, the size of the sample is admittedly small, and more research would 
be necessary to verify the impressions gained from the present data. 
Chapter 7 suggests that the reasons for these findings might be found in what is 
described in the historical chapter, which established that the chronotope of Jordan as 
a state is the youngest or newest when compared to religious or social chronotopes, 
e.g., the tribes. It is true that technically speaking the population in the area 
encountered state structures before the foundation of the modern state because the 
Ottoman Empire ruled over this area since the beginning of the sixteenth century. 
However, the control it exerted was only sporadically noteworthy and often rather 
nominal. The newly founded state in the 1921 relied on one hand on British support, but 
on the other hand, it only could survive because the tribes inhabiting the area accepted 
it and were willing to be integrated into it. This peculiar symbiosis between the state 
chronotope and tribal chronotope gave the tribal norms a strong position. The tribal 
laws were officially abolished in 1974 but due to a few specific state laws remained de 
facto in effect. 
Regarding the religious chronotopes, the state made even more noticeable 
concessions. Not only is the claim to rule by the Hashemite family rooted in the religious 
chronotope – after all, they are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad – but by 
delegating central domains to the religious courts, it essentially upheld the logic of the 
Majalla which was created by the Ottoman Empire. Thus, one could regard this as 
protracted aftereffects of the Ottoman era. For hundreds of years, people were 
expected to rule themselves, and the habitus of the rural population does not seem to 
have changed much in this regard until today. 
 
8.2.3 The centrality of the social chronotope and ᶜayb 
The data also shows clearly how central the c ayb code remains until today. As mentioned 
in the introductory chapter and also in Chapter 4, religion has a significant role in the 
history and socio-cultural world of the area, and it is understandable why it is called the 
Islamic world or Islamic Middle East. With few exceptions, the informants seemed to 
identify themselves quite strongly with one or the other religion. Nevertheless, the vast 
majority, including informants who expressed their strong personal hope that religious 
norms should take precedence over other codes, particularly the social norms, 
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acknowledge that ᶜayb has a much firmer grip on peoples accounting practices than 
ḥarām, let alone the legal norms. In other words, the social chronotope emerges from 
the data as the one, which, all the societal developments and Islamic awakenings 
notwithstanding, has the strongest gravitational pull. This finding supports Zubeida’s 
(2011) notion that Islam is only one and often not even the most influential force in 
societal life and that the term “Islamic Middle East” might be conveying a position of 
Islam which it does not have in people’s everyday life. 
 
8.2.4 The centrality of gender-related issues in ᶜayb and ḥarām 
Another noteworthy finding, which emerges from the data, is the commonality between 
ᶜayb and (the everyday usage of) ḥarām regarding their preoccupation with gender or 
sex-related norms. It is essential to point out here what already has been repeatedly 
underscored throughout the dissertation, namely that the study is focusing on a 
vernacular version of Islam, very much in line with its concern for understanding 
people’s “practical sociological reasoning” rather than abstract religious systems or 
academic discourse. 
Almost all informants saw their respective religion as fair and blameless regarding 
questions of gender justice and even equality, which was expressed succinctly by one 
informant with the metaphor that “we are all like the teeth of a comb”, i.e., there is no 
difference between men and women. In the case of many religious norms, e.g., 
prohibition of stealing, killing, and lying, that seems to be entirely comprehensible. Also, 
in the case of zināɔ (adultery/fornication), men and women are to be treated equally. 
However, some other gender-related religious norms evidently were to be borne by 
females only. The dress code was less egalitarian in its regulations about how much of 
one’s body is allowed to show to members of the other sex outside the circle of the 
muḥarramīn. This aspect is ruled by proscriptions based on the concept of ᶜawra, which 
shows vast gender-based differences. Another disparity in the religious code, which was 
mentioned frequently was the requirement for women to submit to a male guardian. 
A legitimate question arises from this discrepancy. Why did informants, even those 
who openly defied some of the religious norms, defend the religious norms in such 
strong ways? It could be argued that this is a case of front stage and backstage dynamic, 
where the informants viewed the interview as taking place on the front stage, and they 
felt obliged to defend their religion. When it came to the ᶜayb code, however, people 
unequivocally agreed that it was unambiguously gendered and in favor of men. Only a 
few defended this disparity, and many found it highly problematic if not appalling. 
Another indication of the unbalance is the fact that the part of the chapter which lists 
and explains the limitations of women through the ᶜayb code constitutes such a big part 
of it while there is barely any example given by the informants which puts a limit on men 
but not on women. 
One of the informants suggested that the reason for downplaying the inequality in 
the religious code might be the fear of persecution which criticizing religion could bring 
about. This argument could be valid in the case of Islam. After all, the Jordan legal code 
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prohibits blasphemy and debasing religion. It is not clear, though, if this could also count 
as a motive for the Christians who also showed a similarly defensive attitude. The data 
appear to be inconclusive regarding this particular question, and more research would 
be required to address it. It seems to be safe to conclude, however, that the data shows 
how deeply the disadvantageous position of women in society is rooted in “culture” 
itself. 
 
8.2.5 ᶜAyb as an aesthetic norm and its consequences 
Another insight which emerged has to do with the kind of value the ᶜayb code is 
supposed to protect. Mamnūᶜ demarcates behavior, which is declared off-limits by some 
kind of authority. The question it answers is if something is forbidden or allowed. In the 
case of legal norms, the antonyms would be legal versus illegal. In that sense, also ḥarām 
demarcates behavior, which is outlawed by divine authority, and its antonym ḥalāl 
designates things permissible by the same authority. While legal norms do not have to 
be ethical, things proscribed by God are usually also seen as unethical. These two fields, 
state and religion, are in many ways homologous (Bourdieu, 1984).  
The following remarks do not intend to exclude the possibility that ᶜayb can be used 
to cement power structures and to keep women in an inferior position. The central 
concern of the ᶜayb code itself, however, does not appear to be the justification or 
naturalization of hierarchical structures. Instead, it seems more appropriate to view c ayb 
as essentially and primarily as an aesthetic code which functions very differently from 
ḥarām and mamnūᶜ. The value it protects is a particular kind of “beauty”, or maybe a 
less mistakable term would be attractiveness. It is mainly about the attractiveness of 
females on the marriage market. The societal expectations and what the public, 
particularly regarding unmarried women, considers acceptable for women is the final 
measurement. 
The social chronotope provides the identities and plots out of which flows the ideal 
of beauty. Men are to be masculine, strong, and are obligated to provide for their 
families and to defend them. An ideal man also has the ability to produce offspring, 
which entails potency. The role of women is more passive and of a more receiving 
nature. Chapter 7 employs the imagery of a field, which is inseminated or pollinated. 
The beauty of a field consists of its fertility and purity. While the sower can sow on many 
fields without damaging his reputation as a seed provider, the field loses its appeal 
immediately to any sower who is contemplating a purchase, i.e., a long-term commit-
ment, even if it only appears to be soiled by the seeds of another sower, notwithstanding 
its actual state. 
The import of the aesthetic nature of ᶜayb becomes apparent when one tries to 
understand the heterogeneous composition of the society’s multinormativity and 
polycentric constructure (Blommaert, 2018a). The study defined norms as ordered sets 
of interactionally co-constructed ratified behavioral details which turned situated 
behavior into recognizable patterns of meaning “for another first time”, and it pointed 
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out that the constructure is a) dynamic and unstable, b) unfinished and stochastic, and 
c) non-unified. These traits apply to all normative codes, however, to differing degrees. 
We have seen that the religious and legal chronotopes developed tangible and 
explicit strategies to harness the dynamic, which is inherently at work within their 
respective fields and to give them more stability and controllability. These strategies 
certainly make the norms more steerable for those who were able to secure dominant 
voices for themselves through various resources and actions. 
This is not to say that no other forces are influencing the outcome of these normative 
discourses. After all, the present study strongly suggests that the development of the 
separate normative codes can only be understood when they are seen as inter-
dependent components of Jordan’s multinormative interplay. However, in the legal and 
religious field, it is much easier to trace the genesis, evolution, and transformation of 
norms and, consequentially, to either block them, support them or even to shape them. 
When it comes to the ᶜayb code, its steerability is limited at best and nonlinear 
effects, as those shown by Blommaert in the case of the term “cool” (Blommaert, 2014), 
are much more apparent in the case of ᶜayb than with the other two mentioned codes. 
Thus, aesthetic preferences and their development over time do not obey the same 
discursive principles as the legal and religious fields. The advertisement industry seems 
to be one of the forces which intentionally try to influence people’s taste and what they 
find appealing. Also, media and an entire host of influencers and opinion-makers 
operating through an ever-growing number of channels play their role in shaping our 
aesthetic habitus. Further studies, however, are necessary to investigate how, e.g., 
descriptive norms generated within all these various discourses impact the ᶜayb code 
and, thus, indirectly legal and religious norms. 
 
8.2.6 The voice of women – shameful but not ᶜawra 
Based on the data, the question if a woman’s voice is shameful must be answered with 
a yes and a no. The ᶜayb code, which defines what is shameful, restricts women in such 
substantial ways and declares so many things necessary for having a voice as shameful 
that it must be concluded that a woman’s voice is seen as shameful. However, a 
woman’s voice is not seen as shameful in the sense of ᶜawra, even though some 
informants contended that not just parts of a woman’s body but her physical voice, her 
scent, and even her womanhood is ᶜawra. On the contrary. Several female informants 
who are committed Muslimas, study their religion and exemplify its virtues, are also 
women who use Islam in order to be active, to shape their society and to have an 
authentic voice in the community. In other words, some women used symbolic capital 
which they were able to acquire by living up to Islamic standards to gain a voice and to 
overcome the limits posed by the ᶜayb code. Thus, they were able to oppose to the 
symbolic violence present in the ᶜayb code and to achieve a degree of emancipation, 
which eludes women as long as they remain in the social chronotope. Further studies 
could investigate to what degree the vernacular form of Islam present in Jordan allows 
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women to erase any forms of symbolic violence or ultimately poses merely a higher 
ceiling but a ceiling nevertheless. 
 
8.2.7 Reasons behind Islamization and its possible effects 
Another intriguing insight, emerging from the findings, has to do with the complex 
composition of societal forces, which accompanied the rise of Islamic symbols such as 
the ḥijāb. Even a superficial comparison of a street scene in the 1970s and the second 
decade of the twenty-first century shows how much the Islamic dress has advanced. 
While there was not a single teacher wearing a ḥijāb to the job interview at F39’s school 
in 1980, now almost everybody – including the women who came without a ḥijāb in 
1980 – is wearing one. People report a similar increase in religious rituals with males – 
e.g., praying and fasting during the month of Ramadan. One could conclude from these 
observations that the country has become more Islamic. However, according to 
Silverstein’s indexical orders, micro-level phenomena can be connected to macro-level 
structures from an entirely different domain or chronotope. 
The study shows how different developments might have contributed to a situation 
where adopting Islamic practices and symbols are comprehensible, albeit not 
necessarily based on the religious chronotope as such. It was suggested, e.g., that the 
emergence of mixed situations, increased anonymity, which also bred sexual 
harassment in public, the disenchantment with Arab nationalism, the search for other 
sources of identity, the return of Palestinians from the Gulf where they had adopted 
more Islamic practices, quite possibly contributed to the recent development towards a 
society which at least appears more Islamic. It is good to remember that some 
informants regarded the adopting of the ḥijāb, at least in its origins, as a fad and not as 
a sign of religious awakening. 
 
8.3 Closing remarks 
We have arrived at the end of this study which attempted a critical analysis of a 
multimodal and polycentric discourse negotiating normative patterns in a society which 
is facing the challenges of rapid change while at the same time trying to hold on to 
tradition, integrating its rich religious heritage and in search for its place and identity in 
the world of the twenty-first century. 
Looking back from the perspective of my personal academic growth, I am particularly 
thankful for two things: the ethnographic experience and the opportunity to develop a 
theoretical toolbox for future research projects. The collecting of data through 
interviews was not only an exhilarating experience. Since the interviews were conducted 
in Arabic, it gave me a unique opportunity to immerse myself in the language and culture 
of the informants. It never stopped to amaze me how, on one hand, people were often 
shy and afraid they might not have anything interesting to tell but then, on the other 
hand, once they got going they very much enjoyed talking about their society and 
culture, doing “practical sociological reasoning” out loud. For most of them, it seemed, 
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the sort of questions which the interviews brought up was something they had maybe 
rarely thought about or discussed openly. The more it was rewarding and deeply 
satisfying to witness how they enjoyed the opportunity to reflect upon things that are 
deeply connected to their own values, life, and identity. 
The theoretical toolbox proved very helpful for several reasons. It helped to avoid 
projecting my thinking into the minds of the active agents. It also did not elevate 
structures and impersonal forces over the real and actual reasoning, but made it 
possible to appreciate the interdependency and interaction of process taking place on 
different scales, which we encounter as a layered simultaneity. Finally, it provided a 
language and tools to describe data and phenomena from a perspective which enabled 
me to make connections and dynamics in complex nexuses. 
Obviously, a decision for something is always a decision against something else. Even 
though it inevitably came at a price, I do not regret having recorded all the interviews. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that some of the informants might have opened up more if 
the interviews had been less formal. Also, choosing a qualitative approach means that 
one has to focus on a small-sized sample, and generalizations must be made cautiously. 
I am aware of such limitations and also the effect of the limited scope of the study. 
Therefore, I have been pointing out throughout Chapters 7 and 8, where further 
research would be necessary and helpful in verifying the drawn conclusions and possibly 
expending on the insights presented. The study is but an ethnographic snapshot and 
does not intend to gloss over the fact that we are dealing with a non-linear and dynamic 
interplay of different orders of indexicality, competing moods, and multiple discourses 
in a host of place and their trajectories. 
It all started with “rich points” (see Chapter 1), which set me off and gave direction 
to my research journey, and now at the end of it, I come to appreciate better than ever 
why Agar calls them this way. Although I am aware that I have learned a great deal – 
and these pages contain but a fraction of the yield – I would be hard-pressed to find 
words which express it as well as T. S. Eliot’s poem “Little Gidding” (Eliot, 1971, p. 239): 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
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Picture #1: The principal of Ma’an Secondary 
School for Girls, Mrs. Frieza Saeed Baslan, the 
wife of Professor Nizar Al-Rafii. 
Tags: Ma’an, Jordanian women, Education 
Source: http://www.historyofjordan.com/ 
jordan2/jh/collection1.php?id=9&page=8980 
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 












Picture #2: Family Sa’id Amish in Amman / Jebel 
al-Taj – Amman. 
Tags: People & Society, Amman 
Source: http://www.historyofjordan.com/ 
jordan2/jh/collection1.php?id=172&page=7382 
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 












Picture #3: Tawfik Al-Nimri in the Jordanian 
radio station in Amman in 1960 with Salah Abu-
Zaid, its director at the time, and the work team. 
Tags: Jordanian TV & Radio, Jordanian Artists 
Source: http://www.historyofjordan.com/ 
jordan2/jh/collection1.php?id=171&page=9011  
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 
Courtesy of historyofjordan.com 













Picture #4: Sheikh Mohammaed Sayah 
al-Laboun (1901-1975) from Northern Shouna 
area with his family. 
Tags: People & Society 
Source: http://www.historyofjordan.com/ 
jordan2/jh/collection1.php?id=172&page=6811 
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 













Picture #5: Amman during the sixties. 
Tags: People & Society 
Source: http://www.historyofjordan.com/ 
jordan2/jh/collection1.php?id=172&page=203  
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 













Picture #6: Jordanian beauty pageant which was 
carried out at the Philadelphia Hotel in the year 
1963 (text on the picture). 
Tags: People & Society 
Source: http://www.historyofjordan.com/ 
jordan2/jh/collection1.php?id=172&page=664 
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 












Picture #7: A women’s demonstration in Amman 
during the war of attrition. 
Tags: Jordanian Women, Amman 
Source: http://www.historyofjordan.com/ 
jordan2/jh/collection1.php?id=9&page=115 
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 
Courtesy of historyofjordan.com 
 
















Picture #8: Picture of retired agent Hajj Musa 
Aref Shnior Brahma and his wife, the late Hajj 
Khairi Muhammad Hussein Al-Ali, who served 24 
years in the Arab Army. 




Retrieved: September 27, 2015 












Picture #9: Jordanian woman. 
Tags: People & Society 
Source: http://www.historyofjordan.com/ 
jordan2/jh/collection1.php?id=172&page=1549  
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 















Picture #10: The annual photo of the Spridon 
Surf Family. Jaffa, 1928. From album Abla and 
Alfred Tubasi.  
Source: https://www.7iber.com/culture/ 
palestine-family-album/ 
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 
© The Palestinian Museum 
 
 













Picture #11: Students of Al - Shamaidat School. 




Retrieved: September 27, 2015 
© The Palestinian Museum 
 
 Picture #12: A picture of the family of David 
Michael, in Amman, just after the Nakba. He had 
sent his family to Amman during the Nakba, and 
he remained in Tiberias until its fall, then went 
to Amman and joined the Jordanian army and 
participated with him in the fight against the 
Zionist gangs in the Hebron area. 
Source: https://www.7iber.com/culture/ 
palestine-family-album/ 
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 
© The Palestinian Museum 
 
 Picture #13: The Jordanian girls in the sewing 
factory in Jericho were almost daily going from 
Amman to Jericho. 




Retrieved: September 27, 2015 
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 Picture #17: Iranian woman in the era before 
the Islamic revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Seaside weekend (Caspian Sea, 1963). 
Source: https://beforethechador.com/ 
caspian-girl.html 
Retrieved: September 27, 2015 
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 Picture #18: Iranian women in the 70’s, before 
the Islamic revolution. 
Source: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/ 
508977195360758044/  









Due to copyright and privacy issues, the pictures #19 till #24 cannot be published. The explanation 
on the blog where they were accessed on 31.03.2015 read: “These pictures are from the [name 
withheld] family archive, and they were all taken in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in the 50’s and60’s. They 
represent the life of the Palestinian community living then in that city.” 
The pictures depict scenes from different social events of a Palestinian family. Some are taken 
in casual settings, like during a birthday party or a walk at the beach, and others appear to depict 
a more formal or festive event. The dress style in the four pictures resembles strongly to the 
pictures #1, #3, #6, and #7. 
Persons interested in the pictures can contact the author of this dissertation. 
   







I = Informant  |  AR = Age range  |  R = Religion (M = Muslim, C = Christian) 
O = Occupation  |  EI = Education ICSD  |  S = Status  |  PCL = Primary/current location 
POU = Place of upbringing 
 
I AR R O EI S PCL POU 
F01 41-45 M teacher, adult education 6 married 
to M002 
Amman Amman 
M02 46-50 M manager 6 married 
to F001 
Amman Zarqa 
F03 21-25 M home maker 6 married 
to M004 
Amman Amman 
M04 26-30 M journalist 7 married 
to F003 
Amman Lebanon 
F05 46-50 M home maker, cleaner, cook 2 married Amman Amman 
F06 36-40 M home maker, seamstress 
(self-employed) 
4 single Salt Amman 
M07 46-50 C manager, trainer, self-
employed, adult education 
7 married Amman Gulf 
F08 21-25 M between jobs, previously 
foreign NGO 
6 single Amman Amman 
M09 26-30 M pharma rep. 7 single Amman Australia 
F10 26-30 M bank employee 6 married Amman Amman 
M11 31-35 M employee at manufacturing 
company 
4 single Amman Mafraq 
F12 31-35 M manager 7 single Amman Irbid 
M13 46-50 M teacher, adult education 8 married Amman Baq3a 
M14 61-65 C manager 7 married Karak Karak 
M15 31-35 C project manager 2 married Amman Amman 
F16 61-65 M home maker 1 married Ajloun Ajloun 
F17 41-45 M home maker 2 married Aqaba Aqaba 
F18 61-65 M home maker 2 married Ajloun Ajloun 
F19 70-75 M home maker 1 widow Amman Irbid 
M20 61-65 M teacher, consultant 8 married Amman Amman 
M21 41-45 M project manager 2 married Irbid Irbid 
M022 36-40 M retired from army, director of 
local NGO 




M023 56-60 C teacher 7 married Amman Karak 
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I AR R O EI S PCL POU 




M025 61-65 M previously at ministry of 
education, then teacher and 
director of school, now retired 




M026 56-60 M previously at ministry of 
education as teacher, left 2003 
and now farming, working in 
local NGOs 




F027 51-55 M previously at bank, then started 
NGO advocating women rights, 
etc., now director same NGO 
6 married Southern 
Valley 
Zarqa 
F028 51-55 M working at NGO advocating 
women rights, etc. 




F029 41-45 M working at centre for people 
with disabilities 




F030 26-30 M working at centre for people 
with disabilities 




F31 71-75 M home maker 1 widow Irbid Irbid 




M033 66-70 M grew up as Bedouin, now 
owner of a small corner shop 
1 married Northern 
Valley 
Palestine 
M034 71-75 M worked as journalist, foreign 
correspondent, now (during 
retirement) active at media 
institute 
6 married Amman Karak 
F035 51-55 M home maker 3 married 
to M36 
Amman Amman 
M036 51-55 M previously IT project manager in 





F037 81-85 C founder and director of school, 
still actively involved 
8 widow Amman North 
America 
M038 66-70 M previously in hotel 
management, now retired and 
working in sales 
6 married Amman Amman 
F039 81-85 C home maker, still active as yoga 
teacher 
4 widow Amman Europe 
M040 51-55 M company owner 6 married Amman Amman 
M041 86-90 C previously army, then owner of 
corner shop, etc. 
2 married Amman Madaba 
F042   C home maker 1? married Amman Madaba 
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I AR R O EI S PCL POU 
F043 61-65 M home maker 3 widow Amman Amman 
M044 76-80 M previously founder and director 
of resale store, now retired 
6 married Amman Amman 
F045 66-70 M home maker, voluntary work 
since 1990s 
2 married Amman Amman 
F046 61-65 M home maker, also working at 
cultural center 
3 married Amman Amman 
F047 56-60 M home maker 3 married Amman Amman 
M048 61-65 M owner of small Arabic 
restaurant 
2 married Amman Amman 
 
  







The following three pages contain information about the interviews which are intended to help 
the reader to assess the setting and privacy of each interview. The table lists: 
1 Date, min. (duration) and place. 
2 Which round the interview belonged to. 
3 What questions were asked. 
4 Which informants were the interviewees of that particular interview and who else was 
present. 
5 In order to give the reader more information to assess how private each interview was, the 
table also indicates  
a if others knew about the interview (to the best knowledge of the researcher); 
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ISCED level 0 Early childhood education 
ISCED level 1 Primary education  
ISCED level 2 Lower secondary education 
ISCED level 3 Upper secondary education 
ISCED level 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
ISCED level 5 Short-cycle tertiary education  
ISCED level 6 Bachelor’s or equivalent level 
ISCED level 7 Master’s or equivalent level  
ISCED level 8 Doctoral or equivalent level 
 
  




Research and interview questions 
 
 
The research questions guided the research. The interview questions were used to conduct the 
interviews. In order to avoid confusion, they are listed here: 
 
Research questions 
1 What are the primary normative codes in Jordan’s society, their distinct features and 
chronotopes within which they function? 
2 What is (and has been) their relative importance and influence on Jordan’s society and each 
other during the recent history? 
3 How do women in Jordan perceive and respond to their own situation? 
4 What are the implications of Jordan’s multinormativity for the voice of women? 
 
Interview questions 
A Who are you? Tell me about yourself and your background! 
B.1 How does a normal day in your life look like? 
B.2 How do Fridays [which is the week’s holiday in Jordan] and weekends look like? 
B.3 Are there special events you go to? 
C.1 Is there a difference between ᶜayb, ḥarām and mamnūᶜ? If so, what is the difference? 
C.2 Do you think there is a difference of ᶜayb, ḥarām, and mamnūᶜ in regard to males and 
females? 
C.3 If so, do you think this difference is fair or just? If not, why do you think that? 
C.4 What do women do or could do who want to revolt against this system? / How would I 










The dissertation explores how different normative systems contribute to the complexity 
of Jordan's multinormative society and what challenges this poses, particularly for the 
voice of women. Although it deals a lot with religious phenomena (mainly Islamic) and 
gender issues, it belongs neither to the category Islamic/Religious Studies nor Gender 
Studies. Instead, it constitutes an ethnographic study from a broader anthropological 
perspective. The initial research interest consisted of a cluster of questions about  
a the norms linked to the three highly common and frequently used metapragmatic 
verbal indicators of illicit behavior, viz. ᶜayb (shame), ḥarām (taboo), mamnūᶜ 
(forbidden); 
b how these norms are connected to the conspicuous developments in recent history, 
which in some areas witnessed the transformation from a traditional way of life at 
the beginning of the twentieth century to a Western outlook in the mid-century and 
which in some cases turned to a more Islamic lifestyle in the recent decades; 
c how these norms regiment male and female behavior. 
In Chapter 2, central concepts are defined and introduced. Norms are seen as originating 
through the interactional co-construction by social agents, which transforms situated 
behavior into recognizable patterns of meaning “for another first time” (Garfinkel, 1967) 
and are considered essential tools for the continuous (re)construction of social order 
and the expression, creation, and interpretation of meaning. As these interactions are 
not merely of linguistic nature, the dissertation adopts a cultural semiotic understanding 
of discourse (Blommaert, 2005).  
The first half of Chapter 3 provides some more conceptual tools of which Bakthin’s 
chronotope is particularly important for the study. Chronotopes can be compared to 
riverbeds. Like a riverbed enables the flow of a river, chronotopes enable stories to 
happen and provide, e.g., the necessary identities, norms, and plots. Together with 
Blommaert’s notion of scales, these concepts provided the central conceptual 
framework that was later used to present a chronotopic history of Jordan in Chapter 4 
and to analyze the ethnographic data. 
The second half of Chapter 3 details the research questions and all methodological 
questions pertaining to the data collection. The data was collected through two separate 
rounds of ethnographic interviews. The first round can be categorized as linguistic 
anthropological in nature as it used three verbal indicators of illicit behavior mentioned 
earlier, viz. ᶜayb, ḥarām, mamnūᶜ, and the data is presented in Chapter 5. One of the 
first round outcomes was the insight that a second round focusing more on the historical 
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development during the recent decades would complement the findings from the first 
round and provide a context for their interpretation. This second round utilized 
historical pictures of people from the Middle East (mostly Jordan and Palestine, but also 
Egypt and Iran) and added a cultural semiotic dimension to the research. The data of the 
second round is presented in Chapter 6. 
The main insights gained from the study can be summarized in the following points. 
 
Correlations between words and specific normative codes 
Ḥarām indexes almost without exception transgressions of the norms belonging to a 
religious chronotope, Muslim and Christian alike. ᶜAyb invokes unmistakably social 
chronotopes whose norms are referred to as “customs and traditions” while the use of 
mamnūᶜ is polysemous. The word is not limited to only one particular normative code. 
It can express that something is off-limits because it is ᶜayb, ḥarām, or forbidden by any 
other authority and reason. However, it can also invoke specifically one chronotope, 
which is the state and its legal norms. 
 
Aftermath of Ottoman Era 
The state chronotope with its legal norms was invoked only rarely outside of Amman. 
The gathered data give the impression that outside of Amman, the state and its law play 
almost no role in people’s reasoning about illicit behavior. The dissertation suggests that 
the reasons for these findings might have to do with the fact that the chronotope of 
Jordan as a state is the youngest or newest when compared to religious or social 
chronotopes, e.g., the tribes. Although the Ottoman Empire ruled over this area since 
the beginning of the sixteenth century, the actual control it exerted was only 
sporadically noteworthy and often relatively nominal. For hundreds of years, people 
were expected to rule themselves, and the rural population’s habitus does not seem to 
have changed much in this regard until today. The newly founded state in 1921, as much 
as it relied on British support, could only survive because the tribes inhabiting the area 
accepted it and were willing to be integrated into it. This peculiar symbiosis between 
the state chronotope and tribal chronotope gave the tribal norms a strong position.  
 
The centrality of the social chronotope and ᶜayb 
The vast majority of the informants, including those wishing that religious norms should 
take precedence over other codes, testifies that ᶜayb has a much firmer grip on people’s 
reasoning than ḥarām, let alone the legal norms. As Islam is only one and sometimes 
not even the most influential force in societal life, it is appropriate to question if the 
term Islamic Middle East might convey a position of Islam that it does not have in 
people’s everyday lives. 
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The centrality of gender-related issues in ᶜayb and ḥarām 
The norms mentioned in connection to ᶜayb and ḥarām showed a considerable 
preoccupation with gender or sex-related norms, and the vast majority of these norms 
regulated female behavior. Almost all informants saw their respective religions as fair 
and blameless regarding gender justice and even equality. While this seems quite 
comprehensible regarding religious norms such as prohibition of stealing, killing, and 
lying, which are applied equally to both genders, there are many gender-related norms 
that evidently regulate and restrict female behavior to a much higher degree than male 
behavior. 
  
ᶜAyb as an aesthetic norm and its consequence 
While the dissertation does not deny that ᶜayb can be used to cement power structures 
and to keep women in an inferior position, it argues that the central concern of the ᶜayb 
code itself does not appear to be the justification or naturalization of hierarchical 
structures. Instead, it seems more appropriate to view ᶜayb as essentially and primarily 
as an aesthetic code that functions very differently from ḥarām and mamnūᶜ. The value 
it protects is a particular kind of aesthetic ideal that is mainly about females’ 
attractiveness on the marriage market. The societal expectations and what the public 
considers acceptable for women is the final measurement.  
The social chronotope provides the identities and plots out of which flows the ideal 
of beauty. Men are to be masculine, strong, and obligated to provide for their families 
and defend them. It also includes the ability to produce offspring. The role of women is 
more passive and of a more receiving nature for which the imagery of a field, which is 
inseminated or pollinated, was used. The beauty of a field consists of its fertility and 
purity. The study points out that aesthetic preferences and their development over time 
do not obey the same discursive principles as the legal and religious fields. Further 
studies are necessary to investigate this particular field’s dynamics and the influence of 
media, advertisement, and other channels. 
 
Voice of women – shameful but not ᶜawra 
The ᶜayb code defines what is shameful. As it restricts women in much more substantial 
ways than men and also declares many things that are necessary for having a voice as 
shameful, it must be concluded that a woman’s voice is seen as shameful. However, a 
woman’s voice is not seen as shameful in the sense of ᶜawra, a term used in Islam to 
denote body parts that must not be shown outside a small, clearly defined circle of 
relatives. Several female informants who are committed Muslimas, study their religion 
and exemplify its virtues, are also women who use Islam to be active, shape their society, 
and have an authentic voice in the community. They use the symbolic capital they were 
able to acquire by living up to Islamic standards to gain a voice and overcome the limits 
posed by the ᶜayb code.  
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Reasons behind Islamization and its possible effects 
Another intriguing insight, emerging from the findings, has to do with the complex 
composition of societal forces, which accompanied the rise of Islamic symbols such as 
the ḥijāb. One could conclude from these phenomena that the country has become 
more Islamic. However, the study suggests how different developments might have 
contributed to a situation where adopting Islamic practices and symbols is 
comprehensible, albeit not necessarily based on the religious chronotope. It was 
suggested, e.g., that the emergence of gender-mixed situations, increased anonymity, 
which also bred sexual harassment in public, the disenchantment with Arab nationalism, 
the search for other sources of identity, and the return of Palestinians from the Gulf 
where they had adopted more Islamic practices, quite possibly contributed to the recent 
development towards a society which at least appears more Islamic. 
 
Tilburg Dissertations in Culture Studies 
 
This list includes the doctoral dissertations that through their authors and/or supervisors are related 
to the Department of Culture Studies at the Tilburg University School of Humanities and Digital 
Sciences. The dissertations cover the broad field of contemporary sociocultural change in domains 
such as language and communication, performing arts, social and spiritual ritualization, media and 
politics. 
 
1 Sander Bax. De taak van de schrijver. Het poëticale debat in de Nederlandse literatuur (1968-
1985). Supervisors: Jaap Goedegebuure and Odile Heynders, 23 May 2007. 
2 Tamara van Schilt-Mol. Differential item functioning en itembias in de cito-eindtoets 
basisonderwijs. Oorzaken van onbedoelde moeilijkheden in toetsopgaven voor leerlingen van 
Turkse en Marokkaanse afkomst. Supervisors: Ton Vallen and Henny Uiterwijk, 20 June 
2007. 
3 Mustafa Güleç. Differences in similarities: A comparative study on Turkish language 
achievement and proficiency in a Dutch migration context. Supervisors: Guus Extra and 
Kutlay Yağmur, 25 June 2007. 
4 Massimiliano Spotti. Developing identities: Identity construction in multicultural primary 
classrooms in The Netherlands and Flanders. Supervisors: Sjaak Kroon and Guus Extra, 23 
November 2007. 
5 A. Seza Doğruöz. Synchronic variation and diachronic change in Dutch Turkish: A corpus 
based analysis. Supervisors: Guus Extra and Ad Backus, 12 December 2007. 
6 Daan van Bel. Het verklaren van leesgedrag met een impliciete attitudemeting. Supervisors: 
Hugo Verdaasdonk, Helma van Lierop and Mia Stokmans, 28 March 2008. 
7 Sharda Roelsma-Somer. De kwaliteit van Hindoescholen. Supervisors: Ruben Gowricharn 
and Sjaak Braster, 17 September 2008. 
8 Yonas Mesfun Asfaha. Literacy acquisition in multilingual Eritrea: A comparative study of 
reading across languages and scripts. Supervisors: Sjaak Kroon and Jeanne Kurvers, 4 
November 2009. 
9 Dong Jie. The making of migrant identities in Beijing: Scale, discourse, and diversity. 
Supervisors: Jan Blommaert and Sjaak Kroon, 4 November 2009. 
10 Elma Nap-Kolhoff. Second language acquisition in early childhood: A longitudinal multiple 
case study of Turkish-Dutch children. Supervisors: Guus Extra and Kutlay Yağmur, 12 May 
2010. 
11 Maria Mos. Complex lexical items. Supervisors: Antal van den Bosch, Ad Backus and Anne 
Vermeer, 12 May 2010. 
12 António da Graça. Etnische zelforganisaties in het integratieproces. Een case study in de 
Kaapverdische gemeenschap in Rotterdam. Supervisor: Ruben Gowricharn, 8 October 2010. 
13 Kasper Juffermans. Local languaging: Literacy products and practices in Gambian society. 
Supervisors: Jan Blommaert and Sjaak Kroon, 13 October 2010. 
14 Marja van Knippenberg. Nederlands in het Middelbaar Beroepsonderwijs. Een casestudy in 
de opleiding Helpende Zorg. Supervisors: Sjaak Kroon, Ton Vallen and Jeanne Kurvers, 14 
December 2010. 
 
15 Coosje van der Pol. Prentenboeken lezen als literatuur. Een structuralistische benadering van 
het concept ‘literaire competentie’ voor kleuters. Supervisor: Helma van Lierop, 17 
December 2010. 
16 Nadia Eversteijn-Kluijtmans. “All at once” – Language choice and codeswitching by 
Turkish-Dutch teenagers. Supervisors: Guus Extra and Ad Backus, 14 January 2011. 
17 Mohammadi Laghzaoui. Emergent academic language at home and at school: A longitudinal 
study of 3- to 6-year-old Moroccan Berber children in the Netherlands. Supervisors: Sjaak 
Kroon, Ton Vallen, Abderrahman El Aissati and Jeanne Kurvers, 9 September 2011. 
18 Sinan Çankaya. Buiten veiliger dan binnen. In- en uitsluiting van etnische minderheden 
binnen de politieorganisatie. Supervisors: Ruben Gowricharn and Frank Bovenkerk, 24 
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